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ACCESSION NBR: 7901160179 DOC. DATE: 79/01/10 NOTARIZED: NO
 FACIL: 50-220 NINE MILE POINT #1, NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 DISE, D.P. NIAGARA MOHAWK PWR
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 IPPOLITO, T.A. ***OPERATING REACTORS BRANCH 3

DOCKET #
05000220

SUBJECT: Provides info, in response to 781129 ltr, re containment purging during operation. Daily purging necessary to retain differential pressure between ddrywell & supression chamber. Further info by 790731 will justify unlimited purging.


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January 10, 1979

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors/Branch #3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Docket No. 50-220
DPR-63

The following information is provided in response to your letter of November 29, 1978 on containment purging during operation.

As a condition of the Mark I Containment Program, it is necessary to maintain a differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber. In order to maintain this differential pressure, it is necessary to purge on a daily basis.

The isolation valves in the vent and purge system are designed to close against the dynamic forces of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. As discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾, the design closure time is adequate to prevent fission product release through these lines. In addition, there is no impact on emergency core cooling system performance as previously described⁽³⁾. Also, the bypassing of isolation signals is not necessary for purging during operation.

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- (1) Final Safety Analysis Report, Vol. I, Section VI-C.
(2) Final Safety Analysis Report, Vol. II, Appendix E.
(3) Final Safety Analysis Report, First Supplement, Section II.

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Mr. Thomas Ippolito
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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By July 31, 1979, we will provide further information to justify unlimited purging. Information regarding manual override features on all safety actuation circuits will be submitted concurrently. In the interim, we will not bypass any safety function not previously analyzed. Appropriate administrative controls are being implemented. Purging will be limited to an absolute minimum as necessary to maintain the drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

Donald P. Dise

Donald P. Dise
Vice President-Engineering

MGM/szd