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Docket No. 50-220

JULY 20 1979

Mr. Donald P. Dise  
Vice President - Engineering  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation  
300 Erie Boulevard West  
Syracuse, New York 13202

Dear Mr. Dise:

RE: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

We are reviewing your submittal dated April 24, 1979 in response to IE Bulletin 79-08. We have determined that the additional information requested in the enclosure is necessary in order to complete our safety evaluation.

We request that responses to the items in the enclosure be forwarded to this office within two weeks of your receipt of the enclosure, which was previously transmitted to you by telecopy. Please contact William F. Kane at (301) 492-7745 if you require additional discussions or clarification regarding the information requested.

Sincerely,

*for* *V. Rooney*

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:  
Request for Additional  
Information

cc w/enclosure:  
See next page.

*App 3*  
*CCP*

|           |                 |                 |                 |                |  |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|--|
| OFFICE >  | ORB #3 <i>W</i> | AD:ORR <i>W</i> | ORB #3 <i>W</i> | <i>B&amp;D</i> |  |
| SURNAME > | JHannon:mj      | WGammill        | Tippolito       | <i>W. Kane</i> |  |
| DATE >    | 6/20/79         | 7/20/79         | 7/20/79         | 7/20/79        |  |

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY



Mr. Donald P. Dise  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation - 2 -


JULY 20 1979

cc:

Eugene B. Thomas, Jr., Esquire  
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae  
1757 N Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Anthony Z. Roisman  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
517 15th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20005

Oswego County Office Building  
46 E. Bridge Street  
Oswego, New York 13126



NINE MILE POINT 1

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

IEB 79-08

Item No. 1

1. Confirm that all licensed operators, plant management and supervisors with operational responsibilities have completed the review of TMI-2 events required by item 1 of IEB 79-08 and that their participation has been documented in plant records.

Item No. 2


1. Clarify your response to indicate whether your review included all lines penetrating containment. Provide the schedule for any additional review if needed.
2. The recirculation sample line to the reactor building should be isolated on all automatic initiations of safety injection in order to prevent inadvertent transfer of radioactive liquid out of containment. Your decision to add isolation valves in early 1981 is acceptable; however, your use of administrative procedures in the interim to assure closing of this line after use is unacceptable. Therefore it is our position that you should review and modify all applicable procedures to assure proper isolation of this line until the design modification is complete. Provide a schedule for the implementation of any new or modified procedures resulting from this review and discuss how these new or modified procedures will permit compliance with the bulletin requirements.

Item No. 4

1. Describe other redundant instrumentation which the operator might have to determine changes in reactor coolant inventory, e.g., drywell high pressure, radioactivity levels, suppression pool high temperature, containment sump pump operation, etc.
2. Clarify your response to indicate whether operators have been instructed to utilize other available information to initiate safety systems. Provide your schedule for completion of this action.

Item No. 5

1. It is not clear from your response whether your review of procedures with respect to the actions directed by items 5a and 5b included all operating procedures and training instructions. Amend your response to clarify this point.
2. Your response to item 5a did not address the matter of unsafe plant conditions. Amend your response to address this matter.



3. Provide a schedule for any actions on item 5 that have not yet been completed.

Item No. 6

1. Please augment your response to indicate the extent to which position and locking device checks are performed for locked safety system valves.
2. Your response did not clearly indicate that all accessible safety-related valves had been inspected to verify proper position. Nor was a schedule for performing the position verification for all safety-related valves provided. Please supplement your response to provide this information.

Item No. 7

1. We require clarification of your response with regard to valve action on resetting of safety features instrumentation. You stated that the drywell high pressure signal that initiates containment isolation has a seal-in feature requiring that both RPS channels be cleared and manual reset accomplished in order to allow opening of the drywell drain valves. Your response did not address the action of the drywell drain valves and other valves on resetting of safety features instrumentation when containment isolation is initiated by low-low reactor vessel water level. Amend your response to address this matter.
2. Discuss the basis on which continued operability of the features designed to prevent inadvertent transfer of radioactive gases and liquids is assured.
3. Provide a schedule for any actions on item 7 that have not yet been completed.

Item No. 8

1. We understand from your response that operability tests are performed on redundant safety related systems prior to removal of any safety related system from service. Since you may be relying on prior operability verification within the current technical specification surveillance interval, operability should be further verified by at least a visual check of the system status to the extent practicable, prior to removing the redundant equipment from service. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment that you will revise your maintenance and test procedures to adopt this position.
2. It is not clear from your response that all involved reactor operational personnel in the oncoming shift are explicitly notified about the status of systems removed from or returned to service. Please indicate how this information is transferred at shift turnover.

Item No. 9

1. Amend your response to assure that your procedures stipulate NRC notification any time "the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition".

