## REGUINTORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

.

ACCESSION NBR:	8805040119	DOC. DATE:	88/04/30	NOTARI	ZED: NO ·		DOCKE	T #
FACIL: 50-410	Nine Mile Poi	nt Nuclear	Station,	Unit 2,	Niagara	Moha	05000	410
AUTH. NAMĘ	AUTHOR A	FFILIATION						÷
JENKINS, R. E.	Niagara M	ohawk Power	r Corp.					
WILLIS, J. L.	Niagara M	ohawk Power	r Corp.				. •	
RECIP. NAME	RECIPIEN	T AFFILIAT	ION					-
	•							

SUBJECT: LER 87-074-01: on 871219, unsatisfactory floor plug installation discovered in fire rated floor. Caused by const deficiency & personnel error. Fire watch patrols established in affected areas. W/880430 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT		COPIE	s	RECIPIENT	· COPI	ES
	ID CODE/NAM	1E	LTTR	ENCL ·	ID CODE/NAME	LTTR	ENCL
	PD1-1 LA		1	1	PD1-1 PD	1	1
	HAUGHEY, M		1	1	BENEDICT, R	1	1
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSO	IN	1	1	ACRS MOELLER	2	2
	AEODÍDOA		<b>1</b>	1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1	1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	3	2	2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1	1
	ARM/DCTS/DAB		1	1	DEDRO	1	1
	NRR/DEST/ADS	7E	i	0	NRR/DEST/CEB 8H	- 1	1
	NRR/DEST/ESB	8D	1	1	NRR/DEST/ICSB 7	1	1
	NRR/DEST/MEB	9H	1	i	NRR/DEST/MTB 9H	1	1
	NRR/DEST/PSB	8D	1	1	NRR/DEST/RSB 8E	1	1
	NRR/DEST/SGB	8D	<b>' 1</b>	1	NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10	1	1
	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	10	1	1	NRR/DOEA/EAB 11	1	1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	10	1	1`	NRR/DREP/RPB 10	2.	2
•	NRR/DRIS/SIB	9A	1	1	NRR/PMAS/ILRB12	1	1
	REG FILE	02	1	1	RES TELFORD, J	1	1
	RES/DE/EIB		1	1	RES/DRPS DIR	1	1
	RGN1 FILE	01	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M		4	4	FORD BLDG HOY, A	1	1
	H ST LOBBY WA	RD	1	1	LPDR	1	1
	NRC PDR		1	1	NSIC HARRIS, J	1	1
	NSIC MAYS, G		1	1			

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

t

. .

1

.

ų

	*		•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							••				•	
	NRC For (9-83)	m 366 4 5 E	и ш. , 12 - <sup>4</sup> - 22 1 - 22 - 24 1 - 22 - 24	ు, సాగన జగ్రాగర్ (11)		LIC .	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT	(LER)	U.S. N	DCLEAR APPROV EXPIRES	REGULA1 /ED OMB 5: 8/31/88	NO. 3150-01	AISSION IDA LOEN	Ξ.
	EACILIT	r.name ( Nf	» Ine Mi	<u>1e P</u>	oint Unit	2	+	Buogo	had E	3+2 1000	Dlug	DOCKET NUMBER	(2)   0	410	1 OF	08	
4 4 1000-00-000-000-000-000-000-000-000-000		Ir Ir	iopera <u>istall</u>	atio	n - Const	ruction	to a <u>Defic</u>	breac ciency	/Pers	onnel	Error	-	<u>.</u> .				
3 1 •	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		6) REVISION	RE MONTH	DAY	E (7) YEAR	· · ·	OTHEF	A FACILITIES INVO	DOCKE	T NUMBE	R(S)		
, ·											N/A	<u> </u>	0   5	1010			
	12	19	87	87	074	<u> </u>	04	30	88	•	. N/A		0   5	10 10			
1	- OPE	RATING	4	20.4	402(b)	DPURSUANT	20.405	(c)	INTE OF 10	CFR 5: 1	Check one or more 60.73(a)(2)(iv)	of the following) (1	11	3.71(5)			
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	POWE	R L –	-000	20.	406(a)(1)(i)		50,36(0	:)(1) 		X	50,73(a)(2)(v)	**	曰?	3.71(e)			
				20.	405(a)(1)(iii)		50,73(4	)(2)(i)		-	50.73(a)(2)(viii)	(A)	ة <del>ا</del>	elow and i 666A]	in Text, NRC	Form	
t.				20. 20.	405(a){1}(iv} 405(a){1}(v}		60,73(a 50,73(a	)(2)(8) )(2)(iii)			50,73(a)(2)(vill) 50,73(a)(2)(x)	(B)					
	NAME			••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••			ICENSEE	CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)			751 594		1959		
		D	shart	F J	anking A	ecietant	Sund	anvier	n Tec	hnica	1 Sunnart	AREA CODE	34	9-4-22	20		
ر ويوسو وور القرر د				<b>L.</b> U	COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH C	OMPONENT	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	ED IN THIS REPO	RT (13)					 • •
	CAUSE	SYSTEM	сомро	NENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPO TO	RTABLE NPRDS			1 - ••
												_					
,				- <u> </u>					8								
×			·····	:l	SUPPLEM	I	EXPECT	ED (14)	×		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	EXPECT	 ED	MONTH	1 DAY	YEAR	,
-	YE	5 (If yes, c	omplete EX	PECTED	SUBMISSION DATE	, ;)	5	( NO				SUBMISS DATE (1	ION 5)				1
4 12 12	ABSTRAC	T (Limit I	to 1400 ipe	cos, 1.o., oj	pproximately fifteen	single-space type	written lii	nes) (16)		•							
) 	On	Dece	ember	19,	1987 at 1	100 with	the	react	or in	Co1d	Shutdowr	(Operati	iona 1				• 1
	Co ra	nditi ted f	ion 4) floor	, an in t	unsatisfa he Divisio	actory f on 2 Ven	loor tilai	plug tion R	insta .oom 1	llatio	on was di d on Cont	scovered rol Build	in a ling	fire (CB)	•		l
· .		evati	ion 30	6.	The insta	llation,	disc	overe	d by	the N	ine Mile	Point Uni	t2	(NMP2	2)		1
	an	Engi	ineeri	ng e	valuation	was con	ducte	ed whi	ch id	entif	ied two c	ther pote	ntia	event 11y			
	un	setis	sfacto the fi	ire r	ppendix R	floor p rs were	lug <del>i</del> decla	instal ared i	latio	ns on able a	January	14, 1988.	In rols	each			
:	in	media	ately	esta	blished.							naven paa					
	Re	visio	. <sup>.</sup> on zer	o of	LER 87-74	4 origin	ally	repor	ted t	hat ti	hese inst	allations	wer	е		1	
91.4	de	ficie	ent as	a ro end	esult of a incering (	a design denartme	defi nt if	icienc t was	y. U deter	pon fi nined	urther an that the	alysis by installa	'a tion				
[	de	sign	was a	ccept	table. He	owever,	of th	ne thr	ee Ap	pendi	x R floor	plugs id	lenti	fied			
	as co	nfiqu	entia: Iratio	n due	e to seala	tory, tw ant bein	o ot g ren	tnem	were from	actua the i	ily in a nstallati	deficient ons. Thi	s wa:	s			
	ca	useď	by a	cons	țruction d	deficien	čy ar	nd per	sonne	1 err	or.	,	٠				
	Th	e cor	recti	ve ac	ctions for	this e	vent	are;	(1)	fire	watch pat	rols were		ha			
	es   be	en ev	rsned Valuat	ed,	(3) the f	ea tire loor plu	areas g on	CB el	evatio	on 30	6 has bee	installati en reseale	ions i id <b>, (</b> 4	nave 4) th	e		
	f]  (5	oor p	lug d	lesig	n details	will be	modi	ified	to ut	ilize	a fire r $(6) = 100$	esistant.	seala	ant,	522		./
	do	cumen	nt wil	1 be	prepared.	<u>8</u>	3050	40119	7 880	430				سکہ	1/1	-	/
t L	1	245				PI S	JR I	ADOCI	050	0041 PDR	0					/	<i>i</i> .
1	983) *********	300 1								• •			P27	っしつ	~~ ()	.4	,' 

7

•

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	* 										ء را <b>لہ</b>
÷		(LER) TEXT CONT	ATI	ION	1		NUCL APP EXP	EAR REG	ULATORY 3MB NO. 31 1/88	16001	MISSION	
	FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)			LER N	UMBER (6'	a		P/	AGE (J	5	ļ
-	DOCHET NUMBER			-	SEC.	UENTIAL NUMBER		NUMBER	'	Ħ		ł
_	Nine-Mi-le-Point-Unit-2	0 15 10 10 10 410	/ <u>8</u> '	57 [·	_,	074		01	- 02	OF	08	
1	TEXT (# more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·								· · ·		I
·	DESCRIPTION-Ur-EVENI				• •	••	• •	-	79 -	-	4 490-0	
	On December 19, 1987 at 1100 with the r Condition 4), at-a-coolant temperature and at ambient pressure, an unsatisfac in a fire-rated-floor_in_the Division Control Building-(CB)_Elevation 306. the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) Fire shutdown fire barriers, constituted an	reactor in Cold SI of approximately tory floor plug i 2 Ventilation (HV This floor plug i 2 Department durin 3 Appendix R viola	hutdov 165 c nstal 'AC) R( instal 1g.a.s ition.	wn deg lat oon lat urv	(Ope irees ion 1 lo tion veil	erations Fahr was of cated , dis lance	ona reni dis on cov of	1 heit cover ered safe	ed∙ by ≩	: 1	-	
	The floor plug installation (refer to ) reasons:	Figure 1) was que	stion	.ed	for	-the	foi	lowin	ıg		•	
- 5 7	1. Portions of the sealant materia floor plug segments were missin fire barrier.	l used to seal th ug allowing air co	e gap: )mmuni	is a icat	irou tion	nd the	e t ugh	hree the		● • ■+ F~}	146 1 1214000	
	The sealant material (specifica fire rating and was not intende	lly a dymeric ela d for installatio	istome n in	<del>:r)-</del> a f	-did fire	-not- rate	hav d b	'é-a arri€	er.	• • ••••	• •	-
	3. The construction of the floor p sealant to seal the space betwe	lug used steel pl en the plug segme	ate a ents.	lor	א, gr	ith t	he	dymer	ic		*	
	As a result of this floor plug install Division 1 HVAC Room—(on-CB Elevation declared inoperable as required by the Section 9A.3.5.1.1Therefore, had a it is possible that equipment in both adversely impacting the station's safe	ation, the fire r 288) and the Divi NMP2 Final Safet fire occurred in fire zones could shutdown capabil	ated sion y Ana eithe have ity.	flo 2 H ilys ir c bee	Jor IVAC sis Jne en a	betwee Room Repor of th ffect	en wa: t ( ese ;ed,	the s FSAR) room	) NS,	, -	•	
	In light of this event, the Niagara Mol review of the design (utilizing the de- installations. As a result of this re potentially unsatisfactory Appendix R CB elevation 288 and on CB elevation 2	hawk Engineering sign documents) o view, on January floor plug instal 37 in fire rated	depart f sim 14, 1 latio floor	tme iila 988 ins 'S.	int ir f 3 tw wer	perfor loor p o oth e ide	rme plu er nti	d a g fied	on			
	For all three incidents, the associated inoperable and fire watch patrols were Section 9A.3.5.1.1) for the affected f	d fire rated floor established (in ; ire zones.	rs wer accord	re dan	dec] ice v	lared with F	fsaf	R				
	On January 19, 1988 a contractor's engi the design details concerning the seali Appendix R floor plugs were adequate. sealant, specified by the design docume 3 hour rated seal. (In the case where removed, the floor plug installation is rated barrier.)	ineering departmer ing requirements f This letter conc ents, was sufficie the dymeric seal s considered a bro	nt iss for th luded ent ir ant wa each l	sue he ( th; n 1 as thr	d a ques at t ieu mis: ougl	lette tione the dy of a sing ( h the	≥r s ≥d ymer sta or fii	stati ric andar re	ng d			
	• • • • • • •	***** ***										

¥

123172

100

2.94. 1

202131222

1.

1. A. T. A.

in internet second s

2

\*

.

\* \* \*

ŝ

---- ----

-----

1

<u>با</u>

11-11

`` 

. 1

4.		•		· ·	•• .	,		-	<u> </u>			•		-	
-i }	1	NRC Form 366A	ATCH COMPANY							U	J.S. NUC	LEAR REG	JULATORY	YCOM	MISSION
· ] *	s!	(Pos)		NT REPORT	(LEK)	TEXIU	ONT	ΰΑτιυ	/N		APP EXF	PROVED OF	⊣MB NO, 31 1/88	15001	104 -
-1 -1		FACILITY NAME (1)	PAGE 2		OCKET N	UMBER (2)			LEP		(6)		<u>р</u>	AGE (	3)
$\frac{1}{1}$	<u> </u>			,		э	1	YEAR	10005	SEQUENTI	AL	REVISION	*	- <b>T</b> -	
Ť	!		-	•,	· .	· · _ /	• · ·	~7	Ī	~7/		· · ·	1 .02		
1	'	Nine Mile Por	int Unit 2	<u> </u>	<u>)   5   0</u>	200	410.	81		0/4	<u>,                                     </u>		.02	Ori	80
	. '	TEXT (If more space is required, us	the determinatio	n that the	desig	an deta	ils we	re adr	equa	te, t	he f	ire			i
	1	watch patrol	s for these floo	r plugs wer	re ser	cured o	n Marci	h 16,	198	18. (	Note	: By	/	,	
3	•	this date the	e floor plug ins	tallation c	on CB	elevat	ion 30	6 was	sea	ledi	n			u.	
ł	,	accordance w	ith its design si	pecificatio	uns.	Ααατει Ν Ηοώ	onaliy, overî	, The tha f	1115 1001	stalia * nlug	ייטרלי ייסר	) 011 (^R			
4	1	elevation 23	7 was in a defic	ient confi	arrat.	ton sin	ice its	seal	ant	was r	•emov	red.		1	
1	1	This constitu	uted a breach of	the associ	iated	fire r	ated f	loor.	Th	ierefo	ne,	the			
4	а <i>П</i>	fire watch pa	atrol for that f	loor plug v	las ir	napprop	riatel	y relt	ieve	d. T	his	<b>0</b> 6			
-			Stallation was in MMD2 Technical	Ot Jaenun i Sunnart En	.eu as rinee	s an ac ∽ (whi]	tuai o A nerf	reacu ormin/	ี นแะ ศ. <u>ล</u>	עת וו walkd	lown	of th	ne		
		CB Appendix 1	R floor plug ins	tallations	in r	orepara	tion o	f thi	s LE	R) di	SCOV	vered			۰,
1		that the inst	tallation on CB	elevation ?	237 wa	as not	satisf	actor	у.	This	info	ormati	ion		
-		was communica	ated to the Site	Fire Prote	ctior	л Super	visor,	who -	imme	diate	ilà				
٠		estabiisnea d	a fire watch for	that TIOUT	• p i uự	J•	•			A					
		There were n	o other inoperab	le systems	whick	h contr	·ibuted	to t	his	event	. N	lo pla	int		
!		system or cor	mponent failure	resulted fr	rom th	n <mark>is ev</mark> e	int.								
1															T
1		II. CAUSE	OF EVENI ,	1 6		1						-			
	)	It was origin	nally reported i	n Revision	zero	of LER	87-74	that	App	endix	k R f	loor			
ţ	•	plugs in the	control buildin	g were unsa	itisfa	actory	as a re	esult	.of	a des	ign				
,	1	deficiency.	However, upon fr	urther anal	ysis,	, Niaga	ra Moha	awk ()	MPC	) Eng	inee	ring,	' <b>-</b>		
2	•	actermined un "as is". En	lat the design up dimension conclu	etalls for ded that at	the H Ithour	%pena⊤; ∼h the	X K TIC	JOP DI	ugs	Were	acc	eptab +hos	ie To		,
	,	floor plugs d	did not conform '	to a standa	ird Ur	derwri	ters Li	aborat	tory	/ test	ed	61165	е		
10,100	1	configuration	n, the installat	ion (as des	igned	1) was	adequat	te for	r th	e fir	e lo	ading	1		
	,	in those area	is. Therefore, t	the floor p	lugi	installi	ation c	on CB	ele	vatio	n 28	8 was	,	•	•
મું	'	1 NOT TH VIVIAL	:100 OT Appendix	K requirem	ents.	J.									
ululu.	1	However, it w	was discovered th	nat portion	s of	the sea	alant r	nateri	ial 1	were	miss	ing	۲		
A.C.	!	from the floo	or plug installat	cions locat	ed on	CB el	evatior	1 306	and	on C	B el	evati	on		
3	1	237. The mis	Sing material tr	rom these t	loor	plug in	nstalla	itions	dic	d cons	stit	ute a			
	1	violations.	The root causes	for these	event	na nave 's are:	2 TU UE (1) CC	: Cuna metry	70e, 10ti	nea ri	ppen. fici(	JIX R			
ł	1	and (2) perso	onnel error.		•••••	J 147 - ,	117	1100	60.L	Jir uu.		;noy ,			
;	1	Some time aft	ton the initial f	eloon nlud		11-+10	- 460	67 - AV	-1,						
1		(by construct	ion personnel) t	n facilita	1115.a to <u>e</u> a	llation winment	h, The	tlour ant h	D I U ∙≏twr	Jgs we	ere i Poori	remov∈ ∼ in	∋q		
ļ		the control b	uilding. When t	these plugs	were	reinst	called,	the	CONS	struci	tion	5 TH			
	1	personnel fai	led to reseal th	ie plugs acr	cordi	ng_to t	the ins	talla	tior	ı deta	il.				
	ļ	Normally this	work would be c	controlled a	by the	e Breac	h Perm	it Pro	oced	lure (	lsee	note)	).		
	ļ	Note:	The breach perm	nit procedu	re (S	-FDP-3)	ı is th	e sta	tior	ne cor	otro1	l over	<b>~</b>		i
\$		breach	es in fire rated	l barriers.	Thi	s proce	adure i	sat	rack	king d	levic	se and	d		1
	~	the ver	hicle used to en	sure that t	che or	pen bre	aches	are p	rope	erly r	resea	led			
ĺ		reauir	er the associate es Fndineering j	d Work is c innut conce	Comp≀e ∽ning	ete. 1	he brea	ach pe	ermi	t pro	)cedu	ire			
l	J	barrie	r integrity and	the steps 1	that	need to	be ta	ken t	opr	noper1	in ch Iv re	le estore	۵		
]		the bar	rrier to its des	ign specifi	icatic	ons.			* r	ч <b>г</b> -	J -		•		
			*		ę	· ···	•	-		, <b>•</b>			•		į
3	I							•							۴

.

: T 🖘 7 .:

10.0

o a state in the second second second

.

خدأست شاخات اتعك

NRC FORM 366A (9-83)

i,

x X

* -	NRC Form 386A (9-83) LICENS EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED OMB NO. 316 EXPIRES: 8/31/88											
<del>4</del> 7 7	FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (	3)										
1000	YEAR WINSEL											
1		-										
1	Nine Mile Point Unit=2 - 0 5 0 0 0 410 87 - 074 - 01 04 0F	08										
1	However, it can not be ascertained if a breach permit was completed for the floor plug installation on CB elevation 306. It is surmised that this floor plug was breached prior to license receipt. If this was the case, this work may not have been controlled by the breach permit procedure. (Note: The breach permit procedure was only in effect in those areas turned over to Niagára Mohawk prior to the operating license receipt.) Therefore, the most probable cause for this incident is a construction deficiency. The floor plug on CB elevation 237 was removed and reinstalled in September, 1987. A breach permit was written for this work. However, the Engineering disposition did not identify the sealing requirements per the design documents for this floor plug. This resulted in the breach permit for this floor plug being cleared without the plug being resealed. Therefore, the root cause for this incident is a personnel error.											
•	Procedure deficiency was also a contributing factor for the latter event. The breach permit procedure requires an independent inspection for breaches in safety related barriers (to ensure that they have been properly resealed) prior to closing out the breach permit paperwork. However, this procedure does not require an independent inspection for non-safety related barriers. In this case an independent inspection of the floor plug installation on CB elevation 237 was determined not to be necessary. But, if an independent inspection was required by the procedure and performed prior to closing out the breach permit, the inspection could have identified that the floor plug was in a deficient configuration. This would have kept the breach permit and the fire watch patrols active until the floor plug was properly cealed											
, 1	III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT											
e ande britte i aler	NMP2 FSAR Section 9B "Appendix R Review Safe Shutdown Analysis" states that there are four paths (trains) by which the station can attain a cold shutdown considering a design basis fire. These trains are dependent on one of the high pressure coolant injection systems being operable and either the Division 1 or 2 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) being operable. These four trains define the minimum combination of systems needed for safe shutdown.											
t t	The following section concerns the breached fire rated floor on CB elevation 306:											
•	A concurrent fire in the Division 1 and Division 2 HVAC Rooms could compromise all four safe shutdown trains, affecting the ability of the station in attaining a cold shutdown condition. A concurrent fire in these two areas had to be considered a possibility since there was a path of communication (the breached floor plug installation on the CB elevation 306) between these two rooms.											
. And another second for												

and the second second

TRAFTINE

1

1

NRC FORM 366A (9-83)

-TRAME

. . **、** . ٩ 

,

.

.

Ĭ

5 -		
	NRC Form 366A (9-83) LICENCE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTRULATION	Ţ
	FACILITY NAME (1) PAGE (3) DOCKET NUMBER (2) -A LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)	t
*	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER	1
	Nine Mile Point Unit 2 0 15 0 0 0 410 87 - 074 - 01 05 0F 08	
and the second	TEXT (W more seen is required, use additional WRC Form Seed (2017) However, the probability of a fire occurring in one of the HVAC rooms and propagating to the other HVAC room (compromising the station's safe shutdown capability) is considered unlikely. This conclusion is based on the following:	
	<ol> <li>Smoke detection is provided in both the Division 1 and Division 2 HVAC Rooms.</li> </ol>	
	2. Both rooms have water suppression systems for the HVAC charcoal filters which constitute the greatest fire load in each room.	
	3. The fire loading in each room is low; approximately 9 minutes per room.	
1	Therefore, considering that prompt detection of a fire in the affected fire zones is assured, and considering that the installed suppression systems along with the NMP2 Fire Department response would mitigate the consequences of a fire, it is unlikely that a fire would be severe enough to propagate from one room, through this floor plug installation; and affect equipment in the other room.	
	This section concerns the breached fire rated floor on CB elevation 237:	(
	A concurrent fire in the Division 2 cable routing area (Fire Area 19) and the cable chase west (Fire Area 16) could also compromise all four safe shutdown trains. A concurrent fire in these areas has to be considered a possibility since there is a path of communication (between these fire areas) through the breached floor plug on CB elevation 237. However, the probability of a fire occurring in one of these areas and propagating to the other area is considered unlikely. This conclusion is based on the following:	
	1. Smoke detection is provided in both fire areas.	
	2. Fire Area 16 is provided with water suppression systems and Fire Area 19 is provided with both water and Carbon Dioxide fire suppression systems.	
به دهمه مشعه د مکشود	Again, considering that prompt detection of a fire in the affected fire zones is assured, and considering that the installed suppression systems along with the NMP2 Fire Department response would mitigate the consequences of a fire, it is unlikely that a fire would be severe enough to propagate from one room, through this floor plug installation, and affect equipment in the other room.	
and a second and a second a s	These events are reportable via $10$ CFR50.73 (a)(2)(v) because the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown condition would have to be considered compromised with the fire rated floors located on CB elevation 306 and on CB elevation 237 inoperable. It can not be determined how long the fire barrier on CB elevation 306 was inoperable as defined by FSAR Section 9A.3.5.1.1. However, it is assumed that it has been inoperable since receipt of the NMP2 operating license on October 31, 1986. The fire barrier on CB elevation 237 has been inoperable since of CB elevation 237 has been inoperable since 0ctober 1, 1987.	

**?**.

-

•

r

NRC FORM 366A (9-83) 

.

\*\* : : - \*\*\*\*

. ſ

и 

, . .

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSE EVENT	REPORT (LER) TEXT C		ATIQ	N	L.U	S. NUCI APP EXP	LEAR REG PROVED O IRES: 8/31	MB NO.	RY CON 3150-0	104
FACILITY, NAME	(1) =======	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•	LER	NUMBER (	6) -			PAGE (	3)
**************************************		• .		YEAR	S S	NUMBER	L	REVISION			
Nine N	lile Point Unit:2 ^	0 15 10 10 10 1	410	87		074		01	06	OF	08
TEXT (If more spe	te le required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)			¢			<u>    I.                                </u>				
IV.	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS	• •								•	
1.	Fire watch patrols were of fire detection for those watch patrols were suspend installations were accept resealing the installation was re-established when location was in a deficion	established in the a areas was verified nded upon the detern table (either by Eng on). The fire watch it was determined th ent configuration.	affected to be d mination gineerin patro nat the	d fir operal ng and l for floo	e zc ble. t th alys CB r pl	nes a The flo is or eleva ug in	fte fi or by tio th	r the re plug n 237 at			:
2.	A problem report (PR #07 other floor plug install their impact on the fire Engineering conducted an other Appendix R floor p subsequent analysis dete concerning the steel play floor plug installations associated areas.	598) was initiated r ations in fire rated rating of the fire investigation and f lug installations we rmined that the desi te and the dymeric e were adequate for t	request d floors barries initial ere unsa ign deta lastome the fire	ing a s; sp r. N ly de atisf ails er) f e loa	n ev ecif iaga tern acto (spe or t ding	valuat ficall nra Mo nined ory. ecific chese j in t	ion y, hawl tha How all App he	of for k t two ever, y tho endix	se R		
3.	The floor plug installat with the existing design plug on CB elevation 237 with corrective action i	ion on CB elevation details per Work Re will be resealed by tem #4.	306 was equest y June	s res (WR # 1, 19	eale 1302 88 f	ed in 233). in con	acco Tho ijuno	ordan e flo ction	ce or	•	
4.	As part of the investigat Engineering evaluated surplug installations. How sealant was not necessar measure, the design deta requiring a fire resistan Design Coordination Repord date for this action iter	tion discussed in It itable sealing metho ever, it was later o y for these floor pl ils for these floor nt sealant. This wi rt (E&DCR) #C47771. m is June 1, 1988.	tem #2, ods for letermin lugs. f plugs v ill be o The an	Niag the ned t But, will ione ntici	ara CB / hat as a be n via pate	Mohaw a fir cons nodifi Engin ed com	k ix l erv ied eer ple	R floa ated ative ing a tion	or nd		
5.	The breach permit proced	ure (S-FDP-3) will t	be revi	sed a	s fo	ollows	:	•	•		
	a. A section will be a breach permit form	dded to the "Breach requiring the basis	Permit for the	Requ e bre	est' ach	' port permi	ion t r	of t eques	he t.	• *	
	b. A section will be a permit form requiri	dded to the "complet ng justification for	tion" po r closin	ortion ng ou	n of t th	the he bre	brea ach	ach perm	it.		
					_						
		·			P						
1		•									
•		н • • •	. ·							-	
		•	•								~ ~

والمعاني بالمرد المتعاصر المراد مار والمرور بالمراجع والمتعان

1

.

.....

.

.

and a standard the standard and and a standard and the standard and the standard and

1......

ini-

.....

A Same Stat ...

•

j,

. . ---· · · ۰ ۱۳. •

· · · ·

·

·	254.000000000000000000000000000000000000		•	<u> </u>													
(9-83) U.S. NU LICENT EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTRATION											ED OMB NO. 3150-0104						
in the second	· _	LIVEI							EXPIR	ES: 8/31/8	8	100-01	••				
Ť	FACILITY NAME (1)	-PAGE ;		DOCKET NUMB	R (2) ***	14	LER	NUMBER (	6)		P	AGE (3					
	¥			•		YEAR	3		L RAN	EVISION		ГТ					
1	·····			-						Umach.							
	- Nine Mile	Point Unit <sup>2</sup>	×	0 5 0 0	0 410	87	<u> -</u>	074		01	07	OF	08				
<u>.</u>	TIDCT (If more apace is requ	ired, use additional NRC Form 3	85A's) (17)	•													
-		The bused of	annit fann u	ill ha rav	sod roquir	ning a	mar	ndator	v								
2	с.	inspection (	hv the fire	denartment	of the br	reach	worl	k site	pri	or to	I						
		closing out	the breach p	ermit pape	work and s	securi	ng 1	the fi	re wa	atch		•					
		patrol.															
						1		<b>ah</b> an	<b>MO 011</b>	inina							
	d.	the penetrat	ion worksnee ion basis do	cuments co	ering the	seali	ina a	detail	s (f	or							
ţ		that penetra	tion) be ent	ered on th	worksheet	t by t	he i	person	- • •	•							
с 1		responsible	for disposit	ioning thi	s form.	-			•								
			•		•		• •	•									
÷.	The	ese actions wil	11 be taken t	o prevent	future inap	propr	riato	e Clos	July	0† 1							
	100 Dre	ach permits.	The breach p	ienari proc		Dere	24130	eu ojy	ouiy	• •							
		JO.	¢														
	6. A 1	lessons learned	i document di	scussing t	nis event v	wi11	pe p	repare	d fo	r the							
	Fir	e and Technica	1 Support De	partments	Lessons Le	earneo	1 boo	oks.	A CO	py of							
;	th	is document will	II be forward	led to the 1910 27° 108	MPC Engine	eering	j vel	partime	11 <b>6</b> •	11112							
ł.	act	, vin will be co	ompreced by M	idy 27, 190	)•												
•	V. ADI	DITIONAL INFORM	1AT ION		•												
•	LER 87-18 breached. effective prior to t	discusses a s The correctiv since it is su implementation	imilar event ve actions ta urmised that of the corre	where a pr ken in LER the event ctive acti	operly sea 87-18 are discussed ons for LE	led pe still in LEF R 87-1	enet:   co   87  8.	ration nsider -74 oc	was ed t curr	late o be ed	er						
•		Identific	ation of Com	ponents Ref	erred to i	n thi	s LE	R r									
				Ŧ	EE 002				TEEE	805							
•	Component			F	IS Funct				Svst	em ID	)						
									-5								
	Fire Detec	tion System			DET				IC								
94 2	Fire Rated	l Floor (Barrie	er)		N/A												
2 20 20	Floor Plug	J L Spalant		0	N/A SFAI				NA								
	Fire Suppr	ression System	(Water)		SRNK				KP								
W	Fire Suppr	ression System	(Carbon Diox	ide)	N/A				KQ								
		•															
:	Failed Con	nonant Idantif	Fication: No	t Annlicah	le l												
		WONCHE AUCHEN			·												
		•									-						
	+																
	•																
,				я			••										
•					•								6				
3	•		•	•					•	•							
1																	

.

72.0

.

18

المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع

-----

15

i

.\*

\*U.S.GPO:1986-0-624-538/455

1993 N 1993 N 1993

. J.



•

. . . . .



NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION /P.O. BOX 32 LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13099/ATELEPHONE (315)/343:21.10 STATIO

NMP32831

April 30, 1988

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410 LER 87-74 Supplement 1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 87-74 Supplement 1

Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v), "Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

- (A) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition;
- (B). Remove residual heat;
- (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or
- (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident."

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

L. Willis

General Superintendent Nuclear Generation

JLW/POB/mjd

Attachments

P277172614

cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1 Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook

u.

.

. T