

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION  
Table 3.2.7 (Continued)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES

<u>Line or System</u>	<u>No. of Valves (Each Line)</u>	<u>Location Relative to Primary Containment</u>	<u>Normal Position</u>	<u>Motive Power*</u>	<u>Maximum Oper. Time (Sec)</u>	<u>Action on Initiating Signal</u>	<u>Initiating Signal (All Valves Have Remote Manual Backup)</u>
<u>Reactor Head Spray</u> (One Line)	1 1	Inside Outside	- Closed	Self Act. Ck. R.M.P.O.	-- 30	- -	-- --
<u>Liquid Poison</u> (One Line)	1 1	Inside Outside	- -	Self Act. Ck. Self Act. Ck.	-- --	- -	-- --
<u>Control Rod Drive Hydraulic</u> (One Line)	1 1	Inside Outside	- -	Self Act. Ck. Self Act. Ck.	-- --	- -	-- --
<u>Scram Discharge System Vent**</u> (One Line)	2	Outside	Open	A.I.A.O.	10	Close	{ Automatic or manual reactor scram.
<u>Scram Discharge System Drain**</u> (One Line)	2	Outside	Open	A.I.A.O.	10	Close	
<u>Core Spray High Point Vent</u> (Two Lines)	1 1	Inside Outside	Closed Closed	AC Motor Air/DC Solenoid	30 30	Close Close	{ Reactor water level low-low or high drywell pressure.

\* R.M.P.O. - Remote Manual Power Operated.

A.I.A.O. - Automatically Initiated Air Operated.

A.I.P.O. - Automatically Initiated Power Operated.

\*\* See 3.1.1e for LCO requirements.

Amendment No. 43, 44, Correction Ltr. 4/10/89

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ATTACHMENT B

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Supporting Information and No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis

The proposed change to Sections 3.1.1 and 4.1.1 adds a requirement to demonstrate Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) operability including showing that the SDV Instrument lines are free of blockage. These changes are necessary to comply with the terms of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Confirmatory Order issued on June 24, 1983. A test shall be performed during the refueling outage following an operating cycle, unless a reactor scram has occurred during that cycle with rod density less than or equal to 50%. Only one demonstration of operability per operating cycle is required. This test shall also be performed following the breaching of the SDV pressure boundary as a post-maintenance test to determine operability. The test will involve verification that the volume of water introduced into the SDV equals the amount drained out. This will ensure adequate volume exists to accept discharge water from the control rods during a reactor scram and adequate instrumentation response. The test will also ensure that the instrument lines are free of blockage and can perform their safety functions. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for SDV vent and drain valves are now proposed. These LCO's will limit the accumulation of water in the SDV and assure that the reactor coolant system is isolated when required.

Page 119, Table 3.2.7, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves, currently has two (2) different but approved versions (Amendments 43 and 44). These two versions have been combined to avoid confusion in reading the Technical Specification. Additionally, the list of initiating signals for the scram discharge system vent and drain valves in Table 3.2.7 has been replaced with a more concise list. The previous listing in Table 3.2.7 was intended to include the same parameters that initiate reactor scram as identified in Table 3.6.2a. "INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES SCRAM". All reactor scram signals, automatic or manual, initiate closure of the scram system vent and drain valves. This change is proposed to avoid having to modify Table 3.2.7 if changes are made in the parameters listed in Table 3.6.2a. Therefore, the changes to Table 3.2.7 are considered administrative.

10 CFR 50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analysis, using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92, about the issue of no significant hazards consideration. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, the following analysis has been performed:



The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment incorporates a commitment to periodically demonstrate that the SDV and instrument piping is free of blockage. The LCO for the SDV vent and drain valves will insure these valves will perform their required function. The fill/drain test will assure that sufficient volume is available in the SDV so that it will accommodate water drained from the control rod drives when a reactor scram occurs. These changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment provides for testing plant equipment (SDV) to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function when required. The SDV will not be subjected to conditions other than those for which it was designed. The SDV vent and drain valves close to prevent potential leakage. Consequently, there is no probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The SDV vent and drain valves will be demonstrated to be operable and will not be subjected to conditions other than those for which they were designed. There will be no reduction in any margin of safety as a result of performing this test.

As determined by the analysis above, this proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.



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August 31, 1989

DOCKET NO(S). 50-220  
 Mr. Lawrence Burkhardt III  
 Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operation  
 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation  
 301 Plainfield Road  
 Syracuse, New York 13212

SUBJECT: NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION  
 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1

The following documents concerning our review of the subject facility are transmitted for your information.

- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Application, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Notice of Availability of Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Safety Evaluation Report, or Supplement No. \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License or Amendment to Facility Operating License, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☒ Bi-Weekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, dated ~~August 23, 1989~~ <sup>[see page 6]</sup> ~~XXXXXX~~ September 22, 1989.
- ☐ Exemption, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Construction Permit No. CPPR-\_\_\_\_\_, Amendment No. \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Facility Operating License No. \_\_\_\_\_, Amendment No. \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Order Extending Construction Completion Date, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Monthly Operating Report for \_\_\_\_\_ transmitted by letter dated \_\_\_\_\_.
- ☐ Annual/Semi-Annual Report- \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ transmitted by letter dated \_\_\_\_\_.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:  
 As stated

cc: See next page

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OFFICE	PDI-1						
SURNAME	CVogan						
DATE	8/2/89						





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**NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION****Biweekly Notice Applications and  
Amendments to Operating Licenses  
Involving No Significant Hazards  
Considerations****I. Background**

Pursuant to Public Law (P.L.) 97-415, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. P.L. 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from July 31, 1989 through August 11, 1989. The last biweekly notice was published on August 9, 1989 (54 FR 32704).

**NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF  
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO  
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND  
PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT  
HAZARDS CONSIDERATION  
DETERMINATION AND  
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING**

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration and Resources Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room P-216, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By September 22, 1989 the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a

request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 325-6000 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

**Boston Edison Company, Docket No. 50-293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts**

**Date of amendment request:** July 31, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** The proposed amendment would delete the onsite and offsite organization charts and specify general requirements in place of the deleted charts. The proposed change affects Section 6.0, "Administrative Control" of the Pilgrim Technical Specifications. The proposed change is submitted in accordance with the guidance provided in the NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-06 dated March 22, 1988.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee addressed the above three standards in the amendment application. In regard to the three standards, the licensee provided the following analysis.

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The changes proposed to remove corporate and plant organization charts from the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated. As stated in NRC Generic Letter 88-06, the requirements necessary for safe operation of the plant have been retained in the Technical Specifications; the changes do not eliminate or alter the functions previously reviewed; and the changes do not affect plant operation and design or create a new accident mode. The changes proposed were modeled after Enclosure 2 to NRC Generic Letter No. 88-06 in conformance with Commission requirements.

(2) Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated because the proposed change is administrative in nature and no physical alterations of plant configuration or changes to setpoints or operating parameters are proposed.

(3) Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because Boston Edison, through its quality assurance programs, its commitment to maintain only qualified personnel in positions of responsibility, and other required controls, assures that safety functions will be performed at a high level of competence. Therefore, removal of the organization charts from the Technical Specifications will not affect the margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination analysis. Based upon this review, the staff agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, based on its review, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Plymouth Public Library; 11 North Street, Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

**Attorney for licensee:** W. S. Stowe; Esq., Boston Edison Company, 800 Boylston Street, 36th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02199

**NRC Project Director:** Richard H. Wessman

**Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket Nos. 50-003 and 50-247, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Westchester County, New York**

**Date of amendments request:** July 25, 1989

**Description of amendments request:** The proposed amendments would revise the "Indian Point Station Units 1 and 2 Physical Security Plan" to (1) redefine several vital areas of Indian Point 2 as Type I rather than Type II and vice versa, (2) make several changes for clarification and standardization of terminology, (3) remove several items

from the list of vital equipment but not actually remove the equipment from vital areas, and (4) remove the City Water Tank from the list of vital equipment and delete its vital area.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The licensee provided the following analysis of the proposed changes:

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether "significant hazards considerations" exist by providing certain examples at 51 FR 7744 (March 6, 1986). Example (i) of 51 FR 7744 which applies to editorial changes, states:

"(i) a purely administrative change to technical specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature."

Although the example cited in 51 FR 7744 refers specifically to proposed change to technical specifications, it is understood that the intent of the guidance is that it apply to license amendment changes, in general, including Physical Security Plan changes such as proposed herein. With the exception of the proposed change to delete the City Water Tank from Table 3.2, the changes to the Physical Security Plan proposed in this application are shown not to involve a significant hazards consideration by reason of the guidance in example (i) above since they amount to merely administrative changes such that there are no functional alternatives being made. Note that the level of security afforded Type I and Type II vital areas at Indian Point is identical and this policy will not change without another amendment request. Likewise, the deletion of items, other than the City Water Tank, from the list of vital equipment will not alter their physical location within vital areas.

Concerning the remaining proposed change, the Commission has provided standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed amendments have been evaluated below and determined not to involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.

(1) Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The City Water Tank is utilized for normal plant operation and may be used as a backup to safety equipment cooling. Its damage or destruction would not cause or increase the probability or consequences of an accident since safety-related vital equipment would not be affected by such

sabotage and would, therefore, remain operable. Therefore, since sabotage in a non-vital area can be assumed to be successful but safety-related equipment in vital areas is assumed to operate as required, the deletion of this item from the list of vital equipment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. Deletion of this item from the vital equipment list implies that we must assume its inoperability in the event of successful sabotage. Such inoperability, caused by damage or destruction, would be serious enough to cause reactor shutdown as required by Technical Specifications but would not result in any previously unanalyzed accident. Overall plant design is such that adequate safety-related equipment and cooling to that equipment exists to bring the plant to a safe shutdown and assure that escalation of an accident beyond the damage to this non-vital piece of equipment would not occur. Successful sabotage of the item deleted from the list of vital equipment with this proposed revision would, therefore, not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?

No. Deletion of this item from the vital equipment list and its subsequent inoperability or destruction due to successful sabotage could yield a forced plant shutdown as required by Technical Specifications. The other consequences of such sabotage would be the elimination of certain backup systems which are not required or relied upon for accident prevention or mitigation purposes. This effect would not be a significant one since the functionally equivalent safety-related vital equipment would not be adversely affected. Therefore, the overall margin of safety would not be significantly reduced.

The staff agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, based on the above, the staff proposes that the proposed amendment will not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.

#### *Local Public Document Room*

*location:* White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York, 10610.

*Attorney for licensee:* Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq., 4 Irving Place, New York, New York 10003

*NRC Project Director:* Robert A. Capra

Duquesne Light Company, Docket No. 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2, Shippingport, Pennsylvania

*Date of amendment request:* July 27, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise Section 4.7.12 of the Technical Specifications to relax the surveillance

frequency of failed snubbers resulting from isolated damage events that cannot be related generically to other snubbers. Specifically, the proposed changes would eliminate the requirement to reduce the surveillance intervals for cases that result from isolated damage. In addition, another change would permit either satisfactory functional test result, or applied remedy be the basis to declare snubbers as operable for the purpose of establishing the next inspection interval. Both these changes have been implemented in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazard consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve any changes to plant hardware or operating procedures. All snubbers and related components will continue to be visually and functionally inspected in accordance with the current specifications, and hence the overall operability of the snubbers are not affected. Thus the answers to the first 2 criteria are negative. None of the previous safety analyses are affected, and no safety assumptions need to be changed. Thus the answer to criterion (3) is also negative. The staff therefore proposes to determine that the requested amendment involves no significant hazards considerations.

#### *Local Public Document Room*

*location:* B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esquire, Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* John F. Stolz

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389, St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida

*Date of amendment requests:* July 26, 1989

*Description of amendment requests:* These proposed amendments would

revise Technical Specifications Sections 3.7 for both units to clarify testing requirements for the main feedwater line isolation valves and the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs).

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee provided the following discussion regarding the above three criteria:

#### *Criterion 1*

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The bases for Technical Specifications 3.7.1.5 for Units 1 and 2 and Technical Specification 3.7.1.6 for Unit 2, state that the main steam isolation valves and main feedwater isolation valves are maintained in the closed position to ensure that the consequences of an excess steam demand event are limited. With the main steam line isolation valves and the main feedwater line isolation valves maintained closed the functional design bases under accident conditions are met by prohibiting the blowdown of both steam generators and ensuring that all main feedwater flow is stopped. Therefore, the potential for excessive cooldown of the reactor coolant system, and the accompanying return to power from subcritical conditions, are reduced by the proposed license amendment.

Adding the statement regarding the inapplicability of Technical Specification 3.0.4 to the Unit 1 MSIV specification is administrative in nature, and brings the Unit 1 specification into agreement with the Combustion Engineering (CE) Standard Technical Specifications. Changing modes with the MSIVs closed does not involve any increase in accident probability or consequences because these valves will already be in their required accident position.

#### *Criterion 2*

Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Maintaining the main steam isolation valves and main feedwater isolation valves closed in Modes 2 through 4 does not create a new or different kind of accident from any previously established. Overpressurization of

the main steam lines when the main steam line isolation valves are closed is prevented by the safety valves on the main steam lines. The availability of feedwater to the steam generators is ensured by the operability requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system.

Allowing Unit 1 to change modes while both main steam line isolation valves are closed is in accordance with the CE Standard Technical Specifications, and will not create the potential for a new or different kind of accident or event.

#### Criterion 3

Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

By maintaining the main steam line and main feedwater isolation valves in a closed position, the potential consequences of a steam line break event are minimized, and the margins of safety provided in the accident analyses of record are increased.

Based upon the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes to the TS involve no significant hazards considerations.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Indian River Junior College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Fort Pierce, Florida 33450

**Attorney for licensee:** Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzinger, 1615 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036  
**NRC Project Director:** Herbert N. Berkow

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket No. 50-389, St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, St. Lucie County, Florida

**Date of amendment request:** July 26, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** This amendment revises Action f. of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1. to make it consistent with the Emergency Diesel Generator testing action requirements.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee provided the following discussion regarding the above three criteria:

#### Criterion 1

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) has not been affected as the proposed change is administrative in nature, and is intended to restore consistency in testing requirements for the emergency diesel generators when one offsite power source is inoperable. No parameters which affect the probabilities of occurrence of any accident are affected by this change.

The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR have not been increased as the proposed surveillance requirements will not adversely affect the operation or operability of the diesels or any other safety related equipment.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety has not changed since reducing the test frequency of the diesel generators and modifying the starting requirements to be consistent with the manufacturer's recommendations are intended to enhance diesel reliability by minimizing severe test conditions which can lead to premature failures.

#### Criterion 2

Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change is administrative in nature and is intended to restore consistency between ACTION statements relative to the starting of emergency diesel generators when one offsite power source is inoperable. The net effect of this change is to reduce the diesel generator testing frequency and starting requirements such that there is still a high degree of assurance that they would operate, if called upon, when one offsite circuit is inoperable, and has no impact on actual accident analysis.

The possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any analyzed in the UFSAR has not been increased in that the proposed license amendment incorporates the starting and testing requirements recommended by Generic Letter 84-15. The intent of the change is to enhance the reliability of the emergency diesel generators by adherence to manufacturer recommendations regarding engine prelube and warmup.

#### Criterion 3

Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change restores consistency between action statements in St. Lucie Unit 2

Technical Specification 3/4.8.1.1, reducing the frequency of diesel engine starts and diesel engine fast, cold starts while providing a high degree of assurance that they would operate, if called upon, when one offsite power circuit is inoperable. The reduction of diesel generator testing frequency should increase the reliability of the diesel generators because the diesel engines will be properly conditioned before startup and the number of starts decreased to reduce wear.

Based upon the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed changes to the TS involve no significant hazards considerations.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Indian River Junior College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Fort Pierce, Florida 33450

**Attorney for licensee:** Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzinger, 1615 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036

**NRC Project Director:** Herbert N. Berkow

Gulf States Utilities Company, Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1 West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

**Date of amendment request:** June 28, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** The proposed amendment would revise License Condition 2.C(14), Emergency Response Capabilities, Attachment 5, Item 3. Item 3 of Attachment 5 to the license specifies the schedule for implementation of modifications (installations or upgrade) for neutron flux monitoring consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 or the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) Licensing Topical Report (NEDO-31558, Position on NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, Requirements for Post-Accident Neutron Monitoring System). The current schedule, as established by Amendment No. 28 to the license, states that modifications, if required shall be completed before restart from the next refueling outage starting after 10 months from the date of receipt of the NRC Staff SER on NEDO-31558, but no later than January 1, 1991 unless otherwise notified in writing by the NRC staff.

The proposed change would modify the implementation schedule to state that modifications, if required, shall be completed before restart from the next refueling outage starting after 18 months from the date of receipt of the NRC Staff SER on NEDO-31558. The licensee's submittal indicates that the reason for the proposed change is that an 18-month period is required from initial specification release to completed installation of the neutron monitoring system (NMS).

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee provided an analysis that addressed the above three standards in the amendment application.

1. No significant increase in the probability or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated results from this proposed change because:

There is no change in system design or operation. The license condition currently requires upgrade of NMS during the third refueling outage. This proposed change will allow operation with the currently installed NMS which has been found to comply with all criteria proposed in the BWROG letter. This system is required to provide neutron flux indication and is not postulated to initiate any accidents. The NMS is used to verify reactor shutdown as part of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The use of neutron monitoring in the EOPs is conservative in that, if it is not available, actions are specified which will lead to safe shutdown without the system. The requirements of RG 1.97 concerning neutron monitoring are additions to the existing system abilities. Therefore, delay in upgrade to RG 1.97 requirements will not significantly increase the probability of an accident and would not lead to an increase in the consequences of an accident as defined in the safety analysis because of the conservative EOP actions.

2. This proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any previously evaluated because:

The current system has been evaluated using alternate criteria proposed in NEDO-31558 and found acceptable for continued operation. This change does not involve any changes to design or operation. In addition,

the neutron monitoring system is not postulated as the initiator of any accidents. Therefore, no new or different accidents are created.

3. This proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

Design, function, and operation of the existing NMS remain the same. There is no specific "margin of safety" associated with this system as used in RG 1.97 other than to assure reactor shutdown following a transient or accident. EOP actions are conservative with respect to the use of the NMS for verification that the reactor is shutdown. When not available during an accident or transient scenario, actions are specified which will lead to safe reactor shutdown. Because these actions lead to a safe plant condition (reactor shutdown), the margin of safety is not reduced. In addition, this request does not result in a reduction to the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the RBS Technical Specifications.

Because the present RBS design meets all criteria provided in the BWROG License Topical Report, NEDO-31558, which was submitted to the NRC April 2, 1988, as supported by the plant-specific evaluation attached (to the June 23, 1989 submittal), extension of the implementation date for a NMS meeting RG 1.97 guidance is justified. This proposed extension allows the NRC to complete their evaluation of the report, which provides an alternative design as allowed by the current license condition to comply with the RG 1.97 requirements. In addition, GSU will be able to better plan its resource utilization to address the NMS pursuant RG 1.97 after the Staff's SER is received.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination. Based on the review and the above discussion, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Government Documents Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803

**Attorney for licensee:** Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq., Conner and Wetterhahn, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006

**NRC Project Director:** Frederick J. Hebdon

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Linn County, Iowa

**Date of amendment request:** October 13, 1987

**Description of amendment request:** The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.2-B, "Instrumentation That Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems." The revision of TS Table 3.2-B would reflect the Containment High Pressure trip level setting to be greater than 2 psig, rather than the current setting of greater than 1

psig but less than 2 psig. Additionally, the remarks section of TS Table 3.2-B would be revised to state "Prevents inadvertent operation of containment spray during normal operation," rather than during "...accident condition". These revisions are necessary to resolve an inconsistency between the DAEC Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the DAEC TS.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:**

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided an analysis of no significant hazards consideration in its request for a license amendment. The licensee has concluded that the TS change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change to the TS would resolve an inconsistency in the instrument setpoint dealing with the control of the containment spray system at primary containment pressures below 2 psig. The resolution of the inconsistency would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The licensee has concluded that the TS change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident because this change would resolve an inconsistency in the TS to reflect an accident that has previously been evaluated in the FSAR. Therefore, no possibility of a new or different kind of accident would be created by the TS modification.

Finally, the licensee has concluded that the TS change would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because the proposal would not change the original margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the proposed changes and agrees with the licensee's conclusion. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant hazards consideration.



**Local Public Document Room**

**Location:** Cedar Rapids Public Library,  
500 First Street, S.E., Cedar Rapids, Iowa  
52401.

**Attorney for licensee:** Jack Newman,  
Esquire, Kathleen H. Shea, Esquire,  
Newman and Holtzinger, 1615 L Street,  
NW., Washington, DC 20036.

**NRC Project Director:** John N.  
Hannon.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,  
Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile Point  
Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Oswego  
County, New York

**Date of amendment request:** June 1,  
1989

**Description of amendment request:**  
The proposed amendment would revise  
Technical Specification Table 4.6.2g,  
Instrumentation That Initiates Control  
Rod Withdrawal Block - Surveillance  
Requirement and Table 4.6.2g Note (g) to  
delete surveillance requirements that  
are either inapplicable or cannot be  
performed due to instrument design  
limitations. The proposed changes will  
(1) remove the surveillance requirement  
to calibrate the Detector Not In Startup  
Position control rod block instruments  
associated with the Source Range  
Monitoring (SRM) and the Intermediate  
Range Monitoring (IRM) instrument  
channels, (2) remove the surveillance  
requirement to calibrate the SRM and  
the IRM Instrument Inoperative control  
rod block instrument channels, (3)  
remove the surveillance requirement to  
perform sensor checks on the SRM and  
the IRM control rod withdrawal block  
instrumentation and (4) revise Note (g)  
to Table 4.6.2g to reflect the changes  
made to the table and the deletion of the  
requirement to calibrate SRM and IRM  
rod block instrumentation prior to  
shutdown.

**Basis for proposed no significant  
hazards consideration determination:**  
The Commission has provided  
standards for determining whether a  
significant hazards consideration exists  
as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed  
amendment to an operating license for a  
facility involves no significant hazards  
considerations if operation of the facility  
in accordance with a proposed  
amendment would not: (1) Involve a  
significant increase in the probability or  
consequences of an accident previously  
evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of  
a new or different kind of accident from  
any accident previously evaluated; or (3)  
Involve a significant reduction in a  
margin of safety. The staff has reviewed  
the licensee's submittal and concludes:

1. The operation of Nine Mile Point  
Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed  
amendment, will not involve a  
significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously  
evaluated because the deleted  
surveillance requirements will not have  
an adverse effect upon the ability of the  
Control Rod Block circuitry to perform  
its intended safety function.

The SRM and IRM systems provide  
multi-channel monitoring of the core  
thermal neutron flux during startup and  
low power operation. In addition, the  
SRM and IRM systems will initiate a rod  
withdrawal block for high neutron flux  
or channel malfunction conditions. Both  
the SRM and the IRM systems provide  
Detector Not In Startup Position,  
Inoperative and Upscale trip signals to  
the control rod withdrawal block  
circuitry and the IRM system provides a  
Downscale trip signal.

The SRM and the IRM Detector Not in  
Startup Position instrument channels  
initiate a control rod block to ensure  
that control rods are not withdrawn  
unless the appropriate detectors are  
properly positioned and capable of  
providing the operator and the circuitry  
with neutron flux information. The  
licensee has indicated that the design of  
these instrument channels does not  
allow the output of the detector to be  
varied in response to a variable test  
signal. Therefore, since the trip is either  
on or off in response to the detector  
position switch, it cannot be calibrated.  
The proposed change to delete the  
requirement to calibrate this function  
will not affect the ability of the rod  
block to function as required, since the  
performance of the associated  
functional tests at the existing Technical  
Specification required frequency verifies  
operability of the rod block function.  
Also, preventive maintenance  
realignment of the detector retraction  
mechanism limit switches each refueling  
outage ensures proper detector and  
position switch alignment.

An SRM and IRM instrument channel  
inoperative rod block is initiated on low  
detector voltage, electronics drawer  
internal module unplugged, or the  
channel mode switch not in the Operate  
position. Since none of these inputs  
require calibration, the proposed change  
to delete the surveillance requirement to  
calibrate the instrument channel  
Inoperative function will not affect their  
ability to initiate a rod block when  
required. Additionally, the functional  
tests on the instrument channels at the  
existing Technical Specification  
required frequency ensures operability  
of the rod block function.

The rod block instrument channels are  
digital/bistable channels and their  
output signal is either present or absent  
depending upon the state of the sensor.  
Because the conditions that generate an  
output signal (high neutron flux or

channel malfunction) are received only  
when the event is present, a qualitative  
determination of acceptable operability  
by observation or comparison with other  
independent sensors measuring the  
same variable (i.e., a sensor check) is  
not possible. Therefore, the proposed  
change to delete the sensor check  
requirement for the SRM and IRM  
instrument channels will not affect the  
ability of the channels to perform as  
required.

A control rod withdrawal block  
functions to prevent control rod  
withdrawal only. Therefore, the change  
to delete the requirement to calibrate  
the SRM and IRM rod withdrawal block  
instrument channels prior to shutdown  
(rod insertion) does not affect the ability  
of these channels to perform as  
required.

A proposed administrative change to  
Note (g) of Table 4.6.2g reflects the  
above proposed changes to Table 4.6.2g.

In summary, the proposed changes do  
not affect the analyses of abnormal  
operational transients or design basis  
accidents as presented in Section XV of  
the Final Safety Analysis Report. The  
proposed changes do not change the  
design or operation of the detector or  
instrumentation and, therefore, do not  
increase the probability or  
consequences of any accident  
previously evaluated.

2. The operation of Nine Mile Point  
Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed  
amendment, will not create the  
possibility of a new or different kind of  
accident from any accident previously  
evaluated since the proposed changes  
do not alter the design or operation of  
the detector or instrumentation systems.

3. The operation of Nine Mile Point  
Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed  
amendment, will not involve a  
significant reduction in a margin of  
safety because, as discussed previously,  
the deleted surveillance requirements  
are unnecessary and do not affect the  
ability of the Control Rod Block  
circuitry to function as required.

Specifically, the SRM and the IRM  
Detector Not In Startup Position rod  
block instrument channel calibrations  
required by the existing Technical  
Specification are being deleted because  
the design of the instrumentation does  
not facilitate calibration. The  
performance of functional tests on the  
instrument channels and preventive  
maintenance checks of the detector limit  
switches presently required by the  
Technical Specifications adequately  
ensures instrument operability and  
alignment, respectively. Calibration of  
the SRM and the IRM instrument  
channel inoperative rod block required

by the existing Technical Specification is not necessary because the channel inputs do not require calibration.

The sensor checks required by the Technical Specifications are not applicable because sensor checks cannot be performed on the digital/bistable outputs from the SRM and IRM sensors that initiate control rod blocks (detector not in startup position, inoperative, upscale and downscale).

The requirement to calibrate Control Rod Withdrawal Instrumentation prior to shutdown (control rod insertion) is not necessary since control rod withdrawal blocks are only applicable for rod withdrawal.

Based upon the above, the staff proposes that the amendment will not involve a significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room**  
Location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

**Attorney for licensee:** Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire, Conner & Wetterhahn, Suite 1050, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006.

**NRC Project Director:** Robert A. Capra

Philadelphia Electric Company, Docket No. 50-352, Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

**Date of amendment request:** July 11, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-06 "Removal of Organization Charts from Technical Specification Administrative Control Requirements" to: (1) remove the onsite and offsite organizational charts from TS Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, respectively and (2) make certain miscellaneous administrative changes in Section 6 of the TSs (Administrative Control) related to revisions to the corporate organization.

GL 88-06 encourages licensees to propose changes to their TS to remove organizational charts from TS and replace them with descriptions of the organizational structure and characteristics which are important to safety. The proposed changes concern the Administrative Controls in Section 6.0, and do not affect any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. The proposed changes in this amendment request are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Category 'A' proposed changes involve removing the onsite and offsite organizational charts from TS

Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, respectively. These proposed changes are consistent with the guidance provided in GL 88-06. Category 'B' proposed changes are five miscellaneous administrative changes. These proposed changes are to: (1) revise paragraphs in Sections 6.2 and 6.5 to reflect the new organization under the Executive Vice President-Nuclear, (2) revise paragraph 6.5.2.1 to indicate that the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) reports to and advises the Executive Vice President-Nuclear, (3) revise paragraph 6.5.2.9.C to indicate that NRB audit reports shall be forwarded to the Corporate Officer(s) responsible for the areas audited, (4) revise paragraphs 6.2.3.2 and 6.2.3.4 to reflect title changes and the deletion of the corporate Independent Safety Engineering Group and (5) revise paragraph 6.14.2 to reflect the groups responsible for technical review of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided an analysis of the no significant hazards consideration in its request for a license amendment for each of the proposed changes discussed previously. The Staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis of the proposed amendment against the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and finds that:

A. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Removing the organization charts from TS does not affect plant operation. The proposed changes do not increase or decrease the qualification, experience or training requirements of onsite or offsite Limerick Generating Station (LGS) personnel. The LGS Quality Assurance Program contains detailed organization charts and associated descriptions of responsibilities. Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3) govern changes to the organizations described in the QA Program. In accordance with the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6) the applicant's organizational structure is included in the LGS Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13. As required by 10 CFR 50.71(e), the licensee submits annual updates to the FSAR.

The administrative changes involving a position title change, creation of an advisory board, distribution of audit reports, ISEG composition, and elimination of unnecessary review details, do not involve the design or operation of plant hardware or systems. Accidents analyzed remain unaffected by these changes.

B. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Removing the organization charts from TS does not affect plant operation. The proposed changes do not increase or decrease the qualification, experience or training requirements of onsite or offsite Limerick Generating Station (LGS) personnel. The LGS Quality Assurance Program contains detailed organization charts and associated descriptions of responsibilities. Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3) govern changes to the organizations described in the QA Program. In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6) the applicant's organizational structure is included in the LGS Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13. As required by 10 CFR 50.71(e), the licensee submits annual updates to the FSAR.

The administrative changes involving a position title change, creation of an advisory board, distribution of audit reports, ISEG composition, and elimination of unnecessary review details, do not involve the design or operation of plant hardware or systems. No new modes of operation, changes to setpoints or changes in operating parameters result from this change.

C. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The removal of the organization charts from TS is accompanied by the addition of requirements for the Limerick organizational structure which are needed to maintain the essential aspects of the material being removed. This will permit the implementation of organizational changes without prior NRC approval provided the change meets these added organizational structure requirements. Consequently, enhancements to the organizational structure, as well as minor administrative changes such as position title revisions, can be implemented promptly upon identification of the need



for the change thereby creating a positive impact on safety.

The administrative changes involving a position title change, creation of an advisory board, distribution of audit reports, ISEG composition, and elimination of unnecessary review details, do not involve the design or operation of plant hardware or systems. No new modes of operation, changes to setpoints or changes in operating parameters result from this change.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and significant hazards analysis and concurs with the licensee's determination as to whether the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. Therefore, the Staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Pottstown Public Library, 500 High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

**Attorney for licensee:** Conner and Wetterhahn, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006

**NRC Project Director:** Walter R. Butler

Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company, Dockets Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units Nos. 2 and 3, York County, Pennsylvania

**Date of application for amendments:** July 11, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** These amendments would remove the organization charts from the technical Specifications to the FSAR in response to the guidance set forth in the NRC staff's Generic Letter 88-06 "Removal of Organization Charts from Technical Specification Administrative Control Requirements." Several administrative changes involving changes in position titles and reporting relationships are also proposed. These proposed changes to the organization charts and the administrative changes have been grouped as Category A and Category B changes, respectively in the licensee's application.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee has provided a discussion of the proposed changes as they relate to these standards; the discussion is presented below. The licensee has arranged these changes into two categories. The licensee's discussion of each of these categories is presented separately as follows.

#### **Standard 1**

The proposed Category 'A' changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Removing the organization charts from the Technical Specifications and replacing them with more general language does not affect plant operation. The proposed changes do not increase or decrease the qualification, experience or training requirements of onsite or offsite nuclear personnel. Additionally, the proposed changes do not affect the shift crew composition or the facility management positions requiring an NRC license.

The Peach Bottom Quality Assurance Plan contains detailed organization charts and associated description of individual and group responsibilities as they apply to the operation and support of the Peach Bottom facility. Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3) govern changes to the organization as described in the Quality Assurance Plan. 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6) requires that the organizational structure also be included in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Section 13 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report provides a description of the organization and detailed organization charts. As required by 10 CFR 50.71(e), this information must be maintained and updated annually. Based on this review, it is concluded that the proposed Category 'A' changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

#### **Standard 2**

The proposed Category 'A' changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes are administrative in nature, and do not involve any physical alterations of plant configurations or changes to setpoints, or operating parameters. It is therefore concluded that removing the organization charts from the Technical Specifications does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

#### **Standard 3**

The proposed Category 'A' changes do not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Removing the organization charts from the Technical Specifications enhances the margin of safety by permitting an organizational change without NRC approval provided that the objectives of proposed paragraph 6.2.1 are met, thereby allowing a more timely

response to situations where the appropriate action is a prompt organizational change. Safety is further enhanced by providing clear and concise definitions of responsibility for the Shift Supervisor, Plant Manager and Vice President, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Further, the proposed changes include additional administrative controls which capture the essential aspects of the material being removed such that the associated requirements will continue to be met. Based on this review, it is concluded that the proposed Category 'A' changes do not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety, but improve the margin of safety.

#### **Standard 1**

The proposed Category 'B' miscellaneous changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Replacing the technical Engineer with the Engineer-Systems on the PORC will not decrease the effectiveness of the PORC. As required by proposed specification 6.2.2.g, either the Superintendent-Technical or the Engineer-Systems will hold a Senior Reactor Operator license, thereby ensuring the level of plant operations expertise of the PORC.

Sufficient corporate management involvement in nuclear plant safety will be maintained with the elimination of the direct reporting requirement of the NRB to the Office of the Chief Executive. The Office of the Chief Executive will be made aware of NRB activities by the Nuclear Committee of the Board through the Board of Directors and by the Executive Vice President-Nuclear.

Designating Corporate Officer(s) responsible for the areas audited instead of the Executive Vice President-Nuclear as the recipient(s) of NRB audit reports is a more appropriate initial level of review. The Corporate Officers have a closer proximity to the sources of problems and therefore can take prompt corrective actions. If NRB audit findings are not satisfactorily addressed by the Corporate Officer(s), the NRB may inform the Executive Vice President-Nuclear through its normal communication channel as defined in Specification 6.5.2.9.

Section 14 of the PBAPS UFSAR has been reviewed to determine the effect of the proposed administrative changes on previously evaluated accidents. It is concluded that the accident analyses in Section 14 of the UFSAR are not affected by the proposed miscellaneous changes. For this reason, as well as the reasons presented above, it is concluded that these changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

#### **Standard 2**

The proposed Category 'B' miscellaneous changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The implementation of these miscellaneous changes will not affect the interpretation or intent of the specifications they involve (6.5.1.2, 6.5.2.9 and 6.5.2.10.c). These changes are purely administrative and do not involve any hardware changes or plant modifications. Therefore, these changes will not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

### Standard 3

The proposed Category 'B' miscellaneous changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The administrative nature of these changes will not impact plant systems or operation. For this reason, as well as the reasons presented in the Safety Assessment and in response to item 1 above, it is concluded that these changes will not involve any reduction in a margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination for the Category A and B changes discussed above and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission has proposed to determine that the above changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126

**Attorney for Licensee:** Troy B. Conner, Jr., 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006

**NRC Project Director:** Walter R. Butler

Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company, Dockets Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units Nos. 2 and 3, York County, Pennsylvania

**Date of application for amendments:** July 19, 1989

### Description of amendment request:

The proposed amendments would eliminate the requirement for use of the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) and would decrease the power level setpoint above which the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) would no longer be required to be used from the existing 25% power level requirement at both units to a new 10% power level setpoint. The licensee states that these proposed amendments are based on and are consistent with the NRC Safety Evaluation Report issued to J. S. Charnley on December 27, 1987, which approved Amendment 17 of General Electric Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel".

### Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards

consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee has provided a discussion of the proposed changes as they relate to these standards; the discussion is presented below.

**Standard 1:** The proposed revisions do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Deleting the RSCS and changing the low power set point on the RWM has no effect on the probability of equipment malfunction in other systems or within the RWM.

The probability of occurrence of an accident is not affected by this change. The probability of an RDA is dependent only on the control rod drive system and mechanisms themselves, and not in any way on the RSCS or RWM.

The consequences of an RDA as evaluated in the PBAPS UFSAR will not be affected by this modification. An extensive probabilistic study was performed by the NRC staff (letter and enclosure from B. C. Rusche, NRR, to R. Fraley, ACRS, dated June 1, 1978, "Generic Item IIA-2 Control Rod Drop Accident (BWRs)"). This study indicated that there was not a need for the RSCS. Furthermore, improved methodologies in the RDA analysis methods (e.g. BNL-NUREG 28109, "Thermal-Hydraulic Effects on Center Rod Drop Accidents in a Boiling Water Reactor," October 1980) indicated that the peak fuel enthalpies resulting from an RDA are significantly lower than previously determined by less refined methodologies.

The RSCS duplicates the function of the RWM. So long as the RWM is operable, the RSCS is not needed since the RWM prevents control rod pattern error. In the event the RWM is out of service, after the withdrawal of the first 12 control rods, the proposed Technical Specifications require that control rod withdrawal movement and compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern be verified by a second licensed operator or technically qualified member of the station technical staff. The verification process is controlled procedurally to ensure a high quality, independent review of control rod movement. In addition, to further minimize control rod movement at low power with the RWM out of service, the proposed Technical Specifications will permit only one plant start-up per calendar year with the RWM out of service prior to or during the withdrawal of the first twelve control rods. All the above taken together demonstrate consistency and applicability to those conclusions reached in the referenced NRC SER, and substantiate the conclusion that there will be no increase in the consequences of an RDA as evaluated in the FSAR as a result of eliminating the RSCS.

There will also be no increase in the consequences of an RDA as evaluated in the UFSAR due to lowering the RWM set point from 25% to 10%. The effects of an RDA are more severe at low power levels and are less severe as power level increases. Although the original calculations for the RDA were performed at 10% power, the NRC required that the generic BWR Technical Specifications be written to require operation of the RWM below 25% power in order to ensure conservatism. However, GE continued to perform the RDA analyses at and below 10% power because these produced more conservative analytical results. More refined calculations by BNL (BNL-NUREG 28109, "Thermal-Hydraulic Effects on Center Rod Drop Accidents in a Boiling Water Reactor," October 1980) have shown that even with the maximum single control rod position error, and most multiple control rod error patterns, the peak fuel rod enthalpy reached during an RDA from these control rod patterns would not exceed the NRC limit of 280 cal/gm for RDAs above 10% power, confirming the original GE analyses. Hence, lowering the RWM set point from 25% to 10% will not result in an increase in the consequences of an RDA as evaluated in the UFSAR. The previously referenced NRC SER has concluded this RWM set point reduction to be acceptable.

**Standard 2:** The proposed revisions do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Operation of the RSCS and RWM cannot cause or prevent an accident. They function to minimize the consequences of an RDA. The RDA is already evaluated in the UFSAR, and the effect of this proposed change on the analyses is discussed in item 1 above.

Elimination of the RSCS and lowering the RWM set point will have no impact on the operation of any other systems, and hence would not contribute to a malfunction in any other equipment nor create the possibility for an accident to occur which has not already been evaluated.

**Standard 3:** The proposed revisions do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Elimination of the RSCS will not lower the margin of safety for the reasons discussed in item 1 above and summarized below:

a) An extensive NRC study has determined that the possibility of an RDA resulting in unacceptable consequences is so low as to negate the requirement for the RSCS.

b) Recent calculations have determined that the consequences of an RDA are acceptable above 10% power.

c) The RSCS is redundant in function to the RWM. Eliminating the RSCS does not eliminate the control rod pattern monitoring function performed by the RWM.

d) To ensure that the RWM will be in service when required, the proposed RWM Technical Specification will be revised to allow only one startup per calendar year with the RWM out of service prior to or during the withdrawal of the first twelve control rods. If the RWM is out of service below 10% power, control rod movement and compliance with prescribed control rod patterns will be

verified by a second licensed operator or technically qualified member of the station technical staff. This situation is controlled by station procedure which specifically requires the following:

- Plant Management approval is required in order for the operator to bypass the inoperable RWM.
- A second operator or technically qualified staff member, with no other duties, is required to verify the first operator's actions while the first operator performs rod movements.
- The startup and the shutdown sequences with their respective signoff sheets provide for verification by the second operator after each rod movement step is completed by the first operator.
- The startup and shutdown sequences follow the same control rod patterns that the RWM enforces if it were not bypassed.

There is no significant reduction in the margin of safety resulting from lowering the RWM set point from 25% to 10% because calculations by GE and BNL have shown that even with the maximum single control rod position error, and most multiple error patterns, the peak fuel rod enthalpy during an RDA from these patterns would not exceed the NRC limit (280 cal/gm) above 10% power.

In summary, GE has provided technical justification for the proposed changes in the Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A and associated references which justify the acceptability of the proposed changes.

The NRC has reviewed and accepted the GE analysis and provided guidelines for licensees wanting to make the changes proposed in NEDE-24011-P-A and approved in the NRC SER issued December 27, 1987 to J.S. Charnley of General Electric.

The proposed changes are consistent with those approved in the NRC SER and the guidelines set forth therein. Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission has proposed to determine that the above changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

#### *Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126

*Attorney for Licensee:* Troy B. Conner, Jr., 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006

*NRC Project Director:* Walter R. Butler

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego, New York

*Date of amendment request:* May 31, 1989 and amplified by letter dated July 7, 1989

#### *Description of amendment request:*

The proposed amendment would modify the core spray (CS) pump flow rate test requirements to make the wording more consistent with the wording of the flow rate test requirements of other pumps in the Emergency Core Cooling System. Presently, the CS pump test requirement in Specification 4.5.A.1.b states that the "Core Spray shall deliver at least 4625 gpm against a system head corresponding to a total pump developed head of greater than or equal to 113 psig." The amendment would change this to read that the "Core Spray pumps shall deliver at least 4625 gpm against a system head corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of greater than or equal to 113 psi above primary containment pressure."

#### *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has evaluated the proposed amendment against the standards provided above and has made the following determination:

Operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as stated in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not:

1. involve significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The intent of the proposed change is to clarify and correct the Technical Specifications. The change is purely administrative in nature. There are no setpoint changes, safety limit changes, or changes to limiting conditions for operation. The proposed change assures that the core spray system is tested in accordance with the assumptions contained in the existing accident analyses. This change has no impact on plant safety operations. The change will have no impact on previously evaluated accidents.

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated. The proposed change is purely administrative in nature and is intended to clarify and improve the quality of the Technical Specification. The change cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The proposed change

corrects an error which currently exists in the Technical Specifications. The change is administrative in nature and will clarify the specifications. This change does not contain any setpoint or safety limit changes regarding isolation or alarms. The proposed change does not affect the environmental monitoring program. This change does not negatively affect the plant's safety systems and does not reduce any safety margins.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination. Based on the review and the above discussion, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

#### *Local Public Document Room*

*location:* State University of New York, Penfield Library, Reference and Documents Department, Oswego, New York 13126.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mr. Charles M. Pratt, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10019.

*NRC Project Director:* Robert A. Capra

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

*Date of amendment request:* July 9, 1987

*Description of amendment request:* The licensee proposes to modify the Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications by:

1. Changing the channel description format for item 7.a of Table 3.3-3, Loss of Voltage, to specify that the total number of channels is 1 per bus.

2. For Item 7.b of Table 3.3-3, Sustained Degraded Voltage, changing the Total Number of Channels, Channels to Trip and Minimum Channels Operable to 3 per bus, 2 per bus and 3 per bus, respectively.

3. For Item 7.b of Table 3.3-4, Sustained Degraded Voltage, changing the Trip Setpoint to greater than or equal to 91.6 percent of bus voltage for less than or equal to 13 seconds and changing the Allowable Values to greater than or equal to 91 percent of bus voltage for less than or equal to 15 seconds.

#### *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*

Item 1, Table 3.3-3 Item 7.a  
This item is being revised to be consistent with the channel description format used for other items in this Table. This is an editorial change only. No modification is being made to the primary undervoltage protection system.

Item 2, Table 3.3-3 Item 7.b

The second level undervoltage protection system has been redesigned

as a result of an event which occurred at Salem Unit No. 2 on August 28, 1988. Immediately following a reactor trip with safety injection, the Unit 2 vital buses began flip-flopping between the No. 21 and 22 Station Power Transformers (SPT) (preferred source of power) until they eventually separated from the offsite power system. The previous design provided for the transfer of a vital bus to the alternate SPT whenever the secondary voltage for its designated SPT dropped below 91 percent of rated bus voltage for greater than 10 seconds. This function was controlled by 2 relays on each vital bus. These relays were positioned such that they monitor the secondary voltage of each of the SPT (1 per SPT). In addition to initiating the transfer function these relays provided a transfer permissive signal such that a vital bus could not be transferred unless the alternate SPT has an acceptable secondary voltage. A separate relay monitored vital bus voltage and provided an input to each of the three Safeguards Equipment Controllers (SEC) such that, for a sustained degraded voltage (less than 91 percent for greater than 13 seconds) condition on 2 out of 3 vital buses, all vital buses were separated from the offsite source and sequenced onto the emergency source.

As redesigned, the transfer function was eliminated. The existing transfer relays were replaced with relays of similar design but with improved setpoint drift characteristics. These new relays (1 per bus) were connected to operate in parallel with the previous vital bus degraded voltage relay. The previous vital bus degraded voltage relay was also replaced with an upgraded relay. The interface with the SEC was then reconfigured from its previous 2 out of 3 bus design to a 2 out of 3 relay per bus design. A failure analysis has been completed by the licensee for each component in the system and demonstrates that no single failure will result in the creation of an unanalyzed condition. The new configuration: (1) eliminates the possibility of vital bus flip-flopping, (2) provides for the separation of the vital buses from the preferred source on an individual basis only, and (3) satisfies General Design Criterion 17 relative to maintaining the connection between the offsite source and the onsite distribution system.

#### Item 3, Table 3.3-4 Item 7.b

This table is being revised to: (1) incorporate the revised trip setpoint for the second level undervoltage protection relays, and (2) to correct the allowable value for second level undervoltage

protection. The present Technical Specification allowable value for second level undervoltage protection is in error as it does not reflect an allowance for line loss due to cable length (about 0.7 percent). However, the present trip setpoint for the second level undervoltage protection system (equal to or greater than 91 percent) provides sufficient margin to account for those losses. The new trip setpoint of greater than or equal to 91.8 percent is based on the results of detailed analyses of the Salem Generating Station electrical distribution system transient response characteristics. Those analyses indicate that, at the Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) bulk power system minimum expected value of 505 KV and for a LOCA on one Salem Unit and a concurrent orderly shutdown of the other Unit, vital bus voltage will recover to a worse case value of about 92.9 percent. The minimum allowable trip value and trip setpoint are derived using the 90 percent minimum motor terminal voltage requirement as a starting point, and then applying appropriate allowances as provided in Regulatory Guide 1.105.

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

1. For Item 7.b of Table 3.3-3, the licensee has analyzed the proposed amendment to determine if a significant hazard exists:

1) The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The failure analysis [performed by the licensee] demonstrates that no single failure results in the existence of an unanalyzed condition. Additionally, the second level undervoltage protection system does not provide an input to the Reactor Protection System nor can it cause any one of the incoming 500 KV sources to be isolated from the Salem Station electrical distribution system. All equipment used in the system will be seismically qualified. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident remains unchanged.

The second level undervoltage system is required to protect against those events (e.g. bulk power system degradation) which result in a degraded voltage at the vital buses but which do not result in a complete loss of

voltage. The modified system continues to satisfy this requirement as previously discussed. Additionally, by eliminating the ability to transfer between SPTs, the potential for damage to safety related motors from frequent starts is eliminated. The increased redundancy in the SEC logic inputs provides greater assurance that the system will perform its intended function. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents remain unchanged.

2) The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. As demonstrated in [the failure analysis], no single failure will result in the existence of an unanalyzed condition. The second level undervoltage system does not provide any input to the Reactor Protection System nor can it cause any one of the incoming 500 KV sources to be isolated from the Salem Station electrical distribution system. The modified design eliminates the possibility of flip-flopping of the vital buses between offsite power sources and thereby assures the availability of all safety related equipment.

3) The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The changes to the second level undervoltage system maintain the existing margin of safety by eliminating the transfer between offsite sources, thereby assuring that the integrity of safety related electrical equipment is maintained. The additional redundancy provided in the revised design enhances the overall reliability of the system and further assures that the system function will be completed.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's significant hazards consideration determination analysis for the changes associated with Item 7.b of Table 3.3-3 and concurs with the licensee's determination that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

2. With respect to the proposed change to Item 7.a of Table 3.3-3 and Item 7.b of Table 3.3-4, the Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of its standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751). One of the examples, (i), of an amendment likely to involve no significant hazards consideration relates to "A purely administrative change to technical specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error or a change in nomenclature."

Another example, (ii), of an amendment likely to involve no significant hazards consideration relates to "A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications, e.g., a more stringent surveillance requirement."

(a) Item 7.a of Table 3.3-3

The change from 3 to 1 per bus is a change in nomenclature. There are 3 buses, each equipped with a shutdown channel so the change to 1 per bus meets example (i).

(b) Table 3.3-4, Item 7.b, Allowable Value

The current Technical Specifications do not take into account the line loss (voltage drop) because of cable length. This change will correct that and therefore, meets example (i).

(c) Table 3.3-4, Item 7.b Trip Setpoint  
Changing the value from greater than or equal to 91 percent to greater than or equal to 91.6 percent is a more stringent requirement. Therefore this change meets example (ii).

Based on the above the staff proposes to determine that the changes to Table 3.3-3, Item 7.a and Table 3.3-4, Item 7.b do not involve a significant hazards consideration because they change the nomenclature, correct an error or provide a more stringent requirement.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Salem Free Public library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079

**Attorney for licensee:** Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Conner and Wetterhahn, Suite 1050, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006

**NRC Project Director:** Walter R. Butler

**Public Service Electric & Gas Company,**  
Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

**Date of amendment request:** January 26, 1989 and May 22, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** By letter dated January 26, 1989, the licensee proposed to withdraw the wording in their June 23, 1988 letter, of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.4.a (no change from current Technical Specifications).

By letter dated May 22, 1989, the licensee proposed to modify Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.4 and 4.1.3.5 by adding a footnote as follows:  
\*\*For power levels below 50 percent one hour thermal "soak time" is permitted. During this soak time, the absolute value of rod motion is limited to six steps.

This is applicable prior to verification of rod positions.

The original request, dated June 23, 1988, was noticed on January 11, 1989 (54 FR 1024).

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:**  
The licensee's January 26, 1989 letter withdrew a proposed change in Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.4.a that would have replaced "Within 15 minutes

prior to withdrawal of any rods in control banks A, B, C or D during an approach to reactor critically (sic)" with "Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any control bank during an approach to reactor critically (sic)". Because this change was not discussed in the licensee's June 23, 1988 application the licensee was asked to justify the change. The licensee chose to withdraw the change. Therefore, no change is being proposed to this section.

The original application would have, among other things, deleted any reference to a waiting period before rod position verification after rod motion. Because individual rod position indication is subject to thermal transients, it is important that thermal equilibrium be achieved before rod position verification at power levels below 50 percent. In their May 22, 1989 letter, the licensee opted to include a footnote to Surveillance Requirements 4.1.3.4 and 4.1.3.5 to allow a one-hour thermal soak period before rod position verification to allow thermal equilibrium to be reached at powers below 50 percent. Also, during the soak time rod motion would be limited to six steps absolute. For powers above 50 percent, rod motion is expected to be small and will not induce significant thermal transients.

In the initial application the licensee had determined that the proposed change did not constitute a significant hazards consideration. The staff reviewed the licensee's analysis and concurred with the licensee's determination that the proposed amendment did not involve a significant hazards consideration. The staff had proposed to determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration [54 FR 1024 dated January 11, 1989].

The licensee has reviewed the original Significant Hazards Consideration and determined: The proposed changes do not affect the previously submitted Significant Hazards Consideration.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and concurs with the licensee's determination that the proposed amendment change does not involve a significant hazards consideration and the original significant hazards consideration remains valid. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079

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Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006

**NRC Project Director:** Walter R. Butler

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Dockets**  
Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Limestone County, Alabama

**Date of amendment requests:** June 20, 1989, as supplemented by letter of July 25, 1989 (TS 271)

**Description of amendment requests:**  
The proposed changes would delete Technical Specification (TS) 3.10.B.1.b.2 and 3.10.B.1.3 which currently allow reactivity additions without continuous core monitoring. Other proposed changes would correct certain identified deficiencies, thereby, resulting in more conservative controls during fuel load and bringing the Browns Ferry TS into consistency with the staff's guidance in the Standard Technical Specifications for Boiling Water Reactors (NUREG-0123).

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:**  
The Commission has provided Standards for determining whether a significant hazards determination exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). 10 CFR 50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analyses, using the standards in Section 50.92, on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and 10 CFR 50.92, the licensee has performed and provided the following analysis:

1. This proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The design basis accident during core alterations is the dropping of a fuel assembly. Since these changes increase the monitoring requirements for core alterations and there is no new fuel handling activity introduced that was not previously allowed by the current technical specifications, there is no increase in the probability or consequence of the dropped assembly accident. These changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a control rod removal error or a fuel rod assembly insertion error. There is no increased probability or consequences of an accidental reactivity insertion or an inadvertent criticality.

2. This proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

These TS changes result in improved monitoring requirement during core alterations that would add reactivity. There are no new activities required during core alterations due to these proposed changes which could introduce any new or different accident. The deletion of the two options of loading fuel without continuous SRM



monitoring will require the use of fuel load chambers (FLCs) during part of the fuel loading. FLCs have been used during 13 previous fuel loadings at BFN. The proposed clarification of the TS allowing the SRM count rate to decrease below 3 cps during the special conditions specified for complete core unloading do not change the intent of the current TS. The Control Rods are fully inserted in the core and are electrically disarmed and cannot be moved. Therefore, no reactivity can be added by control rod movement. In addition, any fuel movements would be to remove a fuel assembly from the reactor core. In either case, no core alterations will be made that would increase core reactivity. All other changes are more conservative than the current TS requirements on core alterations, including normal control rod movement. Therefore, the possibility of a new kind of accident is not created.

3. This change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The only margin of safety applicable to fuel loading is the requirement for having 0.38 percent delta K shutdown margin. The proposed changes are conservative by requiring continuous SRM monitoring during core alterations which could add reactivity. In addition, the requirements for control rod withdrawal with the vessel head removed will be considered as a core alteration which is also more conservative than the current TS. The use of SRMs for core monitoring during core alterations is not taken credit for in any margin of safety as defined in the TS bases. Since these proposed TS changes are more restrictive, they will not result in the reduction of any margin of safety as defined in the TS bases.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the application for amendments involves no significant hazards considerations.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Athens Public Library, South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

**Attorney for licensee:** General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, E11 B33, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

**NRC Assistant Director:** Suzanne Black

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia

**Date of amendment request:** July 24, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** The proposed change would modify the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications (TS) which identifies the membership composition of the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) by adding the Superintendent-Engineering to the list of members.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has reviewed the proposed change in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the request does not involve significant hazards considerations in that it would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because the [change reflects] administrative considerations and [does] not change the plant design or operation. Presently, provisions made in the Technical Specifications for the appointment of alternate members to the SNSOC may be utilized with regard to the Superintendent-Engineering. The proposed change merely allows the augmentation of the pool of members readily available to convene meetings of the SNSOC; or

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because, as above, plant design or operation is not affected by [the] proposed [change], or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, because neither plant design or operation is affected. [The] proposed [change does] not alter the function, alternates, meeting frequency, quorum, responsibilities, authority, or records of the SNSOC as defined by the Administrative Controls of the Technical Specifications.

Based on the staff's review of the licensee's evaluation, the staff agrees with the licensee's conclusions as stated above. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendments do not involve significant hazards considerations.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: The Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

**Attorney for licensee:** Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Hutton and Williams, P.O. Box 1535, Richmond, Virginia 23212.

**NRC Project Director:** Herbert N. Berkow Washington Public Power Supply System, Docket No. 50-397, Nuclear Project No. 2, Benton County, Washington

**Date of amendment request:** June 15, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** The licensee has completed the installation of a wide range neutron flux monitoring system as required by license condition 2.C.(16) Attachment 2, Item 3(b). The amendment request is to put the operability requirement for this wide range flux monitoring system into Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.5-1, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation." Surveillance requirements for the wide range monitor would be put into Table 4.3.7.5-1, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements." Under accident conditions the wide range monitoring system will replace three other neutron flux monitoring systems. Requirements for the average power range monitor (APRM), the intermediate range monitor (IRM), and the source range monitor (SRM) would be removed from these two tables.

The licensee has also requested a change to the Action Statement to be implemented in the event of inoperability of the wide range flux monitoring system. The current action statement to be applied when the neutron flux monitors are inoperable would require repair or shutdown within a specified time. The proposed action statement would allow use of an alternate sampling method instead of shutdown in the event of inoperability of the wide range system. The alternate sampling method would utilize the APRM, the IRM, and the SRM.

By letter dated November 16, 1988 the licensee notified the NRC that the installation of the wide range monitoring system would take place during the 1987 refueling outage and requested that the technical specifications be revised to incorporate the requirements for this new system. Notice of consideration of issuance of this amendment was published in the Federal Register on April 8, 1987 (52 FR 11377). The licensee experienced a number of difficulties in demonstrating the environmental qualifications of the system and asked to defer action on the November 1988 request. Because of the significant lapse in time, on May 17, 1989 the NRC notified the licensee that the November 18, 1988 request was being denied. Subsequently the licensee resolved the environmental qualification problems.

The June 15, 1989 amendment request seeks the exact changes sought in the November 16, 1988 request. The licensee declared that the statements made in the 1988 letter are still accurate and applicable including their arguments supporting the determination of no significant hazards. Therefore, the November 18, 1988 letter will be.

considered as part of the amendment request.

**Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has determined and the staff agrees, that the requested amendment per 10 CFR 50.92 does not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the equipment installed will not provide input to any safety systems relied upon in the licensing bases accident analyses. The change in action statements does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the redundant APRM, IRM, and SRM monitors presently in use will be available should the wide range monitors be declared inoperable.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated because the equipment provides monitoring only and merely provides another display that indicates neutron flux or power levels in addition to the existing devices currently relied upon. The change in action statements does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident because the equipment provides a monitoring function only and has adequate redundancy with the existing APRM, IRM, and SRM monitors so that no new or different kind of accident is credible.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because no safety margins are affected. This wide range monitoring equipment provides a passive monitoring function only and is not part of any plant safety related system, thus safety margins will not be affected. The change in action statements does not involve a significant reduction in margin of safety because the existing redundant monitors provide adequate backup given the remote possibility that both wide range monitors become inoperable.

Based on the above considerations the Commission proposes to determine that

the requested change to the WNP-2 Technical Specifications involves no significant hazards considerations.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Richland City Library, Swift and Northgate Streets, Richland, Washington 99352.

**Attorneys for licensees:** Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq., Bishop, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502 and G.E. Doupe, Esq., Washington Public Power Supply System, P.O. Box 968, 3000 George Washington Way, Richland, Washington 99352.

**NRC Project Director:** George W. Knighton

Yankee-Rowe Nuclear Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-029, Yankee-Rowe Nuclear Power Station, Bolton, Massachusetts

**Date of amendment request:** July 24, 1989

**Description of amendment request:** The proposed amendment consists of two proposed changes: (1) The proposed amendment modifies Table 3.2-1 of Technical Specification 3.2.4 to substitute a limit on the operating loop average temperature for the current limit on cold leg temperature. The proposed average temperature limit will allow greater operational flexibility during part-load operation and will maintain DNB margins to be bounded by full power conditions. (2) The proposed amendment removes the word "Exxon" from the last paragraph of Technical Specification Base 3/4.2.4.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has evaluated the proposed amendment against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined the following for the first proposed change:

(1) An increase in temperature will not increase the probability of an accident. The main steam line break is the only licensing analysis affected by the change. The reanalysis of this event has shown that the consequences remain acceptable. Therefore,

there is not a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed event.

(2) An increase in temperature will not result in a new failure mechanism which could initiate an accident. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any previously analyzed.

(3) The steady-state DNBR margin has been evaluated at part-load conditions with the increased cold leg temperatures allowed by this change. The DNB performance at reduced load is bounded by the limiting full power condition. The transient licensing analyses were also evaluated, with the main steam line break being the only affected event. Reanalysis of this transient has shown that the results will remain acceptable. Therefore, this change will not result in a significant decrease in safety margins.

For the second proposed change: This change is editorial in nature and would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Based on this review, the staff therefore determines that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

**Local Public Document Room**  
location: Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301.

**Attorney for Licensee:** John A. Ritsher, Ropes and Gray, 225 Franklin Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02110.

**NRC Project Director:** Richard H. Wessman

#### PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED NOTICES OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO OPERATING LICENSES AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices either because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration.

For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on the day and

page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice.

**Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, York County, Pennsylvania**

*Date of amendment request:* August 26, 1988

*Brief description of amendment request:* This amendment revises the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the Containment Cooling System (CCS) in TS 3/4.5.B and would revise related requirements for diesel generator (DG) testing in TS 3/4.5.F and the associated Bases.

*Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register:* July 28, 1989 (54 FR 31395)

*Expiration date of individual notice:* August 28, 1989

*Local Public Document Room location:* Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of amendment request:* July 12, 1989, as supplemented July 26, 1989

*Brief description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments would revise the North Anna Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications by revising the definition of slave relay testing and by clarifying the test requirements for Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) slave relays.

*Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register:* August 9, 1989 (54 FR 32729)

*Expiration date of individual notice:* September 8, 1989

*Local Public Document Room location:* The Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

#### NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated. No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendments, (2) the amendments, and (3) the Commission's related letters, Safety Evaluations and/or Environmental Assessments as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for the particular facilities involved. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects.

**Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois; Docket Nos. 50-458 and 50-457, Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois**

*Date of application for amendments:* May 22, 1989

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments modify Technical Specification 5.3.2 to allow the use of hafnium, or silver-indium-cadmium, or a combination of both, as the absorber material in the rod control cluster assemblies.

*Date of issuance:* July 17, 1989

*Effective date:* July 17, 1989

*Amendment Nos.:* 30 for Byron and 19 for Braidwood

**Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72, and NPF-77.** The amendments revised the Technical Specification.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27224). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 17, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* For Byron Station, the Rockford Public Library, 215 N. Wyman Street, Rockford, Illinois 61101; for Braidwood Station, the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481.

**Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304, Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Lake County, Illinois**

*Date of application for amendment:* June 13, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* These amendments modify Sections 4.0.3 and 4.0.4, General Surveillance Requirements, of the Technical Specifications for Zion Station. In addition Section 3.3.1.F, Relief Valves, is revised to include exception to General Limiting Condition 3.0.4.

*Date of issuance:* August 1, 1989

*Effective date:* August 1, 1989

*Amendments Nos.:* 117, 106

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-39.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27225). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 1, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Waukegan Public Library, 128 N. County Street, Waukegan, Illinois 60085.

**Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-155, Big Rock Point Plant, Charlevoix County, Michigan**

*Date of application for amendment:* February 6, 1987 as supplemented November 2, 1987.

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment modifies paragraph 2.C.(5) of the license to require compliance with the amended for a "call-in" program for off-duty guards from their residences. This Plan was amended to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.

*Date of issuance:* July 28, 1989

*Effective date:* July 28, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 98



**Facility Operating License No. DPR-8.** The amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** October 19, 1988 (53 FR 40983). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 28, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** North Central Michigan College, 1515 Howard Street, Petoskey, Michigan 49770.

**Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-155, Big Rock Point Plant, Charlevoix County, Michigan**

**Date of application for amendment:** May 25, 1989 and supplemented on June 30, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** This amendment revises Section 3.7(d), (e) and (f) to depict the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and NUREG-0123, Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors and to remove the 24 hour duration requirement to reduce the impact of diurnal effects by using an NRC approved "Total Time" or Point-to-Point method described in ANSI N45.4-1972 and Bechtel Topical Report BN-70P-1, Rev. 1.

**Date of issuance:** July 31, 1989

**Effective date:** July 31, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 99

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-8.** The amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27227). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** North Central Michigan College, 1515 Howard Street, Petoskey, Michigan 49770.

**Duquesne Light Company, Docket No. 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2, Shippingport, Pennsylvania**

**Date of application for amendment:** August 11, 1988

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment revises the supplemental leak collection and release system (SLCRS) flow rate from 59,000 cfm to 57,000 cfm, reflecting an approved change to the design basis of the SLCRS. This is a partial response to the licensee's application.

**Date of issuance:** August 2, 1989

**Effective date:** August 2, 1989

**Amendment No. 19.**

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-73.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** October 5, 1988 (53 FR 39168). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No

**Local Public Document Room location:** B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

**Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia**

**Date of application for amendments:** April 5, 1989

**Brief description of amendments:** The amendments modified the Technical Specifications to delete footnotes that are no longer applicable.

**Date of issuance:** August 8, 1989

**Effective date:** August 8, 1989

**Amendment Nos.:** 21 and 2

**Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81:** Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** May 17, 1989 (54 FR 21308). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 8, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Burke County Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

**Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia**

**Date of application for amendments:** April 6, 1989

**Brief description of amendments:** The amendments modified Technical Specification 4.5.2.h.1)b) to increase for Unit 1 the maximum total charging pump flow rate with a single pump running.

**Date of issuance:** August 8, 1989

**Effective date:** August 8, 1989

**Amendment Nos.:** 22 and 3

**Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81:** Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** May 31, 1989 (54 FR 23314). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 8, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Burke County Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

**Houston Lighting & Power Company, City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company, City of Austin, Texas, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas**

**Date of amendment request:** June 1, 1989

**Brief description of amendments:** The proposed changes allow the use of both hafnium (Hf) and silver-indium-cadmium (Ag-In-Cd) design Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCA) within the core.

**Date of issuance:** July 31, 1989

**Effective date:** July 31, 1989

**Amendment Nos.:** 10 and 2

**Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27229). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No.

**Local Public Document Rooms Location:** Wharton County Junior College, J. M. Hodges Learning Center, 911 Boling Highway, Wharton, Texas 77488 and Austin Public Library, 810 Guadalupe Street, Austin, Texas 78701

**Illinois Power Company, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, DeWitt County, Illinois**

**Date of application for amendment:** May 18, 1988

**Description of amendment request:** The change revised the setpoint requirement for the control rod scram accumulator low pressure alarm.

**Date of issuance:** August 4, 1989

**Effective date:** August 4, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 24

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-62.** The amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** December 14, 1988 (53 FR 50330). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 4, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No

**Local Public Document Room location:** The Vespasian Warner Public

Library, 120 West Johnson Street,  
Clinton, Illinois 61727.

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company,  
Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold  
Energy, Center, Linn County, Iowa

*Date of application for amendment:*  
April 14, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revised the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Facility Operating License No. DPR-49, extending the DAEC Integrated Plan for 2 years beyond the current expiration date of May 3, 1989.

*Date of issuance:* August 8, 1989

*Effective date:* August 8, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 161

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-49.* Amendment revised the license.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27231). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 8, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Cedar Rapids Public Library, 500 First Street, S.E., Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401.

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York

*Date of application for amendment:*  
May 27, 1988

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment corrects several editorial, typographical, and other minor errors.

*Date of issuance:* July 19, 1989

*Effective date:* July 19, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 134

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-59.* Amendment revised the Technical Specification.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* April 19, 1989 (54 FR 15835). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 19, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Penfield Library, State University College of Oswego, Oswego, New York.

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey

*Date of application for amendment:*  
May 5, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment request increases the Technical Specification channel functional test surveillance intervals for

various Control Rod Block instrumentation in accordance with General Electric Company Licensing Topical Report NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 1.

*Date of issuance:* July 28, 1989

*Effective date:* July 28, 1989 and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

*Amendment No.:* 29

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-57.* This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 14, 1989 (54 FR 25376). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 28, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Pennsville Public Library, 190 S. Broadway, Pennsville, New Jersey 08070

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

*Date of application for amendments:* July 15, 1988 and supplemented by letters dated April 25, 1989 and May 24, 1989.

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments deleted the organization charts, Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 and replaced them with more general organizational requirements.

*Date of issuance:* July 31, 1989

*Effective date:* Units 1 and 2, as of the date of issuance to be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.

*Amendment Nos.:* 99 and 76

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75.* These amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 31, 1989 (54 FR 23322). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-385, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

*Date of application for amendment:*  
August 24, 1988

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment modifies the value for the average electrotype temperature and the average battery capacity.

*Date of issuance:* August 7, 1989

*Effective date:* August 7, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 80

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-12.* Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 3, 1989 (54 FR 18959). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 7, 1989

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Fairfield County Library, Garden and Washington Streets, Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180.

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

*Date of application for amendment:*  
May 22, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* This Amendment allows, in the case of a missed surveillance requirement, delaying compliance with the Action Statement for a period up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowed outage time limits of the Action Statement are less than 24 hours and establishes as the starting time of the noncompliance that time when it is discovered that the Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. This Amendment also permits passage through or to Operational Conditions as required in order to comply with the Action Statements.

*Date of issuance:* August 8, 1989

*Effective date:* August 8, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 81

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-12.* Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* July 12, 1989 (54 FR 29411). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 8, 1989. The amendment was inadvertently issued before expiration of the comment period. However, no comments or requests for hearing were received within the period for such comments or requests.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Fairfield County Library, Garden and Washington Streets, Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180.

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Dockets Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Limestone County, Alabama**

*Date of application for amendments:* January 13, 1989 (TS 256)

*Brief description of amendments:* The proposed changes would delete certain surveillance testing requirements on redundant but independent systems when a system is declared inoperable and a requirement to verify alignment of valves in the injection/safety related flow paths.

*Date of issuance:* August 2, 1989

*Effective date:* August 2, 1989

*Amendments Nos.:* 169, 169, 140

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68:* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 17, 1989 (54 FR 21316). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Athens Public Library, South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Dockets Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Limestone County, Alabama**

*Date of application for amendments:* May 15, 1989 (TS 270)

*Brief description of amendments:* This amendment corrects Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.A.3 to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix H and revises the Bases section to reflect the specimen withdrawal program agreed upon by TVA and the NRC.

*Date of issuance:* August 3, 1989

*Effective date:* August 3, 1989

*Amendments Nos.:* 170, 170, 141

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68:* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 14, 1989 (54 FR 25379). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 3, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Athens Public Library, South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

**Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee**

*Date of application for amendments:* March 27, 1989 (TS 88-27)

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments revise the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications. The changes increase the base current value for the containment air return fans, in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.6, from 28 amperes to 32 amperes. The band for an acceptable current (i.e., 277.5 amperes) is not being changed.

*Date of issuance:* July 31, 1989

*Effective date:* July 31, 1989

*Amendment Nos.:* 121, 110

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* April 19, 1989 (54 FR 15838). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1001 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402.

**Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee**

*Date of application for amendments:* December 22, 1988 (TS 88-34)

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The changes remove inappropriate testing requirements associated with the auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS) and add a new requirement on the automatic isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation exhaust. Surveillance requirements for ABGTS activation exist in Section 7, "Plant Systems," and Section 9, "Refueling Operations," of the TS. The ABGTS test requirement associated with the auxiliary building ventilation monitoring system (ABVMS) was deleted from both Section 7 and Section 9. The ABGTS test requirement associated with a Phase A containment isolation signal was deleted from Section 9 but remains in Section 7. The ABGTS test requirement associated with the high radiation signal from the spent fuel pool monitors was deleted from Section 7 but remains in Section 9. A new requirement was added to Table 4.3.9 of Specification 3.3.3.10, "Radioactive Gaseous Effluent

Monitoring," to demonstrate automatic isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation exhaust any time the ABVMS (radiation monitor) indicates measured levels above the alarm/trip setpoint. The requirement was in Sections 7 and 9 as part of the ABGTS actuation test for a high radiation signal from the ABVMS but was deleted. Also, two typographical errors in the Unit 1 Specification 3.3.3.10 have been corrected.

*Date of issuance:* August 3, 1989

*Effective date:* August 3, 1989

*Amendment Nos.:* 122, 111

*Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* February 8, 1989 (54 FR 6212). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 3, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1001 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402.

**Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio**

*Date of application for amendment:* January 15, 1988

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment deleted Sections 3/4.3.3.7, Chlorine Detection Systems, from Appendix A, Technical Specifications, and Section 3/4.3.3.7 from the Bases. The index in Appendix A has also been updated to reflect this deletion.

*Date of issuance:* August 4, 1989

*Effective date:* August 4, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 134

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-3.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27241). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 4, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

**Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio**

*Date of applications for amendment:* November 2, 1987; January 5, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment corrects typographical errors and makes minor word changes to achieve consistency between the Technical Specifications and plant nomenclature. It also deletes certain statements that are no longer necessary because of elapsed time and/or completion of specified actions.

*Date of issuance:* August 4, 1989

*Effective date:* August 4, 1989

*Amendment No. 135*

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-3.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 17, 1989 (54 FR 21317). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 4, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of application for amendments:* May 23, 1989

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments reduce the NA-1&2 TS 3/4.2.5 limit on the minimum measured flow rate in the reactor coolant system from 289,200 gallons per minute (gpm) to 284,000 gpm. This reduction in the minimum flow rate is enveloped within the NA-1&2 UFSAR Chapter 15 accident analyses.

*Date of issuance:* July 31, 1989

*Effective date:* July 31, 1989

*Amendment Nos.: 120 and 104*

*Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27244). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* The Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of application for amendments:* June 8, 1989

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments revise TS 3.3.3.5, Table 3.3-9, which addresses the auxiliary shutdown panel monitoring instrumentation. The measurement range of the charging flow instrumentation is changed from 0-150 gpm to 0-180 gpm, and the format of Table 3.3-9 and Table 4.3-6 is changed from horizontal to vertical.

*Date of issuance:* August 2, 1989

*Effective date:* August 2, 1989

*Amendment Nos.: 121 and 105*

*Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27244). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* The Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, Virginia**

*Date of application for amendments:* March 28, 1989

*Brief description of amendments:* The amendments revise the TS Table 3.3-6 which specifies the operability requirements for radiation monitors. The change is in conformance with the NRC guidance provided in Generic Letter No. 83-37, dated November 1, 1983.

*Date of issuance:* August 2, 1989

*Effective date:* August 2, 1989

*Amendment Nos.: 122 and 106*

*Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 3, 1989 (54 FR 18962). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* The Alderman Library, Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22901.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia**

*Date of application for amendments:* August 5, 1988, as supplemented January 25, 1989.

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments revise the requirements governing the operability of the Individual Rod Position Indicating System (IRPIS). The changes involve shifting the emphasis from the IRPIS to the demand position indicating system (the step counters) for rod group position information during shutdown and certain transient operational modes such as reactor startup.

*Date of issuance:* August 2, 1989

*Effective date:* August 2, 1989

*Amendment Nos. 131 and 131*

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* February 22, 1989 (54 FR 7647). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185

**Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin**

*Date of application for amendments:* March 17, 1989.

*Brief description of amendments:* The Technical Specification 15.2.3.1.B.(5) is revised to eliminate the f-delta-I function from the Overpower Delta T (OPDT) setpoint to increase the flexibility of operation at full power by allowing use of the full flux difference operating envelope.

*Date of issuance:* July 31, 1989

*Effective date:* July 31, 1989

*Amendment Nos.: 123 and 126*

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 17, 1989 (54 FR 21318). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Library, 1516

Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers,  
Wisconsin.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating  
Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf  
Creek Generating Station, Coffey  
County, Kansas

*Date of amendment request:* March 28,  
1988

*Brief description of amendment:* The  
current Wolf Creek Technical  
Specifications did not identify actions to  
be taken if either the measured overall  
integrated containment leakage rate or  
the measured combined leakage rate for  
all penetrations and valves subject to  
Type B and C tests exceed allowable  
limits when the reactor coolant system  
temperature is above 200° F. The  
amendment introduced Action  
statements to be taken if local leak rate  
testing, performed at power, exceeds  
allowable limits.

*Date of Issuance:* August 9, 1989

*Effective date:* August 9, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 33

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-  
42.* Amendment revised the Technical  
Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal  
Register:* August 24, 1988 (53 FR 32301).  
The Commission's related evaluation of  
the amendment is contained in a Safety  
Evaluation dated August 9, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration  
comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room*

*Location:* Emporia State University,  
William Allen White Library, 1200  
Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas  
66801 and Washburn University School  
of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621

**NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE AND FINAL  
DETERMINATION OF NO  
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS  
CONSIDERATION AND  
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING  
(EXIGENT OR EMERGENCY  
CIRCUMSTANCES)**

During the period since publication of  
the last biweekly notice, the  
Commission has issued the following  
amendments. The Commission has  
determined for each of these  
amendments that the application for the  
amendment complies with the standards  
and requirements of the Atomic Energy  
Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and  
the Commission's rules and regulations.  
The Commission has made appropriate  
findings as required by the Act and the  
Commission's rules and regulations in 10  
CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the  
license amendment.

Because of exigent or emergency  
circumstances associated with the date

the amendment was needed, there was  
not time for the Commission to publish,  
for public comment before issuance, its  
usual 30-day Notice of Consideration of  
Issuance of Amendment and Proposed  
No Significant Hazards Consideration  
Determination and Opportunity for a  
Hearing. For exigent circumstances, the  
Commission has either issued a Federal  
Register notice providing opportunity for  
public comment or has used local media  
to provide notice to the public in the  
area surrounding a licensee's facility of  
the licensee's application and of the  
Commission's proposed determination  
of no significant hazards consideration.  
The Commission has provided a  
reasonable opportunity for the public to  
comment, using its best efforts to make  
available to the public means of  
communication for the public to respond  
quickly, and in the case of telephone  
comments, the comments have been  
recorded or transcribed as appropriate  
and the licensee has been informed of  
the public comments.

In circumstances where failure to act  
in a timely way would have resulted, for  
example, in derating or shutdown of a  
nuclear power plant or in prevention of  
either resumption of operation or of  
increase in power output up to the  
plant's licensed power level, the  
Commission may not have had an  
opportunity to provide for public  
comment on its no significant hazards  
determination. In such case, the license  
amendment has been issued without  
opportunity for comment. If there has  
been some time for public comment but  
less than 30 days, the Commission may  
provide an opportunity for public  
comment. If comments have been  
requested, it is so stated. In either event,  
the State has been consulted by  
telephone whenever possible.

Under its regulations, the Commission  
may issue and make an amendment  
immediately effective, notwithstanding  
the pendency before it of a request for a  
hearing from any person, in advance of  
the holding and completion of any  
required hearing, where it has  
determined that no significant hazards  
consideration is involved.

The Commission has applied the  
standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made  
a final determination that the  
amendment involves no significant  
hazards consideration. The basis for this  
determination is contained in the  
documents related to this action.  
Accordingly, the amendments have been  
issued and made effective as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the  
Commission has determined that these  
amendments satisfy the criteria for  
categorical exclusion in accordance  
with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental  
impact statement or environmental  
assessment need be prepared for these  
amendments. If the Commission has  
prepared an environmental assessment  
under the special circumstances  
provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has  
made a determination based on that  
assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the  
action see (1) the application for  
amendment, (2) the amendment to  
Facility Operating License, and (3) the  
Commission's related letter, Safety  
Evaluation and/or Environmental  
Assessment, as indicated. All of these  
items are available for public inspection  
at the Commission's Public Document  
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L  
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the  
local public document room for the  
particular facility involved.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be  
obtained upon request addressed to the  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
Washington, DC 20555, Attention:  
Director, Division of Reactor Projects.

The Commission is also offering an  
opportunity for a hearing with respect to  
the issuance of the amendments. By  
September 22, 1989, the licensee may file  
a request for a hearing with respect to  
issuance of the amendment to the  
subject facility operating license and  
any person whose interest may be  
affected by this proceeding and who  
wishes to participate as a party in the  
proceeding must file a written petition  
for leave to intervene. Requests for a  
hearing and petitions for leave to  
intervene shall be filed in accordance  
with the Commission's "Rules of  
Practice for Domestic Licensing  
Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a  
request for a hearing or petition for  
leave to intervene is filed by the above  
date, the Commission or an Atomic  
Safety and Licensing Board, designated  
by the Commission or by the Chairman  
of the Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Board Panel, will rule on the request  
and/or petition and the Secretary or the  
designated Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Board will issue a notice of hearing or  
an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a  
petition for leave to intervene shall set  
forth with particularity the interest of  
the petitioner in the proceeding and how  
that interest may be affected by the  
results of the proceeding. The petition  
should specifically explain the reasons  
why intervention should be permitted  
with particular reference to the  
following factors: (1) the nature of the  
petitioner's right under the Act to be  
made a party to the proceeding; (2) the  
nature and extent of the petitioner's



property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 325-6000 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and

telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

**Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* August 3, 1989.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment raises the maximum allowed service water system inlet water temperature from 85° F to 90° F and raises the allowable containment air temperature from 120° F to 130° F.

*Date of issuance:* August 7, 1989

*Effective date:* August 7, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 143

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-28:* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration:* No. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 7, 1989.

*Local Public Document Room location:* White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10610.

**Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 50-286, Indian Point Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* August 4, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises Technical Specification 3 to permit the plant to operate with a service water temperature above 90° F with containment air temperatures up to 130° F for up to seven hours before reaching the hot shutdown condition via normal operation procedures.

*Date of issuance:* August 11, 1989

*Effective date:* August 11, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 87

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-64:* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards*

*consideration:* No. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, consultation with the State, and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 11, 1989.

*Local Public Document Room location:* White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10601

*Attorney for licensee:* Mr. Charles M. Pratt, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10019.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of August, 1989.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects-I/II,  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

[Doc. 89-14729 Filed 8-22-89; 8:45 am]

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