



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO. 50-220

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated September 17, 1980 the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63. The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in response to the NRC's letter dated July 2, 1980. These changes are discussed in Sections 2 and 3 of this evaluation.

2.0 Background Information

By our letter dated September 13, 1979 we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the Three Mile Island (Unit 2) accident. Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A", were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1, 1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to Niagara Mohawk dated March 21, 1980.


In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Category "A" requirements, we requested that licensees amend their Technical Specifications to incorporate additional Surveillance Requirements and Limiting Conditions of Operation, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2, 1980. Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable. The licensee's application, dated September 17, 1980, is in response to our request. Each of the issues identified by the NRC and the licensee's response is discussed in the following evaluation.

3.0 Evaluation

1) Emergency Power Supply/Inadequate Core Cooling

As applicable to Boiling Water Reactors (BWR's), we indicated that water level instrumentation is important to post-accident monitoring and that surveillance of this instrumentation should be performed.

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The licensee's response to this item stated that the requirement for returning an inoperable level instrument to operable within 7 days is too restrictive. In lieu of the 7 day corrective action requirement the licensee proposed 15 days based upon the fact that during this period a redundant channel is available. We do not agree with the licensee's finding that 15 days is more appropriate in that 7 days is more than adequate to take the necessary corrective action. The licensee has verbally agreed to the 7 day requirement.

We have reviewed the proposed Technical Specifications for water level instrumentation. The surveillance requirements for instrument checks (once per month) and calibration (once per fuel cycle) meet our guidelines. Based on this, we conclude that the licensee's response satisfies our request.

2) Valve Position Indication

Our requirements for installation of a reliable position indicating system for relief and safety valves was based on the need to provide the operator with a diagnostic aid to reduce the ambiguity between indications that might indicate either an open relief/safety valve or a small line break. Such a system did not need to be safety grade provided that backup methods of determining valve position are available.

The required indication was to be provided to plant operators located in the control room. The staff has found acceptable two methods of satisfying this requirement: (1) Separate audible and visual indication in the control room for each valve, or (2) Use of the control room computer to obtain information for each specific valve. The licensee has agreed verbally to satisfy this requirement.

We have reviewed the proposed Technical Specifications for safety relief valve position indication. The licensee requested that the plant be allowed to continue to operate until the next plant shutdown with inoperable instrumentation. We agree that an extended period of inoperability for one of the two indicators for each valve is acceptable. However, if both indicators for a particular valve are inoperable, repairs should be accomplished within 30 days or an orderly shutdown should be initiated. The licensee has verbally agreed to this requirement which is reflected in the attached Technical Specifications. Based on this, we conclude that the licensee has satisfied this requirement.

3) Containment Isolation

Our request indicated that the specifications should include a Table of Containment Isolation Valves which reflect the diverse isolation signal requirement of this Lessons Learned issue. The licensee



response indicated that this requirement is presently covered in the Nine Mile Point Technical Specifications 3.2.7, 4.2.7, 3.4.2 and 4.4.2 and Bases. We have reviewed these Technical Specifications and Bases and conclude that the licensee has adequately responded to this requirement.

4) Shift Technical Advisor (STA)

Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA. The STA function includes both accident and operating experience assessment. The licensee response proposed TS changes which provide for the Shift Technical Advisor. We have reviewed these changes and conclude that the licensee has satisfied this requirement.

5) Integrity of Systems Outside Containment

Our letter dated July 2, 1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a Systems Integrity Measurements Program. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor containment.

By letter dated December 31, 1979 the licensee proposed a program to reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical levels. This program includes (1) provisions establishing preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements, and (2) leak test requirements for each system at a frequency not to exceed refueling cycle intervals. We have reviewed this program and conclude that the licensee has satisfied this requirement. The proposed Technical Specifications will ensure compliance.

6) Iodine Monitoring

Our letter dated July 2, 1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to iodine monitoring. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions.

By letter dated December 31, 1979, the licensee proposed a program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions.



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This program includes (1) Training of personnel, (2) Procedures for monitoring, and (3) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment. We have reviewed this program and conclude that the licensee has satisfied this requirement. The proposed Technical Specifications will ensure compliance.

4.0 Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR. s1.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: April 13, 1981



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INVESTIGATION
OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.