

J.H. Joyce, Chief, FLSA, LI, 4/1/92

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-220/92-09
50-410/92-10

Docket Nos. 50-220
50-410

License Nos. DPR-63
NPF-69

Licensee: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
301 Plainfield Road
Syracuse, New York 13212

Facility Name: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Scriba, New York

Inspection Conducted: March 23-27, 1992

Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security

Inspector: *Edward B. King*
E. B. King, Physical Security Inspector

4-2-92
date

Approved by: *R. R. Keimig*
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section
Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards

4-3-92
date

Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previously Identified Open Security and Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Items; Management Support, Program Plans, and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; and Security Training and Qualifications.

Results: The licensee's physical security program was determined to be effective and directed toward assuring public health and safety. Management support for the program was evident through the implementation of several program enhancements to increase its effectiveness. Action to resolve previously opened Fitness-for-Duty program issues was observed have been thorough and prompt. In addition, a previously opened security program issue also was effectively closed. No violations of regulatory requirements were identified, but one unresolved item concerning the perimeter intrusion detection system was opened.



DETAILS

1.0 Key Persons Contacted

1.1 Licensee

- *J. Beratta, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- *P. Carroll, General Supervisor Operations
- *D. Keeney, Compliance Coordinator
- *H. Christensen, General Supervisor
- *R. Granssen, Nuclear Security Specialist
- *W. Byrne, Nuclear Security Specialist
- *R. Miller, Supervisor Nuclear Security Training
- *C. Craigmile, Director FFD/Medical
- *C. Ouderkirk, Supervisor, Security Administration
- *L. Stephens-Twining, Nuclear Security Specialist
- *N. Zufalt, Nuclear Security Specialist
- *E. Pearson, Supervisor, Technical Services

1.2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

W. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector

*Denotes those present at the exit interview

The inspector also interviewed other licensee security personnel during this inspection.

2.0 Followup of Previously Identified Security and Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Items

2.1 Security

2.1.1 (Closed) UNR 50-220/88-30-01 and 50-410-/88-29-01: Weaknesses in Vital Area (VA) Barriers

The inspector verified that corrective actions to the remaining licensee-identified VA barrier weaknesses were completed. Based on observations of the barriers and discussions with licensee management, the inspector determined the corrective actions to be satisfactory. No discrepancies were noted.

2.2 Fitness-for-Duty

During the initial inspection of the FFD program on July 9-12, 1991, the inspector identified one potential weakness and five follow-up items to be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. The licensee's corrective actions for



those items were reviewed during this inspection and were found to be acceptable as follows:

2.2.1 (Closed) UNR 50-220/91-15-01 and 50-410/91-13-01: FFD Supervisory Training

The inspector determined that the training requirements for supervisory personnel were being met. This determination was based on a review of the licensee's corrective actions which included the development of a tracking program to identify newly promoted and hired supervisory personnel. No discrepancies were noted.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed follow-up items in the areas of: (1) actions to be taken when trace amounts of alcohol are detected below the cutoff levels to determine if the alcohol level is decreasing or increasing; (2) medical review officer (MRO) potential to overrule supervisor determination for cause testing; (3) proper storage and securing of Employee Assistance Program (EAP) records; (4) licensee's ability to identify individuals having infrequent access; and (5) the location of the breathalizers to reduce the potential of compromising confidentiality when two individuals are being tested at the same time. The licensee's corrective actions in all of those areas were found to be acceptable and there were no further regulatory concerns.

3.0 Management Support, Security Program Plans, and Audits

3.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be consistent with program needs. This determination was based upon the inspector review of the various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection as documented in this report.

Security program enhancements made since the last routine physical security inspection (50-220/91-18 and 50-410/91-18) are as follows:

- the completion of Phase II of the assessment system upgrade;
- the installation of a card reader system to enhance licensee-designated vehicle and driver access to the Protected Area (PA); and
- the development of a new tactical response weapons course.



3.2 Security Program Plans

The inspector verified that changes to the Security Plan (the Plan), as implemented, did not decrease the effectiveness of the Plan and that they were submitted in accordance with NRC requirements.

3.3 Audits

The inspector reviewed the licensee's annual Quality Assurance Audit, No. 91009, of the security program, which was conducted from June 6-13, 1991. During the audit, no adverse findings were identified but five recommendations were made. The recommendations were not indicative of any programmatic problems and were appropriately addressed. No deficiencies were noted.

4.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barrier, Detection and Assessment Aids

4.1 Protected Area Barrier

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the PA barrier on March 23, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the NRC-approved Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

4.2 Protected Area Barrier

The inspector observed the perimeter detection aids on March 25, 1992, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. The inspector requested testing of the detection aids at several locations in numerous zones. Five locations tested unsatisfactorily. The inspector verified that the zones tested satisfactorily during the previous periodic functional test.

The licensee implemented immediate corrective actions which included the establishment of compensatory measures in the deficient areas and the repair and testing of all zones which tested unsatisfactory. All repairs were completed within twelve hours of the time of discovery.

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The licensee also committed to re-emphasize the post responsibilities to all patrol officers to improve the officers' awareness while conducting patrols. This is an unresolved item (URI 50-220/92-09-01 and 50-410/92-10-10) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

4.3 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a PA and isolation zone lighting survey on March 24, 1992, from approximately 6:45 p.m. to 8:15 p.m., accompanied by a licensee security supervisor. The inspector determined by observation that the station's lighting system was very effective and that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier. No deficiencies were noted.

4.4 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during day and night periods and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

4.5 Vital Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of selected VA barriers on March 24, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the VA barriers were installed and maintained and described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

4.6 Vital Area Detection Aids

The inspector requested and observed testing of selected VA detection aids on March 24, 1992, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.



5.0 Protected and Vital Areas Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

5.1 Personnel Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:

- 5.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards. No deficiencies were noted.
- 5.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the plan. The inspector observed both plant and visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic periods on March 24 and 25, 1992. The inspector also interviewed members of the security force and licensee security staff about personnel access procedures. Additionally, the inspector observed access control processing for Unit II drywell entry and reviewed the radiation protection records and the security access control logs for March 5-7, 1992. The inspector determined that only authorized personnel were granted access to the area and that a mechanism was in place to positively control materials and personnel into the area. No deficiencies were noted.
- 5.1.3 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required. No deficiencies were noted.
- 5.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee had escort procedures for visitors into the PA and VAs. No deficiencies were noted.
- 5.1.5 The licensee had a mechanism for expediting access to the vital equipment during emergencies and that mechanism was adequate for its purpose. No deficiencies were noted.

5.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that were brought into the PA through the main access portal. The inspector reviewed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also observed package and material processing and interviewed



members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. No deficiencies were noted.

5.3 Vehicle Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified by a security force member (SFM) at the main access portal. This procedure was consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector determined that at least two SFMs control vehicle access at the main vehicle access portal. On March 24, 1992, the inspector also observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures. No deficiencies were noted.

6.0 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspector observed the operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined they were operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector verified that the CAS and SAS did not require any operational activities that would interfere with the assessment and response functions. No deficiencies were noted.

7.0 Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures

The inspector determined that the licensee was conducting testing and maintaining security systems and equipment as committed to in the Plan. This determination was based upon a review of the test records for security equipment. The security organization had a dedicated maintenance group, composed of 8 I&C technicians and one electrician, which conducts preventive maintenance and ensures prompt repair and return to service of security equipment. A review of these records indicated repairs were normally made within 24 hours after a repair request was generated. The inspector also reviewed the use of compensatory measures and security force overtime and found them to be minimal, largely due to the efforts and prompt response of the maintenance group. No deficiencies were noted.

8.0 Security Training and Qualification

The inspector randomly selected and reviewed training and qualification records for 10 SFMs. The physical qualification and firearms requalifications records were inspected for armed SFMs and security supervisors. The inspector determined that



the training had been conducted in accordance with the security training and qualification (T&Q) plan and that it was properly documented.

Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that they were professional and knowledgeable of the job requirements. No deficiencies were noted.

9.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection of March 27, 1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the findings were presented.

