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MANGAN,C.V. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SCHWENCER,A. Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT: Forwards info re containment isolation & leak testing,per 841221 request.Reasons why main steam lines not vented during Type A testing discussed.Info will be included in Amend 17 to FSAR.

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NIAGARA MOHAWK

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

December 28, 1984
(NMP2L 0312)

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Enclosed for your use is information regarding Containment Isolation and Leak Testing for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 which was discussed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff during a telephone discussion on December 21, 1984.

Specifically, the staff had requested a further explanation of why the main steam lines were not vented during Type A testing. This explanation has been inserted on FSAR page 6.2-86. In addition, we informed the staff that we would be adding a second valve to several test lines that previously had only one valve and a threaded pipe cap. This commitment is being incorporated in the FSAR by removing footnote 35 on Table 6.2-56 and revising Figure 6.2-70 Sheets 4, 5, 8, 12, 15 and 36 to show the two valves.

The enclosed information will be included in Final Safety Analysis Report Amendment 17.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

DMS:jab
Enclosure
xc: R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector
Project File (2)

B001
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of	)	
	)	
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation	)	Docket No. 50-410
	)	
(Nine Mile Point Unit 2)	)	

AFFIDAVIT

C. V. Mangan, being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

C V Mangan

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York and County of Onondaga, this 28 day of December, 1984.

Janis M. Macro
Notary Public in and for
Onondaga County, New York

My Commission expires:

JANIS M. MACRO
Notary Public in the State of New York
Qualified in Onondaga County No. 4784555
My Commission Expires March 30, 1985

Exemption Justification (10CFR50 Appendix J, Part III, A.1.d)

1. Systems that are required to maintain the plant in a safe condition during the test shall be operable in their normal mode and need not be vented.

2. Systems that are normally filled with water and operating under post accident conditions need not be vented.

The Type A Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) is normally performed at the end of a refueling outage. At this time, the reactor pressure vessel head is installed and tensioned. In order to maintain the minimum vessel flange and head flange temperature required by the Technical Specifications, the reactor vessel water level is maintained at the flange level. Thus, the main steam lines are flooded during the time the ILRT is performed, and cannot be vented to the Primary Containment.

The control rod drive and hydraulic control for the reactor recirculation flow control valves will not be vented during the ILRT as justified by Notes 17 and 26 of Table 6.2-56, respectively.

The pre-operational (initial) Type A test shall be performed in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J, ANS N45.4 and ANSI 56.8-1981. This method employs:

4 hours (min) stabilization period
24 hours (min) ILRT test period
1 to 4 hours (min) verification period

The 24 hour Type A test shall provide the baseline for post operational tests.

Post operational Type A tests can be performed using BN-TOP-1 which provides the bases for a type A test duration of eight hours (min) with 20 data sets (min).

The test method utilized is the absolute method, as described in BN-TOP-1, Rev. 1, 1972. Values of primary containment atmosphere dry-bulb temperature, dew point temperature (vapor pressure), and pressure are used in the leakage rate calculations.

The primary containment leakage monitoring system (LMS) provides means for monitoring the primary containment pressure during ILRT. Two independent pressure sensing lines, each equipped with a quartz digital type absolute pressure manometer, are provided in LMS system. One extra quartz manometer is provided as a not-installed spare (Figure 6.2-73).

Eighteen temperature elements and six humidity analyzers are provided in the primary containment atmosphere monitoring system (CMS) to monitor dry-bulb and dew point temperatures, respectively (Figure 6.2-71).

The test procedure, test equipment and facilities, period of testing, and verification of leak test accuracy follow the recommendations of BN-TOP-1, Rev. 1, 1972.

Acceptance criteria and test intervals Type A, B and C tests will be in conformance with 10CFR50, Appendix J.

TABLE 6.2-56 (Cont)

integrity isolation valve will be remote manually operated from the control room, using signals which indicate loss of feedwater flow.

The classification of the feedwater lines from the reactor vessel to and including the third isolation valve will be Code Group A; beyond the third valve, Code Group D.

(33) Bypass leakage through these penetrations is via the post-accident sample system branch connections. Leakage volumes are accounted for as post-accident sampling system bypass leakage.

(34) Due to the metal bellows arrangement on tip drywell penetration flanges they will be included in Type A Testing rather than Type B Testing.



Z-5A, B, C RHR PUMP A, B, C SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL
Z-15 LPCS PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL

FIGURE 6.2-70

ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENT
FOR PENETRATION Z-5A, B, C, AND Z-15
SHEET 4 OF 43

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT



Z-17 RCIC PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL
Z-12 HPCS PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL

FIGURE 6.2-70

ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENT
FOR PENETRATION Z-17 AND Z-12
SHEET 5 OF 43

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT



Z-8A, B RHR DRYWELL SPRAY

FIGURE 6.2-70

ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENT
FOR PENETRATION Z-8A, B
SHEET 8 OF 43

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2
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

Z-19 RCIC TURBINE EXHAUST

FIGURE 6.2-70

ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENT
FOR PENETRATION Z-19
SHEET 12 OF 43

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NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT



Z-13 HPCS TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL

FIGURE 6.2-70

ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENT
FOR PENETRATION Z-13
SHEET 15 OF 43

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NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT



Z-90 RCIC TURBINE EXHAUST
VACUUM BREAKER

FIGURE 6.2-70

ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENT
FOR PENETRATION Z-90
SHEET 36 OF 43

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT