NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Automatic Initiation of Standby Gas Treatment System Train B

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
1 2	3 1	8 6	8 6	0 2 5	0 1	0 7	0 7	8 7	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Robert G. Randall, Supervisor Technical Support	3 1 5 3 1 4 9 - 1 2 1 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 31, 1986 at 0030 hours automatic initiation of the Division II Standby Gas Treatment system train occurred. This was caused by:

1. The presence of a "low flow" signal from the Reactor Building Ventilation system, and

2. An erroneous signal indicating "low reactor building differential pressure" was transmitted due to wind conditions at the exterior differential pressure primary element".

The root cause of the event was component location design deficiency. A design change has been initiated to relocate the exterior differential pressure primary elements. (One for Division I and one for Division II).

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	8 6	— 0 2 5	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 31, 1986 at 0030 hours, with the mode switch in the shutdown position, the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit #2 experienced automatic initiation of the Division II Standby Gas Treatment system train. At the time of the event, the Reactor Building Ventilation system was secured. Reactor building differential pressure was being maintained by the Division I Standby Gas Treatment system train. This situation resulted in a Reactor Building Ventilation system "low flow" signal being present in the logic for Standby Gas auto initiation.

The exterior differential pressure primary element transmitted a spurious signal indicating "low reactor building differential pressure" due to wind conditions. This coupled with the "low flow" signal mentioned above caused the automatic initiation of the Division II Standby Gas Treatment system train. An erroneous signal was suspected at the time of the event and subsequently verified by comparing readings with another component.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the event was component location design deficiency. At the current location, the differential pressure primary elements (one for Division I and one for Division II) are susceptible to gusts of wind and cause erroneous signals to be transmitted.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73 part (a)(2)(iv) automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature.

During this event, safety consequences were not compromised. Per Technical Specification section 3.6.5.1 Secondary Containment Integrity is not applicable in cold shutdown when irradiated fuel is not being handled in the reactor building and when core alterations and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel are not in progress. The design basis of the Standby Gas Treatment System is to limit the release of radioactive gases from the reactor building to the environment within the guidelines of 10CFR100 in the event of a LOCA and to maintain a negative pressure in the reactor building under accident conditions. When automatic initiation occurred the reactor building differential pressure was within Technical Specifications (-0.250 inches water gauge) and secondary containment integrity even during an accident would not have been compromised.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	8 6	— 0 2 5	— 0 1	0 3 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The Standby Gas Treatment System differential pressure primary elements have been sensitive to wind gusts causing spurious signals for automatic initiation of Standby Gas Treatment to be transmitted in the past. However, this is the first time a spurious signal was coupled with a Reactor Building Ventilation system low flow condition and automatic initiation of Standby Gas Treatment system occurred. The reactor building ventilation system provides redundant instrumentation for observing and recording reactor building differential pressure.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

A design change has been initiated to relocate the differential pressure primary elements for both divisions of the Standby Gas Treatment system so they will not be affected by gusts of wind.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Identification of Components Referred to in this LER

Component	IEEE 803 EIIS Funct	IEEE 805 System ID
Standby Gas Treatment System	N/A	BH
Primary Element, Differential Pressure	PDE	BH
Reactor Building Ventilation System	N/A	VA

The component which gave the erroneous signal (PDE) is a Brandt model number 10SPP2283 element.

There have been no previous similar events. Automatic initiation of Standby Gas Treatment System has not previously occurred as a result of low Reactor Building pressure differential combined with a Reactor Building Ventilation system "low flow" signal.