

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
Interview of: PHIL MacEWEN

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Monday, August 19, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 14


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

Interview of :
PHIL MacEWEN :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Monday, August 19, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 4:05 p.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC
William Vatter, INPO



P R O C E E D I N G S

[4:05 p.m.]

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4 MR. VATTER: It's August 19. We're at Nine Mile
5 Point Unit Two, administration building, conducting an
6 interview with Phil MacEwen -- did I say it right?

7 MR. MacEWEN: Right.

8 MR. VATTER: My name is Bill Vatter. I'm an
9 employee of INPO on loan to the NRC for the IIT
10 investigation of an event that occurred at Nine Mile Point
11 on August 13.

12 Also here is --


13 MR. KAUFFMAN: John Kauffman, from NRC
14 headquarters.

15 MR. MacEWEN: Phil MacEwen, auxiliary operator for
16 Niagara Mohawk.

17 MR. VATTER: Phil, could you tell us a little bit
18 about your background, how long you've worked for Niagara
19 Mohawk and what you did before then?

20 MR. MacEWEN: I've spent six years as an auxiliary
21 operator Niagara Mohawk. Before that, I worked as a
22 mechanic as FitzPatrick nuclear plant, and I worked
23 construction for Johnson Controls Instrumentation at Nine
24 Mile Point.

25 MR. VATTER: Okay.



1 Phil, we're interested in finding out about the
2 events of August 13, what you were doing and the things that
3 you did in response to the event. Perhaps we could start by
4 having you tell us what your job assignment was that day and
5 what you were doing before the event occurred.

6 MR. MacEWEN: My first job assignment that day was
7 to go with -- There were six operators all together, I
8 believe.

9 MR. VATTER: What time did you come in? Were you
10 on the midnight shift?


11 MR. MacEWEN: No, I was on the day shift. I was
12 in the control room at 6 o'clock.

13 MR. VATTER: Okay. When did you come onto the
14 site?

15 MR. MacEWEN: Within five minutes, probably 5:55
16 in the morning.

17 MR. VATTER: Okay. When was the first time that
18 you were aware that things weren't like they should have
19 been?

20 MR. MacEWEN: About two minutes to 6, maybe. I
21 was changing my shoes in the locker room, and one of the
22 other operators told me that there had been a scram, so I
23 hurried up to the control room. When I got to the control
24 room, the CSO assigned me and another operator to try and
25 restart the UPS's.



1 MR. VATTER: Who was the other operator that was
2 assigned with you?

3 MR. MacEWEN: Aaron Armstrong.

4 MR. VATTER: And it was a CSO that gave the
5 instruction?

6 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

7 MR. VATTER: And he told you to go and restart the
8 UPS's.

9 MR. MacEWEN: He said, if it was possible to try
10 and start the UPS's.

11 MR. VATTER: Okay. So what did you do then?

12 MR. MacEWEN: I went right from there to the
13 switch gear building. When we got down there, we opened up
14 the procedure. In the time that we were reviewing the
15 procedure, four more operators come down. Two of them were
16 CSOs, and one of them was an RO. They pretty much were
17 telling us what to do.


18 MR. VATTER: Do you remember who those guys were?
19 We might be able to figure it out here.

20 MR. MacEWEN: Well, Aaron Armstrong and myself
21 were the first two. Then Jim Stevens came down, Dave
22 Hanczyk, Mike Garbus, and Bob Spooner.

23 MR. VATTER: Okay.

24 MR. MacEWEN: Is that all of them?

25 MR. VATTER: I think so.



1 So you and Aaron were trying to figure out the
2 procedure.

3 MR. MacEWEN: We were thumbing through the
4 procedure. We looked at the table of contents, trying to
5 find something that covered a tripped UPS. It was not very
6 plain in the procedure how to restart a tripped UPS. There
7 was how to start one up from a shut down position, but not
8 from a trip position.

9 MR. VATTER: Okay.

10 MR. MacEWEN: Like I said, we were looking through
11 the procedure, and then Dave Hanczyk showed up, Mike Garbus,
12 and Bob Spooner. They diagnosed rather quickly that we have
13 to have power, and they directed us to close in the CB-4,
14 the maintenance supply.

15 MR. VATTER: Did you try operating any of the
16 switches or breakers --

17 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

18 MR. VATTER: -- before Dave showed up?

19 MR. MacEWEN: No. When Dave showed up, he was the
20 one that started giving directions. First we were going to
21 try a normal restart, but that wouldn't work.

22 MR. VATTER: That was Dave's direction.

23 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

24 MR. VATTER: Did you have the cabinet doors opened
25 up before you got there?



1 MR. MacEWEN: No.

2 I don't think we had the cabinet -- I'm not sure
3 on that. I mean, the procedure sits right on the door, and
4 we opened the procedure first. I don't believe we opened a
5 door.

6 MR. VATTER: Okay.

7 MR. MacEWEN: I'm not positive on that.

8 MR. VATTER: So Dave sized up the situation and
9 told you what to do?

10 MR. MacEWEN: Yes. He just told us what breakers
11 to reset and then told us to open -- He figured out the
12 first UPS. He opened up the door on the CB-4, the
13 maintenance supply breaker --

14 MR. VATTER: Did you try to do a normal start on
15 that thing first, before you did that?

16 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

17 We tried the normal restart procedure, and that
18 didn't work.

19 MR. VATTER: Okay.

20 MR. MacEWEN: That was resetting the CB-1, CB-2,
21 CB-3, and then trying to auto-restart, but it wouldn't work.
22 I think it had to do with the logic also being tripped --
23 from what I've learned afterwards.

24 MR. VATTER: And then the CB-1 and CB-2 breakers
25 were shut after you made that attempt; is that right?



1 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

2 MR. VATTER: Then did you reopen those before you
3 shut CB-4?

4 MR. MacEWEN: CB-3 was open at the time.

5 To start it, you close CB-1, and then you try and
6 start it, and then you close CB-2 -- CB-2 is the battery
7 power. I can't remember exactly how the procedure is
8 written, but, I mean --

9 MR. VATTER: Well, did you reopen those breakers
10 before you shut in CB-4?

11 MR. MacEWEN: I'm not sure.

12 MR. VATTER: Okay.

13 MR. MacEWEN: I'm really -- I mean, it was a week
14 ago.

15 MR. VATTER: I understand. It was a week ago, and
16 it was going pretty fast at the time.


17 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

18 MR. VATTER: So Dave -- did he shut CB-4, or did
19 he show somebody else how to do it?

20 MR. MacEWEN: He did the first one, and then I did
21 one UPS. I closed the CB-4 on one of the UPS's, and I
22 believe Spooner and Garbus each did a UPS.

23 MR. VATTER: Have you ever had training on how to
24 do that?

25 MR. MacEWEN: Now from the training center. I've



1 had it from the system engineer during the startup and test
2 days.

3 MR. VATTER: Would you have known how to close in
4 CB-4 is Dave wasn't there to show you?

5 MR. MacEWEN: I'm sure I -- If I would have had
6 direction from the control room to go outside of the
7 procedure, then I could have done that. I knew how to do
8 it.

9 MR. VATTER: You knew how to do it.

10 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

11 But without having an RO or a CSO there to make
12 the decision to go outside of procedure, I wouldn't have
13 done that.

14 MR. VATTER: Okay. Then what did you do? That
15 was UPS -- which one did you do first?

16 MR. MacEWEN: I believe it was 1A.


17 MR. VATTER: What happened after that one was
18 running?

19 MR. MacEWEN: We got that one running, and then we
20 proceeded to close the CB-4s on the rest of the UPS's.

21 MR. VATTER: Who was it that went and got G?

22 MR. MacEWEN: I don't know. I was not involved in
23 G at all.

24 MR. VATTER: What did you do then, after the UPS's
25 were restored -- the power was restored there?



1 MR. MacEWEN: I went back to the control room for
2 another job.

3 MR. VATTER: And what job did they give you to do?

4 MR. MacEWEN: Pretty much they said, Stay out of
5 the way.

6 [Laughter.]

7 MR. MacEWEN: I didn't get another job until maybe
8 a half hour after the event, and then they had me take the
9 steam generator-rejecter out of service and shut down off-
10 gas.

11 MR. VATTER: Off-gas had already isolated.

12 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.


13 MR. VATTER: And you had to go back out in the
14 plant to do that.

15 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

16 MR. VATTER: Did you have an RP tech go with
17 you -- rad tech?

18 MR. MacEWEN: I stopped at rad protection --
19 Because of the time they had the alarms to monitors going
20 off in the turbine building, they said before we could go
21 into the turbine building we had to stop at rad protection,
22 and they said it was okay to go in the plant. But we had to
23 log in before we went in and log out when we came out.

24 MR. VATTER: Did they have the hogger running at
25 that time?



1 MR. MacEWEN: That was my other job. We started
2 the hoppers, yes.

3 MR. VATTER: Do you have to start the hopper
4 locally, or can you start that up from the control room?

5 MR. MacEWEN: They start it from the control room,
6 but we did our prestart checks -- I did the prestart checks
7 locally, and they started it from the control room.

8 MR. VATTER: Now, there was a rad monitor on the
9 off-gas. Do you know what that was reading when you were
10 preparing to put the hopper one?

11 MR. MacEWEN: No.

12 MR. VATTER: It reads only in the control room; is
13 that right? I don't know.

14 MR. MacEWEN: They can read it in the control
15 room, and I believe, if you were to go to it locally, you
16 can read it there.

17 MR. VATTER: But it's inside a room.

18 MR. MacEWEN: Right. It's a different room
19 entirely from where the control panel is for off-gas.

20 MR. VATTER: So you don't have prestart checks to
21 do in that room.

22 MR. MacEWEN: No.

23 MR. VATTER: At the local control panel.

24 MR. MacEWEN: The hoppers are separate. I mean,
25 that was checking oil levels, water levels in the separator



1 tank, and then having them start it. After the hoppers are
2 started, then I -- which way did this happen? We isolated
3 the steam generator-rejecters and off-gas. I'm pretty sure
4 that's the order we did it.

5 MR. VATTER: Okay. What did you do next?

6 MR. MacEWEN: I may have missed a step in here.
7 We restarted a condensate booster pump also. I was on the
8 condensate booster pump. I think that was -- that was
9 before the hoppers.


10 MR. VATTER: What did you have to do locally to
11 restart the condensate booster pump?

12 MR. MacEWEN: Actually, nothing. I was standing
13 by to make sure that we had oil to the pump, make sure the
14 oil pump was running, and somebody else was at the con
15 demins. It's hard to remember exactly what order -- Now
16 the jobs are coming back to me, what we did. The booster
17 pump, I stood it, made sure that we had a good start on the
18 pump, that the stop check went open. And then back to the
19 control room.

20 MR. VATTER: Okay.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: When you were out in the plant
22 early on in the event, were there any areas where you
23 noticed the lights were out?

24 MR. MacEWEN: When I first come into the plant and
25 I had changed my shoes, the lights were out in the stairway



1 going to the control room, right next to the elevator.

2 MR. KAUFFMAN: All the lights or part of the
3 lights?

4 MR. MacEWEN: There was some kind of lighting. I
5 mean, the stairway was lit, but it was dark.

6 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay.

7 MR. MacEWEN: I mean, you could see the stairs,
8 but it was pretty dark.

9 MR. VATTER: What do you think we ought to know
10 about this event that you haven't told us?

11 MR. MacEWEN: What I think you should know in
12 regards to what? Personnel actions, equipment operations?

13 MR. VATTER: Yes, anything.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: Let's just kind of -- We asked you
15 what you did, and we explored it a little bit, but, if
16 there's something that we haven't brought up or talked about
17 that you think is interesting -- any problems encountered or
18 anything that helped you respond really well. The question
19 is if you think there's anything that's important that we
20 should know, or just interesting. That could be events or
21 good things or bad things -- whatever occurs to me.

22 MR. MacEWEN: They're doing something in the
23 control room right now. I believe they're separating the
24 procedure for electrical distribution. That's a good thing,
25 because in our procedure we had UPS's and normal switch gear



1 and some of the other switch gear. They're separating the
2 procedures now so that it's not quite so confusing when you
3 open it up.

4 MR. VATTER: That's the procedure that's in the
5 rack down by the UPS's.

6 MR. MacEWEN: And in the control room. I mean,
7 it's the same procedure.

8 Otherwise, not to pat ourselves on the back, but I
9 thought we did a pretty good job for a situation that has
10 never happened before.

11 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. What was your involvement
12 when they did the site area emergency? How was
13 accountability accomplished for you? What did you have to
14 do for accountability?

15 MR. MacEWEN: Punch through the card reader into
16 the control room. All the operators were in the control
17 room at that time, and from there they assigned jobs to us,
18 but then, after a while, they allowed us to go back to the
19 break area across the hall.

20 You've heard the UPS story enough times, haven't
21 you?

22 MR. VATTER: I think so. That's not to say that
23 your story isn't worth hearing.

24 MR. MacEWEN: I understand what you're saying,
25 but, I mean, how many times can you hear that we closed CB-4



1 on the UPS's.

2 MR. VATTER: Well, you can hear it about five or
3 six times.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: If there are no further questions
5 or comments, that's the end of the interview.

6 MR. MacEWEN: Okay.

7 [Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the taking of the
8 interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


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
DOCKET NUMBER:

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were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY
Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



07-84A-96

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
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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
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5 Point Unit Two, administration building, conducting an
6 interview with Phil MacEwen -- did I say it right?

7 MR. MacEWEN: Right.

8 MR. VATTER: My name is Bill Vatter. I'm an
9 employee of INPO on loan to the NRC for the IIT
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11 on August 13.

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
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15 MR. MacEWEN: Phil MacEwen, auxiliary operator for
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17 MR. VATTER: Phil, could you tell us a little bit
18 about your background, how long you've worked for Niagara
19 Mohawk and what you did before then?

20 MR. MacEWEN: I've spent six years as an auxiliary
21 operator Niagara Mohawk. Before that, I worked as a
22 mechanic as FitzPatrick nuclear plant, and I worked
23 construction for Johnson Controls Instrumentation at Nine
24 Mile Point.

25 MR. VATTER: Okay.



1 Phil, we're interested in finding out about the
2 events of August 13, what you were doing and the things that
3 you did in response to the event. Perhaps we could start by
4 having you tell us what your job assignment was that day and
5 what you were doing before the event occurred.

6 MR. MacEWEN: My first job assignment that day was
7 to go with -- There were six operators all together, I
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
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13 MR. VATTER: Okay. When did you come onto the
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17 MR. VATTER: Okay. When was the first time that
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19 been?

20 MR. MacEWEN: About two minutes to 6, maybe. I
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22 other operators told me that there had been a scram, so I
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24 room, the CSO assigned me and another operator to try and
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11 MR. VATTER: Okay. So what did you do then?

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13 switch gear building. When we got down there, we opened up
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15 procedure, four more operators come down. Two of them were
16 CSOs, and one of them was an RO. They pretty much were
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18 MR. VATTER: Do you remember who those guys were?
19 We might be able to figure it out here.

20 MR. MacEWEN: Well, Aaron Armstrong and myself
21 were the first two. Then Jim Stevens came down, Dave
22 Hanczyk, Mike Garbus, and Bob Spooner.

23 MR. VATTER: Okay.

24 MR. MacEWEN: Is that all of them?

25 MR. VATTER: I think so.



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24 MR. VATTER: Did you have the cabinet doors opened
25 up before you got there?



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10 before you shut in CB-4?

11 MR. MacEWEN: I'm not sure.

12 MR. VATTER: Okay.

13 MR. MacEWEN: I'm really -- I mean, it was a week
14 ago.

15 MR. VATTER: I understand. It was a week ago, and
16 it was going pretty fast at the time.

17 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

18 MR. VATTER: So Dave -- did he shut CB-4, or did
19 he show somebody else how to do it?

20 MR. MacEWEN: He did the first one, and then I did
21 one UPS. I closed the CB-4 on one of the UPS's, and I
22 believe Spooner and Garbus each did a UPS.

23 MR. VATTER: Have you ever had training on how to
24 do that?

25 MR. MacEWEN: Now from the training center. I've



1 had it from the system engineer during the startup and test
2 days.

3 MR. VATTER: Would you have known how to close in
4 CB-4 is Dave wasn't there to show you?

5 MR. MacEWEN: I'm sure I -- If I would have had
6 direction from the control room to go outside of the
7 procedure, then I could have done that. I knew how to do
8 it.

9 MR. VATTER: You knew how to do it.

10 MR. MacEWEN: Yes.

11 But without having an RO or a CSO there to make
12 the decision to go outside of procedure, I wouldn't have
13 done that.

14 MR. VATTER: Okay. Then what did you do? That
15 was UPS -- which one did you do first?

16 MR. MacEWEN: I believe it was 1A.

17 MR. VATTER: What happened after that one was
18 running?

19 MR. MacEWEN: We got that one running, and then we
20 proceeded to close the CB-4s on the rest of the UPS's.

21 MR. VATTER: Who was it that went and got G?

22 MR. MacEWEN: I don't know. I was not involved in
23 G at all.

24 MR. VATTER: What did you do then, after the UPS's
25 were restored -- the power was restored there?



1 MR. MACEWEN: I went back to the control room for
2 another job.

3 MR. VATTER: And what job did they give you to do?

4 MR. MACEWEN: Pretty much they said, Stay out of
5 the way.

6 [Laughter.]

7 MR. MACEWEN: I didn't get another job until maybe
8 a half hour after the event, and then they had me take the
9 steam generator-rejecter out of service and shut down off-
10 gas.

11 MR. VATTER: Off-gas had already isolated.

12 MR. MACEWEN: Yes.

13 MR. VATTER: And you had to go back out in the
14 plant to do that.

15 MR. MACEWEN: Yes.

16 MR. VATTER: Did you have an RP tech go with
17 you -- rad tech?

18 MR. MACEWEN: I stopped at rad protection --
19 Because of the time they had the alarms to monitors going
20 off in the turbine building, they said before we could go
21 into the turbine building we had to stop at rad protection,
22 and they said it was okay to go in the plant. But we had to
23 log in before we went in and log out when we came out.

24 MR. VATTER: Did they have the hogger running at
25 that time?



1 MR. MacEWEN: That was my other job. We started
2 the hoppers, yes.

3 MR. VATTER: Do you have to start the hogger
4 locally, or can you start that up from the control room?

5 MR. MacEWEN: They start it from the control room,
6 but we did our prestart checks -- I did the prestart checks
7 locally, and they started it from the control room.

8 MR. VATTER: Now, there was a rad monitor on the
9 off-gas. Do you know what that was reading when you were
10 preparing to put the hogger one?

11 MR. MacEWEN: No.

12 MR. VATTER: It reads only in the control room; is
13 that right? I don't know.

14 MR. MacEWEN: They can read it in the control
15 room, and I believe, if you were to go to it locally, you
16 can read it there.

17 MR. VATTER: But it's inside a room.


18 MR. MacEWEN: Right. It's a different room
19 entirely from where the control panel is for off-gas.

20 MR. VATTER: So you don't have prestart checks to
21 do in that room.

22 MR. MacEWEN: No.

23 MR. VATTER: At the local control panel.

24 MR. MacEWEN: The hoppers are separate. I mean,
25 that was checking oil levels, water levels in the separator



1 tank, and then having them start it. After the hoppers are
2 started, then I -- which way did this happen? We isolated
3 the steam generator-rejecters and off-gas. I'm pretty sure
4 that's the order we did it.

5 MR. VATTER: Okay. What did you do next?

6 MR. MacEWEN: I may have missed a step in here.
7 We restarted a condensate booster pump also. I was on the
8 condensate booster pump. I think that was -- that was
9 before the hoppers.

10 MR. VATTER: What did you have to do locally to
11 restart the condensate booster pump?

12 MR. MacEWEN: Actually, nothing. I was standing
13 by to make sure that we had oil to the pump, make sure the
14 oil pump was running, and somebody else was at the con
15 demins. It's hard to remember exactly what order -- Now
16 the jobs are coming back to me, what we did. The booster
17 pump, I stood it, made sure that we had a good start on the
18 pump, that the stop check went open. And then back to the
19 control room.

20 MR. VATTER: Okay.

21 MR. KAUFFMAN: When you were out in the plant
22 early on in the event, were there any areas where you
23 noticed the lights were out?

24 MR. MacEWEN: When I first come into the plant and
25 I had changed my shoes, the lights were out in the stairway



1 going to the control room, right next to the elevator.

2 MR. KAUFFMAN: All the lights or part of the
3 lights?

4 MR. MacEWEN: There was some kind of lighting. I
5 mean, the stairway was lit, but it was dark.

6 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay.

7 MR. MacEWEN: I mean, you could see the stairs,
8 but it was pretty dark.

9 MR. VATTER: What do you think we ought to know
10 about this event that you haven't told us?

11 MR. MacEWEN: What I think you should know in
12 regards to what? Personnel actions, equipment operations?

13 MR. VATTER: Yes, anything.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: Let's just kind of -- We asked you
15 what you did, and we explored it a little bit, but, if
16 there's something that we haven't brought up or talked about
17 that you think is interesting -- any problems encountered or
18 anything that helped you respond really well. The question
19 is if you think there's anything that's important that we
20 should know, or just interesting. That could be events or
21 good things or bad things -- whatever occurs to me.

22 MR. MacEWEN: They're doing something in the
23 control room right now. I believe they're separating the
24 procedure for electrical distribution. That's a good thing,
25 because in our procedure we had UPS's and normal switch gear



1 and some of the other switch gear. They're separating the
2 procedures now so that it's not quite so confusing when you
3 open it up.

4 MR. VATTER: That's the procedure that's in the
5 rack down by the UPS's.

6 MR. MacEWEN: And in the control room. I mean,
7 it's the same procedure.

8 Otherwise, not to pat ourselves on the back, but I
9 thought we did a pretty good job for a situation that has
10 never happened before.

11 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. What was your involvement
12 when they did the site area emergency? How was
13 accountability accomplished for you? What did you have to
14 do for accountability?

15 MR. MacEWEN: Punch through the card reader into
16 the control room. All the operators were in the control
17 room at that time, and from there they assigned jobs to us,
18 but then, after a while, they allowed us to go back to the
19 break area across the hall.

20 You've heard the UPS story enough times, haven't
21 you?

22 MR. VATTER: I think so. That's not to say that
23 your story isn't worth hearing.

24 MR. MacEWEN: I understand what you're saying,
25 but, I mean, how many times can you hear that we closed CB-4



1 on the UPS's.

2 MR. VATTER: Well, you can hear it about five or
3 six times.

4 MR. KAUFFMAN: If there are no further questions
5 or comments, that's the end of the interview.

6 MR. MacEWEN: Okay.

7 [Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the taking of the
8 interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of PHIL MacEWEN

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY
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