San and a start of the start of	REGULATORY FORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYNEM (RIDS)	
ACCESSION NBR:	8709150276 DOC. DATE: 87/09/11 NOTARIZED: NO	DOCKET #
FACIL: 50-410	Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit'2, Niagara Moha	05000410
AUTH. NAME	AUTHOR AFFILIATION	
RANDALL, R. G.	Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.	
LEMPGES, T. E.	Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.	•
RECIP. NAME	RECIPIENT AFFILIATION	
`		

SUBJECT: LER 87-032-01: on 870612, while plant in hot shutdown condition, RWCU sys isolation occurred. Caused by design & const deficiencies. RWCU has been oriented to eliminate air collection point. W/870911 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / ENCL / SIZE: 6

NOTES: 21

05000410

í

	RECIPIENT	COPI	ES	RECIPIENT	COP	IES
	ID CODE/NAME	LTTR	ENCL	ID CODE/NAME	LTTR	ENCL
	PD1-1 LA	1	1	PD1-1 PD	1	1
	HAUGHEY, M	1	1	BENEDICT, B	1	1
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1	1	ACRS MOELLER	2	2
	AEOD/DOA	1.	1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1	1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2	2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1	1
	DEDRO	1	1	NRR/DEST/ADS	1	0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1	1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1	1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1	1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1	1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1	1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1	1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1	1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1	1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1	1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2	2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1	i
	REG_EILE 02	1	1	RES DEPY GI	1	1
	RES TELFORD, J	1	1	RES/DE/EIB ·	1	1
	RGN1 FILE 01	1	1	•		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5	.5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1	1
	LPDR	1	1	NRC PDR	1	1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1	1	NSIC MAYS, G	1	1

Þ . · · · × `i . •

.

•

.

NRC Form (9-83)	n 366	•				,		ENS	EE EVE		POI	 7T	(LER)	U.S. NU	CLEAR PPROV XPIRES	REGULA ED OMB A 5: 8/31/85	TORY COA	AMIS: 104
													<u> </u>					
FACILITY	NAME (1)	• •										, 0	OCKET NUMBER	(2)		1 <u>1</u>	I SE
TITLE		e Mi	<u>1e Po</u>	<u>1nt</u>	Unit	2	<u></u>	- ion	<u> </u>		<u> </u>			5 0 0	0	410	110	F
	nea Nea	illa!	tions	nup Du	o to Di	II I oci	an ai	nd C	onstru	ction	Do:	rer Fic	icial riow					
EVI	ENT DATE	(5)	10113		R NUMBER (6)	gn ai		REPORT DA	E (7)	De		OTHER F	ACILITIES INVO	LVED (3)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	*	NUMBER		REVISION	MONT	H DAY	YEAR			FACILITY NAME	s	DOCK	ET NUMBE	RISI	
													• N/A		0 1	51010	101	
	1.0	07		_		_		•										
06	12	8/	8/		032		01	09	11	87			<u>N/A</u>		0 1			
OPE	RATING	. 3	1HIS HE	AND/N	IS SUBMITTE	O PUI	ISUANT '	TO THE	REQUIREM	ENTS OF 1	O CFR	9: 10 Y 1	Check one or more of	the following) (1	" 	77 74/53		
POWE	8 "		20.	406(a)	(\$)(i)			50.38	-5(c) 5(c)(1)			-	50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)		
· LEVE (10)	L	000	20.	405(a)	ເນເສ	,		50,38	3(c)(2)				50,73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER /S	pecity in Al	bstre
			20.	405(a)	(1)(iii)			50,73	}(a){2}(i)				50,73(a)(2)(vili)(A)			below and 366AJ	in Text, Ni	IC F
			20.	405(a)	(1)(iv)		L	50,73	l(a)(2)(ii)	*			50,73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20,	405(e)	(1)(v)			50.73	i(+)(2)(iii)				50,73(a)(2)(x)	<u> </u>	L			
NAME							<u> </u>	LICENSE	E CONTACI	FOR THE	LER (121	-	1	TELEPI	ONE NUM	18ER	
	~ •		~ ~					-						AREA CODE				
(KOb	ert (a. Ra	nda	11, Su	per	V1 SO1	r Te	chnica	I Sup	por	t		315	34	9-244	5	
					COMPLETE	ONE	LINE FOR	EACH	COMPONEN	T FAILUR	DESC	9819E	D IN THIS REPORT	(13)				
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPO	DNENT	, M/	ANUFAC: TURER	REPO	NPROS			CAUSE	SYST	EM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPO	NPROS		
											+						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
			•				-											88
																		2
				-	C11001 0110	<u> </u>		1.288	<u></u>	×		[L	·•		<u>'</u>	<u></u>	<u>ू</u> **
	·													EXPECTE SUBMISSI	DN			+
YE	5 (11 yes, co	mplete E)	RPECTED	รบอพ	ISSION DATE	1			<u>x</u> NO	·				OATE (1	51			
On act Rea a h pre (ps Alt for def 1. 2. 3. 4.	June uatio ctor ot sh ssure ig) a hough this icien Corr T A R T	12, n of Water utdow and at t ever cies. ectiv he RW he fill spec WCU f he re	1987 an E Clewn co temp 32°F, the t 100 s lex h cial flow eject	at ingiu andiaere imeb is b io to to seasa fl	2121 h neered p (RWCI tion w ture w spectiv of the een de ns for ion flo s will k force nsmitte ow tran	our Sa J) ither vel ter th be be h sm	s, N fety syste appr y. vent is ev rema as be prob itter	ine i Fea read roxin no d to vent ent i oved een a lems r or	Mile P ture (At th ctor m mately conclu be a are: has be and t assign ifice	oint ESF), e tim ode s 583 sions combi en pr he bl ed to eleme	Unii spo e o wit poun con nat ock eva nt v	t 2 ecif ft nds uld ion 'ly ing alu vil	2 (NMP2) e ifically, the event, in "SHUTD s per squa d be made, n of design globe va ate and t ll be reloc	xperienc isolatio the pla DWN". R re inch the roo n and co n and co lves re- roublesh cated.	ed n of nt w eact gaug t ca nstr orie	the as ir or use uctio nted. the	'n	
<i>₹</i>			9- , za,	f 19	· • • • • • • • • •	چىت. ئور 1	۲ ۱۰۰۰ ۲	F (-1. 848. w)										7

,

•

5

. . .

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Decker Numbers CD Vers Total Total State	LICENSEE EVENT	U ONT (LEN/ TEXT CONT	INUATIO		V	APF EX	PROVED C	эмв NO. 31/85	3150-0	0104
Nine Mile Point Unit 2o s o o d 0At the importance of the control of t	LITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LE	R NUMBER (6)			(3)	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2Isiologi 41067O32O102.07If more used needed Wide Lem SectionI.DESCRIPTION OF EVENTOn June 12, 1987 at 2121 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), specifically, isolation of the Reactor Mater Cleanup (RWCU) system. At the time of the event, the plant was in a hot shutdown condition with the reactor mode switch in "SMUTDOWN". Reactor pressure and temperature were approximately 583 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and 482°F, respectively.Following a scram at 2056 hours (LER 87-31), a Niagara Mohawk operator was controlling reactor water level. During reactor startup/hot standby, it is 	· ·		YEAR		NUMBER	-	REVISION	4		Γ
If more used is needed with a constrained of the second	Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 15 10 10 10 1 410	. 87		032		01	02	. OF	o
 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On June 12, 1987 at 2121 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), specifically, isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RMCU) system. At the time of the event, the plant was in a hot shutdown condition with the reactor mode switch in "SMUTDONN". Reactor pressure and temperature were approximately 583 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and 482°F, respectively. Following a scram at 2056 hours (LER 87-31), a Niagara Mohawk operator was controlling reactor water level. During reactor startup/hot standby, it is necessary to remove excess reactor coolant, due to Control Rod Drive (RDS) system until steam can be passed directly to the Main Condenser. The removed excess reactor coolant (reject flow) may be directed to either the Main Condenser or to the 'Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment system. While removing the inservice RWCU filter demineralizer in preparation to reduce the amount of reject flow, a sensed high flow differential between RWCU system solation. For the event, operator actions were per the approved temporary operating procedure 87-41, "Feedwater/Clean-Up System Operation". This procedure was in effect during startup and shutdown of the plant to mitigate feedwater line temperature.stratification. There were no components or systems which were inoperable and/or out of service which contributed to the event. No plant system or component failures resulted for this event has been determined to be a combination of design and construction deficiencies. There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal experienced in the event in the process system. Additionally, the type of transmitters used for RWCU flow indication have a very fast response time and are particularly sensitive to air amplified moi	III more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)		~t	- L A			L	<u> </u>		<u></u>
 On June 12, 1987 at 2121 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), specifically, isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system. At the time of the event, the plant was in a hot shutdown condition with the reactor mode switch in "SUUTDONN". Reactor pressure and temperature were approximately 583 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and 482°F, respectively. Following a scram at 2056 hours (LER 87-31), a Niagara Mohawk operator was controlling reactor water level. During reactor startup/hot standby, it is necessary to remove excess reactor coolant, due to Control Rod Drive (RDS) system cooling water in-flow and reactor water thermal swell, via the RWCU system until steam can be passed directly to the Main Condenser. The removed excess reactor coolant (reject flow) may be directed to either the Main Condenser or to the Liquid Radioactive Wate Treatment system. While removing the inservice RWCU filter demineralizer in preparation to reduce the amount of reject flow, a sensed high flow differential between RWCU system Suction and reject flow transmitters occurred and initiated the RWCU system per the approved temporary operating procedure 87-41, "Feedwater/Clean-Up System Operation". This procedure was in effect during startup and shutdown of the plant to mitigate feedwater line temperature.stratification. There were no components or systems which were inoperable and/or out of service which contributed to the event. No plant system or component failures resulted from the event. II. CAUSE OF EVENT Although at the time of the event no conclusions could be made, the root cause for this event has been determined to be a combination of design and construction deficiencies. There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal expe	I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT		٠							
 Following a scram at 2056 hours (LER 87-31), a Niagara Mohawk operator was controlling reactor water level. During reactor startup/hot standby, it is necessary to remove excess reactor coolant, due to Control Rod Drive (RDS) system cooling water in-flow and reactor water thermal swell, via the RWCU system until steam can be passed directly to the Main Condenser. The removed excess reactor coolant (reject flow) may be directed to either the Main Condenser or to the 'Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment system. While removing the inservice RWCU filter demineralizer in preparation to reduce the amount of reject flow, a sensed high flow differential between RWCU system suction and reject flow transmitters occurred and initiated the RWCU system Deparation". This procedure was in effect during startup and shutdown of the plant to mitigate feedwater line temperature.stratification. There were no components or systems which were inoperable and/or out of service which contributed to the event. No plant system or component failures resulted from the event. II. CAUSE OF EVENT Although at the time of the event no conclusions could be made, the root cause for this event has been determined to be a combination of design and construction deficiencies. There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal experienced in the sensing lines can have an amplifying affect on perturbations that may be present in the process system. Additionally, the type of transmitter sensitive to air amplified noise. 	On June 12, 1987 at 2121 hours actuation of an Engineered Saf Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) s a hot shutdown condition with pressure and temperature were (psig) and 482°F, respectively	, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 ety Feature (ESF), speci ystem. At the time of t the reactor mode switch approximately 583 pounds	(MP2) fically he even in "SHU per sq	ex , i t, TDO uar	perienc solatic the pla WN". F e inch	:ed)n o ३nt }eac gaा	of the was ' ctor uge	e in		
For the event, operator actions were per the approved temporary operating procedure 87-41, "Feedwater/Clean-Up System Operation". This procedure was in effect during startup and shutdown of the plant to mitigate feedwater line temperature.stratification. There were no components or systems which were inoperable and/or out of service which contributed to the event. No plant system or component failures resulted from the event. II. CAUSE OF EVENT Although at the time of the event no conclusions could be made, the root cause for this event has been determined to be a combination of design and construction deficiencies. There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal experienced in the event discussed in this report and for the RWCU system isolation. Air in the sensing lines can have an amplifying affect on perturbations that may be present in the process system. Additionally, the type of transmitters used for RWCU flow indication have a very fast response time and are particularly sensitive to air amplified noise.	Following a scram at 2056 hour controlling reactor water leve necessary to remove excess reac cooling water in-flow and reac steam can be passed directly t coolant (reject flow) may be d Liquid Radioactive Waste Treat filter demineralizer in prepar- high flow differential between occurred and initiated the RWC	s (LER 87-31), a Niagara 1. During reactor start ctor coolant, due to Con tor water thermal swell, o the Main Condenser. T irected to either the Ma ment system. While remo ation to reduce the amou RWCU system suction and U system isolation.	Mohawk up/hot trol Ro via th he remo in Cond ving th nt of r reject	ope star d Dr e Ri ved ense e i eje fl	erator ndby, i rive (F WCU sys ercess er ort nservic ct flov ow trar	was t i (DS) ;ten ; re ; re ; o t ; o t ; e F y, z nsm ²	; s syst unt actor the the {WCU a sen: itter:	tem il sed s		
II. CAUSE OF EVENT Although at the time of the event no conclusions could be made, the root cause for this event has been determined to be a combination of design and construction deficiencies. There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal experienced in the event discussed in this report and for the RWCU system isolation. Air in the sensing lines can have an amplifying affect on perturbations that may be present in the process system. Additionally, the type of transmitters used for RWCU flow indication have a very fast response time and are particularly sensitive to air amplified noise.	For the event, operator action procedure 87-41, "Feedwater/Cla effect during startup and shut temperature stratification. There were no components or sy which contributed to the event from the event.	s were per the approved ean-Up System Operation" down of the plant to mit stems which were inopera . No plant system or co	tempora . This igate f ble and mponent	ry (pro eedu /or fa	operati ocedure water 1 out of ilures	ing : wa ine : se re:	is in ? Prvice sultee	e d		
Although at the time of the event no conclusions could be made, the root cause for this event has been determined to be a combination of design and construction deficiencies. There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal experienced in the event discussed in this report and for the RWCU system isolation. Air in the sensing lines can have an amplifying affect on perturbations that may be present in the process system. Additionally, the type of transmitters used for RWCU flow indication have a very fast response time and are particularly sensitive to air amplified noise.	II. CAUSE OF EVENT		,							
There has been a history of erratic flow indication problems, specifically with the RWCU system flow indicators. It has been determined that air in the transmitter sensing lines is the most probable cause for the erroneous flow signal experienced in the event discussed in this report and for the RWCU system isolation. Air in the sensing lines can have an amplifying affect on perturbations that may be present in the process system. Additionally, the type of transmitters used for RWCU flow indication have a very fast response time and are particularly sensitive to air amplified noise.	Although at the time of the eve for this event has been determ deficiencies.	ent no conclusions could ined to be a combination	be mad of des	e, † ign	the roc and cc)t c)nst	ause: cruct	ion		
	There has been a history of er- the RWCU system flow indicator transmitter sensing lines is th signal experienced in the even isolation. Air in the sensing perturbations that may be pres- of transmitters used for RWCU are particularly sensitive to	ratic flow indication pr s. It has been determin he most probable cause f t discussed in this repo lines can have an ampli ent in the process syste flow indication have a v air amplified noise.	oblems, ed that or the rt and fying a m. Add ery fas	spe ain erro for ffeo itio t re	ecifica r in th oneous the RW ct on onally, esponse	lly e flc ICU , th ≥ t ⁺	' with)w syste Ne typ ime an	ו ∍m ספ nd		
		•								

.

.

s

• •

. . .

• • ٩ · · · 0

,

i. 2 •

	RT (LER) TEXT CONTINU	JATION D APPROVE EXPIRES:	REGULATORY COMMISSION D OMB NO. 3150-0104 8/31/85
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVIS	ON
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 410	87 - 032 - 01	03. OF 04.

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Efforts have been expended to determine the air source and the areas where air collects. It has been determined that air coming out of aqueous solution at decreasing reactor pressures tends to collect at specific points in the transmitter sensing lines. Furthermore, it has been determined that these air collection points could have been avoided by using a different design or proper construction techniques. Specifically, the following design and construction deficiencies have been identified; (1) The RWCU Suction Transmitter (2WCS*FT67X(Y)) sensing line flex hoses are positioned horizontally with a slight vertical slope. This orientation allows air to collect in the uneven interior surface of the hose. The instrument tubing run could have been designed with a greater vertical slope; eliminating these collection points. (2) The globe blocking valves on the RWCU suction flow transmitter sensing lines were installed with their stems in a vertical orientation creating another air collection point. These valves could have been installed with the stems horizontal avoiding this collection point. (3) The RWCU Suction Flow Element (2WCS*FE115) was installed at an improper orientation, with the vent and drain holes not at top and bottom, but rotated at a 45 degree angle. This improper installation allowed an air collection point by eliminating a vent passage. Proper orientation of this orifice would have avoided this air collection point.

Flow oscillations from the RWCU Blowdown Flow Transmitters (2WCS*FT69X(Y)) are attributed to the location of the Flow Element (2WCS*FE126), which is an identified design deficiency. Modification PN2Y87MX119 has been prepared by Niagara Mohawk to relocate this flow element when the Power Ascension schedule permits. This modification, when implemented, should mitigate future erratic flow indications.

III. : ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The NMP2 Final Safety Analysis Report Section 5.4.8 states: "The RWCU system is classified as a primary power generation system (not an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)), a small part of which is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) up to and including the outside isolation valve. The other portions of the system are not part of the RCPB and can be isolated from the reactor. The RWCU system may be operated at any time during planned reactor operations or it may be shutdown if water quality is within the Technical Specification limits."

An RWCU isolation does not impair the station's capability to achieve a safe shutdown condition. The RWCU isolation function operated as designed with no other transients or inoperable systems contributing to the event.

The event is considered reportable via 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because the isolation function is an ESF function which is part of the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System.

The duration of the event was approximately nine minutes.

• • • - · · .

• .

. .

1

ν.

. * a

.*

٤ -

	e Car			`										*		
NRC_ (9-83)	Form		TEX	тс	ONTIN	UATIO	TION O APPROVED					IGULATORY COMMISSION OMB NO. 3150-0104 /31/85				
FACI	LITY NAME (1)		100	CKET N	UMBER	(2)		T	LE	ER N	UMBER (6)		F	3)	
								YEAP		SEC	UENTIAL		REVISION		Π	
- 	Nine M	ile Point Unit 2	0	5	0 0	0	410	87			032		01	<u>04</u> .	OF	04
:	T \/	CODDECTIVE ACTIONS												r		
	1 .									_			_			
- -	1.	eliminate an air collection po	(2) Din	WCS [,] t.	*FEI	[5]	has be	en p	rope	erl	y ori	ent	ed to)e >		
2. Per NMP2 Modification PN2Y87MX167, the RWCU Suction Flow Transmitter (2WCS*FT67X(Y)) sensing lines inside the primary containment will be modified as follows to eliminate identified air collection points; the flex hoses will be replaced with rigid tubing and the blocking globe valves will be re-oriented. This work is presently scheduled to be completed during the Test Condition 2 outage																
If the actions described above are not effective in reducing the en flow signals (from the RWCU suction flow transmitters) to an accept level, the transmitter lines outside of the primary containment wi reworked to eliminate probable air collection areas. These actions being taken as part of a systematic troubleshooting program to corp RWCU flow transmitter problems.										e er ept wil ons orr	ratic able 11 be are rect t	he				
		This corrective action in cons should minimize transient effe due to entrapped air in the se	jun ect: ens	ctic s or ing	on wi n the line	th RW s.	correc CU suc	tive tion	act flc	tio DW	n ite trans	em # smit	ters			à
	3.	A special task force has been RWCU transmitter problems.	special task force has been assigned to evaluate and troubleshoot the WCU transmitter problems.													
	4. Modification PN2Y87MX119 will incorporate the suggested design changes from General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL) 450. SIL 450 recommends that the RWCU Blowdown Flow Element (2WCS*FE126) be placed upstream of 2WCS-FV135 to prevent erratic flow indications from the RWCU Blowdown Flow Transmitters (2WCS*FT69X(Y)) and unnecessary RWCU isolations. This modification is scheduled to be completed during the Test Condition 2 outage.															
	۷.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION				•										
Identification of Components Referred to in this LER																
	Compone	IEEE 803 EIIS Funct						•		IEE Sys	D					
ĺ	Flow Tr Instrum Reactor Flow Ir Isolat Globe V		I		FT TB N/ FI N/ RT	G A A V						IJ CE CE JE IJ				
	Two sin event a	nilar events involving RWCU isc and are discussed in LER 87-47.	olat ,	tion	is ha	ve	occurr	ed at	: NM	1P2	sinc	e t	his			

•

.

•

NRC FORM 366A 19 831

٦

•

. . 2 . ٩ , . . • •**.**

.



NMP26447

IE22

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA

301 PLAINFIELD ROAD SYRACUSE, NY 13212

THOMAS E. LEMPGES VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR GENERATION

September 11, 1987

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410 LER 87-32 - Supplement 1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 87-32 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 Supplement 1 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii) report was made at 2345 hours on June 12, 1987.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation

TEL/JTD/mjd

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1 Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook .

. . . • • •