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DISE,D.P. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
EISENHUT,D.G. Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: Forwards supplementary info re control of heavy loads. Requests addl time to complete response to info requested in sections 2.2 & 2.3 of Encl 3 to NRC 801222 ltr. Addl info delayed until 820322.

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TITLE: Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel (USI A-36) Operating Reactor

NOTES:

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A-36

September 22, 1981



Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Docket No. 50-220
DPR-63

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

Your letter of December 22, 1980 as amended on February 3, 1981 requested information regarding the control of heavy loads at Nine Mile Point Unit 1. The attached information supplements that provided in our letter of July 28, 1981.

Due to the substantial analyses required, Niagara Mohawk will need additional time to complete its response to information requested in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of enclosure 3 to your December 22, 1980 letter. Therefore, submittal of this additional information, originally scheduled for September 22, 1981, will be delayed until March 22, 1982.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

D. P. Dise
Vice President Engineering

GJG:ja

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Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

Nine Mile Point Unit 1

Docket 50-220

DPR-63

Control of Heavy Loads

September 22, 1981

I. Introduction

By letter dated December 22, 1980 from Mr. D. G. Eisenhut, licensees were requested to review controls for the handling of heavy loads. By letter dated July 28, 1981, Niagara Mohawk provided a partial response to Section 2.1 of enclosure 3 to the Commission's letter. This submittal supplements the information provided in the July 28, 1981 letter.

The Commission's letter of December 22, 1980 requested that information be submitted by Septemer 22, 1981 relative to sections 2.2 and 2.3 of enclosure 3. Due to the substantial analyses required, submittal of this information will be delayed until March 22, 1982.

II. Discussion

Section 2.1.2

Request:

Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

Response:

Niagara Mohawk's July 27, 1981 response indicated that, for the 150 ton turbine building crane, Niagara Mohawk was evaluating the effects of a load drop which would breech the turbine floor. There are safety related electrical cables and mechanical equipment in the areas beneath the turbine floor. Safety related cables are located beneath the east and west ends of the turbine building crane pickup area. These cable runs are for separate channels of redundant systems (i.e., channel 11 runs under one end of the pick area and channel 12 runs on the other end). Feedwater lines are also located under the turbine floor in the pick area of the crane. These lines supply water to the High Pressure Coolant Injection system, which is a safety system. However, no credit has been taken for this system in the accident analyses.

Since the cable runs under the pick area of the crane are channelized and separated by more than 200 feet, it is unlikely that one load drop would disable both trains of a redundant system. Therefore, the ability to safely shutdown and remove decay heat is maintained.

Based upon this information, the 150 ton turbine building crane will not be included in the evaluation for drops of heavy loads which can cause damage to equipment required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal.

Section 2.1.3-d

Request:

Verify that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3-c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5) are not met, describe any proposed alternatives or demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load handling reliability.

Response:

Niagara Mohawk has reviewed all available documentation for slings and special lifting devices listed in response to Section 2.1.3-c of our July 28, 1981 submittal. The results of this review indicate that in some cases documentation does not exist to show that slings meet the design requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971, or that the special lifting devices meet ANSI N14.6-1978.

Based on our preliminary review, Niagara Mohawk believes that most of these slings and lifting devices can be shown to meet the ultimate intent of these standards. To assure that proper lifting devices are used, Niagara Mohawk will verify compliance either by design calculation and/or load test, or one for one replacement of non-complying lifting devices. This will be completed prior to the next scheduled refueling outage.

Section 2.1.3-f

Request:

Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

Response:

Our July 28, 1981 response indicated that the 125 ton reactor building redundant crane met the requirements of ANSI B30.2.0-1967, but may not be in complete compliance with the 1976 version. Discussions with the crane manufacturer indicate that compliance with the 1976 version of the code can be demonstrated. Certification demonstrating compliance with the mandatory requirements will be provided to Niagara Mohawk by the crane manufacturer.