

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (11) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | PL | SL | SL | SL | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 5
7 3 7 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE

CCN'T
 01 | 01 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 9
7 3 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
 02 | While preparing to start up after refueling, B2 Station Service Transformer
 03 | failed, deenergizing the B2 480V Load Center. About 3 minutes later the 2
 04 | tie breakers feeding the AB DC bus from the B bus tripped, deenergizing the
 05 | AB DC bus. Loss of this caused a loss of AB control power and 120V vital
 06 | AC which feeds all control room alarms but NOT instruments. The DC bus,
 07 | 120V AC and alarms were restored within 15 minutes.
 08 | See LER 335-79-28 for related events.


09 | E | C | 11 | B | 12 | C | 13 | C | K | T | B | K | R | 14 | A | 15 | Z | 18
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
 17 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 10
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
 13 | E | 13 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | A | 25 | W | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 26
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD- FORM SUB. PRIME COMP SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
 10 | The B to AB tie breakers were thoroughly tested and inspected. A loose
 11 | power termination was discovered on the B side breaker and the instantaneous
 12 | over current trip was set on "Lo" on both breakers. The trip was reset to
 13 | Hi per design and all connections were torqued. All similar breakers were
 14 | checked. See attached continuation sheet.

15 | H | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | A | 31 | OPERATOR OBSERVATION
7 3 7 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
 15 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
7 3 7 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | 39 | NA
7 3 7 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | 40 | NA
7 3 7 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
 19 | Z | 42 | NA
7 3 7 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
 22 | N | 44 | NA
7 3 7 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION

NAME OF PREPARER P. L. Pace PHONE. (305) 552-3654

8201060355 811228
 PDR ADDCK 05000335
 PDR



LER 335-81-053

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION-CONT.

It is felt that a combination of the loose power connection in conjunction with the additional load placed on the "AB" DC Bus due to the loss of "B2" 480V Load Center* caused the "B" side breaker to trip. Once the "B" side breaker tripped the "AB" side breaker would naturally trip on undervoltage. It must be noted that the vital 120V AC does not supply power to instrumentation in the Control Room and the Instrument AC system does that so Control Room instrumentation was not lost.

The erroneous "Lo" setting on the overcurrent trip, at first suspected, is now not considered a cause of this occurrence.

* The Vital AC inverter is powered from the "B2" 480 V LC Via "AB" 480 V MCC. The "AB" DC Bus is the backup power source.

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