

ORIGINAL

07-117A-91

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
Interview of: ALFRED DENNY

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Sunday, August 18, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 13

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


ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF Alfred T. Denny / SEPC
(Name/Position)

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction and Reason for Correction</u>
5	2:	^{change} REC to RECS
6	24	CAP-2 should be EAP-2
7	23	between "Unit One" and "then" insert "who" so this line would read in part: "over to Unit One who then made"
8	2	"Res" should be "RECS" ::::
8	7 2	Add "Work" after "did not" so that this line would read: "The Gattsonics did not work"
8	7	The general thrust of this statement is that I did not hear the Unit one gattsonics announced but I was not paying particular attention to the gattsonics and some one else might have heard them.
9	15	Change Chester to Chart

Alfred T. Denny
8/23/91
11:30 AM

Page 1 of 1 Signature Alfred T. Denny Date 8/23/91



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM


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Interview of :
ALFRED DENNY :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Sunday, August 18, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 2:12 p.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC
Michael Jordan, NRC
PRESENT WITH MR. DENNY:
Jerry Helker, Niagara Mohawk



P R O C E E D I N G S

[2:12 p.m.]

1
2
3 MR. KAUFFMAN: This is an interview associated
4 with the Incident Investigation Team investigation of the
5 August 13 event at Nine Mile Point Two. We're in the Nine
6 Mile Point Two P Admin Building, and the date is August 18,
7 1991. The time is 2:12 p.m.

8 My name is John Kauffman. I'm with AEOD.

9 MR. JORDAN: My name is Michael Jordan. I'm with
10 the NRC, Region III.


11 MR. DENNY: My name is Alfred Denny, and I'm the
12 site -- I should say the station emergency plan coordinator
13 for Nine Mile Point Two.

14 MR. HELKER: My name is Jerry Helliker. I'm the
15 general supervisor of operations at Nine Mile Two, here at
16 Al Denny's request.

17 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. Good.

18 To start out, we'd like you to tell us a little
19 about your previous background and experience and jobs
20 you've held prior to your current job -- a little bit about
21 your work history

22 MR. DENNY: Okay. I started out in life as a high
23 school science teacher. I taught two years of high school
24 science and math in South Dakota, and I spent three years in
25 the United States Army, and I came back to South Dakota and



1 taught two more years. Then, in 1968, I joined the General
2 Electric nuclear energy division as an engineering
3 assistant. I worked my way up to the title of associate
4 engineer, and I worked in various departments: I worked in
5 the projects department. Finally, I worked in the
6 international business development in San Jose.

7 Then I had the opportunity to go to the training
8 department and work with the Tulsa training center. At that
9 time, General Electric had established a product line of
10 BWR-6 and had two simulators. It had the Perry simulator
11 and the Black Box, and I worked as senior reactor operator
12 instructor on the Black Box simulator.


13 Then, in October, 1984, I came to work for Niagara
14 Mohawk, for the position as an apprentice for the assistant
15 station shift supervisor. I sat through the license
16 exam -- through the training, and I passed the written, but
17 I did not pass --

18 MR. JORDAN: Let's stop.

19 [Pause for announcement on public address system.]

20 MR. DENNY: So I worked in their operations
21 department, and I worked in the independent safety
22 engineering group. More recently, I'm back in the
23 operations department, for about the last six months.

24 My current assignment is the station emergency
25 plan coordinator. At the time of the incident, I had gone



1 to work at 6 p.m. the previous evening. At the time of the
2 incident, I was turning over to my relief, Tom Tuttle, at 6
3 a.m. -- it was actually before 6 -- on the 13th of August.


4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay.

5 When the event started and happened, I'd like you
6 to just run through what you saw, what you did, and
7 basically describe what happened.

8 MR. DENNY: Okay. Our desk is actually in the
9 corner of the control room behind the fire panel. The first
10 indication of the incident was that there was a dramatic
11 dimming of the lights. Tom Tuttle and I walked out from
12 behind the panel, and the CSO also announced -- I believe it
13 was the CSO -- that we had lost all of our annunciators.

14 So the SSS also came out on the floor; the ASSS
15 came out on the floor. Personally, I spent some time trying
16 to determine the status of the reactor. I looked at various
17 indications to determine the status of the reactor.

18 At the time that the SSS said to put the mode
19 switch in shutdown, I went in search of the EAP-2 procedure,
20 which is the classification of a particular event. I
21 assisted in the classification of the event and suggested
22 the classification to the SSS. Once he agreed with that
23 classification and made the general announcement in the
24 control room and the time of that announcement, then I
25 proceeded to work with the communications coordinator, who



1 was a rad waste operator, in filling out the necessary forms
2 for our immediate notifications by the RED system.

3 Thereafter, during the incident, I would assist
4 him in filling out these forms. I would get the SSS's
5 signature, with his agreement, as to the content of the
6 form, and I would go to the panels and try to determine as
7 much additional information so that we could fill out the
8 forms more accurately.

9 Then, once the power had been restored to the
10 panels, it was obvious that things were under control.

11 MR. HELKER: For clarification, for your benefit,
12 when he says "our desk," he means the SEPC desk, behind the
13 fire panel.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: The SEPC function is a little
15 unusual. It's not in most places in the industry.


16 MR. HELKER: I think the functions are in the
17 industry.

18 MR. KAUFFMAN: The functions are, but he actual
19 job is --

20 MR. HELKER: The actual individual performing
21 those functions may not be.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: I guess I'd like it if you could
23 just kind of describe not what you did, but just in general
24 what the SEPC's duties are.

25 MR. DENNY: Okay. The SEPC was actually brought




1 out, I believe, historically, at this site, because, once we
2 exceeded the necessary fifteen-minute notification period
3 from the time that the event was declared. So it appeared
4 to be an over-burden problem for the SSS. The SSS was
5 simultaneously trying to operate in the EOPs, the emergency
6 operating procedures, and to go into the emergency plan.
7 The idea was to allow him to work within the EOPs to
8 stabilize the plant, and yet to provide him some assistance
9 in meeting the requirements of immediate notification and
10 the emergency plan.

11 Basically, the shift emergency plan coordinator
12 is working with the communications aide to fill out the
13 forms necessary to make the immediate notification.

14 We also have, according to the emergency
15 administrative procedures, the EAPs, an SSS's checklist.
16 Initially, during an event, the SSS is the site emergency
17 director, and so the SEPC function not only helps him meet
18 his communication requirements, but it helps him meet his
19 duties as the site emergency director.

20 MR. JORDAN: You say you suggested the
21 classification of the event. Can you give us an idea what
22 was its classification that you suggested to him?

23 MR. DENNY: We had, if you go down through the
24 CAP-2 on the left-hand column it gives an entire series of
25 different things.



1 One of the things listed there is loss of
2 annunciators and then if you move across horizontally on any
3 particular line it will work you through unusual event,
4 alert, site emergency, general emergency.

5 So we had under the alert category here a
6 statement of loss of annunciators and then under the site
7 emergency there was loss of annunciators associated with
8 transient and we had the loss of annunciators and the
9 associated transient was the reactor scram.

10 That brought us into this particular category.


11 Also prior to showing that to the SSS I had shown
12 it to the oncoming ASSS, a guy by the name of Don Bosnic.
13 Once he and I saw or appeared to agree on that
14 classification then I went forward and talked to the SSS.

15 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. We know that that UPS's
16 affected some of the communications equipment, such as
17 Gaitronics.

18 Could you tell us how the notifications were made
19 and any problems that were encountered?

20 MR. DENNY: Initially our telephones worked and so
21 it is my recollection that the oncoming ASSS, Don Bosnic
22 called over to Unit One. He either called over or the CSO
23 had someone call over to Unit One then made the site
24 announcement over the Gaitronics.

25 We had lost our Gaitronics but Unit One had not.



1 Our telephones worked properly. We were able to
2 use the RCS line and the NRC phone worked and we were able
3 to call Unit One so we had normal telephone communication.
4 We just appeared not to have Gaitronics.

5 MR. JORDAN: Did you hear any of the notification
6 when Unit One made their notification in your control room?


7 MR. DENNY: No. The Gaitronics did not. I had no
8 -- in the press of events that these things made, others may
9 have heard them but I you know did not hear them.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: How were the notification forms
11 filled out? Who gathers -- what is the process? Who
12 gathers the information and where do they get it?

13 MR. DENNY: It is a joint effort between the site
14 emergency planning coordinator and the communications aide
15 and it is whoever feels the most familiar with getting the
16 particular information because they will have varying
17 degrees of experience and that person will gather the data.

18 These forms are on a 8 1/2 by 11 sheet that has
19 stick-um on the top and you can just rip off the forms, so
20 you can carry it around as a pad and gather the data and
21 then return it to the telephone or the communication aide.

22 In this particular instance the communication aide
23 was making the notifications and filling out the initial
24 things on this form like what the site was and what the time
25 was and then I was gathering the details for him.



1 Then I would carry it up to the SSS and the SSS
2 would read what I had said and then sign it and I would
3 return it to the communications aide.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: You had no difficulty getting all
5 the information parameters you needed, even with the loss of
6 instrumentation or were there some data you couldn't get?

7 MR. DENNY: I was able to get all the data that I
8 needed for that form because the -- it was largely
9 meteorological data that we're requested to put on that
10 form and all the meteorological instruments were powered.


11 You could verify, it was possible to say that
12 water level you know was under control because on the 603
13 panel -- 601 I believe it is -- the ECCS panel?

14 MR. HELKER: 601.

15 MR. DENNY: 601 panel. The charter recorders were
16 working and it was possible to verify the SRMs or the
17 neutron monitoring being down on the SRMs because three of
18 the source range monitors were working.

19 MR. KAUFFMAN: Just kind of a, I guess a followup,
20 I haven't seen your form but most forms have something about
21 a stack rate or perhaps in-plant rad levels. Do you have
22 any of that information on your forms?

23 MR. DENNY: Yes. The forms says. It also gives
24 us the option to say that a release is not applicable. So
25 in this instance a release was not applicable but there is



1 definitely a place on that form for that data.

2 MR. JORDAN: I take it you have been or have not
3 been ever licensed as an operator?

4 MR. DENNY: I have never been licensed. I was set
5 for the license class and I passed, you know, the local and
6 I passed the written but I have never passed the -- at one
7 time failing the walkthrough and another time the simulator.

8 MR. JORDAN: You say three SRMs were working?

9 MR. DENNY: Yes. The ASRM we had a problem with
10 an IRM drawer and so the ASRM was removed from service
11 during that incident so we had -- or due to maintenance
12 prior to that incident -- and so we had B, C and D showing
13 indication.

14 MR. JORDAN: A was removed prior to the event?

15 MR. DENNY: Yes.

16 MR. JORDAN: You mentioned that when you started
17 out that you were, the location of your desk that you
18 noticed a significant dimming in the lights?

19 MR. DENNY: Yes. That didn't last long but it was
20 enough to like somebody hitting you over the head with
21 something to call your attention to it.

22 MR. JORDAN: Did the lights come back in the area
23 where you had access?

24 MR. DENNY: Yes. It appeared to me that it was a
25 general dimming but the light level in the control room



1 thereafter was sufficient.

2 MR. JORDAN: Okay, you noticed no other areas of
3 dimming lights in the area?

4 MR. DENNY: I didn't go any further than the
5 control room but in the control room I noticed no
6 deficiency in the lighting.

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: When people came into the control
8 room did you hear any reports of areas in the plant having
9 lights out?

10 MR. DENNY: I didn't. If I did, I didn't pay any
11 attention to what they were saying. It didn't register in
12 my brain anyhow.

13 MR. HELKER: May I ask a question to clarify?

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure.


15 MR. HELKER: Was it the actual lighting dimmed or
16 the level of lighting went down because the annunciator
17 lights went out?

18 MR. DENNY: I actually believe that the lights
19 dimmed. It struck me that the lights dimmed.

20 MR. KAUFFMAN: The overhead lights?

21 MR. DENNY: The overhead lights, although it could
22 have been, you know, it's entirely subjective but it struck
23 me that the overhead lights had dimmed.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: We have heard from other people
25 that this started with a loud pop. Did you hear any loud



1 pop?

2 MR. DENNY: I have no recollection. That didn't
3 stick in my mind.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Emergency planning is not in the
5 charter, and the emergency response really isn't in the
6 charter of our investigation so I think that this may be
7 about it for this interview.

8 MR. JORDAN: Is there anything that you know of,
9 something that we haven't covered, that you would like to
10 put on the record right now for information?

11 MR. DENNY: I can't think of anything.


12 MR. JORDAN: Okay.

13 MR. KAUFFMAN: I guess a general question we
14 normally ask too is if there was anything that helped you
15 respond to this, that helped make it really go well, or if
16 there was any area where you said, wow, I wish I'd have had
17 this or this procedure was really -- held us up here.

18 Do you have any suggestions or any compliments for
19 things that were there that worked really well?

20 MR. DENNY: I think that the general level of
21 training definitely contributed to the positive outcome and
22 it reduced, you know, any potential for panic.

23 I also think that the operations department has a
24 very high degree of professionalism and this also benefitted
25 the positive outcome of this event, but I didn't myself see



1 anything -- nothing sticks in my mind that needed improving,
2 no particular event or no particular procedure that I ran
3 across that needed improvement.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: That concludes the interview.

5 [Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the taking of the
6 interview was concluded.]

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
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of ALFRED DENNY

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



1. THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF DALLAS, ss. I, _____, Notary Public in and for said County and State, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original of the same as the same appears from the records of said County.

Witness my hand and the seal of said County at Dallas, Texas, this _____ day of _____, 19____.

Notary Public in and for said County and State.

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
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
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John J. 91
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Page 1 of 1 Signature Alfred T. Denny Date 8/23/91

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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
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16 Al Denny's request.

17 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. Good.

18 To start out, we'd like you to tell us a little
19 about your previous background and experience and jobs
20 you've held prior to your current job -- a little bit about
21 your work history

22 MR. DENNY: Okay. I started out in life as a high
23 school science teacher. I taught two years of high school
24 science and math in South Dakota, and I spent three years in
25 the United States Army, and I came back to South Dakota and



1 taught two more years. Then, in 1968, I joined the General
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5 signature, with his agreement, as to the content of the
6 form, and I would go to the panels and try to determine as
7 much additional information so that we could fill out the
8 forms more accurately.

9 Then, once the power had been restored to the
10 panels, it was obvious that things were under control.

11 MR. HELKER: For clarification, for your benefit,
12 when he says "our desk," he means the SEPC desk, behind the
13 fire panel.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: The SEPC function is a little
15 unusual. It's not in most places in the industry.


16 MR. HELKER: I think the functions are in the
17 industry.

18 MR. KAUFFMAN: The functions are, but he actual
19 job is --

20 MR. HELKER: The actual individual performing
21 those functions may not be.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: I guess I'd like it if you could
23 just kind of describe not what you did, but just in general
24 what the SEPC's duties are.

25 MR. DENNY: Okay. The SEPC was actually brought




1 out, I believe, historically, at this site, because, once we
2 exceeded the necessary fifteen-minute notification period
3 from the time that the event was declared. So it appeared
4 to be an over-burden problem for the SSS. The SSS was
5 simultaneously trying to operate in the EOPs, the emergency
6 operating procedures, and to go into the emergency plan.
7 The idea was to allow him to work within the EOPs to
8 stabilize the plant, and yet to provide him some assistance
9 in meeting the requirements of immediate notification and
10 the emergency plan.

11 Basically, the shift emergency plan coordinator
12 is working with the communications aide to fill out the
13 forms necessary to make the immediate notification.

14 We also have, according to the emergency
15 administrative procedures, the EAPs, an SSS's checklist.
16 Initially, during an event, the SSS is the site emergency
17 director, and so the SEPC function not only helps him meet
18 his communication requirements, but it helps him meet his
19 duties as the site emergency director.

20 MR. JORDAN: You say you suggested the
21 classification of the event. Can you give us an idea what
22 was its classification that you suggested to him?

23 MR. DENNY: We had, if you go down through the
24 CAP-2 on the left-hand column it gives an entire series of
25 different things.



1 One of the things listed there is loss of
2 annunciators and then if you move across horizontally on any
3 particular line it will work you through unusual event,
4 alert, site emergency, general emergency.

5 So we had under the alert category here a
6 statement of loss of annunciators and then under the site
7 emergency there was loss of annunciators associated with
8 transient and we had the loss of annunciators and the
9 associated transient was the reactor scram.

10 That brought us into this particular category.


11 Also prior to showing that to the SSS I had shown
12 it to the oncoming ASSS, a guy by the name of Don Bosnic.
13 Once he and I saw or appeared to agree on that
14 classification then I went forward and talked to the SSS.

15 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. We know that that UPS's
16 affected some of the communications equipment, such as
17 Gaitronics.

18 Could you tell us how the notifications were made
19 and any problems that were encountered?

20 MR. DENNY: Initially our telephones worked and so
21 it is my recollection that the oncoming ASSS, Don Bosnic
22 called over to Unit One. He either called over or the CSO
23 had someone call over to Unit One then made the site
24 announcement over the Gaitronics.

25 We had lost our Gaitronics but Unit One had not.



1 Our telephones worked properly. We were able to
2 use the RCS line and the NRC phone worked and we were able
3 to call Unit One so we had normal telephone communication.
4 We just appeared not to have Gaitronics.

5 MR. JORDAN: Did you hear any of the notification
6 when Unit One made their notification in your control room?


7 MR. DENNY: No. The Gaitronics did not. I had no
8 -- in the press of events that these things made, others may
9 have heard them but I you know did not hear them.

10 MR. KAUFFMAN: How were the notification forms
11 filled out? Who gathers -- what is the process? Who
12 gathers the information and where do they get it?

13 MR. DENNY: It is a joint effort between the site
14 emergency planning coordinator and the communications aide
15 and it is whoever feels the most familiar with getting the
16 particular information because they will have varying
17 degrees of experience and that person will gather the data.

18 These forms are on a 8 1/2 by 11 sheet that has
19 stick-um on the top and you can just rip off the forms, so
20 you can carry it around as a pad and gather the data and
21 then return it to the telephone or the communication aide.

22 In this particular instance the communication aide
23 was making the notifications and filling out the initial
24 things on this form like what the site was and what the time
25 was and then I was gathering the details for him.



1 Then I would carry it up to the SSS and the SSS
2 would read what I had said and then sign it and I would
3 return it to the communications aide.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: You had no difficulty getting all
5 the information parameters you needed, even with the loss of
6 instrumentation or were there some data you couldn't get?

7 MR. DENNY: I was able to get all the data that I
8 needed for that form because the -- it was largely
9 meteorological data that we're requested to put on that
10 form and all the meteorological instruments were powered.


11 You could verify, it was possible to say that
12 water level you know was under control because on the 603
13 panel -- 601 I believe it is -- the ECCS panel?

14 MR. HELKER: 601.

15 MR. DENNY: 601 panel. The charter recorders were
16 working and it was possible to verify the SRMs or the
17 neutron monitoring being down on the SRMs because three of
18 the source range monitors were working.

19 MR. KAUFFMAN: Just kind of a, I guess a followup,
20 I haven't seen your form but most forms have something about
21 a stack rate or perhaps in-plant rad levels. Do you have
22 any of that information on your forms?

23 MR. DENNY: Yes. The forms says. It also gives
24 us the option to say that a release is not applicable. So
25 in this instance a release was not applicable but there is



1 definitely a place on that form for that data.

2 MR. JORDAN: I take it you have been or have not
3 been ever licensed as an operator?

4 MR. DENNY: I have never been licensed. I was set
5 for the license class and I passed, you know, the local and
6 I passed the written but I have never passed the -- at one
7 time failing the walkthrough and another time the simulator.

8 MR. JORDAN: You say three SRMs were working?

9 MR. DENNY: Yes. The ASRM we had a problem with
10 an IRM drawer and so the ASRM was removed from service
11 during that incident so we had -- or due to maintenance
12 prior to that incident -- and so we had B, C and D showing
13 indication.

14 MR. JORDAN: A was removed prior to the event?


15 MR. DENNY: Yes.

16 MR. JORDAN: You mentioned that when you started
17 out that you were, the location of your desk that you
18 noticed a significant dimming in the lights?

19 MR. DENNY: Yes. That didn't last long but it was
20 enough to like somebody hitting you over the head with
21 something to call your attention to it.

22 MR. JORDAN: Did the lights come back in the area
23 where you had access?

24 MR. DENNY: Yes. It appeared to me that it was a
25 general dimming but the light level in the control room



1 thereafter was sufficient.

2 MR. JORDAN: Okay, you noticed no other areas of
3 dimming lights in the area?

4 MR. DENNY: I didn't go any further than the
5 control room but in the control room I noticed no
6 deficiency in the lighting.

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: When people came into the control
8 room did you hear any reports of areas in the plant having
9 lights out?

10 MR. DENNY: I didn't. If I did, I didn't pay any
11 attention to what they were saying. It didn't register in
12 my brain anyhow.

13 MR. HELKER: May I ask a question to clarify?

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure.


15 MR. HELKER: Was it the actual lighting dimmed or
16 the level of lighting went down because the annunciator
17 lights went out?

18 MR. DENNY: I actually believe that the lights
19 dimmed. It struck me that the lights dimmed.

20 MR. KAUFFMAN: The overhead lights?

21 MR. DENNY: The overhead lights, although it could
22 have been, you know, it's entirely subjective but it struck
23 me that the overhead lights had dimmed.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: We have heard from other people
25 that this started with a loud pop. Did you hear any loud



1 pop?

2 MR. DENNY: I have no recollection. That didn't
3 stick in my mind.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: Emergency planning is not in the
5 charter, and the emergency response really isn't in the
6 charter of our investigation so I think that this may be
7 about it for this interview.

8 MR. JORDAN: Is there anything that you know of,
9 something that we haven't covered, that you would like to
10 put on the record right now for information?

11 MR. DENNY: I can't think of anything.

12 MR. JORDAN: Okay.

13 MR. KAUFFMAN: I guess a general question we
14 normally ask too is if there was anything that helped you
15 respond to this, that helped make it really go well, or if
16 there was any area where you said, wow, I wish I'd have had
17 this or this procedure was really -- held us up here.

18 Do you have any suggestions or any compliments for
19 things that were there that worked really well?

20 MR. DENNY: I think that the general level of
21 training definitely contributed to the positive outcome and
22 it reduced, you know, any potential for panic.

23 I also think that the operations department has a
24 very high degree of professionalism and this also benefitted
25 the positive outcome of this event, but I didn't myself see



1 anything -- nothing sticks in my mind that needed improving,
2 no particular event or no particular procedure that I ran
3 across that needed improvement.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: That concludes the interview.

5 [Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the taking of the
6 interview was concluded.]

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
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of ALFRED DENNY

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

