NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)

Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Due to Procedure Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
0 1	2 6	8 7	8 7	— 0 0 9	— 0 1	0 7	0 7	8 7	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
4		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Robert G. Randall, Supervisor Technical Support	3 1 5 — 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 26, 1987 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was at 0% power with the mode switch in shutdown. Procedure N2-ISP-RPS-R102, "Turbine Stop Valve Closure Instrument Channel Calibration" was being performed to comply with Technical Specifications. N2-ISP-RPS-R102 involves the cycling of turbine stop valve position limit switches for the purpose of calibration. Because each valve test produces one half an isolation signal, a full isolation occurred when both stop valves SV-3 and SV-4 limit switches were calibrated. The inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) 2MSS*HYU6A-D then closed. This event would have been prevented had each isolation logic channel and MSIV logic been reset between the channel tests.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Steps will be added to N2-ISP-RPS-R102 to reset the isolation logic and MSIV logic between channel tests.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 26, 1987 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was at 0% power with the mode switch in shutdown.

At approximately 20:10 permission was given by the SSS to perform instrument surveillance test, N2-ISP-RPS-R102. N2-ISP-RPS-R102, "Turbine Stop Valve Closure Instrument Channel Calibration" provides direction in the calibration of the stop valve closure limit switches 2RPS*ZS1A thru 2RPS*ZS1D. This involves cycling the valve position switch to the "valve open" position and back again to verify the closure trip setpoint. Each valve test produces half an isolation signal upon limit switch arm movement to the "open valve position". A full isolation occurred after surveillance testing had been conducted on both stop valves SV-3 and SV-4. The following is the general sequence of events:

1. Instrument and Control (I&C) technician began work on turbine stop valve SV-4 limit switch 2RPS*ZS1B. Per procedure, 2RPS*ZS1B is "changed" to the "valve open" state, energizing/deenergizing associated relays and subsequently setting up a one half channel trip and a one half MSIV isolation. This logic seals in and is not automatically reset.

2. Inboard MSIVs 2MSS*HYV6A-6D are opened per attachment 8 of N2-ISI-RPV-R@001.

3. The I&C technician began work on turbine stop valve SV-3, limit switch 2RPS*ZS1A. Per procedure, 2RPS*ZS1A is "changed" to the "valve open state, energerzing/deenergizing associated relays and subsequently setting up a channel trip and an MSIV isolation.

4. The MSIVs closed at approximately 20:47.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The I&C technician performed the limit switch calibration in accordance with N2-ISP-RPS-R102.

This event has been attributed to a procedural deficiency in the instrument surveillance procedure. No steps are provided which call for the isolation logic and the main steam valve isolation logic to be reset after each limit switch calibration. If a step such as this had been called out in the procedure, the event would not have occurred.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

An undesireable challenge to a plant emergency safety feature system did occur due to a procedural deficiency. There were, however, no adverse safety consequences as a result of the event. The main steam isolation valves closed, as designed on what appeared to be a "low condenser vacuum" condition. (see attachment 1 for contact logic). The main steam line outboard and drain line isolation valves received isolation signals but were previously closed. N2-ISP-RPS-R102 will normally be conducted during refueling.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

Procedural steps will be added to N2-ISP-RPS-R102 which instruct the I&C technician to reset the isolation logic and main steam isolation logic between each valve test. I&C will make these additions before the next use of the procedure.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Identification of Components Referred to in this LER

Component	IEEE 803 EIIS Funct	IEEE 805 System ID
Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSS)	ISV	SB
Turbine Stop Valve (MSS)	SHV	TA
Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switches (MSS)	ZIS	TA
Reactor Protection System Relay (RPS)	RLY	JC

No events similar to LER 87-09 had previously occurred.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ATTACHMENT 1



MSIV & DRAINS
ISOLATION LOGIC