

July 25, 1980

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
Attention: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

RE: Nine Mile Point Unit #1
Docket No. 50-220
DPR-63

Dear Mr. Grier:

Your June 12, 1980 Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 80-14 requested actions regarding the Scram Dump Volume System at Nine Mile Point Unit #1. The attachment to this letter addresses Items 1 through 6 of that Bulletin. Actions described herein complete response requirements for this Bulletin. Any additional information or records are readily available at your request.

The information contained in the attachment to this letter demonstrates that continued operation of Nine Mile Point Unit #1 does not present an undue safety hazard to the public.

Very truly yours,



Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President -
Nuclear Generation

mtm

Attachments

cc: NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ITEM #1

Review plant records for instances of degradation of any SDV level switch which was or may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly. Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance.

RESPONSE

From reviews of plant records such as Maintenance Work Documents and Plant Occurrence Reports, there is no evidence involving any instances of degradation for any SDV level switch which was or may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly.

ITEM #2

Review plant records for instances of degradation of SDV vent and drain valve operability. Provide the closure times required and typically observed for these valves and the basis for the required closing times. Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance of degradation.

RESPONSE

From review of plant records for instances of degradation on SDV vent and drain valves, there is no evidence of any related occurrences. Concerning closure times of these valves, there are none required in our Technical Specifications. The closing times observed for these valves were typically 3.3 seconds for the drain valve and 3.7 for the vent valve as monitored during scram testing for NRC I.E. Bulletin 80-17.

ITEM #3

By procedures, require that the SDV vent and drain valves are normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).

RESPONSE

Operating Procedure N1-OP-5, "Control Rod Drive Systems 22, 44, 44.L, 48, 53, and 55", has been revised to require that the SDV vent and drain valves be normally operable and open. Operations Surveillance Test Procedure N1-ST-Q4, "Reactor Cooling System Isolation Valves Exercising Test", has been revised to include quarterly testing of these valves for operability.

Both procedures now contain the requirement that if the SDV valves become inoperable, or are closed for more than 1 hour in a 24 hour period, such conditions will be logged, and prompt notification (within 24 hours) will be made to the NRC.



ITEM #4

Review instances in which water hammer or damage which may have been caused by water hammer has occurred in SDV relating piping. Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance.

RESPONSE

There is no evidence of any instances in which water hammers occurred or caused damage in SDV related piping during the entire plant history.

ITEM #5

Review surveillance procedures to ensure that degradation of any SDV level switch due to a damaged float or other cause would be detected and that inoperability from any cause would be reported to the NRC.

RESPONSE

The Surveillance Procedure which ensures that degradation of any SDV level switch due to a damaged float or other cause would be detected is N1-ISP-RD-08, "High Level Scram Discharge Volume", which is a monthly instrument surveillance/calibration test procedure. This test checks the level switch operability versus the water volume accuracy with all the corresponding alarm and instrument functions. This test also addresses appropriate supervision notification upon any unacceptable results which would ultimately be reported to the NRC.

ITEM #6

If no functional test or inspection which would detect degradation of each SDV level switch has been performed during the past 3 months, make provisions to perform an inspection and functional test of all SDV level switch assemblies at the next reactor shutdown of greater than 48 hours duration.

RESPONSE

During the past 3 months, SDV level switch functional tests, which would have detected degradation, have been performed monthly on dates 4/5, 5/2, 5/31 and 6/29/80, with acceptable test results in accordance with test procedure N1-ISP-RD-08.

