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NIAGARA MOHAWK

NMP-2483

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

August 29, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission-Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

RE: Nine Mile Point Unit #1
Docket No. 50-220
DPR-63
I.E. Bulletin 80-17, Supplement #3

Dear Mr. Grier:

Your August 22, 1980, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 80-17, Supplement #3, requested actions regarding the Control Rod Drive System at Nine Mile Point Unit #1. The attachment to this letter addresses Items 1 and 2 of that Bulletin. Actions responded herein complete requirements for this Bulletin. Any additional information or records are readily available at your request.

We estimate that a total of 40 man-hours were expended in the review and preparation of the report(s) associated with this Bulletin.

The information contained in the attachment to this letter demonstrates that continued operation of Nine Mile Point Unit #1 does not present an undue safety hazard to the public.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

jl
Attachment
xc: NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D. C. 20555

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RESPONSE ATTACHMENT TO BULLETIN 80-17, SUPPLEMENT #3

ITEM #1

1. For those plants in which the scram discharge volume headers are connected to the instrument volume by a 2 inch pipe, within five days of the date of this Bulletin, provide or verify that procedures are in effect to:

   a. Require an immediate manual scram on low control rod drive air pressure with a minimum 10 psi margin above the opening pressure of the scram outlet valves.

Response:

The opening pressure of the scram outlet valves is specified at 50 psig. There presently exists a low CRD control air pressure alarm at 75 psig. Special Operating Procedure No. N1-SOP-15, Malfunction of Control Rod Drive System, was revised in Section #7 to implement a Manual Scram at 60 psig if efforts could not maintain pressure above this value.

ITEM #1

   b. Require an immediate manual scram in the event of:
      (1) Multiple rod drift-in alarms, or
      (2) A marked change in the number of control rods with high temperature alarms.

Response: (1)

Special Operating Procedure No. N1-SOP-15, Malfunction of Control Rod Drive System, and Operating Procedure No. N1-OP-5, CRD Systems, were revised to require an immediate manual scram in the event of multiple rod drift-in alarms.

Response: (2)

Procedure changes were made to Special Operating Procedure No. N1-SOP-15, Malfunction of Control Rod Drive System, Section #4, to require an immediate manual scram if a marked change in the number of control rods with high temperature alarms is found to be caused by decreasing air pressure.

ITEM #2

In addition, every BWR licensee is requested within five days of the date of this bulletin to provide and implement procedures which require a functional test using water for the instrument volume level alarm, rod block and scram switches after each scram event, before returning to power. This procedure should remain in effect until modifications in addition to Item B.1 of IEB 80-17 supplement No. 1 are completed to substantially increase reliability of water level indication in the scram discharge volume(s).

Response:

Operating Procedure No. N1-OP-43 for Station Start-up and Shutdown was amended to include Scram Discharge Volume functional testing using water for the instrument volume level alarm, rod block and scram switches after each scram event, before returning to power with Instrument Surveillance Procedure N1-ISP-RD-08.