

ORIGINAL
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

07-118A-91

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
Interview of: BOB SPOONER

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Sunday, August 18, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 27

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
Exhibit 3-1 (continued)

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ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF Bob Spooner (CSO)
(Name/Position)

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction and Reason for Correction</u>
18	2	1986, AUGUST OF '86' THAT IS WHEN I OBTAINED MY UNIT # R.O. LICENSE
18	4-5	NINE MILE POINT, UNIT ONE FROM MARCH 1984 TO AUGUST OF 1986 APPROXIMATELY 2 1/2 YEARS

Page 1 of 1 Signature [Signature] Date 8/22/91



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM


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Interview of :
BOB SPOONER :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Sunday, August 18, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 3:15 p.m.

- PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
- John Kauffman, NRC
- Michael Jordan, NRC
- William Vatter, INPO
- PRESENT WITH MR. DENNY:
- Jerry Helker, Niagara Mohawk



P R O C E E D I N G S

[3:15 p.m.]

1
2
3 MR. KAUFFMAN: It's August 18, 1991, 3:15 p.m.
4 We're at Nine Mile Point, Unit Two, admin building, to
5 conduct an interview with Bob Spooner in his involvement
6 with the August 13, 1991, event at Nine Mile Point, Unit
7 Two. My name is John Kauffman, and I'm with NRC/AEOD.

8 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter. I work for INPO.

9 MR. JORDAN: My name is Michael Jordan. I'm with
10 the NRC.

11 MR. SPOONER: My name is Bob Spooner. I'm a
12 licensed reactor operator at Nine Mile Two.

13 MR. HELKER: Jerry Helker, general supervisor,
14 Nine Mile Two, here at Bob Spooner's request.

15 MR. KAUFFMAN: Bob, I'd like to start by having
16 you tell us when you came into the control room -- I think
17 it was during the event -- what you saw, and the activities
18 that you saw others doing, and then the involvement you had
19 in the activities that morning.

20 MR. SPOONER: Okay. I understand you want me to
21 start from the time I arrived in the control room, or would
22 you rather hear from on site?

23 MR. KAUFFMAN: Your choice.

24 MR. SPOONER: Okay.

25 MR. VATTER: Why don't you tell it from when it




1 started to seem that things were not like they usually are.

2 MR. SPOONER: The first thing I noticed, which
3 really didn't trigger anything, was when I came in. I
4 normally come in through the cardox room, elevation 261, and
5 I have access to the control building elevator, which takes
6 you up to the control room level. There was reduced
7 lighting in that area. It didn't seem abnormal at the time,
8 because there was still lighting available. I called for
9 the elevator; when the elevator arrived, it was pitch dark
10 in the elevator; there were no lights at all in the
11 elevator, although the elevator was operational.

12 I took the elevator up to control room. I entered
13 the back of the control room, came up through the center of
14 the panels. I think the first person I saw was the CSO.
15 Some comments were made about a reactor scram. The unit had
16 tripped off line. There were no annunciators available. I
17 proceeded to the back of the control room, just to monitor
18 the activities and stay out of the way. The SROs were in
19 the control room at the time. There were three or four
20 reactor operators at the panels doing various things at the
21 direction of the senior reactor operators.

22 I overheard comments about, the 1-series
23 uninterruptable power supplies were not available. I
24 monitored the control room activities for probably a couple
25 of minutes. I proceeded across the hall to the break area.



1 I obtained my hard hat and safety shoes because I figured
2 they would need additional help, whether it was in the plant
3 or in the control room.

4 I met another operator in the hallway, Mike
5 Garbus. I told him that things weren't going well in the
6 control room. We went back into the control room.

7 MR. VATTER: Mike is another oncoming operator.

8 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.

9 MR. VATTER: He was just getting there.


10 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.

11 We both were in the back of the control room. We
12 did not perform any manipulations in the control room at
13 this time. We were there probably a couple minutes. We
14 both then proceeded out of the control room, and we were
15 going to go down to the location of the UPS's, 1-Alpha,
16 Bravo, Charlie, and Delta.

17 MR. VATTER: Excuse me. Before we go any further,
18 could you try to fix some part of that sequence that you
19 just gave us in time. Do you know what time it was you
20 came into the control room?

21 MR. SPOONER: I'm not sure of the exact times --
22 somewhere between 0600, 0610, somewhere in that time frame.
23 That's a guess.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: One of the things we're trying to
25 do is keep our time line straight here. Normally in an



1 event investigation, you have all kinds of alarm printers.

2 MR. SPOONER: Right. The security computer was
3 operational, as I was able to card in and out.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Right.

5 MR. SPOONER: I'm not sure whether you can obtain
6 entry and exit times from that computer, if you needed to.

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure.

8 MR. SPOONER: We proceeded out the back of the
9 control room, down the corridor, to the southwest control
10 building stairwell. When we opened the door to the
11 stairwell, it was dark. There were no lights at all in the
12 stairwell.

13 We cautiously proceeded down the stairwell to the
14 261 elevation.

15 MR. VATTER: Did you have flashlights?

16 MR. SPOONER: No, I did not.


17 MR. VATTER: If you had had one, would you have
18 used it?

19 MR. SPOONER: Yes.

20 MR. KAUFFMAN: You were going down there because
21 you thought it needed to be done, or you had been directed
22 to go down there.

23 MR. SPOONER: We were going down to the UPS 1-
24 series, right, because there was no power available.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: And you were directed to do that,



1 or you just thought it needed to be done?

2 MR. SPOONER: We saw it was needed to be done.

3 When we got to 261, we went to the locker room and
4 obtained a couple flashlights. We then proceeded into the
5 normal switch gear building. We did some cursory checks of
6 the switch gears. We knew the UPS 1-series received power
7 through normal distribution. We had looked at a few
8 breakers that we knew supplied power to the UPS's. All the
9 breakers that we looked at were closed and had no trips in
10 on them.


11 We then proceeded to the 237 elevation from normal
12 switch gear, from 261. Again, the stairwell was dark, but
13 this time we had flashlights. We proceeded into the room
14 where the UPS's are located, the 1-series. There were
15 several operators in the area, one licensed operator, Dave
16 Hanczyk. He informed us that he had attempted to start the
17 uninterruptable power supplies per the procedure with no
18 success. Mike Garbus and myself proceeded to the Alpha
19 unit, UPS-1-Alpha --

20 MR. VATTER: Is that in the room there?

21 MR. SPOONER: Where there are four of them.
22 That's correct. It's the room we went down to to look at,
23 the big group of us.

24 MR. VATTER: Okay.

25 MR. SPOONER: We had two alarms in on the unit.



1 All the breakers indicated open on the logic mimic. We
2 looked at a couple of the breakers on the UPS itself. The
3 breakers were not in a trip-free condition; in other words,
4 they were just in the open position.

5 MR. VATTER: Do you remember which ones those
6 were?

7 MR. SPOONER: No, I don't.

8 MR. VATTER: Did you have the cabinet doors open?

9 MR. SPOONER: Yes, we opened the cabinet doors.

10 MR. VATTER: There are like one, two, three, four
11 across, as you look at them from the right.

12 MR. SPOONER: Right.

13 MR. VATTER: Do you remember the location of those
14 breakers that you saw were open, whether they were on the
15 left side or on the right side?


16 MR. SPOONER: I couldn't say for sure. We looked
17 at a couple of them.

18 MR. VATTER: They were fully to the off position.

19 MR. SPOONER: That's correct. The ones we looked
20 at were. I know for certain that the CB-4 breaker was fully
21 off, because ultimately that would be the one that we closed
22 down.

23 MR. VATTER: That's the one that's covered up with
24 that motor operator.

25 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.



1 MR. VATTER: I guess 3 and 4 are both covered up
2 with motor operators, aren't they?

3 MR. SPOONER: That sounds right.

4 MR. VATTER: Okay.

5 MR. SPOONER: Looking at the mimic, I said we
6 determined that all the breakers were open.

7 MR. VATTER: That's from that little --

8 MR. SPOONER: The little logic mimic that has
9 indicator lights on it.


10 MR. VATTER: Yes.

11 MR. SPOONER: We had a short discussion with Dave
12 Hanczyk, in which he reiterated that he was unable to
13 restart any UPS's and that the procedure requirement for the
14 section that he was in required that the UPS maintenance
15 supply was energized, which it was not.

16 MR. VATTER: Did he indicate to you that he didn't
17 do anything because he didn't have the maintenance supply
18 energized, or did he indicate that he tried by operating
19 some switches or breakers or something to get it to work?

20 MR. SPOONER: His words were that he did not have
21 any success trying to restart the UPS's.

22 I don't know if he stopped when he got to the
23 procedural step that required him to have the CB4 breaker
24 closed in or if he tried to continue on in the procedure. I
25 am not sure of that.



1 I had a discussion with Dave Hanczyk. I
2 recommended that we just go ahead and override and close in
3 these maintenance supply breakers.

4 MR. VATTER: You recommended that to Dave?

5 MR. SPOONER: Right, and Mike Garbus was in the
6 area. Based on what we saw we didn't see any breakers in a
7 trip-free conditions. We knew that all five UPS's were not
8 doing their job. They were not energizing the critical
9 buses. That didn't make any sense based on our knowledge of
10 how these things operate. They each have three power
11 supplies and their logic is set up such that they are going
12 to make every attempt to get some sort of power onto that
13 critical bus, okay?

14 The fact that all five of them were not doing
15 their job we deduced in our own minds that more than likely
16 there was not a physical electrical fault on five critical
17 buses. We determined that it was appropriate to re-energize
18 those buses by overriding the UPS logic.

19 MR. VATTER: Okay. How did you do that?


20 MR. SPOONER: We had to --

21 MR. VATTER: Did you have a procedure for that?

22 MR. SPOONER: No.

23 MR. VATTER: Is there a procedure that tells you
24 how to do that?

25 MR. SPOONER: My understanding is presently there



1 is not. There is not a section of the procedure that
2 directs you to override these breakers.

3 MR. VATTER: Okay.

4 MR. SPOONER: Several of the operators in the area
5 have done it before during the startup program so we knew
6 what we had to do to get these maintenance breakers shut.

7 MR. VATTER: Are you one of those guys that knew
8 it from the startup program?

9 MR. SPOONER: I knew that it could be done. I
10 knew that there was a way to just remove the actuator from
11 CB4 and that there would be a manual, just a circuit breaker
12 there that could be manually closed.

13 Other operators in the area knew how to remove
14 that actuator. There is a latch mechanism underneath it and
15 it swings out like a door. We did that. We opened the
16 doors or removed the mechanisms from the breakers. The
17 breakers were not in a trip-free condition. They were
18 actually opened and we closed the maintenance bus power
19 supply.

20 MR. VATTER: Did somebody there show you how to
21 move that motor operator off the breaker?

22 MR. SPOONER: Yes.

23 MR. VATTER: Who was that?

24 MR. SPOONER: I'm not sure. I think it was Jim
25 Stevens.



1 MR. VATTER: Okay. Then what happened when you
2 closed the breaker?

3 MR. SPOONER: Simultaneously there was several
4 other operators in the area. We had closed all four breakers
5 for the associated Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, UPS 1's and
6 then proceeded to the Gaitronics, called the control room
7 and asked the individual on the other end of the line
8 whether they had regained annunciators and control room
9 indications. The feedback I got was that yes, they had.

10 They asked for my name. I gave it to them. Then
11 we proceeded, I proceeded back to the control room.

12 MR. VATTER: Who do you think was in charge in the
13 room there with the UPS's or were they just kind of doing
14 their own thing or was somebody giving direction?


15 MR. SPOONER: I got the impression when I arrived
16 that Dave Hanczyk was in charge. He had the procedure in
17 his hand.

18 MR. VATTER: Did you take over since you are --

19 MR. SPOONER: No, I did not. I wouldn't say that
20 I took over. Dave was the -- he was the on-shift of record
21 licensed reactor operator, one of the shift of record.

22 MR. VATTER: So you recommended to Dave and Dave
23 made the decision to do this?

24 MR. SPOONER: That sounds right. I guess we were
25 in concurrence. I don't know as you could say one person



1 made the decision.

2 MR. VATTER: You talked about it.

3 MR. SPOONER: We talked -- the three reactor
4 operators discussed it, right, and we were all in agreement
5 that that was the avenue to take.

6 MR. VATTER: Now the other reactor operator was?

7 MR. SPOONER: Mike Garbus, myself, Dave Hanczyk.

8 MR. VATTER: Okay, so then the control room told
9 you what to do on the Gaitronics?

10 MR. SPOONER: We re-energized the four critical
11 buses.

12 MR. VATTER: In that room?

13 MR. SPOONER: In that room. That restored the
14 Gaitronics. We then communicated to the control room what we
15 had done.

16 MR. VATTER: What did they tell you to do?


17 MR. SPOONER: They did not tell us -- there was no
18 direction given.

19 MR. VATTER: Okay, so what did you do?

20 MR. SPOONER: I proceeded back to the control
21 room.

22 MR. VATTER: Okay. Did everybody come up then or
23 did they do other things?

24 MR. SPOONER: Mike Garbus returned to the control
25 room with me. I am not sure -- I can't account for the



1 other people in the area.

2 MR. VATTER: Okay, so then what did you do?

3 MR. SPOONER: Arrived in the control room. I made
4 a report to the Station Shift Supervisor, Mike Conway, to
5 explain to him exactly what the configuration was at the UPS
6 1 series, to make him understand that the maintenance
7 breakers were closed in and that they were manually
8 overridden.

9 MR. VATTER: Go ahead.

10 MR. SPOONER: Okay. I then remained in the control
11 room. I stood back to monitor what was going on to get a
12 feel for the direction that the SSS was taking and the shift
13 operators.

14 One of the first things I was asked to do was make
15 the emergency announcement for site area emergency and I did
16 that.

17 MR. VATTER: Do you remember what time it was?


18 MR. SPOONER: No, I do not.

19 MR. VATTER: Who was keeping a log? Or maybe
20 nobody was keeping a log.

21 MR. SPOONER: I am not sure who was keeping the
22 log. I know the log was being maintained.

23 MR. VATTER: You made an announcement on the
24 Gaitronics?

25 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.



1 MR. VATTER: For site area emergency?

2 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.

3 MR. VATTER: Is the Gaitronics the only public
4 address system that you have available? It's not something
5 you can dial up with the telephones?

6 MR. SPOONER: Can you rephrase that?

7 MR. VATTER: Yes, I'll try. Is there any other
8 way to make a public address type announcement besides using
9 the Gaitronics?

10 MR. SPOONER: Okay, the Gaitronics is just for the
11 site.

12 MR. VATTER: I understand that.

13 MR. SPOONER: It's the speaker system.

14 MR. VATTER: Yes. Is there another --

15 MR. SPOONER: It's the only system that is
16 available to broadcast to the entire site.

17 MR. VATTER: That's what I wanted to know.

18 MR. SPOONER: It has two redundant systems within
19 itself but because all the UPS's, the 1 series, were down
20 both whatever you call it -- the Blue and the Red system I
21 believe -- they were both de-energized.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: It is my understanding that you
23 made the announcement on Unit Two and that previously they
24 had called over to Unit One and had Unit One make the
25 announcement on Gaitronics.

23 24 25



1 MR. SPOONER: I obtained that information also at
2 a later time that the information was -- right, like you
3 say, the announcement was made at Unit One but even in the
4 merge mode that did not transmit at Unit Two because we had
5 no power.

6 When I made the announcement I merged so in effect
7 Unit One made that announcement twice, myself making it the
8 second time.

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: Did you get any further assignments
10 after the site area emergency and do any further activities?


11 MR. SPOONER: As I progressed through this thing
12 the plant conditions were stabilized, verified. I was asked
13 to follow along with the cool-down and stabilization of the
14 plant with the normal shutdown procedure, which would be OP-
15 101 Charlie.

16 We obtained a working copy of that and I proceeded
17 to follow along, verify the control room operators, that
18 they performed actions in accordance with that procedure and
19 sign off the steps as appropriate.

20 MR. KAUFFMAN: At some point in here did you, did
21 the shift turn over and come on shift and relieve the shift
22 that was there?

23 MR. SPOONER: No. That was not part of my duties
24 for that week.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: That's right.



1 MR. SPOONER: I am a Shift Foreman for B shift,
2 which we were an extra shift for that week, so no I did not
3 take any shift duties.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: And I guess you stayed in the
5 control room until your normal shift time was -- I am trying
6 to get a closeout on how long you were up there and when you
7 finally left.

8 MR. SPOONER: I was in the control room until some
9 time in the afternoon.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: Early? Late?

11 MR. SPOONER: Early afternoon.

12 MR. VATTER: What can you tell us about the
13 equipment that didn't operate properly or as expected might
14 be a better way to say it? For example, the feed pumps
15 tripped at the time of the scram.


16 Do you know anything about that?

17 MR. SPOONER: I'm aware that there was a feed pump
18 trip but my knowledge of that was obtained by attending the
19 post-event critique.

20 MR. VATTER: Okay. We also heard from others that
21 the RCIC system operated in an unstable way and had to be
22 run manually when they first started it.

23 Do you know anything about that?

24 MR. SPOONER: Again, my knowledge of that was
25 obtained from the post-event critique.



1 MR. HELKER: The following morning we had a post-
2 event critique when all the shifts were out there and
3 involved and stepped through it similarly to the way a
4 simulator critique is held.

5 That is when a lot of this information was brought
6 out.

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: When you were following along in
8 the shutdown procedure, we know the operators had some
9 problems for example restoring condensate booster pumps. Do
10 you have any knowledge or any involvement in the problems
11 that were encountered as the cooldown and shutdown
12 continued?

13 MR. SPOONER: I remember orders being given from
14 the SSS concerning the condensate system.


15 MR. KAUFFMAN: But you weren't really involved?

16 MR. SPOONER: I was not involved in the
17 manipulations.

18 MR. KAUFFMAN: If we could I would like to change
19 tracks. I forgot a question I normally lead off with and
20 that's to get a little background for the human performance
21 people about your experience and background that you brought
22 to your job, so if you would, like we did prior to the
23 interview, run through your educational and work experience.

24 MR. SPOONER: Okay. Let me look here.

25 [Pause.]



1 MR. SPOONER: I have been a licensed reactor
2 operator on Unit Two I think since 1984, August of '84.
3 Previous to that I held a reactor operator license on Nine
4 Mile Point, Unit One for probably a year and a half, two
5 years.

6 I was an aux operator at Unit One. I was hired by
7 Niagra-Mohawk in 1982, November of '82.

8 Prior to that I had six years in the Nuclear Navy,
9 submarines. I was a mechanical operator and I had a lot of
10 time in the ship yard. I decommissioned one submarine and
11 commissioned a newer submarine so I had a significant amount
12 of shipyard time.

13 High school graduate from Camillus, New York.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay.

15 MR. VATTER: I don't think you said, as we were
16 talking about your role in the control room, if you ever had
17 actually relieved the shift in this CSO position?


18 MR. SPOONER: No, I did not.

19 MR. VATTER: So you were like an extra guy?

20 MR. SPOONER: Extra -- yes. That's correct,
21 assigned to an extra shift working the day shift hours.

22 MR. VATTER: And that's what you expected to be
23 doing?

24 MR. SPOONER: That's what I expected to be doing
25 the entire week, yes.




1 MR. KAUFFMAN: I'd like you to brainstorm if you
2 could. We know that there were some things that allowed or
3 helped in the response to this event. The example was that
4 occurred close to shift relief time and a lot of extra
5 people showed up when they were needed and that helped the
6 response. That may have been fortunate.

7 Have you thought about the event? If you could
8 tell us things that helped you or that helped the site have
9 a good response -- maybe it was training, experience of the
10 people, just any things you felt really helped in your
11 response or the group response to the event.

12 MR. SPOONER: Okay. You touched on one of them,
13 the fact that -- the hour that it occurred. There was
14 probably a handful or better of operators that were inside
15 the protected area or made it inside the protected area
16 prior to security I guess closing down the turnstiles,
17 myself being one of those.

18 Operators after a certain point as well as other
19 people assigned to the site weren't allowed in by Security
20 because of the site area emergency. Obviously the more
21 operators that made it in prior to that, the better, as it
22 gave the operating crew better resources to combat the
23 casualty.

24 A lot of people made the comment that our training
25 did us well in this situation. I think I would have to



1 agree. I know personally I have seen portions of this in
2 the simulator. In other words they may have taken one of
3 the UPS's away from us. I think I found myself in a
4 similar situation in the simulator in that I was unable to
5 verify the control rods being inserted because they took a
6 UPS away that looked very similar to what the crew had to
7 deal with in this situation.

8 I would have to agree that training is a fairly
9 strong point although they haven't identified this as a
10 possibility, losing all the 1 series UPS's.


11 I think the EOPs proved themselves in this
12 situation as well as the operators' ability to execute them
13 in this situation.

14 Again, training showed up in that in that I didn't
15 notice any reluctance for people to perform steps that we
16 know are or that we think of as rather extreme.

17 The first thing that comes to mind is RPS jumpers.
18 There didn't seem to be any hesitancy to perform these
19 various attachments of the EOPs which we do on the simulator
20 and we hoped that we would never have to do at the plant.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: Are you actually able to walk
22 through in the simulator and place the jumpers and I guess
23 what I am talking about is actual walk-arounds in the plant
24 or in the simulator to perform the various EOP attachments.

25 MR. SPOONER: The training gets accomplished. In



1 a case like that it is a two-step process.


2 There's various scenarios in the simulator where
3 we would be required to install jumpers. The simulator is
4 not set up such that we can but then when we do our JPMS,
5 Job Performance Measures, there's JPMS related to the EOPs
6 so that completes the training loop in that we go to the
7 panel and simulate the installation of those jumpers, for
8 example.

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: Can you think of any more things
10 that aided the response?

11 MR. SPOONER: I guess looking at specifically the
12 UPS's the experience of the operators in that there was a
13 number of us there that have taken this plant through the
14 startup phase and we knew some off-normal procedures that
15 could be performed on these UPS's to re-energize the
16 critical bus without procedural guidance.

17 MR. KAUFFMAN: I'd like to turn this question
18 around. You touched on at least one point earlier, where
19 things could have been better. An example was that the UPS
20 procedure didn't really work for the condition that the
21 UPS's were in. Do you know or have any other areas where
22 difficulties were encountered in response to the event that
23 could be identified and maybe fixed in the future?

24 MR. SPOONER: That particular case was identified
25 in the post-event critique. There was another procedure



1 that was identified as a problem area, with the condensate
2 booster in relation to the feed pump suction valves. I
3 believe that problem was resolved and the procedure was
4 possibly not applicable to what they were doing and the fact
5 that they couldn't perform all aspects of it. As it turned
6 out, the access to the turbine building was restricted, and
7 therefore they couldn't complete the procedure.

8 Other than that, I'm not aware of any procedural
9 problems.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: Any hardware? If you had
11 everything in the world at your disposal, can you think of
12 anything that you would have liked to have had in this
13 event? It's just a brainstorming session. If you can't
14 come up with anything, that's fine.

15 MR. SPOONER: Right.


16 Again, out of the post-event critique, a big
17 problem was control room-to-plant communications. I don't
18 have an answer as to the solution to the problem, but it
19 definitely came out as a problem. Again, it falls back on
20 that these are uninterruptable power supplies.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: These mostly went away after the
22 power was restored, 6:22.

23 MR. SPOONER: The problems went away.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: The radio came back.

25 MR. SPOONER: Yes, and the Gaitronics returned.




1 That's correct.

2 MR. HELKER: May I make a statement in regard to
3 procedures?

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure.

5 MR. HELKER: I think in regard to the use of
6 procedures down at the UPS, they found that, when they got
7 down there, the procedure wasn't specifically written to
8 address the particular set of plant conditions at which they
9 found the UPS. I think it's difficult to write procedures
10 to address every conceivable plant condition or situation at
11 which you might have to operate equipment. For those
12 conditions, frankly, in emergency situations, we do have a
13 clause -- administrative guidance -- in a procedure, which
14 addresses emergency situation. Basically, it says that,
15 under emergency conditions for which there is no procedure
16 guidance, individuals are allowed and expected to operate
17 equipment where it's necessary to protect personnel safety
18 and plant equipment. I think that this is one particular
19 instance when we had to utilize that particular clause of
20 our administrative procedures, simply because you cannot
21 write procedures to address every conceivable -- or, in this
22 case, what we didn't conceive as a possible situation or
23 plant condition.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: Jerry, will you please state the
25 procedure reference?



1 MR. HELKER: It's in AP-2.

2 MR. VATTER: Bob, have you ever had training on
3 UPS operation?

4 MR. SPOONER: Yes. We've had training on the
5 uninterruptable power supplies.

6 MR. VATTER: What kind of training? Classroom
7 training?

8 MR. SPOONER: Primarily what I recall is classroom
9 training.

10 MR. VATTER: Did it address how you operate them,
11 turn them on, get them started, shift to maintenance power
12 supply, that kind of stuff?

13 MR. SPOONER: Yes.


14 MR. VATTER: Did it address abnormal operation,
15 like how to start it up on a dead bus?

16 MR. SPOONER: I don't recall that it did?

17 MR. VATTER: So the knowledge that you had that
18 you could close in the maintenance power supply manually was
19 not from training.

20 I'm just trying to repeat what I think you said.

21 MR. SPOONER: I guess I would say that it didn't
22 directly come from training. It came from knowledge
23 obtained in training, knowledge obtained during the startup
24 program, and just an analysis of the situation that we were
25 in.



1 MR. KAUFFMAN: And you also rotate in plant and in
2 control room in your normal duties, right?

3 MR. SPOONER: That is correct.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: You get some on-the-job, in-plant
5 related experience.

6 MR. SPOONER: That's correct. I've been a chief
7 shift operator for over a year, and prior to that I was in
8 the situation that you're talking about, where I was a
9 licensed reactor operator but we rotated back and forth.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: I have no further questions. Bill,
11 do you have more questions?

12 MR. VATTER: Just a second.

13 [Pause.]

14 MR. VATTER: Could you talk to us a little bit
15 about the way in which they got rod position indication back
16 in the control room? Our understanding is that, when the
17 uninterruptable power supply was re-energized, a number of
18 the rods had indication right away, but some did not. Are
19 you aware of that situation, or did all that happen before
20 you got back to the control room?

21 MR. SPOONER: I was aware that there were a number
22 of control rods that they had problems verifying the
23 position of.

24 MR. VATTER: Were you involved in that
25 verification?



1 MR. SPOONER: No, I was not.

2 MR. VATTER: So you don't know which ones had
3 problems?

4 MR. SPOONER: No, I do not know.

5 MR. VATTER: Do you know how they addressed that
6 problem?

7 MR. SPOONER: I'm not certain how they addressed
8 that problem.

9 MR. VATTER: If you were in that situation, would
10 you know what to do? What would you do to try to -- What
11 would you have thought would be reasonable things to do?


12 MR. SPOONER: I know that what they did was, they
13 were in the EOPs, which address -- there's a portion that
14 addresses reactivity, so your guideline comes from the
15 EOPs, RQ, and then you get directed into a contingency.

16 MR. VATTER: What to do if you don't know where
17 all the rods are.

18 MR. SPOONER: That's correct. There's prereqs.
19 If you cannot confirm the reactor shutdown --

20 MR. VATTER: Does it have any guidance on what to
21 do with regard to finding out where the rods are?

22 MR. SPOONER: It gives you guidance in that it
23 gives you the vehicles by which you can verify examples:
24 rod worth minimizer, rod sequence control system, full core
25 display, process computer. As far as specific operation of



1 those systems, you may be directed to an attachment of the
2 EOPs or the normal operating procedure.

3 MR. HELKER: It's our scram procedure, OP-101-
4 Charlie, which specifically provides that listing, or
5 sections which tell us how to determine what rod position
6 is.

7 MR. VATTER: OP-101-Charlie is both the scram
8 procedure and the normal shutdown procedure?

9 MR. HELKER: That's correct. OP-101-Charlie,
10 section H.1, is the scram procedure. It's part of the
11 normal shutdown procedure.

12 MR. KAUFFMAN: You'll provide us with that, right?

13 MR. HELKER: One is currently being copied as we
14 speak.

15 MR. VATTER: Well, I guess I'm out of questions.

16 MR. KAUFFMAN: We're out of questions. At this
17 point, we throw the table open to you. If you have anything
18 that you want to bring up, you're free to make a statement
19 for the record.

20 MR. SPOONER: No.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. That concludes the
22 interview.

23 [Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the taking of the
24 investigative interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of BOB SPOONER

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

12



THE

OF

AND



OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
 Interview of: BOB SPOONER

Docket No.


LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Sunday, August 18, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 27

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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Interview of :
BOB SPOONER :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Sunday, August 18, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 3:15 p.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC
Michael Jordan, NRC
William Vatter, INPO
PRESENT WITH MR. DENNY:
Jerry Helker, Niagara Mohawk



P R O C E E D I N G S

[3:15 p.m.]

1
2
3 MR. KAUFFMAN: It's August 18, 1991, 3:15 p.m.
4 We're at Nine Mile Point, Unit Two, admin building, to
5 conduct an interview with Bob Spooner in his involvement
6 with the August 13, 1991, event at Nine Mile Point, Unit
7 Two. My name is John Kauffman, and I'm with NRC/AEOD.

8 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter. I work for INPO.

9 MR. JORDAN: My name is Michael Jordan. I'm with
10 the NRC.

11 MR. SPOONER: My name is Bob Spooner. I'm a
12 licensed reactor operator at Nine Mile Two.

13 MR. HELKER: Jerry Helker, general supervisor,
14 Nine Mile Two, here at Bob Spooner's request.


15 MR. KAUFFMAN: Bob, I'd like to start by having
16 you tell us when you came into the control room -- I think
17 it was during the event -- what you saw, and the activities
18 that you saw others doing, and then the involvement you had
19 in the activities that morning.

20 MR. SPOONER: Okay. I understand you want me to
21 start from the time I arrived in the control room, or would
22 you rather hear from on site?

23 MR. KAUFFMAN: Your choice.

24 MR. SPOONER: Okay.

25 MR. VATTER: Why don't you tell it from when it



1 started to seem that things were not like they usually are.

2 MR. SPOONER: The first thing I noticed, which
3 really didn't trigger anything, was when I came in. I
4 normally come in through the cardox room, elevation 261, and
5 I have access to the control building elevator, which takes
6 you up to the control room level. There was reduced
7 lighting in that area. It didn't seem abnormal at the time,
8 because there was still lighting available. I called for
9 the elevator; when the elevator arrived, it was pitch dark
10 in the elevator; there were no lights at all in the
11 elevator, although the elevator was operational.

12 I took the elevator up to control room. I entered
13 the back of the control room, came up through the center of
14 the panels. I think the first person I saw was the CSO.
15 Some comments were made about a reactor scram. The unit had
16 tripped off line. There were no annunciators available. I
17 proceeded to the back of the control room, just to monitor
18 the activities and stay out of the way. The SROs were in
19 the control room at the time. There were three or four
20 reactor operators at the panels doing various things at the
21 direction of the senior reactor operators.

22 I overheard comments about, the 1-series
23 uninterruptable power supplies were not available. I
24 monitored the control room activities for probably a couple
25 of minutes. I proceeded across the hall to the break area.



1 I obtained my hard hat and safety shoes because I figured
2 they would need additional help, whether it was in the plant
3 or in the control room.

4 I met another operator in the hallway, Mike
5 Garbus. I told him that things weren't going well in the
6 control room. We went back into the control room.

7 MR. VATTER: Mike is another oncoming operator.

8 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.

9 MR. VATTER: He was just getting there.


10 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.

11 We both were in the back of the control room. We
12 did not perform any manipulations in the control room at
13 this time. We were there probably a couple minutes. We
14 both then proceeded out of the control room, and we were
15 going to go down to the location of the UPS's, 1-Alpha,
16 Bravo, Charlie, and Delta.

17 MR. VATTER: Excuse me. Before we go any further,
18 could you try to fix some part of that sequence that you
19 just gave us in time. Do you know what time it was you
20 came into the control room?

21 MR. SPOONER: I'm not sure of the exact times --
22 somewhere between 0600, 0610, somewhere in that time frame.
23 That's a guess.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: One of the things we're trying to
25 do is keep our time line straight here. Normally in an



1 event investigation, you have all kinds of alarm printers.

2 MR. SPOONER: Right. The security computer was
3 operational, as I was able to card in and out.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Right.

5 MR. SPOONER: I'm not sure whether you can obtain
6 entry and exit times from that computer, if you needed to.

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure.

8 MR. SPOONER: We proceeded out the back of the
9 control room, down the corridor, to the southwest control
10 building stairwell. When we opened the door to the
11 stairwell, it was dark. There were no lights at all in the
12 stairwell.

13 We cautiously proceeded down the stairwell to the
14 261 elevation.

15 MR. VATTER: Did you have flashlights?

16 MR. SPOONER: No, I did not.

17 MR. VATTER: If you had had one, would you have
18 used it?

19 MR. SPOONER: Yes.

20 MR. KAUFFMAN: You were going down there because
21 you thought it needed to be done, or you had been directed
22 to go down there.

23 MR. SPOONER: We were going down to the UPS 1-
24 series, right, because there was no power available.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: And you were directed to do that,



1 or you just thought it needed to be done?

2 MR. SPOONER: We saw it was needed to be done.

3 When we got to 261, we went to the locker room and
4 obtained a couple flashlights. We then proceeded into the
5 normal switch gear building. We did some cursory checks of
6 the switch gears. We knew the UPS 1-series received power
7 through normal distribution. We had looked at a few
8 breakers that we knew supplied power to the UPS's. All the
9 breakers that we looked at were closed and had no trips in
10 on them.

11 We then proceeded to the 237 elevation from normal
12 switch gear, from 261. Again, the stairwell was dark, but
13 this time we had flashlights. We proceeded into the room
14 where the UPS's are located, the 1-series. There were
15 several operators in the area, one licensed operator, Dave
16 Hanczyk. He informed us that he had attempted to start the
17 uninterruptable power supplies per the procedure with no
18 success. Mike Garbus and myself proceeded to the Alpha
19 unit, UPS-1-Alpha --


20 MR. VATTER: Is that in the room there?

21 MR. SPOONER: Where there are four of them.

22 That's correct. It's the room we went down to to look at,
23 the big group of us.

24 MR. VATTER: Okay.

25 MR. SPOONER: We had two alarms in on the unit.



1 All the breakers indicated open on the logic mimic. We
2 looked at a couple of the breakers on the UPS itself. The
3 breakers were not in a trip-free condition; in other words,
4 they were just in the open position.

5 MR. VATTER: Do you remember which ones those
6 were?

7 MR. SPOONER: No, I don't.

8 MR. VATTER: Did you have the cabinet doors open?

9 MR. SPOONER: Yes, we opened the cabinet doors.

10 MR. VATTER: There are like one, two, three, four
11 across, as you look at them from the right.

12 MR. SPOONER: Right.

13 MR. VATTER: Do you remember the location of those
14 breakers that you saw were open, whether they were on the
15 left side or on the right side?

16 MR. SPOONER: I couldn't say for sure. We looked
17 at a couple of them.

18 MR. VATTER: They were fully to the off position.

19 MR. SPOONER: That's correct. The ones we looked
20 at were. I know for certain that the CB-4 breaker was fully
21 off, because ultimately that would be the one that we closed
22 down.

23 MR. VATTER: That's the one that's covered up with
24 that motor operator.

25 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.



1 MR. VATTER: I guess 3 and 4 are both covered up
2 with motor operators, aren't they?

3 MR. SPOONER: That sounds right.

4 MR. VATTER: Okay.

5 MR. SPOONER: Looking at the mimic, I said we
6 determined that all the breakers were open.

7 MR. VATTER: That's from that little --

8 MR. SPOONER: The little logic mimic that has
9 indicator lights on it.

10 MR. VATTER: Yes.

11 MR. SPOONER: We had a short discussion with Dave
12 Hanczyk, in which he reiterated that he was unable to
13 restart any UPS's and that the procedure requirement for the
14 section that he was in required that the UPS maintenance
15 supply was energized, which it was not.

16 MR. VATTER: Did he indicate to you that he didn't
17 do anything because he didn't have the maintenance supply
18 energized, or did he indicate that he tried by operating
19 some switches or breakers or something to get it to work?

20 MR. SPOONER: His words were that he did not have
21 any success trying to restart the UPS's.

22 I don't know if he stopped when he got to the
23 procedural step that required him to have the CB4 breaker
24 closed in or if he tried to continue on in the procedure. I
25 am not sure of that.



1 I had a discussion with Dave Hanczyk. I
2 recommended that we just go ahead and override and close in
3 these maintenance supply breakers.

4 MR. VATTER: You recommended that to Dave?

5 MR. SPOONER: Right, and Mike Garbus was in the
6 area. Based on what we saw we didn't see any breakers in a
7 trip-free conditions. We knew that all five UPS's were not
8 doing their job. They were not energizing the critical
9 buses. That didn't make any sense based on our knowledge of
10 how these things operate. They each have three power
11 supplies and their logic is set up such that they are going
12 to make every attempt to get some sort of power onto that
13 critical bus, okay?

14 The fact that all five of them were not doing
15 their job we deduced in our own minds that more than likely
16 there was not a physical electrical fault on five critical
17 buses. We determined that it was appropriate to re-energize
18 those buses by overriding the UPS logic.

19 MR. VATTER: Okay. How did you do that?


20 MR. SPOONER: We had to --

21 MR. VATTER: Did you have a procedure for that?

22 MR. SPOONER: No.

23 MR. VATTER: Is there a procedure that tells you
24 how to do that?

25 MR. SPOONER: My understanding is presently there



1 is not. There is not a section of the procedure that
2 directs you to override these breakers.

3 MR. VATTER: Okay.

4 MR. SPOONER: Several of the operators in the area
5 have done it before during the startup program so we knew
6 what we had to do to get these maintenance breakers shut.

7 MR. VATTER: Are you one of those guys that knew
8 it from the startup program?

9 MR. SPOONER: I knew that it could be done. I
10 knew that there was a way to just remove the actuator from
11 CB4 and that there would be a manual, just a circuit breaker
12 there that could be manually closed.

13 Other operators in the area knew how to remove
14 that actuator. There is a latch mechanism underneath it and
15 it swings out like a door. We did that. We opened the
16 doors or removed the mechanisms from the breakers. The
17 breakers were not in a trip-free condition. They were
18 actually opened and we closed the maintenance bus power
19 supply.

20 MR. VATTER: Did somebody there show you how to
21 move that motor operator off the breaker?

22 MR. SPOONER: Yes.

23 MR. VATTER: Who was that?

24 MR. SPOONER: I'm not sure. I think it was Jim
25 Stevens.



1 MR. VATTER: Okay. Then what happened when you
2 closed the breaker?

3 MR. SPOONER: Simultaneously there was several
4 other operators in the area. We had closed all four breakers
5 for the associated Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, UPS 1's and
6 then proceeded to the Gaitronics, called the control room
7 and asked the individual on the other end of the line
8 whether they had regained annunciators and control room
9 indications. The feedback I got was that yes, they had.

10 They asked for my name. I gave it to them. Then
11 we proceeded, I proceeded back to the control room.

12 MR. VATTER: Who do you think was in charge in the
13 room there with the UPS's or were they just kind of doing
14 their own thing or was somebody giving direction?


15 MR. SPOONER: I got the impression when I arrived
16 that Dave Hanczyk was in charge. He had the procedure in
17 his hand.

18 MR. VATTER: Did you take over since you are --

19 MR. SPOONER: No, I did not. I wouldn't say that
20 I took over. Dave was the -- he was the on-shift of record
21 licensed reactor operator, one of the shift of record.

22 MR. VATTER: So you recommended to Dave and Dave
23 made the decision to do this?

24 MR. SPOONER: That sounds right. I guess we were
25 in concurrence. I don't know as you could say one person



1 made the decision.

2 MR. VATTER: You talked about it.

3 MR. SPOONER: We talked -- the three reactor
4 operators discussed it, right, and we were all in agreement
5 that that was the avenue to take.

6 MR. VATTER: Now the other reactor operator was?

7 MR. SPOONER: Mike Garbus, myself, Dave Hanczyk.

8 MR. VATTER: Okay, so then the control room told
9 you what to do on the Gaitronics?

10 MR. SPOONER: We re-energized the four critical
11 buses.

12 MR. VATTER: In that room?

13 MR. SPOONER: In that room. That restored the
14 Gaitronics. We then communicated to the control room what we
15 had done.

16 MR. VATTER: What did they tell you to do?


17 MR. SPOONER: They did not tell us -- there was no
18 direction given.

19 MR. VATTER: Okay, so what did you do?

20 MR. SPOONER: I proceeded back to the control
21 room.

22 MR. VATTER: Okay. Did everybody come up then or
23 did they do other things?

24 MR. SPOONER: Mike Garbus returned to the control
25 room with me. I am not sure -- I can't account for the



1 other people in the area.

2 MR. VATTER: Okay, so then what did you do?

3 MR. SPOONER: Arrived in the control room. I made
4 a report to the Station Shift Supervisor, Mike Conway, to
5 explain to him exactly what the configuration was at the UPS
6 1 series, to make him understand that the maintenance
7 breakers were closed in and that they were manually
8 overridden.

9 MR. VATTER: Go ahead.

10 MR. SPOONER: Okay. I then remained in the control
11 room. I stood back to monitor what was going on to get a
12 feel for the direction that the SSS was taking and the shift
13 operators.

14 One of the first things I was asked to do was make
15 the emergency announcement for site area emergency and I did
16 that.

17 MR. VATTER: Do you remember what time it was?

18 MR. SPOONER: No, I do not.

19 MR. VATTER: Who was keeping a log? Or maybe
20 nobody was keeping a log.

21 MR. SPOONER: I am not sure who was keeping the
22 log. I know the log was being maintained.

23 MR. VATTER: You made an announcement on the
24 Gaitronics?

25 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.



1 MR. VATTER: For site area emergency?

2 MR. SPOONER: That's correct.

3 MR. VATTER: Is the Gaitronics the only public
4 address system that you have available? It's not something
5 you can dial up with the telephones?

6 MR. SPOONER: Can you rephrase that?

7 MR. VATTER: Yes, I'll try. Is there any other
8 way to make a public address type announcement besides using
9 the Gaitronics?

10 MR. SPOONER: Okay, the Gaitronics is just for the
11 site.

12 MR. VATTER: I understand that.

13 MR. SPOONER: It's the speaker system.


14 MR. VATTER: Yes. Is there another --

15 MR. SPOONER: It's the only system that is
16 available to broadcast to the entire site.

17 MR. VATTER: That's what I wanted to know.

18 MR. SPOONER: It has two redundant systems within
19 itself but because all the UPS's, the 1 series, were down
20 both whatever you call it -- the Blue and the Red system I
21 believe -- they were both de-energized.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: It is my understanding that you
23 made the announcement on Unit Two and that previously they
24 had called over to Unit One and had Unit One make the
25 announcement on Gaitronics.



1 MR. SPOONER: I obtained that information also at
2 a later time that the information was -- right, like you
3 say, the announcement was made at Unit One but even in the
4 merge mode that did not transmit at Unit Two because we had
5 no power.

6 When I made the announcement I merged so in effect
7 Unit One made that announcement twice, myself making it the
8 second time.

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: Did you get any further assignments
10 after the site area emergency and do any further activities?


11 MR. SPOONER: As I progressed through this thing
12 the plant conditions were stabilized, verified. I was asked
13 to follow along with the cool-down and stabilization of the
14 plant with the normal shutdown procedure, which would be OP-
15 101 Charlie.

16 We obtained a working copy of that and I proceeded
17 to follow along, verify the control room operators, that
18 they performed actions in accordance with that procedure and
19 sign off the steps as appropriate.

20 MR. KAUFFMAN: At some point in here did you, did
21 the shift turn over and come on shift and relieve the shift
22 that was there?

23 MR. SPOONER: No. That was not part of my duties
24 for that week.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: That's right.



1 MR. SPOONER: I am a Shift Foreman for B shift,
2 which we were an extra shift for that week, so no I did not
3 take any shift duties.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: And I guess you stayed in the
5 control room until your normal shift time was -- I am trying
6 to get a closeout on how long you were up there and when you
7 finally left.

8 MR. SPOONER: I was in the control room until some
9 time in the afternoon.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: Early? Late?

11 MR. SPOONER: Early afternoon.

12 MR. VATTER: What can you tell us about the
13 equipment that didn't operate properly or as expected might
14 be a better way to say it? For example, the feed pumps
15 tripped at the time of the scram.

16 Do you know anything about that?

17 MR. SPOONER: I'm aware that there was a feed pump
18 trip but my knowledge of that was obtained by attending the
19 post-event critique.

20 MR. VATTER: Okay. We also heard from others that
21 the RCIC system operated in an unstable way and had to be
22 run manually when they first started it.

23 Do you know anything about that?

24 MR. SPOONER: Again, my knowledge of that was
25 obtained from the post-event critique.



1 MR. HELKER: The following morning we had a post-
2 event critique when all the shifts were out there and
3 involved and stepped through it similarly to the way a
4 simulator critique is held.

5 That is when a lot of this information was brought
6 out.

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: When you were following along in
8 the shutdown procedure, we know the operators had some
9 problems for example restoring condensate booster pumps. Do
10 you have any knowledge or any involvement in the problems
11 that were encountered as the cooldown and shutdown
12 continued?

13 MR. SPOONER: I remember orders being given from
14 the SSS concerning the condensate system.


15 MR. KAUFFMAN: But you weren't really involved?

16 MR. SPOONER: I was not involved in the
17 manipulations.

18 MR. KAUFFMAN: If we could I would like to change
19 tracks. I forgot a question I normally lead off with and
20 that's to get a little background for the human performance
21 people about your experience and background that you brought
22 to your job, so if you would, like we did prior to the
23 interview, run through your educational and work experience.

24 MR. SPOONER: Okay. Let me look here. .

25 [Pause.]



1 MR. SPOONER: I have been a licensed reactor
2 operator on Unit Two I think since 1984, August of '84.
3 Previous to that I held a reactor operator license on Nine
4 Mile Point, Unit One for probably a year and a half, two
5 years.

6 I was an aux operator at Unit One. I was hired by
7 Niagra-Mohawk in 1982, November of '82.

8 Prior to that I had six years in the Nuclear Navy,
9 submarines. I was a mechanical operator and I had a lot of
10 time in the ship yard. I decommissioned one submarine and
11 commissioned a newer submarine so I had a significant amount
12 of shipyard time.

13 High school graduate from Camillus, New York.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay.

15 MR. VATTER: I don't think you said, as we were
16 talking about your role in the control room, if you ever had
17 actually relieved the shift in this CSO position?


18 MR. SPOONER: No, I did not.

19 MR. VATTER: So you were like an extra guy?

20 MR. SPOONER: Extra -- yes. That's correct,
21 assigned to an extra shift working the day shift hours.

22 MR. VATTER: And that's what you expected to be
23 doing?

24 MR. SPOONER: That's what I expected to be doing
25 the entire week, yes.




1 MR. KAUFFMAN: I'd like you to brainstorm if you
2 could. We know that there were some things that allowed or
3 helped in the response to this event. The example was that
4 occurred close to shift relief time and a lot of extra
5 people showed up when they were needed and that helped the
6 response. That may have been fortunate.

7 Have you thought about the event? If you could
8 tell us things that helped you or that helped the site have
9 a good response -- maybe it was training, experience of the
10 people, just any things you felt really helped in your
11 response or the group response to the event.

12 MR. SPOONER: Okay. You touched on one of them,
13 the fact that -- the hour that it occurred. There was
14 probably a handful or better of operators that were inside
15 the protected area or made it inside the protected area
16 prior to security I guess closing down the turnstiles,
17 myself being one of those.

18 Operators after a certain point as well as other
19 people assigned to the site weren't allowed in by Security
20 because of the site area emergency. Obviously the more
21 operators that made it in prior to that, the better, as it
22 gave the operating crew better resources to combat the
23 casualty.

24 A lot of people made the comment that our training
25 did us well in this situation. I think I would have to



1 agree. I know personally I have seen portions of this in
2 the simulator. In other words they may have taken one of
3 the UPS's away from us. I think I found myself in a
4 similar situation in the simulator in that I was unable to
5 verify the control rods being inserted because they took a
6 UPS away that looked very similar to what the crew had to
7 deal with in this situation.

8 I would have to agree that training is a fairly
9 strong point although they haven't identified this as a
10 possibility, losing all the 1 series UPS's.

11 I think the EOPs proved themselves in this
12 situation as well as the operators' ability to execute them
13 in this situation.

14 Again, training showed up in that in that I didn't
15 notice any reluctance for people to perform steps that we
16 know are or that we think of as rather extreme.

17 The first thing that comes to mind is RPS jumpers.
18 There didn't seem to be any hesitancy to perform these
19 various attachments of the EOPs which we do on the simulator
20 and we hoped that we would never have to do at the plant.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: Are you actually able to walk
22 through in the simulator and place the jumpers and I guess
23 what I am talking about is actual walk-arounds in the plant
24 or in the simulator to perform the various EOP attachments.

25 MR. SPOONER: The training gets accomplished. In



1 a case like that it is a two-step process.


2 There's various scenarios in the simulator where
3 we would be required to install jumpers. The simulator is
4 not set up such that we can but then when we do our JPMS,
5 Job Performance Measures, there's JPMS related to the EOPs
6 so that completes the training loop in that we go to the
7 panel and simulate the installation of those jumpers, for
8 example.

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: Can you think of any more things
10 that aided the response?

11 MR. SPOONER: I guess looking at specifically the
12 UPS's the experience of the operators in that there was a
13 number of us there that have taken this plant through the
14 startup phase and we knew some off-normal procedures that
15 could be performed on these UPS's to re-energize the
16 critical bus without procedural guidance.

17 MR. KAUFFMAN: I'd like to turn this question
18 around. You touched on at least one point earlier, where
19 things could have been better. An example was that the UPS
20 procedure didn't really work for the condition that the
21 UPS's were in. Do you know or have any other areas where
22 difficulties were encountered in response to the event that
23 could be identified and maybe fixed in the future?

24 MR. SPOONER: That particular case was identified
25 in the post-event critique. There was another procedure



1 that was identified as a problem area, with the condensate
2 booster in relation to the feed pump suction valves. I
3 believe that problem was resolved and the procedure was
4 possibly not applicable to what they were doing and the fact
5 that they couldn't perform all aspects of it. As it turned
6 out, the access to the turbine building was restricted, and
7 therefore they couldn't complete the procedure.

8 Other than that, I'm not aware of any procedural
9 problems.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: Any hardware? If you had
11 everything in the world at your disposal, can you think of
12 anything that you would have liked to have had in this
13 event? It's just a brainstorming session. If you can't
14 come up with anything, that's fine.

15 MR. SPOONER: Right.


16 Again, out of the post-event critique, a big
17 problem was control room-to-plant communications. I don't
18 have an answer as to the solution to the problem, but it
19 definitely came out as a problem. Again, it falls back on
20 that these are uninterruptable power supplies.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: These mostly went away after the
22 power was restored, 6:22.

23 MR. SPOONER: The problems went away.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: The radio came back.

25 MR. SPOONER: Yes, and the Gaitronics returned.



1 That's correct.

2 MR. HELKER: May I make a statement in regard to
3 procedures?

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure.

5 MR. HELKER: I think in regard to the use of
6 procedures down at the UPS, they found that, when they got
7 down there, the procedure wasn't specifically written to
8 address the particular set of plant conditions at which they
9 found the UPS. I think it's difficult to write procedures
10 to address every conceivable plant condition or situation at
11 which you might have to operate equipment. For those
12 conditions, frankly, in emergency situations, we do have a
13 clause -- administrative guidance -- in a procedure, which
14 addresses emergency situation. Basically, it says that,
15 under emergency conditions for which there is no procedure
16 guidance, individuals are allowed and expected to operate
17 equipment where it's necessary to protect personnel safety
18 and plant equipment. I think that this is one particular
19 instance when we had to utilize that particular clause of
20 our administrative procedures, simply because you cannot
21 write procedures to address every conceivable -- or, in this
22 case, what we didn't conceive as a possible situation or
23 plant condition.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: Jerry, will you please state the
25 procedure reference?



1 MR. HELKER: It's in AP-2.

2 MR. VATTER: Bob, have you ever had training on
3 UPS operation?

4 MR. SPOONER: Yes. We've had training on the
5 uninterruptable power supplies.

6 MR. VATTER: What kind of training? Classroom
7 training?

8 MR. SPOONER: Primarily what I recall is classroom
9 training.

10 MR. VATTER: Did it address how you operate them,
11 turn them on, get them started, shift to maintenance power
12 supply, that kind of stuff?

13 MR. SPOONER: Yes.

14 MR. VATTER: Did it address abnormal operation,
15 like how to start it up on a dead bus?

16 MR. SPOONER: I don't recall that it did?

17 MR. VATTER: So the knowledge that you had that
18 you could close in the maintenance power supply manually was
19 not from training.

20 I'm just trying to repeat what I think you said.

21 MR. SPOONER: I guess I would say that it didn't
22 directly come from training. It came from knowledge
23 obtained in training, knowledge obtained during the startup
24 program, and just an analysis of the situation that we were
25 in.



1 MR. KAUFFMAN: And you also rotate in plant and in
2 control room in your normal duties, right?

3 MR. SPOONER: That is correct.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: You get some on-the-job, in-plant
5 related experience.

6 MR. SPOONER: That's correct. I've been a chief
7 shift operator for over a year, and prior to that I was in
8 the situation that you're talking about, where I was a
9 licensed reactor operator but we rotated back and forth.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: I have no further questions. Bill,
11 do you have more questions?

12 MR. VATTER: Just a second.

13 [Pause.]

14 MR. VATTER: Could you talk to us a little bit
15 about the way in which they got rod position indication back
16 in the control room? Our understanding is that, when the
17 uninterruptable power supply was re-energized, a number of
18 the rods had indication right away, but some did not. Are
19 you aware of that situation, or did all that happen before
20 you got back to the control room?

21 MR. SPOONER: I was aware that there were a number
22 of control rods that they had problems verifying the
23 position of.

24 MR. VATTER: Were you involved in that
25 verification?



1 MR. SPOONER: No, I was not.

2 MR. VATTER: So you don't know which ones had
3 problems?

4 MR. SPOONER: No, I do not know.

5 MR. VATTER: Do you know how they addressed that
6 problem?

7 MR. SPOONER: I'm not certain how they addressed
8 that problem.

9 MR. VATTER: If you were in that situation, would
10 you know what to do? What would you do to try to -- What
11 would you have thought would be reasonable things to do?

12 MR. SPOONER: I know that what they did was, they
13 were in the EOPs, which address -- there's a portion that
14 addresses reactivity, so your guideline comes from the
15 EOPs, RQ, and then you get directed into a contingency.

16 MR. VATTER: What to do if you don't know where
17 all the rods are.

18 MR. SPOONER: That's correct. There's prereqs.
19 If you cannot confirm the reactor shutdown --

20 MR. VATTER: Does it have any guidance on what to
21 do with regard to finding out where the rods are?

22 MR. SPOONER: It gives you guidance in that it
23 gives you the vehicles by which you can verify examples:
24 rod worth minimizer, rod sequence control system, full core
25 display, process computer. As far as specific operation of



1 those systems, you may be directed to an attachment of the
2 EOPs or the normal operating procedure.

3 MR. HELKER: It's our scram procedure, OP-101-
4 Charlie, which specifically provides that listing, or
5 sections which tell us how to determine what rod position
6 is.

7 MR. VATTER: OP-101-Charlie is both the scram
8 procedure and the normal shutdown procedure?

9 MR. HELKER: That's correct. OP-101-Charlie,
10 section H.1, is the scram procedure. It's part of the
11 normal shutdown procedure.

12 MR. KAUFFMAN: You'll provide us with that, right?

13 MR. HELKER: One is currently being copied as we
14 speak.

15 MR. VATTER: Well, I guess I'm out of questions.


16 MR. KAUFFMAN: We're out of questions. At this
17 point, we throw the table open to you. If you have anything
18 that you want to bring up, you're free to make a statement
19 for the record.

20 MR. SPOONER: No.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. That concludes the
22 interview.

23 [Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the taking of the
24 investigative interview was concluded.]

25



REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of BOB SPOONER

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

