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ACCESSION NBR:9108070251 DOC.DATE: 91/08/01 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL:50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha .05000410 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CONWAY,J.T. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. FIRLIT,J.F. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 91-009-01:on 910503,ESF actuation occurred due to spurious high radiation level signal.Caused by inadequate welder training program content.Procedure change evaluation initiated.W/910801 ltr.

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NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION /P.O. BOX 32 LYCOMING, NEW, YORK 13093 / TELEPHONE (315) 343-2110

Joseph F. Firlit Vice President Nuclear Generation

NMP 80566

August 1 ,

1991

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410 LER 91-09, Supplement 1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 91-09 Supplement 1

Is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)".

This Supplement is being issued to: (1) Provide a root cause; and (2) Provide additional corrective actions.

A 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii) report was made at 1017 hours on May 3, 1991.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

//Joseph F. Firlit
Vice President - Nuclear Generation

JFF/RM/lmc ATTACHMENT

108070251

PDR ADUČK OŠČOO410

xc: Thomas T. Martin, Regional Administrator Region I Wayne L. Schmidt, Sr. Resident Inspector

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NRC Form 366 (9-83)	LIC	ENSE	e eve	NT RE	PORT	(LER)		CLEAR REGULAT APPROVED OMB EXPIRES: 8/31/88	ORY COMMISSION NO. 3150-0104
FACILITY NAME (1)							CKET NUMBER		PAGE (3)
Nine_Mile_Point_Unit_2	<u> </u>						15 0 0	·	
Engineered Safety Feature	Actuat	ion o	due t	o a Sp	ouriou	ıs High Rac	liation l	_evel Sig	nal
EVENT DATE (6) LER NUMBER (6		RE	PORT DAT	E (7)			CILITIES INVO		r
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		FACILITY NAME	S	DOCKET NUMBER	_
				ŀ	_N/A_			0 5 0 0	
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POWER LEVEL 1. 0. 0 20.405(a)(1)(i)		50,36(c)	(1)		<u> </u>	50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	÷
		50,36(c)				· 50,73(a)(2)(vil)	\$		ecify in Abstrect In Text, NRC Form
20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50,73(a) 50,73(a)				50,73(e)(2)(viii)(A)		366A)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)				50,73(s)(2)(viii)(8) 50,73(s)(2)(x)	+	۳	и
	I			FOR THIS	LER (12)			ъ	
NAME							AREA CODE	TELEPHONE NUM	IBER
John T. Conway, Manager T	echnica	1 Sup	pport	NMP2			3 1 5	3 4 9	-,2,6,9,8
COMPLETE C	NE LINE FOR	EACH CO	MPONEN	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPORT		9 121	
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE	
							<u> </u>		
	, 								
SUPPLEMEN	TAL REPORT	EXPECTE	D (14)				EXPECTE	D	DAY YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		<u>x</u>					SUBMISSI DATE (11	5)	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately filteen single-space typewritten line) (16) On May 3, 1991, at 0831 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). Specifically, the Secondary Containment (Reactor Building) isolated and the Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit Cooler and Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) started automatically. The ESF actuation was initiated by a high radiation level signal in the Reactor Building Ventilation System (HVR). At the time of the event, the reactor mode switch was in the "RUN" position (Mode 1) with the reactor operating at 100% rated thermal power.									
The root cause of the event has been determined to be inadequate welder training program content.									
The Control Room operators implemented the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) for Secondary Containment control until Reactor Building radiation was verified at normal operating levels and the cause for the ESF actuation was determined to be a spurious high radiation level trip. Other corrective actions included: 1) returning the HVR system to a normal line up after welding was complete; 2) issuing guidance to welders to route their welding cables away from instrument cables; 3) discussing the grounding and routing of cables with Maintenance and Building Services welders; 4) enhancing the corporate and site welding programs; and 5) writing a site welding procedure.									
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NRC Form 366									

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NRC FORM 366A (6-89)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			
	TIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.			
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)		
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 9 1 0 0 9 0 1	1	
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)		,		

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 3, 1991, at 0831 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). Specifically, the Secondary Containment (Reactor Building) isolated and the Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit Cooler and Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) started automatically. The ESF actuation was initiated by a high radiation level signal in the Reactor Building Ventilation System (HVR). At the time of the event, the reactor mode switch was in the "RUN" position (Mode 1) with the reactor operating at 100% rated thermal power.

The high radiation level trip signal was generated by the Division II "above refuel floor" radiation monitor which responded as though a high radiation level condition existed. The circuitry functioned per its design initiating a Secondary Containment isolation, and automatic starts of the Division II Emergency Recirculation Unit Cooler (2HVR*UC413B) and Division I and II trains of GTS.

Immediately, the Control Room operators implemented the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) for Secondary Containment Control (N2-EOP-Secondary Containment Control), verified the Secondary Containment did isolate, verified the automatic start of the Emergency Recirculation Unit Cooler and Division I and II trains of GTS, and noted the indication for process radiation monitor 2HVR*CAB14B to be above the alarm setpoint (indicated level 1.46 E-2 micro ci/cc; alarm level 1.00 E-4 micro ci/cc).

At 0833 hours, the Control Room operators noted the indication for other radiation monitors in the Reactor Building were normal including 2HVR*CAB14A which indicated 3.60 E-7 micro ci/cc. A radiation survey of the Reactor Building was commenced and at 0844 hours, radiation levels were verified normal allowing the operators to exit the EOP for Secondary Containment Control.

An investigation into the cause of the spurious actuation revealed Direct Current (DC) Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) was in | 1 progress four feet above the radiation monitoring microprocessor 2HVR*RUW14B. Several attempts to duplicate the initial radiation trip signal were unsuccessful, but the radiation indication was | 1 affected to a lesser degree when a SMAW arc was drawn near the pipe weld. It was determined from Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) memory and discussions with the welder that electrical noise was being detected by the radiation monitoring microprocessor during the same time frame as welding was in progress.

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	GGA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	VEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 9 1 0 0 9 0 1	0 3 OF 0 7

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (cont.)

During the investigation into the spurious trip, it was noted that a low flow alarm existed for the process radiation monitor 2HVR*CAB14B. Investigation of the alarm found a blown fuse in the junction box supplying power to the motor operated flow control valve for sample flow to the process radiation monitor. It was determined that the already shut valve received a false shut signal which caused an overload of the valve operating motor and the blown fuse.

The fuse was replaced and welding was completed by 1600 hours on the same day and a functional test (N2-RSP-RMS-M108) of the process radiation monitor was commenced. During this test, a failed check source positioning solenoid was discovered, and the functional test of the process radiation monitor was aborted. The source check positioning solenoid was replaced, and the functional test of the process radiation monitor was then completed satisfactorily.


On May 4, 1991, at 2112 hours, the Control Room operators returned the GTS system and Emergency Recirculation Unit Coolers to standby and restored the Reactor Building Ventilation System to its normal line up per operating procedure N2-OP-52 "Reactor Building Ventilation System".

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The immediate cause of the event was a Division II "above refuel floor" high radiation level signal. The root cause evaluation for this event has been completed per Nuclear Division Procedure NDP-16.01, "Root Cause Evaluations."

The root cause of this event has been determined to be inadequate welder training program content. Specifically, the investigation revealed the individuals involved were not adequately trained in how to properly ground their welding equipment or how to run their welding leads. Welders are taught to ground their equipment physically close to the weld but no emphasis is placed on evaluating for electrical continuity to welding equipment ground. Also, the proper routing of welding leads and the reasons for this routing are not stressed in training.

The omission of proper welding setup techniques extends to the welding procedures. The lack of a setup procedure was a contributing cause to this event.



(6-89)			APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 IMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS FORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.		
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 9 1 0 0 9 0 1	Q 4 OF 0]		

II. CAUSE OF EVENT (cont.)

The intermediate cause of this event has been determined to be improper setup of welding equipment. First, the hot and ground leads were run side-by-side and routed near 2HVR*CAB14B instrument A magnetic field built up around the parallel welding cables. leads and induced a voltage in the instrument cabling. Secondly, the welder grounded the welding equipment to the pipe to be welded, but did not consider the ground path after the pipe was cut. The ground was physically close to the pipe being welded, but electrically, it presented a high impedance path from the hot lead to the ground lead (see attached diagram). The result of either or both of these routing problems caused the electrical noise induced spiking and trip of 2HVR*CAB14B. The electrical noise was localized and did not affect identical radiation monitoring equipment six feet away from 2HVR*CAB14B.

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III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73 part (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)".

Secondary Containment isolation, Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit Cooler automatic start, and GTS automatic starts are conservative actions having no adverse safety consequences, for the general public or the plant, at any reactor power level. The event in no way adversely affected any other safety system nor the operators ability to achieve safe reactor plant conditions.

The duration of the event was 1 day, 12 hours, 41 minutes.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The immediate corrective actions were to determine the validity and cause of the high radiation level trip signal.

Follow-up corrective actions for this event included:

1. Radiation monitor 2SWP*CAB14B was returned to service, and GTS and the Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit Coolers 1 were returned to standby at the completion of welding operations.

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*	NRC FORM 366A	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	
•	(6-89),	APPROVED OMB NO, 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92	
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	TEXT (If more space is req	equired, use edditionel NRC Form 366A's) (17)	<u> </u>
		,	
	<u>IV.</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTIONS</u> (cont.)	'
	2.	The current welding instructions provide specific guidance and Engineering evaluation for high frequency AC TIG welding to	
		ensure instrumentation is not impacted. No such controls	
	_	action 6 is written, a memo has been written to the	
	h	Maintenance Managers from Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 emphasizing caution when performing any welding near	
	1	instrumentation. This memo directs that welding cables are	
		routed away from instrumentation cables.	
	3.	A meeting between the welding engineer, NMP2 welders, and the	
		Construction Services supervisor was held to discuss this LER	
		and the proper setup of welding equipment in close proximity to instrumentation.	
	4.	A Training Review Request has been initiated to have proper	
		welding equipment setup included in the corporate welder training program.	
	5.	The concerns raised by this event will be covered with the	
		welders in continued training. Enhancement of the training program is also being evaluated.	
	ć		
	6.	A Procedure Change Evaluation has been initiated to write a procedure for welding on site. This procedure will include	
5	•	precautions necessary to prevent recurrence of this event.	
	v.	ADDITIONAL_INFORMATION	•
	A.		
	A.	Failed component identification:	
· .		Component description - check source positioning solenoid	
		Mark number - CS01	
		Manufacturer - Kaman Instrumentation Corp. Part Number - 823779-026A	
		Part Number - 823779-026A Symbol Number - 9311296	
		Niagara Mohawk Drawing - 1.73L-801-055	
		Niagara Mohawk Spec - P281F	
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
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NRC FORM 366A (6-89)	U.S. NUC	LEAR REGULATORY COMMISS	SION " APPRO	DVED OMB NO. 3150-0104	
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			OF MANAGEMENT AN	DUCTION PROJECT (3150 D BUDGET, WASHINGTON,	DC 20503.
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<u>v.</u>	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (C	ont.)	ر بور	×	•
в.	Previous similar events:		1) A		
D.	FIEVIOUS SIMILAI EVENCS:	,			
•	There have been severa	l Reactor Bu	ilding isola	tions with	
	emergency ventilation	starts, cau	sed by spui	rious high	
	radiation level signals.	Only one of	these was at	tributed to	
•	welding, LER 89-26, "Eng	Ineered Safet	y Feature Ini	tiation Due	
	to Spurious Trip Signals The investigation for LEF	Realized by H	lign frequency	y welaing".	1
	welding. One of the co	rrective act	ions. a Lesso	ons Learned	
	Transmittal, addressed g	rounding of D	C SMA welding	equipment.	
	Had this corrective action	on been incor	porated into a	a permanent	
	program, it may have pre	vented this ϵ	event.		
c.	Identification of compon	ents referred	to in this 1	LER:	-
		-			
· · ·	COMPONENT	ET.	IEEE 803 IS FUNCTION	IEEE 805 <u>SYSTEM</u> ID	
2		•	ID FONCTION	<u>SISIEM ID</u>	
	Secondary Containment (R	x Bldg)	N/A	NG	
	Reactor Building Unit Co	olers	CLR	VA	
	Standby Gas Treatment Sy Reactor Building Ventila	stem	N/A	BH	_
	Above Refuel Floor Proces	ss Radiation	N/A	VA	-
	Monitor and Microproces		MON	IL	
	Digital Radiation Monitor	ring System	MON	IL	
	Flow Control Valve	, ,	FCV	IL	
	Check Source Positioning	`Solenoid	SOL	IL	
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