

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

## SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

# RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

## NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

## NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

## DOCKET NO. 50-410

#### INTRODUCTION

The licensee, Niagara Mohawk Corporation (NMPC), by letter dated April 21, 1988, proposed a Technical Specification change to Section 4.8.1.1.2.a.7 that reduces the minimum allowable pressure for the Division III (EDG\*2) emergency standby diesel generator air start receivers from greater than or equal to  $(\geq)$  225 psig to  $\geq$ 190 psig.

#### EVALUATION

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The NMP-2 Electrical Power System uses three separate and independent diesel generators, EDG\*1 (Division I), EDG\*2 (Division III) and EDG\*3 (Division II). Each standby diesel generator has a separate and independent diesel starting system. Although the basic starting system is the same for the three standby diesel generators, the components for EDG\*2 differ from those of EDG\*1 and EDG\*3. Due to these differences, the surveillance requirement for verifying the pressure in the EDG\*2 air start receivers requires revision.

The existing surveillance requires that the pressure in EDG\*2 air start receivers be  $\geq 225$  psig. This pressure coincides with the diesel generator air compressor start setpoint and is based upon the requirement that the Division III diesel be capable of conducting five consecutive 10-second starts without starting the air compressors to recharge the air start receivers. With the surveillance requirement and the compressor start setpoint both at 225 psig, there is the possibility that through inherent instrument drift, the pressure could fall below 225 psig, thus violating Technical Specification requirements and rendering EDG\*2 inoperable.

The licensee tested the Division III DG to determine if it could meet Technical Specification starting requirements at a reduced air receiver pressure. The Division III DG was demonstrated to be capable of five consecutive 10-second starts without recharging air receivers from an initial air start receiver pressure of 150 psig, and is therefore capable of starting when required at a reduced pressure in the air receivers.



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Section 4.8.1.1.2 of the Technical Specifications, which provides the DG surveillance requirements, is being revised as follows: Air start receiver surveillance requirements for EDG\*2 are being transferred to Section 4.8.1.1.2.a.8 from Section 4.8.1.1.2.a.7. Section 4.8.1.1.2.a.8 requires that the pressure in EDG\*2 air start receivers be ≥190 psig. The minimum air receiver pressure of 190 psig allows a 40 psig margin beyond the 150 psig initial air start receiver pressure that has been tested and verified capable of meeting Technical Specification starting requirements.

#### SUMMARY

As a result of our review, which is described in the evaluation, we conclude that the proposed Technical Specification changes are acceptable.

## ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of the facility components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20 and changes to surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

## CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: July 12, 1989

#### PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:

V. McCree

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