

Mr. B. G. Hooten
Executive Director, Nuclear Operations
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

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Region I

Dear Mr. Hooten:

SUBJECT: Review of the Power Systems area for Nine Mile Point 2

On May 10, 1984, we met with members of your staff to discuss, among other issues, the status of the review of the Power Systems area for Nine Mile Point 2. At that time your staff was informed of the open items resulting from the NRC staff review in that area. Enclosure 1 contains the electrical portion of the open items in the Power Systems area. Enclosures 2 & 3 contains the mechanical portion of the open items in the Power Systems area. The numbers in the left margin correspond to questions transmitted to you by letters on October 3, 1983 (430.2-430.117) and November 21, 1983 (430.118) and in the acceptance package (430.1).

It is requested these open issues be discussed at meetings with the NRC staff prior to submittal of formal responses. An advance copy of proposed responses is requested to be made available to the staff at least one week prior to each meeting. In order to meet the present licensing schedule for an SER the proposed meetings should be scheduled to accommodate a formal transmittal of the responses (either as an FSAR amendment or as an enclosure to a letter to be followed by an FSAR amendment) no later than August 15, 1984. In order to expedite the review process in this area, representatives of NMPC at these meetings should be prepared to meet until an acceptable written draft response has been agreed to for each of the open items (or it has been determined that an impasse has been reached and it is agreed to disagree, at this point the appeal process would be appropriate).


Within seven days of receipt of this letter please provide the licensing project manager with a proposed schedule for meeting to discuss all of the open items listed. Any questions concerning the enclosed information should be directed to the Project Manager, Mary F. Haughey on (301) 492-7897.

A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing

cc: *with enclosure
E. Tomlinson, PSB*
J. Lazevnick, PSB*
M. Srinivasan, PSB
J. Knight, PSB
A. Ungaro, PSB

M. Haughey
DL:LB#2/PM DL:LB#2/BC
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6/14/84 6/14/84

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A PDR





UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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
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Nine Mile Point 2

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
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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2
DISCUSSION OF QUESTION RESPONSES

430.1 Open. Additional response due April, 1984

430.2 a. & b.


- It appears that the note on Figure 430.7-1 identifying line #21 as a potential addition is incorrect. Shouldn't it be line #20?
 - If the two additional lines to the Scriba substation are not installed, only two lines will serve the substation and one of the lines is taken through Fitzpatrick station. There is also only one circuit breaker at Scriba separating the two lines. Discuss the reliability of this configuration and the effect of Fitzpatrick station operation on the availability of the offsite lines. Also, if there is a fault in the circuit breaker interconnecting the two offsite lines or the circuit breaker fails to trip on a fault on one of the lines, demonstrate that the reactor can remain in a safe condition (assuming onsite power is not available) for the period of time it takes to reestablish at least one offsite power circuit. In place of the above provide the additional offsite lines to Scriba.
 - Figure 430.7-1 shows only one duct bank between the Scriba substation and the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 115 kV switchyard. If the failure of the cables in the duct bank can cause a total loss of offsite power to NMP-2 verify that the reactor can remain in a safe condition (assuming onsite power is not available) for the period of time it takes to reestablish at least one offsite power circuit or provide a redundant duct bank. Describe the separation of the Scriba substation control circuits. If they are not separated provide the same analysis as requested above or provide separation.
- c. Response OK
- d. A new design configuration has been provided for the offsite system, however, new stability analysis has not been provided. Is the old write-up in the FSAR applicable to the new configuration? An analysis for the loss of the largest capacity to the grid and removal of the largest load from the grid should be provided. Also, show that loss of Fitzpatrick station will not affect the NMP-2 offsite system.




- 430.3 Response OK, but still a concern for offsite reliability expressed in previous question.
- 430.4 Response OK
- 430.5
- a. Response OK
 - b. Response OK
 - c. Open, response due April of 1984
- 430.6 Response OK
- 430.7
- Describe the separation between the 345/115 kV transformers at Scriba substation. Are they located on the north and south sides of the Scriba substation with their respective transmission lines? They should be separated in accordance with GDC-17.
 - Describe the routing of the offsite circuits between the NMP-2 115 kV switchyard through the plant to their termination at the 4160 V safety buses. The routes should be separated.
- 430.8 Open. Question and response missing from FSAR.
- 430.9 Response OK
- 430.10 If a safety bus is being powered from its alternate offsite power source and that source is subsequently lost, will the bus be automatically reenergized from the diesel generator? This should be the case.
- 430.11 Response OK
- 430.12
- a. Response OK
 - b. Response OK
 - c. Response OK
 - d. Response OK
 - e. Response OK
- 430.13 Response OK
- 430.14 Response OK
- 430.15
- a. Response OK
 - b. Response OK
 - c. Response OK




- 430.15 d. Provide more information on the sequencer circuitry. What is meant by sequential relaying? What type of relays are used? Describe the location of the sequencer circuits. Are they centrally located or distributed? Will failure of one relay result in loss of the entire load sequencer?
- e. Response OK
- 430.16 a. Response OK
- b. Response OK
- c. ●Regarding the alarms associated with the division I and II diesel generators - the single common alarm in the control room which is designated as Emergency Diesel Generator System Trouble/Trip does not provide a clear indication to the operator of whether the machine has a disabling or non-disabling condition since both are annunciated in the same window. All the conditions which render the diesel generator incapable of responding to an emergency auto-start signal should be alarmed in a common diesel generator inoperable window. Non-disabling conditions should not be mixed with these.
- Regarding the alarms associated with the division III diesel generators - if the "low fuel oil level in day tank" and "low starting air pressure" conditions render the diesel generator incapable of responding to an emergency start they should not be alarmed as "Engine Trouble" together with other non-disabling conditions.
- 430.17 Response OK - provided the latest information telecopied April 2, 1984 is formalized.
- 430.18 ●The response to this question for the division III diesel generator incorrectly states the HPCS diesel generator is running in parallel with the offsite power and no further governor adjustment is necessary. Actually the HPCS diesel generator has been separated from offsite power by tripping of the dg feed breakers due to the LOCA signal. Therefore, it should be returned to the isochronous mode.
- The response also states that if the HPCS dg is running unloaded, a LOOP signal or a LOCA signal would automatically trip the feed breaker and connect the diesel generator to the HPCS bus. If offsite power is available and only a LOCA signal is received with the dg running unloaded, the LOCA loads should be loaded onto the offsite power supply rather than the diesel generator.




- 430.19
- a. The new information provided for the control and instrumentation circuits states that the penetrations can carry the maximum short circuit current available for an extended period (sufficiently longer than the fault clearing time) without exceeding their thermal limit. They should be able to carry this current continuously unless they have two protective devices in series, otherwise a single failure of a protective device under a fault condition would damage the penetration. Discuss your compliance with this position.
 - b. Response OK
 - c. Open. Have not responded to this question.
 - d. The response only address the RCP breakers. Are there any other penetration circuit breakers which require external control power for tripping? If so, address them as well.
 - e. The response does not provide the penetration I^2t curves plotted against the fault current clearing time curves of the interrupting devices. We need these curves to verify that the penetration is protected by both interrupting devices over the full range of the I^2t curve. Each set of curves should show the maximum available fault current to the penetration and should have a simple one line diagram showing orientation of the protective devices to the penetration. Penetration protection curves should also be provided for 120 VAC and 125 VDC control circuits.
- 430.20
- The marking of cables at 15 ft. intervals is not in accordance with the interval specified in R.G. 1.75. The staff has also been consistent in applying the 5 ft. interval requirement in current license reviews. You should, therefore, mark the cables at 5 ft. intervals beginning immediately or provide justification why it is not being done.
 - Regarding the marking of raceways, I have not found any response which indicates that raceways are marked, prior to installation of cables, not exceeding 15 ft. intervals and at entry to and exiting from enclosed areas. Provide this response.
- 430.21 Response OK



- 430.22 The response to this question does not address how the emergency lighting circuits are isolated from the Class 1E system. The lighting fixtures are not qualified Class 1E, therefore, they must have isolation. An acceptable isolation means are two overcurrent devices in series both coordinated with the upstream bus feeder overcurrent device.
- 430.23
- a. Your response on associated circuits should describe the identification and color coding used for these circuits. Do the circuits become associated because of inadequate separation distances or by virtue of being connected to the Class 1E power system? Verify that the associated circuit is routed only with the division to which it is associated down to an isolation device.
 - b. Your response to this question states that to date there are no cases where analysis has been used to justify less than 6-in. separation. Verify that this response includes cabinets located in the PGCC.
 - c. Response OK
 - d. In accordance with position C.8 of R.G. 1.75 verify that the electrical tunnels and vertical cable chases are ventilated.
 - e. Your response indicates that flexible conduit is used as a barrier in NSSS panels to achieve required separation. Provide an analysis supported by tests which indicate the flex conduit is a suitable barrier and describe the separation maintained between the flex conduit and external circuit. We also understand that a fire retardant tape will be used as a barrier in PGCC cabinets. Provide an analysis supported by tests which indicate the tape is a suitable barrier and describe the separation maintained between the tape and external circuit.
 - f. Response OK
 - g. Response OK
- 430.24
- a. The maximum battery terminal voltage indicated on FSAR page 8.3-57 for the division III batteries is 2.5 volts higher (137.5 V vs 135 V) than the maximum operating voltage of the loads. Demonstrate how a 2.5 volt drop to the terminals of the loads is maintained at light load and maximum voltage while no more than a 2.5 volt drop is maintained during heavy load and minimum voltage (battery voltage 112.5 V vs load voltage 110 V). There also appears to be a discrepancy between the maximum battery voltage (137.5 V) indicated on FSAR page 8.3-57 and that indicated on page 8.3-58 (2.33 V/cell X 60 = 139.8). Resolve this discrepancy.



- 430.24
 - b. Response OK
 - c. The division III bus low voltage alarm setting of 112.5 V is not set sufficiently high to act as a battery discharge alarm. A battery low voltage alarm set at 123-125 V dc or a separate discharge alarm should be provided.
 - d. Response OK
 - e. Response OK
- 430.25 The response to this question provided on page Q&R F430.25-1 appears in conflict with that provided on FSAR page 8.3-42a. Resolve this conflict and provide a description of the detailed operation of the bypass circuitry.
- 430.26 Document the rationale used in assuming that the motor starting currents and the circuit breaker tripping amps do not occur simultaneously. Provide this documentation as a response to this question or as a revised footnote.
- 430.27 Response OK
- 430.28 Response OK
- 430.29 Response OK
- 430.30 Open. Will provide response May 1985
- 430.31 Response OK
- 430.32 Response OK
- 430.33 Response OK
- 430.34 Response OK
- 430.35 Partial response provided is OK. Additional response to be provided May 1984.
- 430.117
 - a. Response OK
 - b. Response OK
- 430.118 Open. Question and response missing from FSAR.



Nine Mile Point, Unit 2PSB Mechanical Questions

- 430.36 The response is acceptable. However, the staff will require a commitment to install the heavy duty turbocharger prior to fuel load.
- 430.37 Not acceptable. No response provided.
- 430.38 The response is acceptable.
- 430.39 The response appears to be acceptable. The mounting for the Division III DG control panel must be confirmed.
- 430.40 Not acceptable. The applicant has not responded adequately to parts (a) and (c) of the question. (The necessity for a response may disappear depending on the acceptability of the applicant's position that the plant design does not require communications.)
- 430.41 Not acceptable. The applicant has responded to parts (a) and (c) of the question, and these responses are acceptable. The applicant has not responded to part (c) of the question. (Part (c) may also become academic - see comments for Q430.40.)
- 430.42 Under review.
-
- 430.43 The response is acceptable.
- 430.44 The applicant's position that lighting is not required in areas containing safety related equipment is being evaluated.
- 430.45 The response is acceptable.
- 430.46 Some additional clarification is required:
Ex: Table 9.5-1 page 6 of 9 - lighting data for control room and relay and computer rooms needs explaining.

page 8 of 9 - adequacy of 7 foot candles in DG rooms
(NUREG-0700 calls for a minimum of 10)



- 430.47 Not acceptable. Eight hour battery packs are acceptable for egress and personnel safety, provided they are seismically mounted. Access to safety related areas, as well as lighting within those areas, must be Class 1E or equivalent, i.e., capable of operation in excess of 8 hours.
- 430.48 Not acceptable. Lighting for safe egress of personnel should be operable during and following any design basis accident and/or transient. The station normal UPS is not Class 1E and is considered to be unavailable following a seismic event. Consequently, egress lighting would also not be available.
- 430.49 Not acceptable. The question is not completely answered. The applicant must demonstrate that:
- (a) battery pack illumination at control room work stations is 10 foot candles or greater, or
 - (b) battery pack illumination is adequate for any task requiring operator action prior to availability of onsite power (lighting),
 - (c) no operator action is required for any design basis accident or transient prior to availability of onsite power (lighting).
- 430.50 Not acceptable. The staff is concerned with all diesel generator auxiliary systems, but the applicant has addressed only a limited number of these systems. Before this question can be considered closed, we will require the following information:
- Division I and II DG's
- (a) complete P&ID's for all auxiliary systems
 - (b) engine interface data as requested
 - (c) verification of design to ASME Section III Class 3 requirements
- Division III DG
- (a) complete P&ID's for all systems
 - (b) a comparison which demonstrates that ANSI B31.1, with pressure testing, is equivalent to ASME Section III in terms of system function and inservice reliability. (see Perry and River Bend)
 - (c) details of Division III auxiliary systems pressure testing



430.51 The response is acceptable.

Note: In section 9.5.5.5, the air start system piping is referred to as a high energy line. This appears to be incorrect, and the FSAR should be revised accordingly.

430.52 Not acceptable. The response in revised FSAR Section 9.5.4.2 is acceptable, but the requested P&ID's have not been provided.

430.53 Not acceptable for the following reasons:

- (a) The requested information is not provided in FSAR Section 9.5.4.
- (b) Logic diagrams in Section 9.5.4 are not complete.
- (c) FSAR Section 8.3 provides a list of alarms and annunciators, but does not include a system description.
- (d) Table 7.5-1 is not applicable.
- (e) Table 7.3-15 is not applicable.
- (f) Inconsistency in Figure 9.5-41, Sheet 1 - see note 4 regarding alarms 852111 and 852213 (is there a common trouble alarm for Division I and II: also, is the alarm in panel 406 a common alarm: where does alarm EGFF C01 annunciate).
- (g) Figure 9.5-41 does not agree totally with Figure 9.5-40, sheets b and c.

Air Start System

- (h) Response is not acceptable because (1) logic diagram does not include controls and alarms on the diesel engine, (2) the FSAR text does not cover engine mounted controls, (3) the FSAR description does not cover abnormal operation, and (4) manual "out-of-service" for start system (Figure 9.5-41, Sheet 4) is not covered.


No data is provided for the Division III DG air start system (logic diagram).

Cooling Water System

- (i) No logic diagrams for the Division I, II or III DG's are provided (cooling water system), and item 16 on Division III diagram list is not included on the schematic.

Lube Oil System

- (j) No logic diagrams are provided as stated in FSAR Section 9.5.7.3 (refer to Fig. 9.5.41).



Combustion Air Intake & Exhaust

- (k) No logic diagrams are provided as stated in FSAR Section 9.5.8.3 (ref. to Fig. 9.5-41).
- (l) Testing and calibration of DG auxiliary systems I&C is not adequately addressed. Tech Specs cover monthly surveillance testing, but do not specifically address I&C testing for both normal and abnormal parameters, or for calibrating I&C if an out of spec. condition is found. The response in Q430.92 is not acceptable.


430.54 Not acceptable. In the event of tornado damage (missile) to the storage tank fill and vent lines, the storage tank would vent into the diesel generator room during filling, which filling would have to be accomplished by pulling a fill hose into the diesel generator room. Other considerations to be addressed include: operating pressure of the vacuum break valve (in inches Hg abs) and the potential effects of this pressure on transfer pump operation (especially as tank level drops): operating pressure of relief valve on day tank vent and the effect of this pressure on transfer pump operation.

430.55 The response is acceptable with regard to external corrosion protection provided that:

- (a) The complete storage tank is encased in concrete, including the portion which extends beyond the diesel generator building, and
- (b) adequate protection is provided for the fill, vent, and sounding lines so as to preclude concentration of corrosion where these lines meet the tank.

The applicant must provide detailed technical information on the function of the fuel oil additive to be used in preventing internal tank corrosion. The applicant must address how free water is prevented, how water is retained in suspension, what gums and tars are prevented from forming, etc. Pending receipt and acceptance of response, this portion of Q430.55 response is not acceptable.

430.56 The response is acceptable. Applicant should identify the anticipated steady state temperature in the storage tanks.




- 430.57 Not acceptable. The system design is such that both transfer pumps are in operation at all times. Therefore, it is logical to assume that both strainers will plug up at the same time, thereby causing loss of fuel flow to the DG's. The simplex strainers do not provide the instant change capability of duplex strainers.
- 430.58 No acceptable. ASTM D2274 is a test designed to predict the formation of solid (particulate) matter as a consequence of fuel oxidation. All solids, including algae, are removed prior to the test. A revised response is required.
- 430.59 Not acceptable. Position 2.a of Reg. Guide 1.137 and Appendix B of ANSI N-195 require the following:
- (a) Testing of new fuel for gravity, water, sediment, and viscosity prior to acceptance.
 - (b) Testing of new fuel for other properties in Table 1 of ASTM D-975 within 14 days.
 - (c) Periodic (every 92 days) testing of stored fuel for conformance to D975 requirements for gravity, water, sediment, and viscosity, and for accelerated oxidation per ASTM D2274.
- Revise the response accordingly.
- 430.60 The response is acceptable.
- 430.61 The response will be acceptable provided the applicant will reference Table 1 of ASTM D-975 or vendor's requirements, whichever is more conservative.
- 430.62 Not acceptable. The following information and/or assurances must be provided before the response can be considered acceptable:
- (a) details of fuel tank construction
 - (b) a procedure is established to limit the fill rate so as to minimize turbulence during filling
 - (c) it can be shown that corrosion products will not form in the storage tanks
 - (d) the fuel oil strainer question can be resolved.
- 430.63 Not acceptable. See comments for Q 430.54.
- 430.64 The response is acceptable



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- 430.65 The response is acceptable.
- 430.66 The response is acceptable.
- 430.67 The response is acceptable. (Question is asked again in Q 430.73)
- 430.68 Not acceptable. No response provided.
- 430.69 Not acceptable. No response provided for Division I and II. The response for Division III will be acceptable when I&C logic diagrams are provided.
- 430.70 See comments for Q 430.53.
- 430.71 The question has been answered. However, the acceptability of the response has not been determined. The staff is concerned that operation of diesel generators at rated speed and no load for prolonged periods during a LOCA with offsite power available will result in diesel engine degradation to an extent that the diesel generators will not be able to accept load in the event of a subsequent LOOP. Therefore, the applicant must demonstrate that the Division I and II, and Division III diesel generators can be adequately loaded to ensure continued reliable operation within six or four hours following a SI signal, respectively.
- 430.72 Not acceptable. The applicant has not provided a basis for the position that there is adequate inventory of cooling water for seven days of operation of the Division III DG. Also, Division I and II DG's have not been addressed.
- 430.73 The response is acceptable. The applicant should expand the response to address detection of lube oil leakage into the cooling water system.
- 430.74 The response will be acceptable if
- (a) the applicant will establish procedures to start and adequately load the DG's to maintain proper engine temperature in the event DG room heating is lost, and
 - (b) the NMP design is such that DG's in test mode will isolate from the grid and revert to automatic mode, ready to accept safety loads, on a LOOP and/or SI signal.
- 430.75 The response is acceptable.
- 430.76 Not acceptable. No response provided.
- 430.77 Not acceptable. The referenced FSAR Section does not answer the question.



430.78 Not acceptable. The applicant's response in FSAR Section 9.5.6.2.1 is not clear. Additional information must be provided as follows:

- (a) does each air receiver contain sufficient air to start the engine five times USING BOTH STARTING BANKS, or only one starting bank
- (b) the total no. of 10 second starts using only one bank, and the no. using both banks in parallel
- (c) the receiver pressure from which the starting capability is determined: i.e., 240 psig, 245 psig ?

430.79 The applicant's response addresses the staff's question adequately. However, the following problems must be resolved.

- (a) The Div. I and II DG's air start system provides for five starts, but not all are 10 second starts: i.e., crank, fire, and accelerate to rated speed and voltage within 10 seconds.
- (b) The Div. III DG five start capability appears to be based on a receiver pressure of 250 psig. In normal operation, however, the receiver pressure can drop as low as 225 psig, and this means that five start capability no longer exists.

Resolution of the above problems is required.

430.80 Not acceptable. Air dryers are required (Div. I & II).

Air dryer design for Div. III will be reviewed on receipt of information. The Div. III air start system is not acceptable pending receipt of this information.

430.81 The response is acceptable with regard to system description, P&ID's, and logic diagrams.

The response is not acceptable with regard to system test and calibration. See comments for Q 430.53.

430.82 Not acceptable. The required P&ID's are not provided.

430.83 Not acceptable. No response provided. The review of the air start system cannot be completed without this information.

430.84 The response is acceptable. However, some additional information is required:

- (a) Is the pilot valve air operated, spring return?
- (b) What causes the post lube valve to close - control air? or fuel control air?




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- (c) Assuming the pilot valve is shifted to allow control air to the post lube valve following engine shutdown, how is the turbocharger lubrication continued for two to three minutes.


Since the turbocharger is not lubricated during engine standby, provide vendor data which states that is acceptable relative to bearing wear (turbocharger) on rapid starts.

This response must be coordinated with the response on engine air controls in Section 9.5.6.

- 430.85 Not acceptable. No response provided.
- 430.86 Not acceptable. The revised FSAR Section referenced in the response does not address the question (for Division I & II). No response is provided for the Division III DG.
- 430.87 Not acceptable. The applicant has not addressed (a) the seismic and quality group classifications of the crankcase breather, and (b) design provisions to mitigate the consequences of a crankcase explosion. In addition, the applicant has not provided a response for the Division III DG.
- For clarification, the applicant should provide details on the crankcase breather design, including location on the engine, and design and operation of the "filters" and condensate drain trap.
- 430.88 The response is acceptable for Division I and II. No response for Division III is provided. This is not acceptable.
- 430.89 Not acceptable. The information regarding the Division III DG is acceptable. However, there is no indication that the response is also applicable to the Division I and II DG's.
- 430.90 The response is acceptable for the Division I and II DG's. However, the response is not acceptable for the Division III DG because no response for the Division III DG in Q 430.88.
- 430.91 The response is acceptable.
- 430.92 Not acceptable. See comments for Q 430.53
- 430.94 Not acceptable. The system as described in the FSAR text and shown on Fig. 9.5-48 does not provide diesel engine prelubrication in compliance with the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660.
- 430.95 Not acceptable. See comments for Q 430.94.
- 430.96 The response will be acceptable pending resolution of Q 430.94 & Q 430.95. Some revision to the response may be required.



- 430.97 Not acceptable. It is still not clear from the FSAR text or figures how tornado missile protection is provided for the combustion air intake and exhaust systems. The requested additional plan, elevation and/or section views have not been provided.
- 430.98 The response is acceptable.
- 430.99 Not acceptable. No response for the Division III DG has been provided. The response covering the Division I and II DG's is acceptable.
- 430.100 Not acceptable. The response will be acceptable when details of tornado missile protection (Q 430.97) have been provided, reviewed, and found acceptable.
- 430.101 This question has been misinterpreted. The staff's concern is that a fire in a diesel generator room, coincident with a failure of a fire protection system for that room, could result in combustion products escaping and subsequently entering the combustion air intakes of the remaining diesel generators, thereby impairing their operation. The applicant should demonstrate how this will be prevented.
- 430.102 Not acceptable. The applicant has not addressed the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 in such areas as NEMA classification of enclosures for both engine mounted and free standing equipment, individual relay dust covers and concrete dust control.
- Note: What electrical components for engine control and operation are mounted on the engine? All such components should be located in a freestanding cabinet (NUREG/CR-0660).
- The response on ambient operating conditions is acceptable for the Division I and II DG's, only. No response has been provided for the Division III DG. This is not acceptable.
- 430.103 The response is acceptable.
- 430.104 The response is acceptable.
- 430.105 Not acceptable. The requested information has not been provided.



- 430.106 The response is acceptable.
- 430.107 The response is acceptable.*
* Closure time for CIV's should be provided.
- 430.108 The response is acceptable.
- 430.109 Not acceptable. We require disassembly and inspection of one of each type of main steam valve at approximately 3 1/3 year intervals (see SRP 10.2, Part II.5.a) Revise the FSAR accordingly.
- Refer to FSAR Section 10.2.2. The applicant states that "The main stop and combined intermediate valves are tested weekly." The applicant should confirm that this test includes the main control valves as well as the main stop valves and CIV's.
- 430.110 The response is acceptable.
- 430.111 The response is acceptable.
- 430.112 The response is acceptable.
- 430.113 The response is acceptable.
- 430.114 The response is acceptable.
- 430.115 Not acceptable. The referenced FSAR Section, in turn, references FSAR Chapter 15. Neither section contains information which provides an answer to the specific question.
- 430.116 The response is acceptable.

