Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO REGULAT DOC.DATE: 87/10/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # ACCESSION NBR: 8710260314 , FACIL: 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha 05000410 AUTHOR AFFILIATION AUTH. NAME RANDALL, R. G.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. LEMPGES, T. E. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RECIP. NAME

SUBJECT: LER 87-057-00:on 870921,ESF actuation occurred.Caused by cognitive personnel error & failure to follow procedure. Technician counseled. W/871020 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR \_ ENCL \_ SIZE:\_ TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

**NOTES: 21** 

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### I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On September 21, 1987 at 1103 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation, specifically, isolation of the Residual Heat Removal (RHS) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. At the time of the event, the plant was in the cold shutdown condition with the reactor mode switch in the "SHUTDOWN" position. Reactor pressure was atmospheric with a reactor coolant temperature of approximately 116°F.

Niagara Mohawk Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians were in the process of performing the I&C surveillance procedure N2-ISP-LDS-MOIO, "Reactor Building General Area Temperature Instrument Channel Functional Test", when an RHS and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) isolation signal was received. This resulted in isolation of the the SDC system. No valve movement occurred for the RCIC system, since it was already isolated at the time of the event.

There were no components or systems which were inoperable and/or out of service which contributed to the event. No plant system or component failures resulted from the event.

### II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the event was cognitive personnel error; failure to follow procedure. This failure to follow procedure was due to an inattention to detail.

Procedure N2-ISP-LDS-MO10 functionally tests the 10 reactor building general area temperature instrument channels 2RHS\*TE81A and 2RHS\*TE81B through 2RHS\*TE85A and 2RHS\*TE85B. The procedure is very repetitious, with essentially identical steps for the testing of each instrument channel. The bypass switch for the RHS and RCIC isolation logic is to be placed in "BYPASS" prior to performing each transmitter/switch calibration. Per procedure, the I&C technician is to request that the Chief Shift Operator (CSO) reposition the bypass switch to "BYPASS" for each instrument channel to be tested and verify the appropriate annunciator and computer point are activated. Preparing to test instrument channel 2RHS\*TE82A, the lead I&C technician assumed he had ordered the bypass switch to the bypass position, without verifying the annunciator and computer point had alarmed, and instructed his co-worker to proceed with the procedure.

Subsequently, the lead I&C technician moved into position to verify the next step in the procedure. As the lead technician read over this step in preparation to verify its completion, he noted that the previous step to bypass the isolation logic was not initialed as having been performed. Once he had recognized his error, he attempted to inform his co-worker. However, by this time the co-worker was already in the process of performing the next step of the procedure. This step is to disconnect the thermocouple leads from the transmitter/switch input terminals. Without the trip logic bypassed, the SDC system isolation was initiated. 6"

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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NRC Form 366A (9-81)

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## Nine Mile Point Unit 2

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# III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is considered reportable via 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because the SDC isolation is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) function which is part of the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System (PCRVICS).

The SDC isolation did not impair the station's capability to achieve (or maintain) a safe shutdown condition, nor was there any conceivable impact to plant or public safety stemming from this event. This statement is based on the following: (1) The isolated system was quickly restored to service. (2) Additionally, even if we assume total failure of RHS shutdown cooling, other alternate methods for cooling the reactor are available and discussed in the NMP2 Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.2.9.

As previously stated, the RCIC steam supply isolation values also received an isolation signal, but no value movement occurred since the values were already closed. The RCIC system was not in operation (nor was it required to be operable by the NMP2 Technical Specifications Section 3.7.4) since the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition. Therefore, the RCIC isolation signal had no impact on station safety. However, at full power (or at any other condition where RCIC is required to be operable), if RCIC is not available to perform its intended function, the High Pressure Core Spray system would be available as a back up system.

The isolation function is considered to be a conservative ESF response. It is considered conservative since the primary objective of the isolation function is to provide protection to the plant and public by preventing releases of radioactive materials to the environment. Additionally, the SDC isolation function operated as designed with no other transients or inoperable systems contributing to this event.

The elapsed time for the event, from the isolation initiation to the restoration of SDC, was approximately three minutes.

# IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Initial corrective actions were for the operators to identify the cause of the SDC isolation, verify the plant status as normal, reset the RHS/RCIC isolation logic and restore the SDC system to service.

Additional corrective actions include the following: (1) The I&C technician involved in this event has been counseled on the importance of following procedures when performing surveillance testing. (2) This event will be discussed in the regular I&C departmental safety meetings. This will assure that other I&C technicians are made aware of this event and its significance in a timely manner. (3) A Training Modification Recommendation (TMR# I87-23) has been initiated requesting discussion of this event in I&C technician training. Completion of this training is scheduled for February, 1988.

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V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION													
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
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NMP26474



RE: Docket No. 50-410 LER 87-57

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 87-57 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A 10CFR50.72 report for this event was made at 1122 hours on September 21, 1987.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement No. 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

ras

Thomas E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation

TEL/JTD/mjd

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1 Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook

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