

07-187-91

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION

UNIT II OPERATIONS

02-LOT-006-344-02-12

Revision

3
07.12/13/90

TITLE: EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL (RR)

	<u>SIGNATURE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
PREPARER	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>12-4-90</u>
TRAINING SUPPORT SUPERVISOR	<u>J. Long for J. P. Clair</u>	<u>12-4-90</u>
TRAINING AREA SUPERVISOR	<u>J. Kaminski</u>	<u>12-5-90</u>
PLANT SUPERVISOR/ USER GROUP SUPERVISOR	<u>[Signature] FOR D. TOPPING</u>	<u>12/10/90</u>

Summary of Pages

(Effective Date: 12/10/90)

Number of Pages: 7

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pages</u>
December 1990	7

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ATTACHMENT 6
LESSON PLAN TEMPORARY/PUBLICATION/ADDENDUM CHANGE FORM

The attached change was made to:

Lesson plan title: Emergency Operating Procedures Radioactivity Release Control (RR)

Lesson plan number: 02-LOT-006-344-2-12

Name of instructor initiating change: D. Penfield

Reason for the change: Change Revision # to Rev. 3

due to typographical error

Type of change:

1. Temporary change

2. Publication change

3. Addendum change


Disposition:


1. Incorporate this change during the next scheduled revision.

2. Begin revising the lesson plan immediately. Supervisor initiate the process.

3. To be used one time only.

Approvals:

Instructor:  /Date 12-12-90

Training Area Supervisor
(or designee):  /Date 12-13-90

100



I. TRAINING DESCRIPTION

- A. Title of Lesson: Emergency Operating Procedures, Radioactivity Release Control (RR)
- B. Lesson Description: This lesson plan discusses the actions taken to control offsite radioactive releases.
- C. Estimate of the Duration of the Lesson: 1 Hour
- D. Method of Evaluation, Grade Format, and Standard of Evaluation: Written Examination with 80% minimum passing grade.
- E. Method and Setting of Instruction: Classroom Lecture
- F. Prerequisites:
 - 1. Instructor:
 - a. Certified in accordance with NTP-16.
 - 2. Trainee:
 - a. Certified in accordance with NTP-10.
- G. References:
 - 1. BWROG Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Rev. 4
 - 2. Plant Procedure N2-EOP-RR, Rev. 4

II. REQUIREMENTS

- A. AP-9, Administration of Training
- B. NTP-10, Training of Licensed Operator Candidates

III. TRAINING MATERIALS

- A. Instructor Materials:
 - 1. Transparencies Package
 - 2. Overhead Projector
 - 3. Whiteboard and Felt Tip Markers
 - 4. EOP Flowchart for RR
 - 5. Training Record
- B. Trainee Materials:
 - 1. EOP Flowchart for RR
 - 2. Course Evaluation Form

IV. EXAM AND MASTER ANSWER KEYS

Will be generated and administered as necessary. They will be on permanent file in the Records Room.

02-LOT-006-344-02-12 -1 December 1990

UNIT 2 OPS/2303

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V. LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of this training, the trainee will have gained the knowledge to perform the following:

A. Terminal Objectives:

- TO-1.0 Given conditions requiring the use of the Emergency Operating Procedure, use the procedure to place the plant in a stable condition as prescribed in the procedure.
- TO-2.0 (SRO ONLY) Direct the actions required per N2-EOP-RR. (3449490603)
- TO-3.0 Perform the actions required for a steam line rupture. (2000400501)

B. Enabling Objectives:

- EO-1.0 State the purpose of the Radioactivity Release Control Procedure.
- EO-2.0 State the entry conditions for the Radioactivity Release Control Procedure.
- EO-3.0 Given the procedural step, discuss the technical basis for that step.

2

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I. INTRODUCTION

Preliminary Activities:

1. Introduce self to class (if unfamiliar).
2. Distribute TR for completion.
3. Distribute Course Evaluation Forms and describe their use.
4. Discuss Method of Evaluation.

Review Learning Objectives with the class.

A. Student Learning Objectives

B. Purpose

Provides necessary actions to limit radioactivity release into areas outside the Primary and Secondary Containments.

EO-1.0

II. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A. Entry Conditions

1. Setpoints

a. The entry condition for this procedure is:

- 1) Stack GEMS - exceeds the alarm setpoint. (P882)
- 2) Vent GEMS - exceeds the alarm setpoint. (P882)
- 3) DRMS Liquid Effluent Monitor - exceeds the alert setpoint (yellow)
 - SWP*RE146A/B
 - CWS-RE157
 - LWS-RE206

NOTE: TP's may be used to highlight points of interest on flowchart; use TP's to show procedural steps if flowchart not used.

EO-2.0



2. Setpoint Bases

Note: This is an Unusual Event action level.

- a. This value selected corresponds directly to an action level in the emergency plan and thus provides the vehicle for coordinating the execution of the EOP's and the emergency plan.
- b. It is sufficiently high that it is not expected to occur during normal operation but sufficiently low that it does not by itself threaten the health and safety of the public.

B. Procedural Steps

1. Activate the emergency plan, if required, IAW EAP-1.
 - It is appropriate to activate the E-Plan, if plant conditions are at the action levels.
2. While executing the following step:
IF
Turbine Building HVAC is shut down
THEN
Restart Turbine Building HVAC (OP-55 Section E.1)
 - Restarting T.B. HVAC is appropriate for the following reasons:

EO-3.0

EO-3.0




- The T.B. is not an airtight structure, which may permit an unmonitored, ground level release.
 - Radioactive Release inside the T.B. may limit personnel access.
3. Isolate all Primary Systems that are discharging into areas outside the Primary and Secondary Containments except systems required to:
- a. assure adequate core cooling
OR
 - b. shutdown the reactor
 - Isolating Primary Systems
 - discharging outside containment is the most direct action to terminate the release.
 - Since the inability to assure adequate core cooling or shutdown the reactor may ultimately result in large radioactivity releases, these systems are not isolated.

Q: What is the definition of a "Primary System"?

A: The pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPV pressure will decrease the steam or water being discharged through an unisolated break in the system.

EO-3.0

EO-3.0



4. IF

The off-site radioactivity release rate approaches or exceeds the Emergency Plant "General Emergency" Level (as determined by chemistry)

AND

A Primary System is discharging into an area outside the Primary and Secondary Containments

THEN

Emergency RPV Depressurization is required; enter RPV Control and execute it concurrently with this procedure.

- Depressurizing the RPV reduces the driving head and therefore the flow from the Primary Systems that are discharging outside the Primary and Secondary Containments.
- Flags are provided referencing EOP-RP, C3, or C5 since they, as appropriate, contain the guidance to enter EOP-C2 to execute the emergency depressurization.

EO-3.0

EO-3.0

Q: What is the purpose of EOP-RR?

A: Provides necessary actions to limit radioactivity release into areas outside the Primary and Secondary Containments.



Q: What are the entry conditions of EOP-RR?

- A:
- Stack GEMS - exceeds the alarm setpoint. (P882)
 - Vent GEMS - exceeds the alarm setpoint. (P882)
 - DRMS Liquid Effluent Monitor - exceeds the alert setpoint (yellow)
 - SWP*RE146A/B
 - CWS-RE157
 - LWS-RE206


III. WRAP-UP

A. Summary

The Radioactivity Release Control procedure establishes the basis for isolating systems and controlling RPV pressure to minimize the off-site release of radioactivity in an emergency.

Discharge from Primary Systems to areas outside of the Primary and Secondary Containment are isolated (if possible) to terminate or minimize any release.

Depressurization of the RPV is required if the radioactivity release rate cannot be controlled below the release rate which requires a General Emergency.



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

02-187-91

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION

UNIT II OPERATIONS

02-LOT-006-344-2-11

Revision

2

TITLE: MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL (MSL)

	SIGNATURE	DATE
PREPARER.	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>12-4-90</u>
TRAINING SUPPORT SUPERVISOR	<u>J. Boyd for J. LeClair</u>	<u>12-4-90</u>
TRAINING AREA SUPERVISOR	<u>J. Kaminski</u>	<u>12-6-90</u>
PLANT SUPERVISOR/ USER GROUP SUPERVISOR	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>12/10/90</u>

Summary of Pages

(Effective Date: 12/10/90)

Number of Pages: 10

Date	Pages
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THIS LESSON PLAN IS A GENERAL REWRITE

CONTROLLED
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I. TRAINING SECTION ON
A. Title of ...
B. Objectives ...
C. Method ...
D. Materials ...
E. Evaluation ...

II. ...
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B. ...
C. ...
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III. TRAINING MATERIALS
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IV. ...
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I. TRAINING DESCRIPTION

- A. Title of Lesson: MSIV Leakage Control (MSL)
- B. Lesson Description: This lesson discusses the actions taken to control radioactive release through the MSL's.
- C. Estimate of the Duration of the Lesson: 1 hour
- D. Method of Evaluation, Grade Format, and Standard of Evaluation: Written Examination with 80% minimum passing grade.
- E. Method and Setting of Instruction: Classroom lecture
- F. Prerequisites:
 - 1. Instructor:
 - a. Certified in accordance with NTP-16.
 - 2. Trainee:
 - a. Certified in accordance with NTP-10.
- G. References:
 - 1. BWROG Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Rev. 4
 - 2. Plant Procedure N2-EOP-MSL, Rev. 4

II. REQUIREMENTS

- A. AP-9, Administration of Training
- B. NTP-10, Training of Licensed Operator Candidates

III. TRAINING MATERIALS

- A. Instructor Materials:
 - 1. Transparencies Package
 - 2. Overhead Projector
 - 3. Whiteboard and Felt Tip Markers
 - 4. EOP Flowchart for MSL
 - 5. Training Record
- B. Trainee Materials:
 - 1. EOP Flowchart for MSL
 - 2. Course Evaluation Form

IV. EXAM AND MASTER ANSWER KEYS

Will be generated and administered as necessary. They will be on permanent file in the Records Room.

Upon completion of this course, the student will have gained the following knowledge and skills:

- 1. Understand the basic principles of the course.
- 2. Apply the concepts learned to practical situations.
- 3. Analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of various methods.
- 4. Design and implement a project based on the course content.
- 5. Communicate the results of the project effectively.

The course is designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the subject matter, covering both theoretical and practical aspects. It is intended for students who are interested in the field and wish to gain a solid foundation in the subject.

Throughout the course, students will engage in a variety of activities, including lectures, seminars, and practical exercises. This approach ensures that students not only learn the theory but also develop the skills necessary to apply it in real-world scenarios.

By the end of the course, students should be able to demonstrate a deep understanding of the subject and be capable of independent research and problem-solving. The course also emphasizes the importance of teamwork and communication, as these are essential skills in many professional settings.

V. LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of this training, the trainee will have gained the knowledge to perform the following:

A. Terminal Objectives:

- TO-1.0 Given conditions requiring the use of the Emergency Operating Procedures, use the procedure to place the plant in a stable condition as prescribed in the procedure.
- TO-2.0 (SRO ONLY) Direct the actions required per EOP-MSL. (3449500603)
- TO-3.0 (SRO ONLY) Direct the actions for a fuel clad failure or a high activity in the reactor coolant or offgas. (3449750403)
- TO-4.0 Operate the Offgas System during a fuel clad failure or a high activity in the reactor coolant. (2719070101)
- TO-5.0 Perform the actions required during a high airborne activity or a high radiation in a local area. (2009170601)
- TO-6.0 Perform the actions required during a high airborne activity or a high radiation in a general area. (2009180601)
- TO-7.0 Perform the actions required for a steam line rupture. (2000400501)
- TO-8.0 Perform the actions required for a fuel cladding failure. (2009060501)
- TO-9.0 Backfill the MSLS between the MSIVs. (2399170101)

B. Enabling Objectives:

Mastery of terminal objectives above will be shown by completion of the following enabling objectives:

- EO-1.0 State the purpose of the MSIV Leakage Control Procedure.
- EO-2.0 State the entry conditions for the MSIV Leakage Control Procedure.
- EO-3.0 Given the procedural step, discuss the technical basis for that step.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Student Learning Objectives

B. Purpose

Provides actions to control, treat and limit excessive leakage through the MSIVs.

II. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A. Entry Conditions

1. Setpoints

- A condition which requires an MSIV isolation
- AND
- An MSL High-High Radiation Level
- AND
- Any of the following:
 - Turbine building HVAC radiation (HVT-RE206) above the "Alert" level (yellow) or cannot be determined, OR

Preliminary Activities:

1. Introduce self to class (if unfamiliar).
2. Distribute TR for completion.
3. Distribute Course Evaluation Forms and describe their use.
4. Discuss Method of Evaluation.

Review Learning Objectives with the class.

EO-1.0

NOTE: TP's may be used to highlight points of interest on flowchart; use TP's to show procedural steps if flowchart not used.

EO-2.0

Discuss: Entry conditions

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

2. The second part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

3. The third part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

4. The fourth part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

5. The fifth part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

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7. The seventh part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

8. The eighth part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

9. The ninth part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

10. The tenth part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

11. The eleventh part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

- Offgas pretreatment radiation (OFG-RE13A/B) above the "Alert" level (yellow) or cannot be determined, OR
- Stack or vent GEMs exceed the alarm setpoint (P882).

2. Setpoint Bases

Discuss: Bases

EO-3.0

- a. The entry conditions are based on an incident that involves fuel failure and MSIV leakage. The values are the associated Trip (MSL High-High Radiation) or Alert (Alert Status on DRMS) levels.
- b. Values are below the initial conditions which require action, and are intended to increase operator awareness of specific parameters.

B. Procedural Steps

1. MSL 1

Discuss: Step 1

IF while executing the following steps, Turbine Building exhaust radiation levels exceed the Turbine Building Release Limit (Figure MSL-1) or cannot be determined, THEN verify the Turbine Building HVAC is operating in the unisolated mode, if available (N2-OP-55).

Show: TP of Figure MSL-1.

Discuss: MSL-1



- | | | |
|--|--|---------------|
| <p>a. Turbine Building HVAC activity is indicative of leakage. MSIVs are a probable source. TB vent in operation assures a monitored release, and keeps activity levels down (lower doses to operators).</p> | <p>Discuss: Basis</p> | <p>EO-3.0</p> |
| <p>2. MSL 2
 <u>IF</u> while executing the following steps, Control Building HVAC radiation level cannot be maintained below 5.92×10^6 uCi/ml, (HVC*RE18A-D)
 <u>THEN</u> confirm or manually initiate the Control Building HVAC pressurization mode (N2-OP 53A, Section H.6).</p> | <p>Discuss: Step 2</p> | |
| <p>a. Control Building special filter trains minimize radiation dose to Control Room operators.</p> | <p>Discuss: Basis</p> | <p>EO-3.0</p> |
| <p>3. MSL 3
 Confirm or initiate an MSIV isolation.</p> | <p>Discuss: Step 3
 Discuss: Basis</p> | <p>EO-3.0</p> |
| <p>a. This reinforces entry condition.</p> | | |
| <p>4. MSL 4
 Wait until MSL radiation is above the MSL Radiation Limit (Figure MSL-2) or cannot be determined,</p> | <p>Discuss: Step 4
 Show TP of Figure MSL-2.</p> | |



AND

Turbine Building HVAC radiation level is above the Turbine Building Release Limit (Figure MSL-1) or cannot be determined,

OR

Offgas pretreatment radiation level is above the Offgas Release Limit (Figure MSL-3) or cannot be determined,

OR

Offsite radiation release rate exceeds the Emergency Plan "Alert" level (as determined by Chemistry).

THEN operate available SJAE through the Offgas System (EOP-6, ATT 16).

- a. MSL radiation is indicative of high activity in the Coolant/Containment.
- b. Turbine Building activity is indicative of leakage from containment. MSIVs are a probable source.
- c. Offgas activity (with MSIVs shut) is an indication of high activity leakage through the MSIVs.
- d. Offsite release means leakage from containment MSIVs are a possible source.

Show TP of Figure MSL-3.

Discuss: Bases

EO-3.0

COMPL.



- e. Processing leakage through the offgas system takes advantage of increased holdup, condensation of steam, filtering of particulates, the charcoal filter absorption and elevated release.

5. MSL 5

Discuss: Step 5

IF the SJAE and Offgas Systems become unavailable,

AND

IF the Turbine Building HVAC radiation level approaches or exceeds the Turbine Building release rate (Figure MSL-1).

THEN

5.1 Shut the following valves:

- Main Turbine Stop Valves
- Main Turbine Control Valves
- Main Turbine Bypass Valves
- 2ARC-MOV5A
- 2ARC-MOV5B
- 2ARC-MOV5C
- 2MSS-AOV92A
- 2MSS-AOV92B
- 2TME-AOV121
- 2ARC-AOV105
- 2ARC-MOV15A
- 2ARC-MOV15B



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- 5.2 Establish Main Turbine Seals (OP-25, Section F.4).
- 5.3 Start all circulating water pumps (OP-10A, Sections E2.0-5.0).
- 5.4 Fill the main steam lines between the MSIVs with water (EOP-6, Att. 7).
- a. With offgas not available, and indication of leakage still present, close off MSLs and condenser, and minimize leakage.
 - b. Closing valves and establishing seals are intended to "bottle up" to the extent possible the MSLs and Condenser to increase hold up time.
 - c. Running circulating water pumps promotes condensation of any steam in the leakage.
 - d. Backfilling the MSIVs provides a water seal on the outboard valve.

Discuss: Bases

EO-3.0



6. MSL 6

IF Off-site radioactivity release rate cannot be maintained below the Emergency Plan "General Emergency" level (as determined by Chemistry) AND A Primary System is discharging into an area outside the primary and secondary containments. THEN Emergency Depressurization is required, enter RPV control and execute concurrently with this procedure.

Discuss: Step 6


- a. Depressurizing the RPV reduces the driving head and therefore the flow from the primary systems that are discharging outside the primary and secondary containments.
- b. Entering EOP-RL, RP and RQ provide the mechanism by which the Emergency Depressurization procedure is reached.

Discuss: Bases

EO-3.0

Q: What is the purpose of EOP-MSL?

A: To provide the actions necessary to control, treat and limit excessive leakage through the MSIV's.



Q: What are the entry conditions of EOP-MSL?

- A:
- A condition which requires an MSIV isolation, AND
 - A MSL high-high radiation level, AND
 - Any of the following conditions:
 - Turbine building HVAC radiation (HVT-RE206) above the "Alert" level (yellow) or cannot be determined, OR
 - Offgas pretreatment radiation (OFG-RE13A/B) above the "Alert" level (yellow) or cannot be determined, OR
 - Stack or vent GEMs exceed the alarm setpoint (P882).

III. WRAP-UP

This procedure provides the action necessary to control, treat and limit excessive leakage through the MSIV's. This procedure attempts to control and monitor the radioactive release by using the normal filtered and elevated release paths of the Turbine and Control Building HVAC and Offgas Systems. If conditions worsen and release rates cannot be controlled, Emergency RPV Depressurization may be required. The MSIV Leakage Control procedure, N2-EOP-MSL, provides a response to a fuel failure incident concurrent with MSIV leakage. The procedure is designed to compliment the actions addressed in the Secondary Containment Control and Radioactivity Release Control procedures.

