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CO (2)
H. Steele
R. L. Ferguson

bcc: J. R. Buchanan, ORNL

Docket No. 50-220

JUL 3 1 1968

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Attention: Mr. Minot H. Pratt
Vice President and
Executive Engineer

Gentlemen:

This refers to Amendment 2, dated June 1, 1967, to your application for a provisional operating license for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station located in the town of Scriba, New York.

Our review of Amendment 2 indicates that additional information on the facility electrical system, instrument air systems and the actuation signals for the engineered safety features is necessary to enable us to continue our review of these matters. A list of specific comments illustrating the kind of information needed is enclosed.

We will be available to discuss and clarify any of the specific comments.

Sincerely yours,

Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosure:
List of Comments

cc: Arvin E. Upton, Esquire
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae

OFFICE ▶	DRL:RP	DRL:RP	DRL:RT	DRL:RP	DRL
SURNAME ▶	VStello/dj	RETedesco	SLevine	RSBoyd	PAMorris
DATE ▶	7/24/68	7/ /68	7/30/68	7/31/68	7/31/68

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53)

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-220

1. Evaluate the ability of the offsite power system to provide power for engineered safety feature and safe shutdown loads with a fault in the outside system. This discussion should include (1) loss of one or more 345 KV transmission lines, (2) sudden loss of the NMP generating capacity, and (3) sudden loss of the largest generating plant in the Niagara Mohawk grid.

2. Evaluate the ability of the offsite power design to satisfy Criterion 39 in view of the two-minute time delay required before the 115 KV disconnect switch can be opened following a fault on one half of the 115 KV system.

3. The FSAR does not discuss the use of d.c. power for circuit breaker operation in the switchyard. Describe how d.c. power is supplied to the switchyard and evaluate the ability of the switchyard to operate properly with a single failure in the d.c. system.

4. A recent electrical fire in a nuclear power station has emphasized the importance of the design of electrical penetrations and cable runs. Describe and evaluate the designs being utilized for the cable runs and electrical penetrations in the Nine Mile Point Station. This discussion should include, but not be limited to, the types of cables being used, the design and spacing of cable trays and electrical penetrations, derating, and circuit overload protection.

5. Describe and evaluate the consequences of complete loss of station air and/or vital instrument air. This discussion should include, but not be limited to, the failure modes of pneumatic instruments and valves under the following conditions:

    1. Post-shutdown from full power operation.

    2. Post accident.

6. The diesel generators are started upon loss of voltage at the essential buses. Evaluate the need for starting the diesel generators on signals other than loss of voltage (e.g., coolant injection).

7. Describe and evaluate the adequacy of the core spray actuation signals. The lack of diverse signals for isolation valve actuation should be discussed.