* An application for an amendment to our operating license containing technical specification Section 3.6.12 has been transmitted to your staff by letter dated January 13, 1984.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.13 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS

Applicability:

Applies to the operating status of the remote shutdown panels.

Objective:

To assure the capability of the remote shutdown panels to provide 1) initiation of the emergency condensers independent of the main/auxiliary control room 2) control of the motor-operated steam supply valves independent of the main/auxiliary control room and 3) parameter monitoring outside the control room.

Specification:

a. During power operation and whenever the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F, at least one remote shutdown panel shall be operable, except as specified in Specification 3.6.13.b.

b. If both remote shutdown panels are inoperable, Specification 3.6.13.a shall be considered fulfilled provided at least one remote shutdown panel is returned to an operable condition within 15 days.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.6.13 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS

Applicability:

Applies to the periodic testing requirements for the remote shutdown panels.

Objective:

To assure the capability of the remote shutdown panels to provide 1) initiation of the emergency condensers independent of the main/auxiliary control room 2) control of the motor-operated steam supply valves independent of the main/auxiliary control room and 3) parameter monitoring outside the control room.

Specification:

The remote shutdown panels surveillance shall be performed as indicated below:

a. Each remote shutdown panel monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated operable by performance of the operations and frequencies shown in Table 4.6.13-1.

b. During each major refueling outage

   1. Each remote shutdown panel shall be demonstrated to initiate the emergency condensers independent of the main/auxiliary control room.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
3.6.13 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS (Continued)	4.6.13 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS (Continued)
c. A remote shutdown panel shall be considered inoperable if either the emergency condenser condensate return valve control switch is inoperable, either motor-operated steam supply valve control switch is inoperable, or the number of operable instrumentation channels is less than that required by Table 3.6.13-1.	2. Each remote shutdown panel shall be demonstrated to open both the motor-operated steam valves.
d. If Specifications 3.6.13.a and 3.6.13.b are not met, prepare and submit a report in accordance with 6.9.2.a.	

TABLE 3.6-13-1

REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL MONITORING

Limiting Condition for Operation

INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM NUMBER OF OPERABLE CHANNELS
Reactor Pressure	1
Reactor Water Level	1
Reactor Water Temperature	1
Torus Water Temperature	1
Drywell Pressure	1
Emergency Condenser Water Level	1
Drywell Temperature	1
"All Rods In" Light	1

TABLE 4.6.13-1

REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL MONITORING

Surveillance Requirement

Parameter	Sensor Check	Instrument Channel Calibration
Reactor Pressure	Once per day	Once per 3 months (a)
Reactor Water Level	Once per day	Once per 3 months (a)
Reactor Water Temperature	Once per day	Once per refueling cycle
Torus Water Temperature	Once per day	Once per refueling cycle
Drywell Pressure	Once per day	Once per 3 months (a)
Emergency Condenser Water Level	Once per day	Once per refueling cycle
Drywell Temperature	Once per day	Once per refueling cycle
"All Rods In" Light	Once per refueling cycle	N/A

(a) The indicator located at the remote shutdown panel will be calibrated at the frequency listed in Table 4.6.13-1. Calibration of the remaining channel instrumentation is provided by Specification 4.6.2.

BASES FOR 3.6.13 AND 4.6.13 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS

The remote shutdown panels provide 1) manual initiation of the emergency condensers 2) manual control of the steam supply valves and 3) parameters monitoring independent of the main/auxiliary control room. Two panels are provided, each located in a separate fire area, for added redundancy. Both panels are also in separate fire areas from the main/auxiliary control room. One remote shutdown panel provides the necessary capabilities consistent with 10CFR50 Appendix R. Therefore, only one remote shutdown panel is required to be operable. The electrical design of the panels is such that no single fire can cause loss of both emergency condensers.

Each remote shutdown panel is provided with controls for one emergency condenser loop. The emergency condensers are designed such that automatic initiation is independently assured in the event of a fire 1) in the Reactor Building (principle relay logic located in the auxiliary control room or 2) in the main/auxiliary control room or Turbine Building (redundant relay logic located in the Reactor Building). Each remote shutdown panel also has controls to operate the two motor-operated steam supply valves on its respective emergency condenser loop. A key operated bypass switch is provided to override the automatic isolation signal to these valves. Once the bypass switch is activated, the steam supply valves can be manually controlled from the remote shutdown panels. Since automatic initiation of the emergency condenser is assured, the remote shutdown panels serve as additional manual controlling stations for the emergency condensers. In addition, certain parameters are monitored at each remote shutdown panel.

The remote shutdown panels are normally de-energized, except for the monitoring instrumentation, which is normally energized. To energize the remaining functions on a remote shutdown panel, a power switch located on each panel must be activated. Once the panels are completely energized, the emergency condenser condensate return valve and steam supply valve controls can be utilized.

ATTACHMENT B

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Supporting Information

Technical Specifications on the Remote Shutdown Panels were requested by your November 3, 1982 letter. Our December 3, 1982 letter transmitted an example of proposed technical specifications for the remote shutdown panels.

In accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R, only one remote shutdown panel is required to be consistent with the alternate shutdown capability requirements. With the controls provided at one remote shutdown panel, hot shutdown can be achieved and maintained independent of the control room. Therefore, the limiting condition for operation in the proposed technical specifications only reflects the requirement for the operability of one remote shutdown panel. If both panels are inoperable, the proposed limiting condition for operation requirement allowing 15 days to return one panel to an operable status or requiring submittal of a report, is considered acceptable based on the low probability of a fire occurrence resulting in the functional loss of the control room. In addition, modifications that are currently scheduled to be installed during the 1984 refueling outage will provide assurance that required systems will operate when needed and spurious actuation of systems that could adversely affect safe shutdown will not occur.

NOTE (1) as indicated on page 241ii5:

> Proposed Specification 3.6.13.d references submitting a report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2.a. The 6.9.2.a that is referenced in that statement refers to the actions proposed in our January 31, 1984 proposed technical specification change regarding Specification 6.0 Administrative Controls. The actions required by 6.9.2.a are:
>
> - Notify the Director of the appropriate Regional Office by telephone within 24 hours.
> - Confirm by telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission no later than the first working day following the event, and
> - Follow-up in writing within 14 days after the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to an operable status.

ATTACHMENT C

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Amendment Classification

This proposed amendment to the Operating License was requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Therefore, in accordance with 10CFR170.22, no fee is provided.

ATTACHMENT D

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

No Significant Hazards Considerations Analysis

The proposed Technical Specification amendment regarding incorporation of the remote shutdown panels involves no significant hazard considerations. Therefore, the operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This determination is based on the following analysis.

The proposed amendment incorporates the remote shutdown panels into the Technical Specifications. Since the remote shutdown panels were not previously included in the Technical Specifications, this proposed amendment constitutes an additional Technical Specification limitation and control. This proposed determination is supported by the fact that the requested action corresponds with example (ii) of the Sholly Rule published in the Federal Register on April 6, 1983, which involves an additional limitation or control not previously incorporated in the Technical Specifications.