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ACCESSION NBR: 8408280163 DOC. DATE: 84/08/23 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moho 05000410
 AUTH. NAME: MANGAN, C.V. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 RECIP. NAME: SCHWENCER, A. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT: Forwards updated status list of SER open items based on meetings to close out items. Concurrence requested.

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August 23, 1984
(NMP2L 0138)

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555


Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Attached please find the updated status list of Safety Evaluation Report open items. This list shows the current status based upon our meetings with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to close out Safety Evaluation Report open items.

We would appreciate your concurrence to the attached list to ensure a smooth close out of the Safety Evaluation Report open items.

Very truly yours,



C. V. Mangan
Vice President

Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

JM/jab
Attachment
xc: Project File (2)

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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(1) nearest population center	2.1	*Confirmatory Section 2.1.3.5
(2) long-term diffusion estimates	2.3.5	*NRC action
(3) (a) seismic design of revetment ditch (b) flood protection berms	2.4.10	*a) Section 2.5.22 b) 8/31
(4) protection against PMP	2.4.2.2	240.11 240.10
(5) protection of the main stack from wave forces from PMWS	2.4.10	*240.17
(6) adequacy of the ultimate heat sink	2.4.11.2	*We accept tech. spec. at 76° F
(7) ground water level	2.4.12.2	*240.15, Section 3.8.4.3, Table 3.8-10, 3.8-11
(8) analysis of postulated rupture of a liquid radwaste tank	2.4.13	*NRC action
(9) recalculation of the changing stresses at the site, assuming shallower burial depths than in the original calculations	2.5.1, 2.5.2	8/15 Send letter or put in amendment
(10) an evaluation of the significance of the decoupled regional stress regimes in the Paleozoic and basement rocks measured in the site region	2.5.1	8/15 Send letter or put in amendment
(11) assessment of seismic or aseismic origin of sedimentary structures	2.5.1, 2.5.2	8/15 Send letter or put in amendment
(12) monitoring program of the Cooling Tower Fault designed to ascertain the strain or displacement rate on the fault	2.5.1, 2.5.2	8/15 Send letter or put in amendment
(13) magnitude of the fault movement for all seismic Category I structures in the power block	2.5.4.5.1	*Table 2.5-43 and Section 2.5.4
(14) excavation, backfill and geological mapping data of the main stack	2.5.4.4.3	*Section 2.5.4
(15) liquefaction potential analysis for the Category I electrical duct bank and manhole	2.5.4.7	*Section 2.5.4




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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(16) update of slope inclinometer and rock extensometer data	2.5.4.10	8/31
(17) dynamic stability of the slopes of the revetment ditch	2.5.6.2.3, 2.5.6.2.4	*241.17Section 2.5.5.2
(18) PMP - flood protection berm	2.5.6.3	8/31 241.18
(19) turbine maintenance	3.5.1.3	8/31
(20) (a) adequacy of tornado missile protection for diesel generator exhaust outside air intakes for HVAC systems Closed Table 3.5-22	3.5.2	*(a) Table 3.5-22
(b) safety-related buried piping		*(b) Redundant to #75
(21) effects of postulated pipe breaks	3.6.1	*210.20, 210.21, 210.22, 210.23 & 410.15
(22) stress and cumulative usage factor limits and inspection requirements for piping inside the break exclusion zone	3.6.2	*210.17
(23) postulation of moderate energy cracks inside containment and of high-energy cracks	3.6.2	*210.21, 210.22
(24) postulation of pipe ruptures	3.6.2	*210.23
(25) feedwater isolation check valves	3.6.2	*210.35
(26) design of pipe rupture restraints	3.6.2	*210.27, 210.26
(27) vertical floor flexibility in the seismic analysis	3.7.3	*7/6/84 letter
(28) results of the concrete containment ultimate capacity analysis	3.8.1	*220.29
(29) containment response to SRV/pool dynamic loads	3.8.1	*210.48 Confirmatory
(30) deviations from the applicable provisions of ASME Section III, Division 2	3.8.1	7/6/84 letter (still open)
(31) deviations from the applicable requirements of ACI 349 as amended by RG 1.142	3.8.3, 3.8.4, 3.8.5	*7/6/84



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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(32) SRV/pool dynamic loads on containment interior structure	3.8.3	*Confirmatory structural audit item #1 complete 9/85. See letter dated 2/10/84
(33) consideration of upward seismic load effects in the foundation stability analysis of the screenwell building	3.8.5	*NMPC letter 2/10/84
(34) structural audit action items	3.8.1, 3.8.6	NMPC letter 2/10/84, 3/30/84, 7/6/84
(35) systems and locations to be monitored during the pre-operational testing program	3.9.2.1	*210.37
(36) acceptance criteria for observed or measured vibration levels	3.9.2.1	*210.37
(37) inclusion of all essential safety-related instrument lines in the vibration monitoring program	3.9.2.1	*210.37
(38) seismic design of HVAC systems	3.9.2.2	*210.43
(39) seismic methods used for the analysis of the safety-related piping in pipe tunnels	3.9.2.2	*3.9.2.2.3A
(40) documentation of analysis for combined loads (LOCA and SSE)	3.9.2.4	*210.54
(41) methodology of combining loads	3.9.3.1	*210.54
(42) clarification of the BWR Mark II hydrodynamic loads	3.9.3.1	*210.49
(43) assurance that downcomers will not develop fatigue cracks	3.9.3.1	*210.50
(44) design of piping and supports in the wetwell area	3.9.3.1	*210.53
(45) design of SRVs and attached discharge piping	3.9.3.2	*210.45, 210.47
(46) design and construction of ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 component supports	3.9.3.3	*210.55



<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(47) stress categories and limits for core support structures and the applicable codes used for evaluation of the faulted condition	3.9.5	*210.61
(48) response to IE Bulletin 80-07	3.9.5	*210.46
(49) leak rate testing of isolation valves	3.9.6	*210.62
(50) preservice and inservice testing of pumps and valves	3.9.6	*210.63
(51) seismic and dynamic equipment qualification program (a) 51-1 to 51-8 (b) 51-9, 51-3	3.10	(a) 12/84 (b) Section 9.5.6 220.9
(52) pump and valve operability assurance 52-1 to 52-8	3.10	12/84
(53) dependability of containment isolation (purge valves)	3.10	Enclosure 11 9/84
(54) performance testing of relief and safety valve (II.D.1)	3.10	Enclosure 12 8/31
(55) qualification of accumulators on automatic depressurization system valves (II.K.3.28)	3.10	Enclosure 13 8/31
(56) long-term operability of deep draft pumps (owe two items)	3.10	271.10 8/31
(57) environmental qualification of equipment (a) 57-1 (b) 57-2	3.11	9/30 (a) 3/85 (b) 3/85
(58) irradiation fuel surveillance program	4.2	
(59) LPMS (loose parts monitoring system)	4.4.6 and (Table 4.4.0)	*4.4.6
(60) inadequate core cooling detection system (II.F.2)	4.4.7	1) 421.23 - 9/30 *2) 421.21 Closed *3) No mechanical instruments
(61) pipe break in the BWR scram	4.6	*410.16
(62) (same as 64)		*Redundant to 64

<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(63) P-T (pressure-temperature) curves	5.3.2, 5.3.3	*251.06
(64) ratio of neutron flux density of specimens in the surveillance capsule to peak neutron flux density at RPV	5.3.3, 5.3.1.2	*251.04
(65) reactor coolant pressure boundary inservice inspection and testing	5.2.4	ISI Plan 8/31
(66) fracture prevention of containment pressure boundary	6.2.7	8/31
(67) control room habitability	6.4	*450.3
(68) exceptions and deviations to RG 1.52, Rev. 2	6.5.5	*450.3
(69) fission product control systems	6.5.3	*450.3
(70) inservice inspection of Class 2 and 3 components	6.6	ISI 8/31
(71) spent fuel storage pool materials surveillance	9.1.2	8/31
(72) spent fuel pool design	9.1.2	*Pg. 9.1-8
(73) light load handling system	9.1.4	*410.37
(74) heavy loads	9.1.5	*410.28
(75) failure of nonseismic buried pipe near safety-related buried pipe	9.2.1	*9.2.1.3
(76) backup nitrogen supply system	9.3.1	*9.3
(77) periodic air quality testing	9.3.1	*410.37
(78) flooding by rupture of nonseismic Category D piping, vessels or tanks or by failure of a back-flow prevention device in the drainage system	9.3.3	*Appendix 3C
(79) postaccident sampling (II.B.3)	9.3.2	a) 8/31 b) 8/31 *c) Sec. 1.12



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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(80) drainage of leakage water away from safety-related components or systems	9.3.3	*410.38
(81) design capability of the CB HVAC system (410.41 and 410.42)	9.4.1	*410.41, 410.42
(82) protection against hydrogen accumulation in the battery rooms	9.4.1	*Section 9A3.7.7
(83) outdoor temperatures assumed for sizing of the CB HVAC	9.4.1	*410.41, 410.42
(84) spent fuel pool area ventilation system	9.4.2	*9.4.2.2.3
(85) tornado missile protection for diesel generator building louvers	9.4.5	*Table 3.5-22
(86) diesel generator building HVAC system conformance to GDC 4 (same as 85)	9.4.5	*Table 3.5-22
(87) protection of essential electrical components from failure due to the accumulation of dust and particulate material	9.4.4	*430.102
(88) potential systems interaction	9.5.1.II.8	*Section 9.A.3.1
(89) administrative controls	9.5.1.III	8/31
(90) fire brigade and fire brigade training	9.5.1.IV	*Section 13.2.12
(91) qualification of fire doors	9.5.1.V.A	*Section 9.A.3.5
(92) floor drains	9.5.1.V.A	*Section 9.A.3.5
(93) safe shutdown capability	9.5.1.V.B	8/31 280.1, 410.47
(94) alternate shutdown capability	9.5.1.V.8	8/31 410.47, 280.1
(95) emergency lighting	9.5.1.V.G	*430.44
(96) installation of fire detectors	9.5.1.VI.A	*9.A.3.6
(97) qualification of the electric fire pump	9.5.1.VI.A	8/31
(98) valve supervision	9.5.1.VI.8	*9.A.3.6



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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSEER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(99) quality group classification information on the design of the turbine gland sealing system	10.4.3	8/31
(100) protection of safety-related systems from flooding from a postulated failure of a circulating water expansion joint or line failure as a result of an SSE	10.4.5	*Appendix 3C
(101) parameters used for calculating liquid and gaseous source terms	11.1.2	*Table 11.3-2
(102) assessment of the capability of liquid and gaseous radwaste systems for keeping the levels of radioactivity in effluents ALARA	11.2.1, 11.2.2, 11.3.1	*NRC action
(103) assessment of charcoal absorber tank failure for 10 CFR 100 dose guidelines	11.3.1	*Pg. 11.3-2
(104) process control program for the solid radwaste system	11.4.1, 11.4.2	*Confirmatory 12/84 460.18
(105) compliance program to meet 10 CFR 61	11.4.2	*Confiomatory 460.18
(106) high-range noble gas monitor (II.F.1)	11.5	*Section 1.10
(107) airborne radioactivity levels (471.1)	12.2	*471.1
(108) airborne radionuclide concentration in liquid radwaste handling area (471.3)	12.2	*471.3
(109) conformance to RGs 1.8, 8.8 and 8.10 (471.4)	12	471.4 8/31
(110) dose rate criteria (II.B.2)(471.9)	12.3.2	*471.9
(111) projected doses to individuals and dose rate maps (471.16)	12.3.2	471.16 8/31
(112) whole-body dose calculations (471.17)	12.3.2	*471.17
(113) postaccident access and shield design review (471.19)	12.3.2	*471.19



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
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(114) crud buildup (471.19)	12.3.2	*
(115) postaccident vital area monitors (471.19)	12.3.2	471.19 8/31
(116) personnel exposure (471.20)	12.3.2	*471.20
(117) inhalation exposure (471.12)	12.4.2.2	*471.12
(118) estimate of N-16 dose contribution (471.13)	12.4.2.2	*471.13
(119) estimate of doses outside of plant structures (471.14)	12.4.2.2	*471.14
(120) dose assessment (471.11)	12.4	471.11 8/31
(121) separation of health physics and chemistry functions (471.21)	12.5.1	*471.21
(122) qualifications of Superintendent Chemistry and Radiation Management (471.21)	12.5.1	*471.21
(123) qualifications of temporary RPMs and commitment to ANSI 3.1	12.5.1	471.21 8/31
(124) training of health physics technicians	12.5.1	471.21 8/31
(125) ANSI 18.1 qualified health physics technician	12.5.1	471.21 8/31
(126) initial training program	13.2.1.1	*6/13
(127) requalification training program	13.2.1.2	*6/13
(128) immediate upgrading of reactor operator and senior reactor operator training and qualifications (I.A.2.1)	13.2.1.4	*6/13
(129) administration of training programs	13.2.1.4	8/31
(130) STA training program	13.2.2	8/31
(131) emergency planning	13.3	Letter 8/2
(132) commitment to Section 5.3 of ANSI/ANS 3.2	13.5.1.1	*13.5
(133) evaluation and development of procedures for transients (I.C.1)	13.5.2, 13.5.2.3	*(640.41)

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


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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(134) upgraded emergency operating procedures	13.5.2	*13.5.2.1 1.10
(135) ATWS procedures	13.5.2	*Section 15.8
(136) loss-of-air-supply tests (640.06)	14.2.7	640.06 8/31
(137) single-failure-proof cranes (NUREG-0612) and heavy load testing (NUREG-0554) (640.07)	14.2	*(a) closed 640.07 *(b) closed 640.07
(138) periodic testing of diesel generators (RG 1.108) (640.08)	14.2.7	640.08 8/31
(139) applicability of RG 1.140 to rad-waste building exhaust (640.09)	14.2.7	640.09 8/31
(140) preoperational test abstracts (640.10c, 640.11op, 640.13op, 640.15c, 640.16c, 640.17c, 640.19c, 640.20c, 640.21c)	14.2.12	640.11, 640.13 8/31
(141) protection of control room operators against accidental chlorine release (640.18)	14.2.12	*640.18
(142) startup test abstracts (640.23, 640.24, 640.26, 640.27, 640.29)	14.2.12	*640.23, *640.24, *640.26, 640.27, 640.29 8/31
(143) incorporation of specific testing identified into test abstracts (640.34)	14.2.12	640.34 8/31
(144) preoperational tests to be conducted after fuel load and tests to be exempted from prior notification (640.35)	14.2.12	640.35 8/31
(145) fuel handling accident	15.7.4	*450.3
(146) loss-of-coolant accident	15.6.5	*450.3
(147) leakage integrity from systems outside containment (III.D.1.1)	15.9.4	*Section 1.10
(148) DCDR Summary Report (I.D.1)	18	4/85
(149) SPDS safety analysis and implementation plan (I.D.2)	18	9/30
(150) Technical Specifications	16	License condition 9/30



<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(151) Physical Security Plan	13.6	NRC action
(152) amplification of vibratory ground motion estimated for the bedrock	2.5.2.4	*Section 2.5.4.7
(153) fuel rod fracturing	4.2	*3.9.1.4
(154) Shift Technical Advisor (I.A.1.1)	13.1.2	8/31
(155) Shift Supervisor administrative duties	13.5.1	8/31
(156) deleted		*Closed deleted
(157) Independent Safety Engineering Group (I.B.1.2)	13.4	8/31
(158) Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures (I.C.2)	13.5.1	8/31
(159) Shift Supervisor responsibilities (I.C.3)	13.5.1	8/31
(160) control room access (I.C.4)	13.5.1	8/31
(161) procedures for feedback of operating experience to plant staff (I.C.5)	13.5.1	8/31
(162) guidance on procedures for verifying correct performance of operating procedures (I.C.6)	13.5.1	*640.41 Letter
(163) fuel assembly coolability	4.2	*Section 3.9.1
(164) design of pipe supports and anchors which separate seismically designed piping and nonseismic Category I piping	3.9.2.2	*210.40
(165) commitment that inservice testing of ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be in accordance with the rules of 10 CFR 50.55(a)(g)	3.9.6	*210.62
(166) test description for confirmatory in-plant tests of SRVs (640.30)	14.2.12	*640.30
(167) analytical method used to determine the minimum required number of the ADS SRVs	5.2.2	*Under separate cover



<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(168) analysis justifying leak detection setpoints for isolation of RCIC	5.4.6	*Section 5.4.6
(169) interlocking of LPCI/LPCS injection valves and pressure setpoints	6.3	*421.39
(170) plant-specific LOCA analysis	6.3, 15.9.3	*3/85 confirmation under separate cover Section 6.3
(171) calculated maximum total hydrogen generation from the chemical reaction of the cladding with water or steam	6.3	*3/85 confirmation under separate cover Section 6.3
(172) method of determining the limited transient event and justification for violating the MCPR limit	15	*Under separate cover
(173) operation with partial feedwater heating	15	*Under separate cover
(174) reporting of SV and RV failures and challenges (II.K.3.3)	15.9.3	*(Section 1.10)
(175) ADS actuation (II.K.3.18)	15.9.3	8/31 under separate cover
(176) reactor vessel level indication (II.K.1.23)	15.9.3	8/31
(177) automatic actuation of containment spray within ten minutes of a LOCA signal	6.2.1.8	8/31
(178) results of containment spray drop efficiency determination	6.2.2	*6.2-47
(179) thermal mixing performance of RHR suction and discharge lines	6.2.2	*480.18
(180) ability of suction strainer to limit debris from blocking primary system flowpaths	6.2.2	*480.14
(181) fiberglass insulation debris in downcomer vents and RHR intake	6.2.2	8/31



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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(182) secondary containment functional design (a) neglect of heat loads in secondary containment drawdown loads (b) SGTS (c) bypass leakage pass barriers	6.2.3 6.2.3 6.2.3	(480.22) 8/31
(183) containment isolation	6.2.4, 6.2.4.2	Table 6.2-56 8/31
(184) containment purge	6.2.4.1, 6.2.4.2	480.24 8/31/84 480.38
(185) combustible gas control	6.2.5	8/31
(186) containment leak testing	6.2.6	8/31
(187) recalculation of steam bypass capability	6.2.1.8	*Redundant to 177
(188) Branch Technical Positions related to instrumentation and control systems (421.1)	7	*421.1
(189) applicability of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, to instrumentation and control systems (421.2).	7	*421.2
(190) first-of-a-kind instrumentation (421.3)	7	421.3 8/31
(191) conformance to RG 1.47 (42.14)	7	421.4 8/31
(192) physical separation of instrumentation and control circuits (421.5)	7	421.5 8/31
(193) shared systems (421.6)	7	*421.6
(194) electrical distribution systems (421.7)	7	*421.7
(195) single failures of passive components (421.8)	7	*421.8
(196) similarity of design (421.9)	7	*421.9
(197) responses to NUREG-0737 items (421.10)	7	*421.10

<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(198) conformance to RG 1.53 (421.11)	7	*421.11
(199) conformance to RG 1.75 (421.12)	7	8/31 421.12
(200) isolation devices (421.13)	7	8/31 421.13
(201) scram discharge volume water level scram input (421.14)	7	*421.14
(202) safety-related systems similarity to licensed reactors (421.15)	7	8/31 421.15
(203) backup scram valves (421.16)	7	*421.16
(204) scram inputs routed through nonseismically qualified structures (421.17)	7	*421.17
(205) Technical Specifications setpoint methodology (421.18)	7	8/31 421.18
(206) ATWS (421.19)	7	*421.19
(207) failures in water level sensing lines (421.20)	7	421.20 8/31
(208) common instrument lines (421.21)	7	*421.21
(209) transmitters and trip units conformance to NEDO-21617 (421.22)	7	*421.22
(210) effects of high temperatures on instrument sensing lines (421.23)	7	421.23 8/31
(211) conformance to RG 1.118 (421.24)	7	*421.24
(212) surveillance test methods (421.25)	7	*421.25
(213) minimum number of operable channels to initiate safety functions (421.26)	7	*421.26
(214) mode switch (421.27)	7	421.27 8/31
(215) IE Bulletin 80-06 (421.28)	7	*421.28
(216) conformance to RG 1.70 (421.29)	7	*421.29
(217) conformance to RG 1.62 (421.30)	7	*421.30
(218) containment spray system permissives (421.31)	7	*421.31



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<u>Issue</u>	<u>DSER Section</u>	<u>Status</u>
(219) conformance to IEEE Std. 279 (421.32)	7	*421.32
(220) primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control system (421.33)	7	*421.33
(221) conformance to GDC 19 (421.34)	7	*421.34
(222) physical and electrical separation of standby liquid control system (421.35)	7	*421.35
(223) conformance to RG 1.97 (421.36)	7	421.36 8/31
(224) IE Bulletin 79-27 (421.37)	7	421.37 8/31
(225) high pressure/low pressure inter- face valve interlocks (421.38)	7	*421.38
(226) use of differential pressure interlocks (421.39)	7	*421.39 except P&ID
(227) APRM bypass capability (421.40)	7	*421.40
(228) IRM bypass capability (421.41)	7	*421.41
(229) control systems failures (421.42)	7	421.42 8/31
(230) high energy line breaks and their effects on control systems (421.43)	7	421.43 8/31
(231) nonsafety-related instrumentation and control systems (421.44)	7	421.44 8/31
(232) plant process computer system (421.45)	7	*421.45
(233) nonsafety-related instrumentation and control systems having a significant impact on safety (421.46)	7	*421.46

* Awaiting NRC action. NMPC has submitted and believes it is responsive to NRC needs.



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POWER SYSTEM BRANCH STATUS LIST

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
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(2)	Offsite Power Circuits	F430.2, F430.3 8/31
(3)	Substation Equipment Monitoring	*F430.5
(4)	Routing & Separation Between Offsite Circuits	*F430.7
(5)	Degraded Voltage, Undervoltage Relays	F430.8 8/31
(6)	Safety Bus Power Source	*F430.10
(7)	Sequencer Circuitry	*F430.15
(8)	Diesel Generator Annunciation	*F430.16
(9)	Diesel Generator Sequences From Test Mode	*F430.18
(10)	Protection of Containment Electrical Penetrations	F430.19 8/31
(11)	Marking Cables & Raceways	*F430.20
(12)	Separation of Emerg. Lgtng. From Class 1E System	*F430.22
(13)	Separation of Electrical Circuits	F430.23 8/31
(14)	125 VDC Class 1E Power Dist. Systems	F430.24 8/31
(15)	Bypass Circuitry for MOV's	*F430.25
(16)	Motor Starting Currents Does Not Synchronize w/Breaker Tripping Amps	*F430.26
(17)	Submerged Equipment as a Result of a LOCA	*F430.30
(18)	Duty Cycle of MOV Motors, Reliability of MOV Motors	*F430.35



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POWER SYSTEM BRANCH STATUS LIST

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
(19)	Training (Operators, Maintenance, QA)	F430.37 8/31
(20)	Onsite Communication System	*F430.40
(21)	Communication Reliability During LOOP	*F430.41
(22)	Description of Interplant Communication Systems	*F430.42
(23)	Emergency Lighting in Areas Containing Safety Related Equipment	F430.44 8/31
(24)	Adequacy of Levels of Emergency Lighting	*F430.46
(25)	Access Lighting to All Safety Related Areas During All Accident & Transient Conditions	*F430.47
(26)	Lighting for Safe Egress of Personnel	*F430.48
(27)	Seismic Support of Battery Pack-Type Lighting	*F430.49
(28)	Design of Diesel Engine Auxiliary Systems	*F430.50
(29)	Description of Fuel Oil System & P&IDs	*F430.52
(30)	Description of All Equipment Related to Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Storage & Transfer Sys.	*F430.53
(31)	Missile Protection for Fuel Oil Storage Equipment	*F430.54
(32)	Fuel Oil Additive Procedure	*F430.55
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(34)	Prevention of algae in Diesel Fuel Storage Tank	F430.58 8/31
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POWER SYSTEM BRANCH STATUS LIST


<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
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POWER SYSTEM BRANCH STATUS LIST

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(66)	Clogging of Air Intake & Exhaust System	F430.100 8/31
(67)	Quality of Diesel Combustion Air During Fire	F430.101 8/31
(68)	Mis-Starting of Diesel Generators Due to Dust & Deleterious Material on Elec. Equipment	F430.102 8/31
(69)	Diesel Engine Interface, P&ID for Combustion Air Intake	F430.105 8/31
(70)	Turbine Speed Control and Overspeed Protection system	F430.106
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POWER SYSTEM BRANCH STATUS LIST

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
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(76)	Loss of Vacuum	*F430.112
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(79)	Failure of Turbine Bypass System High Energy Line	*F430.115
(80)	Non-Class 1E Transfers or Interconnections Connected to Redundant Class 1E Power Supplies	*F430.118

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