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 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 MANGAN, C. V. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Responds to request for addl info re max credible fault test of J-10 relay. Test procedure & summary of test results addressing NRC questions encl.

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REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE [REDACTED] IN THE [REDACTED] AREA  
DURING THE PERIOD [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]

Reference is made to the report of the [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] and to the report of the [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED].

The [REDACTED] has been identified as a [REDACTED] and is being [REDACTED] by the [REDACTED].

DATE	ACTIVITY	LOCATION	STATUS
1/15/50	CONFERENCE	WASHINGTON	CONFIDENTIAL
1/20/50	MEETING	WASHINGTON	CONFIDENTIAL
2/5/50	REPORT	WASHINGTON	CONFIDENTIAL
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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/301 PLAINFIELD ROAD, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13212/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

February 4, 1987  
(NMP2L 0991)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-410

Gentlemen:

On January 28, 1987, we met with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff to address the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 main steam isolation valve actuator design. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission asked for additional information on three topics. Further, on January 28, 1987, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission asked for a maximum credible fault test of the J-10 relay. This test procedure and summary of the test results are included in the attachment to this letter and addresses the staff's questions.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

*C. V. Mangan*  
C. V. Mangan  
Senior Vice President

NLR/pns  
2559G  
Attachment

xc: Regional Administrator, Region I  
Ms. E. G. Adensam, Project Director  
Mr. W. A. Cook, Resident Inspector  
Project File (2)

*Adol*  
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PDR ADCK	05000410
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of ]  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ] Docket No. 50-410  
(Nine Mile Point Unit 2) ]

AFFIDAVIT

C. V. Mangan, being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

C. Mangan

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York and County of Onondaga, this 4<sup>th</sup> day of February, 1987.

Beth A. Menikheim  
Notary Public in and for  
Onondaga County, New York

My Commission expires:

BETH A. MENIKHEIM  
Notary Public in the State of New York  
Qualified in Onondaga County No. 4804074  
My Commission Expires August 31, 1988



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BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT  
DENVER, COLORADO

## ATTACHMENT

### A. Main Steam Isolation Valve Testing

Our January 15, 1987 letter (NMP2L 0973) indicated that the main steam isolation valves would be full stroke tested at each cold shutdown. This commitment is based upon Technical Specification Section 4.0.5 which required compliance with ASME Section XI. ASME Section XI Part IWV 3412 requires a cold shutdown full stroke test. The Niagara Mohawk commitment to implement this testing is described in Section I (page 1-4) and Appendix D (cold shutdown test justification MSS-VCS-1) of the Preservice Inspection Plan Pump and Valve Plan, and will be incorporated into the Inservice Inspection Plan. (See item C below.)

### B. Quality of the Solenoid "SVC" and Non-1E Channel Separation

Two 3 ampere fuses received power from the Class 1E buses in the MSIV panel and provide separation of the Class 1E and non-Class 1E systems.

The load for the non-Class 1E solenoid and other devices is approximately 1 ampere. Therefore, the 3 ampere fuse is properly rated for its application. In addition, the continuous load of 3 amperes for the "SVC" solenoid and related devices will not degrade the ability of the Class 1E system to perform its intended function. The Class 1E system is designed for and rated to support the 3 ampere current. The Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) setpoints are coordinated with the load requirements of the solenoid valves. Calculations were performed to ensure both the high and low EPA trip setpoints maintain the voltage within the allowable values of the solenoid valves.

These fuses are procured and installed as class 1E fuses and the replacement of these fuses is covered by the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Standing Order No. 14 "Operations Department Fuse Control Program." This procedure ensures a quality assurance review which includes verification that a correct size fuse is installed.

The fuses are located within the MSIV panel and the wiring within the panel is separated in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report Table 1.8-1 for Regulatory Guide 1.75. The Class 1E and non-Class 1E controls are in a separate enclosure within the panel with a conduit between the two enclosures.

The cable from the panel to the non-Class 1E solenoid is routed in non-Class 1E raceway system.



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C. Safety-Related Solenoid Testing

Each solenoid valve is provided with a reed switch position indication, which can be used to determine solenoid valve position. The two safety-related solenoid valves in each MSIV can be checked for operation after each MSIV closure. When both safety related solenoid valves on the MSIV actuator open, a position indicator light will illuminate. The operator can verify proper solenoid valve operation in the control room by using the installed indicator lights. This verification will be incorporated into an operation surveillance procedure (prior to the next operation surveillance procedure test) and conducted at least once during each refueling outage (every 18 months). Further, during each test, performed in accordance with item A above, proper solenoid valve operation will be verified. Operating Surveillance procedure N2-MSS-CS-001 will be changed to incorporate this requirement.

D. Maximum Credible Fault Testing

On January 29, 1987, the NRC requested that a maximum credible fault test be performed on the J10 relay installed in the MSIV actuator circuit. The attached procedure and test results are provided for NRC information and use.

