



Seabrook Station

# After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - April 5, 2016

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



**FEMA**

*Published July 08, 2016*

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## Seabrook Station

# After Action Report/Improvement Plan

*Published July 08, 2016*

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Out of Sequence: Special Facilities

Brentwood:

Donna Clarke Family Day Care (Day Care)  
Rockingham County Nursing Home (Nursing Home)

East Kingston:

East Kingston Elementary School (Public School SAU#16)

Exeter:

Exeter Center (Nursing Home)  
Harris Family Children's Center (Day Care)

Greenland:

Kaleidoscope Home Child Care (Day Care)

Hampton:

Adeline C. Marston School (Public School SAW#90)  
Sandbox Pre-School (Day Care)

Hampton Falls:

Robins Child Place (Day Care)

Kingston:

Bright Start Early Learning Center (Day Care)  
Southern District YMCA Camp Lincoln, Inc. (Camp)

Newfields:

Nurture and Nature Children's Center (Day Care)  
Newton Learning Center (Day Care)  
Sanborn Regional Middle School (Public School SAU#17)

Portsmouth:

Little Blessings (Day Care)

Rye:

Rye County Day School  
Rye Junior High (Public School SAU#50)  
Webster at Rye (Nursing Home)

Seabrook:

Miss Beth's Day Care (Day Care)

South Hampton:

South Hampton Barnard School (Public School SAU#21)

Stratham:

Little Sprouts (Day Care)

3.3.5 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.6 Dover Local EOC

3.3.7 Manchester Local EOC

3.3.8 Rochester Local EOC

3.3.9 Rochester MS Reception Center

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 5, 2016, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Division, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I conducted an exercise in the 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone around the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. Interviews and out-of-sequence demonstrations for schools, other special facilities, and reception, monitoring, and decontamination centers (as outlined in this report) were conducted within 60 days of the exercise. The purpose of the exercise and out-of-sequence activities was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

DHS wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in The State of New Hampshire, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The State of Maine, local communities, and private and volunteer organizations that participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the out-of-sequence activities.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were NO Level 1 Findings; NO Level 2 Findings; five (5) Planning Issues were identified as a result of this 2016 Plume Exercise.

The three (3) previous Planning Issues identified during the 2014 HAB Exercise were resolved during this exercise or during the Combined Functional Drills preceding this exercise.

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# SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

## 1.1 Exercise Details

**Exercise Name**

Seabrook Station

**Type of Exercise**

Plume

**Exercise Date**

April 5, 2016

**Program**

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

**Scenario Type**

Radiological Emergency

## 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

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#### Participating Organizations

#### 1.0 Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Seabrook Station exercise: New Hampshire

##### 1.1 Brentwood EOC

- East Rockingham Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)
- Town of Brentwood Board of Selectmen
- Town of Brentwood Department of Public Works
- Town of Brentwood Fire Department
- Town of Brentwood Police Department

##### 1.2 Dover EOC

- City of Dover City Manager
- City of Dover Fire Department
- City of Dover Police Department
- Strafford County ARES

##### 1.3 East Kingston

- ARES
- East Kingston Emergency Management Agency
- East Kingston Fire Department
- East Kingston Police Department
- East Kingston Selectman

##### 1.4 Exeter EOC

- Exeter Hospital
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- New Hampshire Homeland Security & Emergency Management (HSEM)
- Phillips Exeter Academy

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- Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)
  - Sau 16 School District
  - Town of Exeter, Board of Selectmen
  - Town of Exeter, Emergency Management
  - Town of Exeter, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
  - Town of Exeter, Fire Department
  - Town of Exeter, IT Department
  - Town of Exeter, Police Department
  - Town of Exeter, Public Safety Dispatch Center
  - Town of Exeter, Public Works
  - Town of Exeter, Radiation Defense
  - Town of Exeter, Town Manager
  - Town of Exeter, Transportation Department
- 1.5 Greenland EOC
- Emergency Management and Staff
  - Fire Department
  - Police Department
  - Department of Public Works
- 1.6 Hampton EOC
- Town of Hampton Department of Health
  - Town of Hampton Emergency Management
  - Town of Hampton Emergency Medical Services
  - Town of Hampton Fire Department
  - Town of Hampton Police Department
  - Town of Hampton Public Works Department
- 1.7 Hampton Falls EOC
- Hampton Falls Clerk's Office
  - Hampton Falls Emergency Management
  - Hampton Falls Fire Department
  - Hampton Falls Police Department
  - Hampton Falls Roads Department
  - Hampton Falls Selectmen
  - Hampton Falls Volunteer Fire Department
- 1.8 IFO Portsmouth
- State of New Hampshire HSEM
- 1.9 Kensington EOC
- Kensington Emergency Management Director
  - Kensington Police Department Chief
  - Kensington Volunteer Fire Department
  - School Administration Unit 16 (Kensington Elementary School)
- 1.10 Kingston EOC
- Sanborn Regional School District

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- Town of Kingston Director of Public Works
  - Town of Kingston Fire Department
  - Town of Kingston Health Officer
  - Town of Kingston Police Department
  - Town of Kingston Selectmen
- 1.11 Manchester EOC
- American Red Cross
  - ARES Volunteers
  - City of Manchester Fire Department
  - City of Manchester Health Department
  - City of Manchester Housing and Redevelopment Authority
  - City of Manchester Information Services
  - City of Manchester Mayor's Office
  - City of Manchester Public Works
  - City of Manchester School District
  - City of Manchester Security Department
  - City of Manchester Transit Authority
  - City of Manchester Water Authority
  - Eversource Energy
- 1.12 New Castle EOC
- New Castle Volunteer Fire Department
- 1.13 New Hampshire Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
- New Hampshire Department of HSEM
  - New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services
- 1.14 Newfields EOC
- ARES
  - Newfields Emergency Management
  - Newfields Fire Department
  - Newfields Police Department
- 1.15 Newton EOC
- ARES
  - Sanborn Regional School District
  - Town of Newton Board of Selectmen
  - Town of Newton Fire Department
  - Town of Newton Highway Department
  - Town of Newton Police Department
  - Town of Newton Town Clerk
  - Town of Newton Transportation Department
- 1.16 North Hampton EOC
- North Hampton Emergency Management
  - North Hampton Fire Department
  - North Hampton Police Department

- North Hampton Public Works
- Town of North Hampton
- 1.17 Portsmouth EOC
  - City of Portsmouth – City Manager and Staff
  - City of Portsmouth Emergency Management
  - City of Portsmouth Fire Department
  - City of Portsmouth Health Department
  - City of Portsmouth Human Resource Department
  - City of Portsmouth Police Department
  - City of Portsmouth Public Works Department
  - City of Portsmouth School Department
  - City of Portsmouth Welfare Department
  - RACES
- 1.18 Rochester EOC
  - ARES
  - Rochester City Council
  - Rochester Emergency Management Director
  - Rochester Fire Department
  - Rochester Police Department
  - Rochester Schools
- 1.19 Rockingham Dispatch
  - Rockingham County Dispatch Center/Sheriff’s Department
- 1.20 Rye EOC
  - Town of Rye Department of Public Works
  - Town of Rye Fire Department
  - Town of Rye Municipal Government
  - Town of Rye Police Department
- 1.21 Seabrook EOC
  - Code Enforcement
  - Communications Officer
  - Emergency Management Director and Staff
  - Fire Chief
  - Police Chief
  - Public Works
  - RACES
  - Radiological Defense Officer
  - School Representative
  - The Board of Selectmen
  - Town Manager
  - Transportation Coordinator
- 1.22 SEOC
  - New Hampshire ARES

- 
- New Hampshire Bureau of EMS
  - New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services
  - New Hampshire Department of Agriculture
  - New Hampshire Department of Education
  - New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services
  - New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game
  - New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services
  - New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Emergency Services Unit
  - New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Radiological Health
  - New Hampshire Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
  - New Hampshire Department of Information Technology
  - New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development
  - New Hampshire Department of Safety, Commissioner's Office
  - New Hampshire Department of Safety, Division of Fire Safety
  - New Hampshire Department of Transportation
  - New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services
  - New Hampshire Governor's Office
  - New Hampshire HSEM
  - New Hampshire National Guard
  - New Hampshire Public Information Officer (PIO)
- 1.23 South Hampton EOC
- Town of South Hampton Board of Selectmen
  - Town of South Hampton Clerk
  - Town of South Hampton Department of Public Works
  - Town of South Hampton Fire Department
- 1.24 State Police Warning
- New Hampshire State Police
- 1.25 Stratham EOC
- Highway Agent
  - NH State EOC – Emergency Medical Services Representative
  - Stratham Police Department
  - Stratham Public Health Department
  - Stratham Selectman
  - Stratham Volunteer Fire Department
  - Stratham Volunteers
- 2.0 Commonwealth of Massachusetts
- 2.1 Amesbury EOC
- Amesbury Emergency Management Agency
  - Amesbury Fire Department

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- Amesbury Police Department
  - Amesbury Department of Public Works
  - Amesbury Communications
  - Amesbury Transportation Coordinator
  - Amesbury Radiological Officer
- 2.2 SEOC
- American Red Cross
  - FEMA
  - Mass 211
  - Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
  - Massachusetts Department of Public Health
  - Massachusetts Department of Transportation
  - Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
  - Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security
  - Massachusetts National Guard
  - Massachusetts State Police
  - Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant
- 2.3 FMT #1
- Massachusetts Department of Health Radiation Control Program
- 2.4 FMT #2
- Massachusetts Department of Health Radiation Control Program
- 2.5 MA 211
- N/a
- 2.6 MEMA Region I
- Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA Region I)
  - American Red Cross
  - Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
  - MA National Guard (MANG)
  - Massachusetts State Police (MSP)
  - ACS
- 2.7 Merrimac EOC
- Merrimac Emergency Management
  - Merrimac Fire Department
  - Merrimac Police Department
  - Merrimac Public Works Department
- 2.8 Newbury EOC
- Newbury Fire Department
  - Newbury Highway Department
  - Newbury Police Department
- 2.9 Newburyport EOC
- Newburyport Fire Department
  - Newburyport Police Department

- Newburyport Harbormaster
- Newburyport Department of Public Works
- Newburyport Department of Health
- Newburyport School District

2.10 Salisbury EOC

- Salisbury Board of Selectman
- Salisbury Department Of Public Works
- Salisbury Emergency Management Agency
- Salisbury Fire Department
- Salisbury Police Department

2.11 West Newbury EOC

- Town of West Newbury Bureau of Health
- Town of West Newbury Department of Public Works
- Town of West Newbury Emergency Management Agency
- Town of West Newbury Fire Department
- Town of West Newbury Municipal Official (acting)
- Town of West Newbury Police Department
- Town of West Newbury Highway Department
- Town of West Newbury Council on Aging

3.0 Maine

3.1 York EOC

- Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry
- Department of Education
- Department of Environmental Protection
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Labor
- Department of Marine Resources
- Department of Transportation
- EMS
- Fire Marshall
- Geospatial Information Services (GIS)
- Inland Fisheries and Wildlife
- Maine Emergency Management Agency
- Maine Forest Services
- Maine Turnpike Authority
- Maine National Guard
- Office of Information Technology
- Public Utilities Commission
- Maine State Police

## **SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY**

### **2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design**

The FEMA Region I evaluated the exercise on April 5, 2016, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency in the HSEEP format.

### **2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities**

### **2.3 Scenario Summary**

The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency.

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## SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

### 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the April 5, 2016 Plume Exercise, conducted to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria contained in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the federal Register, Volume 67, No. 80 "FEMA - Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25, 2002).

Detailed information on the evaluation area criteria and the extent-of-play agreements for the drill are included as appendices to this report.

### 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in the table on following pages presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during the drill by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met

L1 – Level 1 Finding

L2 – Level 2 Finding

P – Planning Issue

N – Not Demonstrated

N/A – Not Applicable

Table 3.1 - Summary of  
Exercise Evaluation (14  
pages)

DATE: 2016-04-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		NH SEOC	NH SS EOF	NH SS FMT-1	NH SS FMT-2	NH SS IFO	NH SS JIC	NH SS 211	NH State Troop A	Rockingham Dispatch	Brentwood EOC	East Kingston EOC
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M			M	M			M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1	M										
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1	M	M									
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2	M				M						
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1	M				M						
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1											
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	P	M	M	M					M	M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M	M									
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1	M									M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2										M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1										M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2								M	M	M	
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1											
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2											
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
RESERVED	4a1											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2		M									
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3			M	M							
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1											
Laboratory Operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1	M				M				M	M	M
RESERVED	5a2											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4											
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M	M			M	P	M			M	M
Support Operations/Facilities												
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1											

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Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1																			
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1																			
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1																			

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2016-04-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Exeter EOC	Greenland EOC	Hampton EOC	Hampton Falls EOC	Kensington EOC	Kingston EOC	New Castle EOC	Newfields EOC	Newton EOC	North Hampton EOC	Portsmouth EOC
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	P
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2											
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1											
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1											
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1											
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1											
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2											
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
RESERVED	4a1											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3											
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1											
Laboratory Operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
RESERVED	5a2											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4											
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Support Operations/Facilities												
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1											

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Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1													
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1													
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1													

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

		Rye EOC	Seabrook EOC	South Hampton EOC	Stratham EOC	Dover EOC	Manchester EOC	Rochester EOC	Rochester RMS Monitoring	MA SEOC	MEMA R1 EOC
<p>DATE: 2016-04-05                      SITE: Seabrook Station, NH                      M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated</p>											
<b>Emergency Operations Management</b>											
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1								M		
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
<b>Protective Action Decision Making</b>											
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1									M	
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1									M	
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2									M	
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1									M	M
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1										
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2d2					M	M	M			
<b>Protective Action Implementation</b>											
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M	M	M	M					M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1									M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1	M	M	M	M						M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2	M	M	M	M						M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2	M	M	M	M						
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1										
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2										
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1										
<b>Field Measurement and Analysis</b>											
RESERVED	4a1										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3										
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1										
Laboratory Operations	4c1										
<b>Emergency Notification and Public Info</b>											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1	M	M	M	M					M	
RESERVED	5a2										
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3										
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4										
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	
Support Operations/Facilities											

Unclassified

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Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1									M		
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1								P	M		
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1											
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1											

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2016-04-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH  M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		MA SS JIC	MA SS FMT-1	MA SS FMT-2	MA SS 211	Amesbury EOC	Merrimac EOC	Newbury EOC	Newburyport EOC	Salisbury EOC	West Newbury EOC
Emergency Operations Management											
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1										
Direction and Control	1c1	M				M	M	M	M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	P	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making											
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1										
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1										
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2										
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1										
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1										
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1										
Protective Action Implementation											
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1		M	M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1										
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1										
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2										
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1					M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2					M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1										
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2										
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1										
Field Measurement and Analysis											
RESERVED	4a1										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3		M	M							
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1										
Laboratory Operations	4c1										
Emergency Notification and Public Info											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1					M	M	M	M	M	M
RESERVED	5a2										
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3										
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4										
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M			M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Support Operations/Facilities											
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1										

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Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1													
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1													
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1													

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2016-04-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH  M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated			Rochester RMS Reception center	Bright Start Early Learning Center	Donna Clarke Family Day Care	Rockingham County Nursing	East Kingston Elementary School	Exeter Center (Nursing Home)	Harris Family Children's Center	Kateitroscope Home Child Care	Adelaine C. Marston School	Seabrook Pre-School	Robins Child Place
Emergency Operations Management													
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1	M											
Direction and Control	1c1	M											
Communications Equipment	1d1	M											
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M											
Protective Action Decision Making													
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1												
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1												
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2												
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1												
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1												
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1												
Protective Action Implementation													
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M											
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1												
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2		M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	M											
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2												
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1												
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2												
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1												
Field Measurement and Analysis													
RESERVED	4a1												
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2												
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3												
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1												
Laboratory Operations	4c1												
Emergency Notification and Public Info													
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1												
RESERVED	5a2												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4												
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1												
Support Operations/Facilities													

Unclassified

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Seabrook Station

Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1	M																		
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1	P																		
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1																			
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1																			

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

		Southern District YMCA Camp	Nurture and Nature Children's Center	Newton Learning Center	Sanborn Regional Middle School	Little Blessings Day Care	Rye County Day School	Rye Junior High	Webster at Rye (Nursing Home)	Miss Beth's Day Care	South Hampton Barnard School
<p>DATE: 2016-04-05                      SITE: Seabrook Station, NH                      M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated</p>											
Emergency Operations Management											
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1										
Direction and Control	1c1										
Communications Equipment	1d1										
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1										
Protective Action Decision Making											
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1										
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1										
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2										
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1										
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1										
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1										
Protective Action Implementation											
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1										
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1										
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1										
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2										
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1										
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2										
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1										
Field Measurement and Analysis											
RESERVED	4a1										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3										
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1										
Laboratory Operations	4c1										
Emergency Notification and Public Info											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1										
RESERVED	5a2										

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Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3																		
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4																		
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1																		
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1																		
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1																		
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1																		
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1																		

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2016-04-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH  M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Little Sprouts (Day Care)																
Emergency Operations Management																		
Mobilization	1a1	M																
Facilities	1b1																	
Direction and Control	1c1																	
Communications Equipment	1d1																	
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1																	
Protective Action Decision Making																		
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1																	
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1																	
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2																	
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1																	
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1																	
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1																	
Protective Action Implementation																		
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1																	
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M																
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1																	
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2	M																
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1																	
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2																	
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1																	
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2																	
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1																	
Field Measurement and Analysis																		
RESERVED	4a1																	
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2																	
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3																	
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1																	
Laboratory Operations	4c1																	
Emergency Notification and Public Info																		
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1																	
RESERVED	5a2																	
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3																	
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4																	
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1																	
Support Operations/Facilities																		

Unclassified

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Seabrook Station

Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1																		
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1																		
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1																		
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1																		

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## 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

### 3.3.1 Massachusetts Jurisdictions

#### 3.3.1.1 Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### 3.3.1.2 MEMA Region I EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### 3.3.1.3 MA (SS) Joint Information Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

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- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.1.4 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 1**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.d.1
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.1.5 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 2**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.1.6 MA (SS) 211**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

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### 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

#### 3.3.2.1 Amesbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### 3.3.2.2 Merrimac Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### 3.3.2.3 Newbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.2.4 Newburyport Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.2.5 Salisbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.2.6 West Newbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.6.1 NH State Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 3.a.1
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.6.2 NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.6.3 NH – (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 1

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.6.4 NH – (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 2**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.6.5 NH (SS) Incident Field Office**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.6.6 NH (SS) Joint Information Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 5.b.1
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.6.7 NH (SS) 211**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.6.8 NH State Troop A**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.6.9 NH Rockingham Dispatch**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7 Risk Jurisdictions**

#### **3.3.7.1 Brentwood Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.7.2 East Kingston Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.7.3 Exeter Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.4 Greenland Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c. 1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.5 Hampton Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.6 Hampton Falls Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.7 Kensington Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.8 Kingston Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.9 New Castle Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.10 Newfields Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.11 Newton Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.12 North Hampton Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.7.13 Portsmouth Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.c.1
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.7.14 Rye Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.7.15 Seabrook Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.16 South Hampton Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.17 Stratham Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

## **3.3.8 Support Jurisdictions**

### **3.3.8.1 Dover Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.d.2, 3.d.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.8.2 Manchester Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.d.2, 3.d.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **Rochester Local EOC**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.d.2, 3.d.1, 5.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.8.3 Rochester MS Reception Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.8.4 Rochester Reception Center Vehicles**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.d.1, 6.a.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 6.b.1
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.8.5 Rochester Reception Center Registration**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 6.a.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.8.6 Rochester Reception Center Portal and Secondary Monitoring**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

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**3.3.8.7 Rochester Reception Center Male Monitoring/Decon**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.8.8 Rochester Reception Center Female Monitoring/Decon**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

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### **3.3.7.18 Adeline C. Marston School**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.19 Bright Start Early Learning Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.20 Donna Clarke Family Day Care**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.21 East Kingston Elementary School (Public School SAU#16)**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.22 Exeter Center Nursing Home**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.23 Harris Family Children's Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.24 Kaleidoscope Home Child Care**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.25 Little Blessings Day Care**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.26 Little Sprouts Day Care**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.27 Miss Beth's Day Care**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.28 Newton Learning Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.29 Nurture and Nature Children's Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.30 Robins Child Place**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.31 Rockingham County Nursing Home**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.32 Rye Junior High School (Public School SAU#50)**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.33 Rye County Day School**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.34 Sanborn Regional Middle School (Public School SAU#17)**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.7.35 Sandbox Pre-School**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.36 South Hampton Barnard School (Public School SAU21)**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.37 Southern District YMCA Camp Lincoln, Inc.**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.7.38 Webster at Rye Nursing Home**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

## **SECTION 4: CONCLUSION**

## APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

<b>Issue Number: 57-16-3a1-P-</b>		<b>Issue No: 01 NH</b>	
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> : 135A-“Emergency Worker Potassium Iodide User Agreement” which indicated, “I will take one (1) tablet (130 milligrams) per day of the thyroid blocking agent as instructed.” When interviewed, the emergency worker recognized the correct dosage was to ingest two (65mg) tablets and demonstrated this to the evaluator. Although some of the emergency workers self-corrected, the form caused some initial confusion.</p>			
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Review of all applicable plans, procedures and documents to ensure that the correct dosage is being administrated.</p>			
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>			
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>		<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>		<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>		<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

<b>Issue Number: 57-16-5b1-P-</b>		<b>Issue No: 02 NH</b>	
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> The NH PIO Spokesperson (Spokesperson) was having difficulty receiving information from the State EOC. Both states’ Spokespersons arrived at 0857. Since the licensee JIC personnel was in place for quite some time before the states arrived, and the Alert EAS occurred over an hour prior to that, the licensee was ready to brief the media as soon as possible. The NH Spokesperson was unaware the SEOC had provided numerous information to the JIC via electronic 300B Forms and through WebEOC. This lack of information occurred several times throughout the day, including after the General Emergency (GE) was declared. The GE was declared at 1100. The licensee was ready to give a media briefing at 1115; however, the states were not ready to provide PAD information. The briefing was pushed back until 1120 and then 1125, and then 1135 and finally was held at 1140. During this 20 minutes of holding off the briefing, the NH Spokesperson tried calling the EOC repeatedly to obtain the necessary information. Because she was not able to get the information in time, she was not able to advise the residents of Seabrook and Hampton Falls of the need to evacuate and consider taking KI.</p>			
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Revise the decision making and dissemination process to assure messages will be received by the public in a prompt manner. Provide training to primary and backup PIOs/Spokespersons in NH.</p>			
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>			
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>		<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>		<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>		<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

<b>Issue Number: 57-16-1.c.1-P-</b>		<b>Issue No: 03 NH</b>
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> The Portsmouth, New Hampshire EOC leadership did not adequately demonstrate direction and control of the emergency response. After receiving the notification of an Alert at 0812, the EMC did not review his job aid in a timely manner. This in turn, delayed ESF staff notifications and activation of EOC for approximately 30-45 minutes. This also led to the initial two 300B forms being read almost an hour after they were sent out. In addition, when 300B #4 and #5 were received, some information was omitted during the EOC briefing, such as canceling-school activities, additional protective actions, and reception center status. The EMC and City Manager made a precautionary actions decision to order an early release of school children and non-essential personnel without thoroughly communicating and coordinating with the State to ensure that the public was notified. The EMC wasn't aware of certain EOC activities, for example, staff were receiving public inquiry calls and providing responses without the EMC's knowledge. There was no Job Aid for the PIO position, which should be handling the public inquiry calls. Also, the EMC gave staff the option to leave during the exercise, if they wanted to get back to their regular jobs.</p>		
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Additional training and review of EOC operations, job aids, and the REP Program along with leadership expectations should be provided. In the future, all staff should perform all duties as if the Graded Exercises was an actual emergency. Staff should remain engaged and present throughout the entire exercise unless there is a real world emergency.</p>		
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>		
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>	<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>	<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>	<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

<b>Issue Number: 57-16-6b1-P-</b>		<b>Issue No: 04 NH</b>
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> During the March 23, 2016, Rochester Reception Center Exercise personnel assigned to the vehicle monitoring and decontamination station did not have proper procedures addressing how to screen Emergency Worker Vehicles in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.</p>		
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management should consider altering current plans and job aids to reflect a dedicated process for the screening of emergency worker vehicles at the reception center.</p>		
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>		
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>	<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>	<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>	<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

<b>Issue Number: 57-16-1d1-P-</b>		<b>Issue No: 01 MA</b>	
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> On April 5, 2016, the Massachusetts Field Monitoring Teams performed all required communications using cellular telephones and a laptop computer with an air card. Though all forms of communication performed reliably during the Seabrook Stations evaluated plume exercise, all rely on local cellular towers and are vulnerable to a single failure.</p> <p>The REP Program Manual directs that “All facilities, FMTs, and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.” The Massachusetts plan for Field Monitoring Teams responding to emergencies at Seabrook Station indicate the laptop computer with air card as the primary means of communication and cellular telephone as the secondary means of communication. Each team had one air card, one licensee issued cellular telephone, two State issued cellular telephones, and two personal cellular telephones. These may be considered to be a single system, relying on the same local cellular towers.</p>			
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Include State system radios, as used for responses to emergencies at Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Stations, or other independent system to Field Monitoring Teams responding to emergencies at Seabrook Station.</p>			
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>			
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>		<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>		<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>		<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

## APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Utility Declared/Time	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken											
		NH SEOC	IFO Portsmouth	NH EOF	NH FMT #1	NH FMT #2	NH JIC	NH State Police Warning	Rockingham Dispatch	Seabrook EOC	Brentwood EOC	East Kingston	Exeter EOC
Unusual Event		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Alert		0752/0801	0753/0827	0752/0752 (MA)				0752/0801	0752/0805	0753	0809	0752/0809	0752/0813
Site Area Emergency		0925/0930	0925/0942	0921/0926 (NH)/0925 (MA)				0925/0930	0925/0934	0939	0935	0925/0936	0938/0925
General Emergency		1100/1111	1100/1119	1100/1100				1100/1111	1100/1116	1121	1118	1100/1119	1100/1116
Simulated Radioactivity Release Began		1053/1111	1100/1119	1100/1100				N/a	1100/1116	1133	1132	1135	1133
Simulated Radioactivity Release Terminated		N/a	Ongoing	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Facility Declared Operational		0833	0845	0849				N/a	0814	0830	0915	0835	0834
Gov Declaration of State of Emergency		1005	1031	1005 (NH)/0955 (MA)				N/a	1005	1024	1005	1005/1018	1001
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/a	N/a	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	1005	N/a	N/a
Exercise Terminated		1245	1245	1233				N/a	1245	1243	1245	1245	1245
Precautionary Actions:													
Close parks		0946	0949	0949 (NH)/0946 (MA)				N/a	0949	0958	0951	0955	N/a
Restrict water traffic		0946	0949	0949				N/a	0949	N/a	0951	0955	N/a
Restrict rail traffic		0946	N/a	0949				N/a	0949	N/a	0951	0955	0955
Restrict airspace		0946	N/a	0949				N/a	0949	0956	0951	0955	0955
Shelter livestock, stored feed, & water		0946	0949	0949				N/a	0949	0956	0951	0955	0955
Schools		N/a	N/a	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
1 <sup>st</sup> A&N Decision		0946	0949					N/a	0949	0956	0951	0953	0945
1 <sup>st</sup> Siren Activation		0958	0958	0958				N/a	0958	0958	0951	0958	0958
1 <sup>st</sup> EAS Message		1001	1001	1001				N/a	1001	1001	0951	1001	1001
2 <sup>nd</sup> A&N Decision		1130	1133	N/a				N/a	1133	1133	1132	1135	1133

**SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE – April 5, 2016**

2 <sup>nd</sup> Siren Activation	1142	1142	N/a				N/a	1142	1142	1132	1142	1142
2 <sup>nd</sup> EAS Message	1145	1145	N/a				N/a	1145	1145	1132	1145	1145
3 <sup>rd</sup> A&N Decision	N/a	N/a	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
3 <sup>rd</sup> Siren Activation	N/a	N/a	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
3 <sup>rd</sup> EAS Message	N/a	N/a	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
KI Decision:												
EWs advised to take KI	1130	1133	1133				N/a	1133	1133	1132	1135	1133
General Public advised to take KI	1130	1133	1133				N/a	1133	1133	1132	N/a	N/a
EWs advised NOT to take KI	N/a	1133	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
General Public advised NOT to take KI	N/a	1133	N/a				N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a

**SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE – April 5, 2016**

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Utility Declared/Time	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken											
		Greenland EOC	Hampton EOC	Hampton Falls EOC	Kensington EOC	Kingston EOC	New Castle EOC	Newfields EOC	Newton EOC	North Hampton EOC	Portsmouth EOC	Rye EOC	South Hampton EOC
Unusual Event		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Alert		0813	0752 / 0816	0752 / 0817	0752 / 0812	0752 / 0809	0810	0751/0809	0752 / 0807	0752/0810	0752/0812	0752/0809	0809
Site Area Emergency		0934	0925 / 0938	0925 / 0937	0925 / 0937	0925 / 0937	0935	0925 / 0936	0925 / 0936	0925/0940	0940/0925	0925/0936	0936
General Emergency		1118	1100 / 1117	1100 / 1119	1100 / 1118	1100 / 1119	1100	1100/1117	1100 / 1119	1100 / 1118	1100/1120	1100/1119	1119
Simulated Radioactivity Release Began		1133	1135	1100 / 1135	1100 / 1118	1100 / 1134	1100	1133	1115 / 1119	1118	1100/137	1135	1133
Simulated Radioactivity Release Terminated		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	1245 / 1245	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Facility Declared Operational		0903	0845	0830	0838	0848	0832	0900	0836	0900	0925	0841	0823
Gov Declaration of State of Emergency		1015	1005	N/a	1005	1036	1005	1005	1018	N/a	1110 (1005)	1005/1038	1133
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	1005	N/a	N/a	N/a
Exercise Terminated		1248	1245	1230	1247	1243	1245	1245	1245	1245	1245	1245	1245
Precautionary Actions:													
Close parks		0956	0955	N/a	0937	0949	0949	0949	1005	0957	N/a	1008	0949
Restrict water traffic		0956	0955	N/a	0937	0949	0949	0949	N/a	N/a	N/a	1008	0949
Restrict rail traffic		0956	0955	0950	0937	0949	0949	0949	0949	N/a	N/a	1135	0949
Restrict airspace		0956	1133	0950	0937	0949	0949	0949	N/a	N/a	N/a	1135	0949
Shelter livestock, stored feed, & water		0956	0955	0950	0937	1153	0949	0949	0952	0957	0950	1136	0949
Schools		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	0850	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	0950	N/a	N/a
1 <sup>st</sup> A&N Decision		0956	N/a	0950	0950 SAE	0937	0949	0953	N/a	0958	0950	0953	0949
1 <sup>st</sup> Siren Activation		0958	0958	0958	0958	0958	0958	0958	0958	1001	0958	0958	0958
1 <sup>st</sup> EAS Message		1001	1001	1001	1001	1001	1001	1001	1001	N/a	1001	1001	1001
2 <sup>nd</sup> A&N Decision		1133	N/a	1135	1139 GE	1119	1133	1137	N/a	1142	1137	1135	1133
2 <sup>nd</sup> Siren Activation		1142	1142	1142	1142	1142	1142	1142	1142	1145	1142	1142	1142
2 <sup>nd</sup> EAS Message		1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	N/a	1145	1145	1145
3 <sup>rd</sup> A&N Decision		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
3 <sup>rd</sup> Siren Activation		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
3 <sup>rd</sup> EAS Message		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
KI Decision:													
EWs advised to take KI		1140	1137	1135	1139	1134	1133	1142	1138	1118	1137	1136	1133
General Public advised to		N/a	N/a	1135	N/a	1134	N/a	1142	N/a	N/a	1137	1136	1133

**SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE – April 5, 2016**

take KI												
EWs advised NOT to take KI	N/a											
General Public advised NOT to take KI	N/a											

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Emergency Classification Level or Event	Utility Declared/Time	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken											
		Stratham EOC	Dover EOC	Manchester EOC	Rochester EOC	MA SEOC	MA 211	MEMA Region I	MA JIC	MA EOF	MA FMT #1	MA FMT #2	Merrimack EOC
Unusual Event		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Alert		0752/0828	0752/0820	0752/0844	0752/0827		0817	0752/0805		0752/0752 (MA)			0750/0809
Site Area Emergency		0925/0938	0927/0932	0925/0951	0925/0941		0932	0925/0929		0921/0926 (NH)/0925 (MA)			0925/0943
General Emergency		1100/1117	1100/1118	1100/1135	1100/1117		1100	1100/1117		1100/1100			1100/1123
Simulated Radioactivity Release Began		1133	1100/1133	1135	1133		1111	1100/1117		1100/1100			1100
Simulated Radioactivity Release Terminated		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a
Facility Declared Operational		0855	0836	0915	0918		N/a	0830		0849			0833
Gov Declaration of State of Emergency		N/a	1005	1026	1005		N/a	0950		1005 (NH)/0955 (MA)			1000
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	1130		N/a			1000
Exercise Terminated		N/a	1246	1245	1245		1242	1241		1233			1241
Precautionary Actions:													
Close parks		N/a	1000	0951	0950		N/a	0941		0949 (NH)/0946 (MA)			N/a
Restrict water traffic		N/a	1000	0951	0950		N/a	0941		0949			N/a
Restrict rail traffic		N/a	1000	0951	0950		N/a	0946		0949			N/a
Restrict airspace		N/a	1037	0951	0950		N/a	0946		0949			N/a
Shelter livestock, stored feed, & water		N/a	0949	0951	0950		N/a	0941		0949			1058
Schools		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a
1 <sup>st</sup> A&N Decision		0949	1134	0951	0950		N/a	0945					0956
1 <sup>st</sup> Siren Activation		0958	1142	0958	0958		N/a	0958		0958			0958
1 <sup>st</sup> EAS Message		1001	1145	1001	1001		N/a	1001		1001			1001
2 <sup>nd</sup> A&N Decision		1133	N/a	1135	1133		N/a	1130		N/a			1140
2 <sup>nd</sup> Siren Activation		1142	N/a	1142	1142		N/a	1142		N/a			1142
2 <sup>nd</sup> EAS Message		1145	N/a	1145	1145		N/a	1145		N/a			1145

**SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE – April 5, 2016**

3 <sup>rd</sup> A&N Decision	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a
3 <sup>rd</sup> Siren Activation	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a
3 <sup>rd</sup> EAS Message	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a
KI Decision:												
EWs advised to take KI	1134	1129	1135	1133		N/a	1130		1133			1135
General Public advised to take KI	N/a	1153	1135	1133		N/a	1130		1133			1135
EWs advised NOT to take KI	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a
General Public advised NOT to take KI	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a	N/a		N/a			N/a

**SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE – April 5, 2016**

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Utility Declared/Time	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken										
		Amesbury EOC	Newburyport EOC	Salisbury EOC	West Newbury EOC	Newbury EOC	York EOC	Maine SEOC				
Unusual Event		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a				
Alert		0752/0806	0752/0807	0752/0816	0752/0806	0752/0809		0839				
Site Area Emergency		0925/0936	0925/0958	0925/0938	0925/0936	0929/0936		0939				
General Emergency		1100/1120	1100/1107	1100/1120	1100/1118	1100/1120		1117				
Simulated Radioactivity Release Began		N/a	N/a	1100/1134	1121	1100/1139		1117				
Simulated Radioactivity Release Terminated		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a				
Facility Declared Operational		0820	0826	0840	0830	0830		0915				
Gov Declaration of State of Emergency		0955	0950	0959	1001	1010		N/a				
Declaration of Local Emergency		0956	1006	1000	1005	1015		1137				
Exercise Terminated		N/a	N/a	1241	1242	1230		1246				
Precautionary Actions:												
Close parks		0955	0952	0956	N/a	1010		N/a				
Restrict water traffic		0955	0952	0956	N/a	1010		N/a				
Restrict rail traffic		0955	0952	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a				
Restrict airspace		0955	0952	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a				
Shelter livestock, stored feed, & water		0955	0952	0956	0953	1010		N/a				
Schools		0911	0941	N/a	0953	N/a		N/a				
Salisbury Plum Island Beaches		N/a	N/a	N/a	0953	N/a		N/a				
10 Mile Safety Zone (Marine)		N/a	N/a	N/a	0953	N/a		N/a				
Parker Wildlife Area		N/a	N/a	N/a	0953	N/a		N/a				
1 <sup>st</sup> A&N Decision		N/a	N/a	0956	0953	0956		N/a				
1 <sup>st</sup> Siren Activation		0958	0958	0956	0958	0958		N/a				
1 <sup>st</sup> EAS Message		1001	1001	0958	1001	1001		N/a				
2 <sup>nd</sup> A&N Decision		1135	N/a	1134	1134	1138		N/a				
2 <sup>nd</sup> Siren Activation		1142	1142	1142	1142	1142		N/a				
2 <sup>nd</sup> EAS Message		1145	1145	1145	1145	1145		N/a				
3 <sup>rd</sup> A&N Decision		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a				
3 <sup>rd</sup> Siren Activation		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a				
3 <sup>rd</sup> EAS or EBS Message		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a				
KI Decision:												
EWs advised to take KI		1135	1134	1134	1134	1139		1045				

**SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE – April 5, 2016**

General Public advised to take KI	1135	1134	1134	1134	1139		N/a					
EWs advised NOT to take KI	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a					
General Public advised NOT to take KI	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a		N/a					

## **APPENDIX C: EXTENT OF PLAY**

**FOR THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,  
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS  
AND THE STATE OF MAINE**

# 2016 SEABROOK STATION EXERCISE CYCLE

## PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY



STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



# EXTENT OF PLAY

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**NEW HAMPSHIRE  
EXTENT OF PLAY  
SEABROOK STATION NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE  
Evaluated Exercise – April 5, 2016**

**BACKGROUND:**

This is the proposed 2016 Extent of Play (EOP) Criteria for the New Hampshire (N.H.) Off-Site Response Organization (ORO) involved in the Plume Exercise Cycle for Seabrook Station. No changes have been made to any criterion except as noted in the document.

This EOP covers all components and activities of the exercise cycle starting with a one-day workshop on September 9th 2015. Several Out-of-Sequence (OOS) activities have been or will be conducted prior to the Tabletop Exercise (TTX) scheduled for October 15, 2015. The Exercise Cycle will culminate with the “graded exercise” on April 5, 2016. Various “out-of-sequence” activities and exercises will be scheduled, but the criteria utilized will be incorporated within this EOP and noted throughout the document, as appropriate.

This document does NOT identify all exercise areas to be discussed/exercised by the State and other off-site response organizations/agencies. The scenarios developed for and utilized in the drills and exercises will incorporate sufficient injects to provide opportunities for all players to participate in response and recovery activities mindful of an all-hazard approach. Items identified in this EOP only will be subject to evaluation.

This is a **NEW HAMPSHIRE ONLY** document. The EOPs for Massachusetts will be combined with this document by FEMA to form a comprehensive EOP for this exercise cycle, if appropriate.

**CALENDAR AND PLAYERS:**

<b>DATES</b>	<b>PLACE</b>	<b>PARTICIPANTS</b>	<b>status</b>
<b>Wed. Sept. 9, 2015 Registration: 8 a.m. Program 8:30-12:30 p.m.</b>	Pease ANG, Bldg 149 Portsmouth, N.H.	Invited: N.H. and Mass. Local EPZ/Host EOC, ICP, personnel; SEOC Command & General Staff; ESF 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Seabrook Station; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard	Workshop Presentation Discussion- based Non-evaluated
<b>Thursday, Oct. 15, 2015 Exercise 8:30 – 4 p.m.</b>	Pease ANG Bldg. 149 Portsmouth, N.H	Invited: SEOC (N.H., Maine, Mass.); Command & General Staff ICP, ESF 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region I; Seabrook Station Monitoring/Sampling Teams; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard	Participant Brief TTX Discussion- based Non-evaluated
<b>Wed. Nov. 18, 2015 (NH SEOC)</b>	State EOCs Local EOCs EOF, JIC,ICP, Monitoring Team locations (appropriate other locations)	N.H. and Mass. Local/Host EPZ EOC personnel; ICP, SEOC Command & General Staff; ESF 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region I; Seabrook Station; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard	Participant Brief CFE #1 Exercise Non-evaluated

<p><b>Wed. Feb. 10, 2016 (NH SEOC)</b></p>	<p>State EOCs Local EOCs EOF, JIC, ICP, Monitoring Team locations (appropriate other locations)</p>	<p>SEOC (N.H., Mass.) Command &amp; General Staff; ESF 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; ICP, Staging Area personnel (selected) DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA;; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region I; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; Seabrook Station; Sampling Teams</p>	<p>Participant Brief CFE#2 Exercise  Non-evaluated</p>
<p><b>Tues. April 5, 2016 (NH SEOC)</b></p>	<p>State EOC Local EOCs EOF, JIC, ICP Monitoring Team locations</p>	<p>N.H. and Mass. Local/Host EPZ EOC personnel; SEOC Command &amp; General Staff; ICP, ESF 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA;; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); Seabrook Station</p>	<p><b>Participant Brief EVALUATED</b></p>

**FACILITIES:**

The following organizations/locations will be involved in the Seabrook Station Plume Exposure Pathway Exercises Cycle in FY2016:

**In Sequence:**

**Local EPZ Community EOCs:** Brentwood, E. Kingston, Exeter, Greenland, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Seabrook, South Hampton, Stratham.

**Local Host Communities:** Dover, Manchester, Rochester (EOCs only - in sequence)

**State Emergency Operations Center**

N.H. Homeland Security & Emergency Management

\*\*\* State Local Liaisons may be located at the IFO Bldg. on Pease Tradeport for part or all of the Exercise Cycle

**Emergency Operations Facility**

New Hampshire Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency (HSEM)

New Hampshire Department of Public Health/Radiological Health

**Radiological Field Monitoring Teams**

**State Police Dispatch – State Warning Point**

**Rockingham County Dispatch**

**Rumor Control – E-911 PSAP**

**Joint Information Center –** For CFE#1, a virtual JIC may be established at the IPOC (SEOC)

**Field Monitoring Teams –** Monitoring Teams (MT1 & MT2)

(Equipment checklist - OOS day before)

**Dose Assessment Personnel/MTC –** Will be located at the EOF on Pease Tradeport

**Out of Sequence:** (On or about March 6 – June 6, 2016)

**Risk Special Facilities:**

**Schools**

**TBD**

**Day Cares**

Donna Clarke Family Day Care (Brentwood)

Harris Family Children’s Center (Exeter)

Kaleidoscope Home Child Care (Greenland)

Sandbox Preschool (Hampton)  
Robins Childs Place (Hampton Falls)  
Bright Start Early Learning Center (Kingston)  
Nurture and Nature Children’s Center (Newfields)  
Agape Preschool (Portsmouth)  
Rye County Day School  
Miss Beth’s Day Care (Seabrook)  
Little Sprouts (Stratham)  
**Long-Term Care Facilities**  
Exeter Center  
Webster at Rye  
Rockingham County Nursing Home  
**Residential Camps - TBD**

<b>Reception Center(s):</b>	<b>Rochester Middle School Graded:</b>
<b>Radiological Lab:</b>	29 Hazen Drive, Concord, N.H.
<b>MS-1 Hospital:</b>	<b>Wentworth-Douglass, Dover, N.H.</b>
<b>NH State Police:</b>	Troop A – Epping, N.H.
<b>NH State Transportation Staging Area</b>	– Rockingham Cty.Courthouse Brentwood, N.H.

**Evaluation Criteria**

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates sub-element 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1 or 5.b.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1 unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

## EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management

### Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

#### *Intent*

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.*

***Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, A.1.e, A.3, A.4; C.1, C.4, C.6; D.4; E.1, E.2; G.3.a; H.3, H.4)***

#### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

The notification process for state and local responders will be completed, and call down rosters will be available to the FEMA Evaluator(s) upon request.

**State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)** – New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) SEOC emergency staff, the Unified Command (Department of Public Health/Radiological Health [RadHealth]), the Emergency Support Function Agencies staff, the State Public Information Line staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Liaison will be activated upon notification per procedures.

**The State Warning Point (SWP)** remains activated on a 24-hour basis. Rumor Control may be set up within E-911.

**Incident Field Office (IFO)** - For this exercise cycle the Local Liaisons will be located at the IFO at the Pease Tradeport and will pre-stage. (10 mins.=1 hr.)

**Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)** – HSEM and RadHealth may be pre-staged. Dose Assessment personnel will also be located at the EOF. (10 mins. = 1 hour)

**Joint Information Center (JIC)** – The NH JIC may be pre-staged for CFE#2 and Evaluated Exercise. (10 mins. = 1 hour). A “Virtual JIC” may be opened and coordinated at the SEOC for CFE#1.

**Field Monitoring Team Personnel (FMT)** - FMT’s will be deployed from the DHHS Building Rad Lab area to a designated staging area after a very short preliminary briefing. When “all” FMT’s have arrived at the staging area (Epping), they will immediately contact the MTC Rad Lab Supervisor and report their readiness and location. They will then contact the Rad Lab Supervisor via phone and receive a full briefing of the event situation. Field Team personnel will use a compressed time: 10 minutes/hour of normal travel response time.

**Local EOCs:** Municipalities will activate their personnel for exercises per procedures.

**Transportation Providers** – Initial calls will be made to three transportation providers to verify the contact information and resources (drivers and vehicles) under the LOA Out-of-Sequence (OOS). Information obtained will be available for review within the Tech Hazards Section at the IPOC. Procedures within community’s will provide input to the Local Liaisons as to potential transportation needs. ESF#13 will be responsible to activate STSA per procedures (simulated). No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized during the CFE’s or Evaluated Exercise.

**State Transportation Staging Area (STSA)** – The STSA will be evaluated out-of-sequence.

**Rochester Reception Center** – The Rochester Reception Center will be activated out-of-sequence.

**Sub-element 1.b – Facilities****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.*

***Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)***

**New Hampshire Extent of Play**

The newly refurbished Radiological Laboratory located in the lower Level of the DHHS Building, at 29 Hazen Drive, Concord, NH, 03301, will be evaluated during this exercise cycle out-of-sequence.

**Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.*

***Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)***

**New Hampshire Extent of Play**

**EPZ/RC EOCs:** If any towns are directed to evacuate, EOC personnel will demonstrate continuity of government through a discussion of logistics. Closing of the local EOC and relocation to a facility outside the EPZ will be simulated through discussion.

**Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment****Intent**

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMTs.*

***Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)***

**New Hampshire Extent of Play**

Contact with any locations not playing will be simulated. Demonstration of operating communication systems will be provided as appropriate.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

**Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.*

***Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)***

**New Hampshire Extent of Play**

Participating facilities will demonstrate/show equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response. Documentation of dosimetry inspection, dosimetry inventory and KI inventory will be available for review at the DHHS/Division of Public Health/Radiological Health office. Inventory is also maintained at the HSEM RIMC Shop

Note: FEMA will provide copies of the Annual Letter of Certification to evaluators, as appropriate. Staging Area Dosimetry and KI will also take place during the OOS STSA exercise. Equipment for Reception Center activities will be demonstrated out-of-sequence.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

**EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making****Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control****Intent**

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO’s plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.*

*Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration TEDE or organ- specific limits) identified in the ORO’s plans/procedures.*

***Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6;f; K.3.a.;K.4)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the SEOC by the Unified Command (HSEM, RadHealth) based upon information provided from the EOF. Dose Assessment staff located at the EOF will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the SEOC for their consideration in making the protective action decisions.

Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace those personnel approaching exposure limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtained. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI. Distribution of KI to emergency workers will be simulated. RadHealth will authorize use of KI when radiological conditions warrant its use.

### Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency.

#### *Intent*

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.*

*ORO must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs from their plans/procedures or EPA's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of precautionary and/or protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.*

***Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

The SEOC decision making team will evaluate the protective action recommendations of the State Dose Assessment team and the utility and develop appropriate protective action decisions.

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the SEOC by HSEM, RadHealth and based upon information provided from the EOF and other appropriate sources.

***Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make precautionary and/or protective action decisions) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the SEOC based upon information provided by the EOF and recommendations from the Dose Assessment personnel who will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF.

### Sub-element 2.c – Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

#### *Intent*

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering, and use of KI, if applicable, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed daycare centers, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from an NPP.*

***Criterion 2.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

Protective action decisions, including those for individuals with disabilities and access/functional needs population groups, are demonstrated at the SEOC based upon information provided by RadHealth Dose Assessment Program staff at the EOF. HSEM and RadHealth staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC (Governor) for their consideration and implementation in making protective action decisions. Information on protective/precautionary actions are passed to special facilities (simulated) from the State EOC to the local liaisons. They then pass this information to the local EMDs who contact special facilities within their jurisdiction.

Processes/procedures utilized by Special Facilities are discussed through interviews during out-of-sequence interviews with a representative selection of special facilities within the EPZ.

## EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation

### Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

#### **Intent**

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of the PAGs, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the “as low as is reasonably achievable” principle as appropriate.*

***Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/***

*procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)*

### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

EPZ/Host EOCs: Dosimetry packets will be issued to a minimum of two individuals who will be working inside each EPZ EOC. Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Knowledge of the use of dosimetry through the Plume Phase and New Hampshire policies on dosimetry will be demonstrated through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator and only with individuals issued dosimetry.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

### **Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision**

#### ***Intent***

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI for institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans / procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans / procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of distributing KI.*

***Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

Schools, Day Care, institutionalized and special facility's staff that may administer KI will be interviewed out of sequence by the FEMA Evaluator.

Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Empty KI tablet containers (small zip-lock bags) will be included in the dosimetry packets for emergency workers. As part of the demonstration by the Radef Officer or individual charged by the facility to implement a KI Plan for the facility, the FEMA Evaluator will be briefed as if they were the recipient of the KI. The evaluator will check the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of KI distribution, and include forms and equipment to be used.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

### Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Precautionary and/or Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

#### *Intent*

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access / functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from an NPP.*

**Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)**

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

**EPZ EOCs:** Calls will be simulated from local EOCs to special facilities and/or individuals with special needs within their jurisdiction. The list of access / functional needs individuals maintained by the local EOCs (via cards or self-identifying) will be shown to the FEMA evaluator; however, the information is confidential and copies will not be provided to the evaluator.

Estimates on transportation needs will be made based upon enrollment/capacity figures on file and/or individuals who have self-identified transportation needs. ESF#1 will simulate a call to the STSA at request of Unified Command at the SEOC to arrange for transportation assets. Requests may also come through Local Liaisons at IFO. No vehicles will be mobilized. A board developed on WebEOC will simulate tracking of the transportation assets. The STSA will be evaluated out-of-sequence.

Local special facilities will be interviewed out-of-sequence where transportation arrangements will be discussed with the FEMA evaluator.

The capability to correctly operate the TTY will be demonstrated at the PSAP (E-911).

***Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement precautionary and/or protective actions for schools.***

***(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

Calls to schools outside with EPZ will be simulated and logged. Contact will be made through the Local EOCs.

**EPZ EOCs:** Initial notification will be simulated to all school, health care facilities and day care centers. Long-term care facilities' administrators will make decisions for their residents after notification based upon health and safety considerations of their patients. Most schools and day cares have indicated an "early release" process to avoid evacuation decision-making.

**EPZ Schools/Day Care Providers:** Participating schools, day care providers and long term health care facilities in the EPZ communities will be visited out of sequence by a FEMA evaluator, who will interview key staff regarding their response plan.

### **Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control**

#### ***Intent***

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans / procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.*

***Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.***

***(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)***

### New Hampshire Extent of Play

EPZ EOCs: EPZ EOCs will demonstrate the ability to direct and monitor traffic control operations within their jurisdictions through discussions and communications with the evaluator. At the EOCs, local roadway/public works representative and the local Police representative will participate in a discussion of procedures and resources available for traffic control. No personnel or equipment will be deployed to field locations.

ESF#1/#13 Troop A and DOT: Representatives from State Police (Troop A) and DOT will demonstrate/explain ACPs through interview at Troop A out-of-sequence. The traffic / access control personnel will not be deployed.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

**Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.**  
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

### New Hampshire Extent of Play

Each EPZ Local EOC will demonstrate decision-making regarding rerouting of traffic following a traffic impediment by a controller inject or through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator. No personnel or equipment will be dispatched to the simulated accident scene. The implementation of an alternate evacuation route for the length of the scenario event will be covered by one (1) local EPZ community (set to evacuate).

If the scenario does not lead to evacuation the criteria shall be deemed complete if the ORO can describe to the evaluator the actions they would take to overcome a major traffic impediment during an evacuation and how such actions would be communicated to the public and affected OROs.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

## EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement and Analysis

### Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

#### Intent

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at an*

*NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.*

**Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)**

### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

Field Teams are managed by the Monitoring Team Coordinator (MTC) who is located at the utility EOF. He will brief and dispatch a minimum of two teams to sampling locations as dictated by scenario play. Each Field Team will collect two complete samples. Rad Health Field Team personnel will prepare sample media, survey forms, and chain of custody documents as if they were being transferred to the lab for analysis. Actual transport of samples will be simulated. Monitoring Team equipment will be evaluated the day before the exercise. Controller injects will be specifically prepared, as appropriate, to allow Field Teams to be evaluated.

**Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a)**

### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

A minimum of two field teams (made up of three people) will each pick up a minimum of two complete samples each consisting of an ambient radiation measurement and an air sample. Charcoal filter cartridges may simulate use of silver zeolite filter media. Simulated cartridges will be prepared for transportation to the Lab for analysis. Field data may be provided (OOS, if necessary) by Controllers to the Accident Assessment (Plume Tracking) Team to facilitate the accident assessment process during the exercise.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

## **EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information**

### **Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System**

#### **Intent**

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A of the RPM (July, 2015), Alert and Notification Systems.*

***Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)***

### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

Actions to demonstrate performance of initial notification of the public will be performed up to the point of actual transmission of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message. The EAS message will be prepared by the PIO in the SEOC and transmitted/encoded by ESF#2. The State Primary EAS Station will be contacted only once and notified that activations of the EAS System will be handled out of the SEOC. Actual activation of the Emergency Alert System will be simulated by SEOC staff.

Rockingham County Dispatch will demonstrate the actions necessary to perform the siren activation up to the point of actually sounding the sirens. Siren sounding will be simulated.

***Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)***

### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

This sub-element will be covered through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator by ESF#2 in the State EOC. No actual notification on the backup system will be conducted.

## **Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media**

### ***Intent***

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the “public inquiry hotline.”*

***Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)***

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

SEOC Joint Information Center: Rumors and trends generated as a result of public inquiry calls to the PSAP Public Information Line will be included in news briefings by the PIO. A “virtual” JIC may be opened and coordinated at HSEM’s SEOC. This “virtual” JIC will be connected to and directly communicate with the NPP’s JIC and partner states through electronic means. (If the NPP’s JIC is accessible to some individuals.)

SEOC: Simcell personnel will make calls simulating members of the public to the PSAP Public Information Line. This process will commence after the initial siren activation. Information on rumor trends recognized at the Public Information Line will be forwarded to the PIO at the SEOC.

E-911 PSAP Public Information Center: Staff assigned at PSAP will demonstrate the ability to handle inquiry calls. Handling at least two rumor trends will be demonstrated.

EPZ Towns: Simcell personnel will make at least one call to the local EOCs simulating members of the public with inquiries. Each local EOC will demonstrate the ability to properly handle these inquiries.

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner. This will NOT be subject to specific time requirements.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an “on the spot” re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

## EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities

### Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees

#### *Intent*

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.*

**Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)**

## New Hampshire Extent of Play

The Rochester Middle School Reception Center will be set up as a reception, monitoring/decontamination facility with capabilities demonstrated out-of-sequence. The facility will exhibit appropriate space and personnel for two (2) registration stations, one (1) special registration area, two (2) messaging and one (1) exiting station. Monitoring/decontamination activities will be established and demonstrated for at least eight (8) evacuees and two (2) emergency workers. Adequate space will be identified for evacuee's vehicles.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

### **Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment**

#### ***Intent***

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.*

***Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)***

### **New Hampshire Extent of Play**

Monitoring and Decontamination Stations will be set up and demonstrated at the Rochester Middle School Reception Center out-of-sequence. One (1) portal monitor will be demonstrated. A minimum of ten (10) individuals (eight (8) representing evacuees and two (2) representing emergency workers) will go through primary monitoring with controller injects establishing the number of individuals presenting themselves as contaminated and proceeding through secondary monitoring and decontamination. There will be a minimum of one female and one male. During these activities monitoring and decontamination equipment, instrumentation, record keeping and routing will be demonstrated appropriately. Monitoring procedures will be demonstrated on at least one (1) vehicle. Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview by the Evaluator.

**Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

### **Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals**

#### ***Intent***

*This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.*

***Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)***

**New Hampshire Extent of Play**

This sub-element will be demonstrated out of sequence at Wentworth-Douglass Hospital in Dover.

**MASSACHUSETTS**  
**EVALUATION AREAS AND EXTENT OF PLAY**

***Overview***

The following organizations/locations will demonstrate in 2016:

**State Emergency Operations Center**

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency  
Massachusetts Department of Public Health  
Massachusetts State Police  
MassDOT  
Massachusetts National Guard  
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health  
Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth  
American Red Cross  
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I  
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Liaison  
MASS 211 Call Center

**Region I Emergency Operations Center**

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency – Region I  
Massachusetts State Police – Troop A  
MassDOT  
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health  
American Red Cross  
Central Medical Emergency Direction (C-Med)  
Region I EOC Volunteer Staff  
RACES Volunteer Staff

**Emergency Operations Facility**

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency  
Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program  
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station

**Radiological Field Monitoring and Sampling Teams**

Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program  
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station

**Joint Information Center**

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency  
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station

**EAS Radio Station**

WBZ 1030 AM

**Risk Jurisdictions**

Amesbury EOC  
Merrimac EOC  
Newbury EOC  
Newburyport EOC  
Salisbury EOC  
West Newbury EOC

**The following demonstrations were conducted out of sequence between May 4 to 7, 2015:**

**School Superintendents (Initial call only during graded exercise):**

Amesbury School Superintendent  
Newburyport School Superintendent  
Pentucket School Superintendent  
Triton School Superintendent

**Schools (Note: \* Denotes KI participation): TBD**

**Amesbury:**

Amesbury Middle School \*

**Merrimac:**

Donoghue School\*

**Newbury:**

Triton Middle School\*

Triton High School\*

**Newburyport:**

Bresnahan School\*

Immaculate Conception School

**W. Newbury:**

Pentucket Regional Middle School\*

Pentucket Regional High School\*

**Day Cares (Note: \*Denotes KI participation): TBD**

**Amesbury:**

Leaps & Bounds Preschool

James Place – The Next Generation

**Special Facilities (Note: \*Denotes KI participation): TBD**

**Amesbury:**

Amesbury Residence

Merrimac Valley Health

**Newburyport:**

Country Rehab & Skilled Nursing\*

Opportunity Works\*

Atria Merrimack Place

Anna Jaques Hospital\*

**Salisbury:**

Assisted Living Center

**The following organizations/locations will be demonstrated in 2017:**

Masconomet Reception Center and RM&D (TBD)

*Per FEMA Region I Memorandum dated, August 4, 2010, "On the Spot" corrections as outlined in Recommendation Initiative 1.5 – Correct Issues Immediately is approved for the following criterion: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1, 5.b.1, 6.a.1, and 6.b.1.*

**EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management****Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate and staff emergency facilities.*

***Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; G.3.a; H.3, 4)***

***Extent of Play***

*Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival. Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the ICS, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.*

*Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This includes the staggered release of resources from an assembly area. Additionally, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.*

*The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.*

*Initial law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role of mutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAB scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

State EOC—Massachusetts Emergency Management (MEMA) SEOC emergency staff, including the Massachusetts Emergency Management Team staff (Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH), Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT), Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (MDMH), Massachusetts State Police (MSP), Massachusetts Army National Guard (MANG), and American Red Cross (ARC), the State Public Information Line (Mass 211) staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Liaison will be pre-staged at TBD in the SEOC cafeteria, and upon notification, will report to the EOC, using a ten-minute per hour travel time. The notification process will be completed, and call down rosters will be shown to the FEMA Evaluator.

The MASS 211 Call Center will be activated for an event at Seabrook Station.

Region I EOC—MEMA Region I EOC staff and emergency volunteer staff will pre-staged at TBD outside the Region I EOC, and upon notification, will report to the Region I EOC, using a ten-minute per hour travel time (note: MEMA Region I staff who report prior to TBD will report at their normal reporting time). The notification process will be completed and call down rosters will be shown to the FEMA Evaluator.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)—MEMA and MDPH personnel will be pre-staged in the area of the EOF, and upon notification, will report to the EOF one hour later.

Joint Information Center (JIC)—MEMA personnel will be pre-staged in the area of the JIC and upon notification, will report to the JIC one hour later.

NIAT Field Monitoring Team Personnel—Field Team personnel will be pre-staged at the Salisbury Fire Department and upon notification, will report to the EOF one hour later.

Local EOCs—Local EOC emergency response staff will be pre-staged at TBD outside the local EOC and upon notification, will report to the EOC, using a ten-minute per hour travel time.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 1.b – Facilities*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.*

***Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.  
(NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.3.a; H.3; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)***

***Extent of Play***

*Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every 8 years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternate and backup facilities). Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, access to backup power, and/or alternate facility, if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.*

*In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in respective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

There are no new or renovated facilities within the Seabrook Massachusetts EPZ. All facilities were evaluated in 2014.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.*

***Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)***

**Extent of Play**

*Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.*

*All activities must be performed based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

If a community is directed to evacuate, EOC personnel will demonstrate continuity of government through a discussion of logistics with the FEMA Evaluator. Closing of the local EOC and relocation will be simulated.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), Incident Command Posts and field monitoring teams.*

***Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)***

***Extent of Play***

*OROs must demonstrate that a primary system and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.*

*Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities, FMTs and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a communications system and use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Contact with locations not playing will be simulated.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an “on the spot” training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.*

***Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)***

**Extent of Play**

*A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged. For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriated equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs) must be available, or their availability described.*

*Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:*

***KI:*** *Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans/procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/procedures. The plans/procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.*

*ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.<sup>94</sup>*

***Dosimetry:*** *Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/ procedures.*

*Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans/ procedures.*

*Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage*

*problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.*

*Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.*

**Monitoring Instruments:** *All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.*

*For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/ exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans/ procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr.) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.*

*In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s). The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.*

**Mutual Aid Resources:** *If the incoming resources arrive with their own equipment (i.e., monitors and/ or dosimetry), they will be evaluated by REP Program standards. FEMA will not inventory equipment that is not part of the REP Program. If an agency has a defined role in the REP Plan, they are subject to the planning process and standards, as well as the guidance of this Manual.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of- Play Agreement.*

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Participating facilities will demonstrate that equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response. FEMA will provide copies of the Annual Letter of Certification to evaluators as documentation of quarterly inventory and operational checks.

### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**EVALUATION AREA 2: Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision-Making****Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.*

*Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans/procedures.*

***Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6.f; K.3.a; K.4)***

***Extent of Play***

*OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits based on their emergency plans/procedures.*

*Participating OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. This would include providing KI and dosimetry in a timely manner to emergency workers dispatched onsite to support plant incident assessment and mitigating actions, in accordance with respective plans/procedures.*

*As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers, based on the ORO's plan/ procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

***Massachusetts Extent of Play***

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided from the EOF.

MDPH Radiation Control Program EOF staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency**

**Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.*

*OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs from their plans/procedures or EPA's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of precautionary and/or protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.*

***Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3)***

**Extent of Play**

*During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan/procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided from the licensee as well as and field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.*

*The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.*

*When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions used, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Demonstration will be in accordance with the NIAT Handbook. The MDPH Dose Assessment Coordinator at the EOF will independently verify dose projections performed by the Utility.

The State EOC decision-making team will evaluate the protective action recommendations of the NIAT Accident Assessment Team and develop appropriate protective action decisions.

Protective action recommendations will be made in accordance with the MARERP and NIAT Handbook.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

***Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make precautionary and/or protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A-3; C-4, 6; D-4; J.9, 10.e, f, m)***

***Extent of Play***

*Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g. Incident Command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate precautionary and/or protective action decision may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g. an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.*

*ORO must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g. mutual aid) necessary to implement a precautionary and/or protective action decision if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are used to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.*

*Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.*

*If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.*

*If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate precautionary and/or protective action decisions with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/ communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to the affected locations.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided by the EOF. MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze the Utility, field monitoring and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 2.c – Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs**

**Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.*

***Criterion 2.c.1: Precautionary and/or Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)***

**Extent of Play**

*Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/ communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.*

*Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.*

*The OROs must demonstrate how the decision-making process takes those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.*

*In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, enroute to school, or at school).*

*Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate hospitals in the EPZ that need to evacuate, or the facilities that are receiving these evacuees, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry to these hospitals/facilities. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.*

*All activities associated must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Protective action decisions, including those for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided by MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff at the EOF. MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze Utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protection action decisions.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate protective action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway. During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the accident and, depending on the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.*

***Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)***

**Extent of Play**

*Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans/ procedures. Often OROs initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's Emergency Classification Levels (ECL). Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and to use protected water supplies.*

*The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The ORO's assessment should include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider the use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plan/procedures. The plans/ procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance. Timely and appropriate recommendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.*

*The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring and local OROs. These decisions include tracking agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ. Demonstration of plans and procedures which use traffic access control points to track agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ may be conducted through interview. OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

***Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Re-entry, and Return***

***Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to make decisions on post-plume relocation, re-entry, and return of the general public. These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant.*

***Criterion 2.e.1: Timely post-plume phase relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)***

***Extent of Play***

***Relocation:*** *OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PAGs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and analyses of vegetation and soil field samples.*

***Re-entry:*** *Decisions must be made on the location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.*

*Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding the individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also included monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.*

*Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions. They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone(s). The extent that OROs need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by scenario events.*

**Return:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base their decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit the cancellation of the Emergency Classification Level and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation****Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.*

***Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.3.a, b; K.4)***

**Extent of Play**

*OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities contained in the ORO's plans/procedures.*

*Each emergency worker must have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.*

*During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans/procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans/procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or to take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two emergency workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.*

*Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases, adequate control of exposure can be affected achieved for all team members using one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate fixed facilities, (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories)*

*may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.*

*OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., lifesaving, protection of valuable property, all activities). ORO must ensure that the process used to seek authorizations for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where lifesaving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.*

*OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with an evaluator.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

#### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

EPZ EOCs: Dosimetry packets will be issued to two emergency workers in each EPZ EOC. Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Empty KI tablet containers (small zip-lock bags) will be included in the dosimetry packets for emergency workers. Knowledge of the use of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated through an interview of these two individuals by the FEMA Evaluator.

#### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an “on the spot” training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

***Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public******Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to provide KI institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans/procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected in ORO's plans/procedures. Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of KI.*

***Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J. 10.e, f)***

***Extent of Play***

*Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plans/procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.*

*If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans/procedures.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Schools, day cares, and special facility staff who administer KI will be interviewed out-of-sequence by the FEMA Evaluator. The FEMA Evaluator will check the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of KI distribution.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**Sub-element 3.c—Implementation of Precautionary and/or Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs**

***Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.*

***Criterion 3.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)***

***Extent of Play***

*Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed day cares, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired and transportation dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs in accordance with plans/procedures.*

*Contact with persons with disabilities and access/functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actually contacted, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.*

*Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate hospitals in the EPZ that need to evacuate, or the facilities that are receiving these evacuees, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry to these hospitals/facilities. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

**Region I:** Initial calls to Transportation Providers will be made to verify telephone number and contact person. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used to determine transportation requirements. No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized. A list of the Transportation Providers from the Resource Manual will be provided to the FEMA Evaluator.

Region I Special Needs Coordinator and staff will demonstrate all appropriate communications with EPZ community EOC staff and coordination of bed space assignment for evacuating nursing home patients and hospital patients, although actual evacuation of special facilities will not occur. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used.

**EPZ EOCs:** All special facilities will receive initial contact only to verify attendance (to be logged for comparison to default number). Default numbers will be used from the Resource Manual for exercise play. Follow-up calls will be **simulated** and logged. Participating special facilities will be interviewed **out of sequence** by a FEMA Evaluator.

Local Transportation Coordinators will report to Region I the number of additional beds needed to accommodate patients from each participating facility that may be directed to evacuate; however, no patients will actually be moved or be impacted in any way. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used to determine number of beds needed.

The list of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs will be shown to the FEMA evaluator; however, the information is confidential and copies will not be provided to the evaluator. All calls will be **simulated** and logged. If the list has a request for TTY notification, then the TTY will be demonstrated by contacting the Region I EOC, who will simulate making the TTY notification for the community.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

***Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement precautionary/protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)***

***Extent of Play***

*School systems/districts (these include public and private schools, kindergartens, and preschools) must demonstrate the ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: Each school system/district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system/district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.*

*If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans/procedures, must be verified.*

*Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.*

*If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview pursuant to the ORO's plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.*

*Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

## Massachusetts Extent of Play

**Region I EOC:** The MEMA Region I Special Needs Coordinator, in an interview with the FEMA Evaluator, will provide a list of schools located outside the EPZ with students who reside within the EPZ. Calls to schools outside the EPZ will be **simulated** and logged.

**EPZ EOCs:** Initial notification will be made to all school superintendents who will contact each school and day care per procedure to obtain attendance (information to be logged for comparison to default numbers). Default numbers for the Resource Manual will be used for exercise play. Follow-up calls will be **simulated** and logged.

### **School Superintendents:**

Amesbury School Superintendent  
Newburyport School Superintendent  
Pentucket School Superintendent  
Triton School Superintendent

**Schools:** Participating facilities were visited **out of sequence** by a FEMA Evaluator in 2015, who interviewed key players (and if the site's plan calls for KI, responsible staff). See page 2 of Extent of Play for list

**Day Care Centers:** Participating facilities were visited **out of sequence** by a FEMA Evaluator, who interviewed key players (and if the site's plan calls for KI, responsible staff). See page 2 of Extent of Play for list.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement protective action plans/procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.*

***Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)***

***Extent of Play***

*OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and protective action decisions (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.*

*Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the extent of play agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent of play agreement.*

*In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon by the extent of play agreement.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

**EPZ EOCs:** EOCs will demonstrate the ability to direct and monitor traffic control operations within their jurisdictions through discussions with the evaluator. The local EOC highway and/or Law Enforcement representative will participate in a discussion of procedures and resources available for traffic control. No personnel or equipment will be deployed to field locations.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an “on the spot” training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)**

**Extent of Play**

*OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuations. In demonstrating this capability, the impediment must remain in place during the evacuation long enough that re-routing of traffic is required and must also result in demonstration of decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees. When, due to specifics of the scenario or jurisdiction, the impediment cannot be located on an evacuation route, it must be located so as to impact the evacuation. When not possible, actual dispatch of resources need not be physically demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Each EPZ Local EOC will demonstrate rerouting of traffic following a traffic impediment through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator. No personnel or equipment will be dispatched to the simulated accident scene. If an impediment is likely to cause lengthy rerouting of traffic along the evacuation route, the Local EOC will communicate this information to MEMA Region I in order for this information to be passed to the JIC. MA will demonstrate only one Local EOC will demonstrate the coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an “on the spot” training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions****Intent**

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion pathway EPZ (i.e., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the nuclear power plant). This sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions.*

***Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.11)***

**Extent of Play**

*Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ. OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA): N/A**

***Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1; J.9, 11)***

**Extent of Play**

*OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.*

*OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

***Sub-element 3.f – Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions******Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for post-plume phase relocation, re-entry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential for protecting the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a commercial nuclear power plant.*

***Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry, relocation, and return of individuals during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.7; J.10.j; J.12; K.5.b; M.1, 3)***

***Extent of Play***

***Relocation:*** OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in area(s) that have residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of procedures for relocation, and the notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

***Re-entry:*** OROs must demonstrate the capability to control re-entry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily re-enter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s), location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry; and (8) maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

***Return:*** OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

*Communications among OROs for relocation, re-entry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.*

*ORO's should use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), as necessary, if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement And Analysis****Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use field monitoring teams within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.*

***Criterion 4.a.1: Reserved***

***Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)***

***Extent of Play***

*Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to brief field monitoring teams on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the field team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with field monitoring teams and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.*

*Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.*

*If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by OROs monitoring teams. If the licensee field monitoring teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field monitoring teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential.*

*ORO's will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

NIAT Field Teams are managed by the Field Team Coordinator who is located at the utility EOF. He/she will brief and in conjunction with the utility and other state agencies, dispatch two teams to sampling locations in accordance with the NIAT Handbook, Section D.4, as dictated by scenario play. NIAT Field Team personnel will prepare one sample media and the report survey results on the appropriate survey forms to the Field Team Coordinator.

***Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I. 8, 9; J.10.a)***

***Extent of Play***

*Two or more field monitoring teams must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. Field monitoring teams must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.*

*OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.*

*OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Two MA NIAT Field Teams will be dispatched from the Salisbury Fire Department (10 minutes to an hour) in accordance with the NIAT Handbook. Once, dispatched, only disposable gloves will be used for actual exercise play. Charcoal cartridges will be used instead of silver zeolite.

The NIAT Field Teams will collect one complete sample (monitoring and air sample) as specified by the procedures in Section D.4 of the NIAT Handbook.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an “on the spot” training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

***Sub-element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling******Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs should have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, re-entry and return decisions. This sub-element focuses on the collecting environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protection of the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.*

***Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 C.1; I.8; J.11)***

***Extent of Play***

*The ORO's field monitoring teams must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.*

*The field monitoring teams and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.*

*ORO's will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision-making.*

***Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)***

***Extent of Play***

*The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.*

*The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as anticipated by the ORO's plans/procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans/procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.*

*The laboratory staff must be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.*

*OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not demonstrated during this exercise

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information**

**Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System**

**Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A of the REP manual, Alert and Notification Systems.

*Exhibit III-4: Evaluation Standards for Alert and Notification Systems*

<b>Demonstration Criteria:</b>	<b>In a Timely Manner</b>	<b>Within 45 Minutes</b>	<b>Within a Reasonable Time</b>
<b>Primary Alert and Notification</b>			
5.a.1: ...covering essentially 100% of the 10-mile EPZ	x		
5.a.4: ...for FEMA-approved exception areas		x	
<b>Backup Alert and Notification for All Incidents</b>			
5.a.3: ...covering the 10-mile EPZ			x

**Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6,7)**

**Extent of Play**

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert/notification and disseminate the information/instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as “with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.” If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is *not* required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

- Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;
- Identification of the commercial Nuclear Power Plant and a statement that an emergency exists there;
- Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and
- A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected populations stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

*If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the OROs plans/procedures and the extent of play agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.*

*ORO's must demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans/procedures as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.*

*All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

The sounding of the sirens and broadcast of EAS/News Releases will be **simulated**. EAS/News Releases will be formulated and distributed by the Massachusetts State EOC. Activation of the EAS system will be coordinated with New Hampshire officials. Actions to demonstrate performance of initial notification of the public will be performed up to the point of actual transmission of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message. The EAS message will be prepared/ encoded by MEMA. EAS radio station WBZ (1030 AM) will be initially contacted and faxed a copy of a standard test message. The EAS stations will return the fax to the Public Affairs Officer to ensure receipt of fax. **Broadcast of EAS messages/News Releases will be simulated.**

### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

*Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]*

*Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)*

### ***Extent of Play***

*If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility. Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first. The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.*

*Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include: (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant; and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.*

*When backup route alerting is demonstrated, **only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated**. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.*

*ORO's may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.*

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Code Red is the backup notification system for Seabrook Station EPZ. It will not be used unless the primary alert and notification system has failed. If used, Code Red will only be sent to test recipients to simulate the notification of the general population in the EPZ.

### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

***Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA- approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E. 6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)***

### ***Extent of Play***

*Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5 to 10 miles from the nuclear power plant must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas within 45 minutes once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.*

*For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by air/water craft, actual routes will be negotiated in the extent of play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.*

*All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This criterion is not required by the Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

***Sub-element 5.b – Subsequent Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media******Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires that OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system should be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the public inquiry hotline.*

***Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)***

***Extent of Play***

*The responsible ORO personnel/representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as “with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.” If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.*

***Message elements:*** *The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.*

*The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. Information about any rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments should also be included. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans/procedures.*

*ORO must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans/procedures.*

*If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO’s plans/procedures.*

**Media information:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

**Public inquiry:** OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

**HAB considerations:** The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated/ communicated with appropriate security authorities, e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies, in accordance with ORO plans/procedures.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.

### Massachusetts Extent of Play

**Joint Information Center:** Information generated as a result of incoming calls to the SEOC Public Information Line/MASS 211 Call Center will be included in news briefings. At least two rumor trends will be handled.

**State EOC:** Control cell personnel will make calls simulating members of the public. The MASS 211 Call Center will demonstrate the ability to handle public inquiry calls. Handling at least two rumor trends (three or more calls of the same nature) will be demonstrated. Two MASS 211 public information line operators each will respond to calls once the Public Alert and Notification System has been activated at Site Area Emergency or General Emergency at the State EOC.

**EPZ Towns:** Control cell personnel will make calls to the local EOCs simulating members of the public. Each local EOC will demonstrate the community's emergency response and refer all other questions to MASS 211 Call Center.

### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities****Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration of Evacuees*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.*

***Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)***

***Extent of Play***

*Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent of play agreement. OROs conducting this demonstration must have 1/3 of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams/instrumentation/portal monitors) available at the facility(ies) as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans/procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.*

*Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six individuals per monitoring station must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans/procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met.*

*ORO must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders or written records are all acceptable means for registration.*

*Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

*Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.*

*Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level or have been placed in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.*

*In accordance with plans/procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.*

*However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.*

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an “on the spot” training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

***Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles***

***Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.*

***Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)***

***Extent of Play***

*The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans/procedures.*

*Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles, based on trigger/action levels and procedures stated in the OROs plans/procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of 2 emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.*

*The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.*

*Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.*

*OROs must demonstrate the capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the emergency worker's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.*

*Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any*

*emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.*

*Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.*

*All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

### **Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

**Note:** If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

**Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host/support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.*

***Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)***

***Extent of Play***

*The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.*

*For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host/support jurisdictions based on their all-hazard sheltering experience and what is historically relevant for that particular area. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.*

*Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.*

*Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animal and vehicles, where applicable, have been placed in a secured area or monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level.*

*In accordance with plans/procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.*

*However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area until they can be monitored or decontaminated (if applicable) and do need confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.*

*If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.*

*All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

**Massachusetts Extent of Play**

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

***Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals******Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.*

***Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)***

***Extent of Play***

*Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim. FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, offsite medical services drills need only be evaluated biennially.*

*Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to monitor/decontaminate and transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.*

*An ambulance must be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the point of departure for the medical facility and then have a non-specialized vehicle transport the "victim(s)" to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interests of the community.*

*Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.*

*Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or enroute, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Contaminated injured individuals transported to medical facilities are monitored as soon as possible to assure that everyone (ambulance and medical facility) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the individual(s). However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the medical facility, then the ambulance crew presumes that the patient(s) is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination controls until the patient(s) is monitored. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.*

*The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Medical facilities are expected to have at least one trained physician and one trained nurse to perform and supervise treatment of contaminated injured individuals. Equipment and supplies must be available for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals.*

*The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements*

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*and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans/procedures.*

*All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.*

### **Massachusetts Extent of Play**

Saints Medical Center will be demonstrated out of sequence

**Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): N/A**

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STATE OF MAINE's EOP

SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
EXERCISE INTREPID  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE  
APRIL 2016

**EXTENT OF PLAY FOR THE STATE OF MAINE**

STATES' EVALUATION AREAS  
AND  
EXTENT OF PLAY  
FOR THE  
SEABROOK EXERCISE  
APRIL 5, 2016

*Based on guidance from Section III.B-Evaluation Areas, Radiological  
Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual", July, 2015.*

**EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management****Sub-element 1.a—Mobilization*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.*

**Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.A, e; A.3,4; C.1,4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2;G.3.a; H.3, 4)**

***Assessment/ Extent of Play***

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, out-of-sequence evaluation or by means of drills conducted at any time.

*Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty Four hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival. Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the ICS, must be completed in accordance with ORO plan/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.*

*Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This includes the staggered release of resources from an assembly area. Additionally, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the extent of play agreement.*

*The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.*

**Maine Extent of Play**

Rosters for 2<sup>nd</sup> shift personnel will be available for all facilities/locations staffed on a 24 hour basis.

State EOC: Emergency staff will not pre-positioned in the SEOC as this is a normal working day staff will be assigned as needed based on the escalating event.

Operations/Communications staff will alert the State ERT based on existing plans.

**Sub-element 1.b —Facilities*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have facilities to support the emergency response.*

**Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, G.3.a; H.3; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)**

***Assessment/Extent of Play***

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, SAVs, or by out-of-sequence demonstration.

*Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every 8 years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations. (this includes all alternate and backup facilities). Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.*

*In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in respective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct affect or impact on emergency response operations performed I those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.*

*Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.*

**Maine Extent of Play**

SEOC will be evaluated as this is the beginning of a new evaluation cycle for the Seabrook NPP IPZ.

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Sub-element 1.c—Direction and Control
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***Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.*

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**Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A,3; C.4,6)**

***Assessment/Extent of Play***

Assessment of this demonstration may be accomplished in a biennial or tabletop exercise. Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g. keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/ supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs be on the OROs mobilization list so they may contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities associated with direction and control must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

**Maine Extent of Play**

SEOC will abide as stated in criterion.

### Sub-element 1.d—Communications Equipment

#### *Intent*

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts and FMTs.*

**Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1 , F.1, 2)**

#### *Assessment/Extent of Play*

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished initially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstrated as applicable in biennial or tabletop exercise, or if their use would be required would be required, during an actual event.

ORO must demonstrate that a primary system, and at least one backup system for fixed facilities is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis, if a communication system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and FMTs and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

#### **Maine Extent of Play**

SEOC will demonstrate its ability to contact York County, State of New Hampshire and FEMA via at least two methods of communications.

**NOTE:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant. After an "on the spot" re-training by the State, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

**Sub-element 1.e—Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations****Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, which requires that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

**Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1, H.7,10; I.7, 8, 9;J.10.a, b, e; J.10,a,b,c; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)**

**Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished primarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequent periodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged. For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed appropriate equipment (e.g. vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows;

**KI:** Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by; (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plan/procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g. civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/procedures. The plans/procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage location(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated of KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopeia standards.

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**Dosimetry:** Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue and bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/procedures).

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the OROs plans/procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CDV-138s) (0-200mR), due to their documented history of leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced as necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV. Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the Manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

**Monitoring Instruments:** All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacture's recommendations must be calibrated annually, Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans/procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr.) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for high range instrument, a procedures must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high range can make useful readings. In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s). The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the *Contamination Monitoring Standard for a portal monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995)* or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

**Mutual Aid Resources:** If the incoming resources arrive with their own equipment (i.e. monitors and/or dosimetry), they will be evaluated by REP Program Standards. FEMA will not inventory equipment that is not part of the REP Program. If an agency has a defined role in the REP Plan, they are subject to the planning process and standards, as well as the guidance of this Manual.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent- of- Play-Agreement.

**Maine Extent of Play****SEOC**

MEMA will discuss with the evaluator the methods by which KI and dosimetry is provided to the area(s) in Maine that may require it. MEMA will show that adequate supplies of KI and dosimetry are available to traffic control workers..

**NOTE:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant. After an “on the spot” re-training by the State, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

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**EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-making****Sub-element 2.a—Emergency Worker Exposure Control****Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/ procedures to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration TEDE or organ-specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans/ procedures.

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**Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; f; K.3.a; K.4.)**

**Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this criterion must be assessed concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

ORO's authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits based on their emergency plans/procedures.

Participating OROs must also demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. This would include providing KI and dosimetry in a timely manner to emergency workers dispatched onsite to support plant incident assessment and mitigating actions, in accordance with respective plans/procedures.

As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI, as a protective measure for emergency workers, based on their plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAGs for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

**Maine Extent of Play**

There will be no exceptions to this sub-element in the Maine Extent of Play.

**Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency*****Intent***

*This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs. OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. Such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of precautionary and/or protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g. other affected OROs and incident command). Availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.*

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**Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 & Supplement 3)**

***Assessment/Extent of Play***

Assessment of this Demonstration criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan/procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee. The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAGs to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10 the ORO and licensee must determine the source difference by discussing input data and assumptions, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

**Maine Extent of Play**

Not applicable to Maine

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Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.10, e, f; m)

### **Assessment /Extent of Play**

Assessment of this demonstration must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based upon information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), an PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate precautionary and/or protective action decision may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a precautionary and/or protective action decision if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are used to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based upon the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors. If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the OROs plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff. If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate precautionary and/or protective action decisions with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the OROs plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. Decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

#### **Maine Extent of Play**

This criterion not applicable to Maine

**Sub-element 2.c—Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions Considerations for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs****Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering and use of (KI), if applicable, for group of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be affected by affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

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**Criterion 2.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs . (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9, J.10.d, e)**

**Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with the incident command, In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual.

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public schools systems/districts during the exercise.

The OROs must demonstrate how the decision-making process takes those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decision on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for the ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

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Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate hospitals in the EPZ that need to evacuate, or the facilities that are receiving these evacuees, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry to these hospitals/facilities. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP Program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

### **Maine Extent of Play**

SEOC

There will be no exceptions to this sub-element in the Maine extent of play.

#### **Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway**

##### **INTENT**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate PADs decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway.

During an accident at a NPP, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the incident, and depending on the nature of the release could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

**Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)**

##### **ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

ORO's are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans/procedures. Often ORO's initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's ECLs. Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and use protected water supplies.

The OROs must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The OROs assessment must include evaluation of the radiological analysis of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider use of agricultural and watershed data within 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the OROs plans/procedures. The plans/procedures contain PAGs on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. We expect that the ORO will take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans and procedures. Often such precautionary actions are initiated by the OROs based on criteria related to the facility's emergency classification levels (ECL). Such action may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and to use protected water supplies.

The ORO should use its procedures (for example, development of a sampling plan) to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies. The ORO assessment should include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs should consider the use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water should then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. The plans/ procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance. Timely and appropriate recommendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information available. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring OROs. These decisions include tracking agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ. Demonstration of plans and procedures which use traffic access control points to track agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ may be conducted through interview.

ORO's will use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other sources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other participating resources.

**All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.**

**MAINE EXTENT OF PLAY:**  
SEOC

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## Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase, Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

### INTENT

The sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to make decisions on post-plume phase relocation, re-entry, and return of the general public. These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at a NPP.

**Criterion 2.e.1: Timely post-plume phase relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)**

### ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

**Relocation:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. OROs will make decisions are for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and analysis of vegetation and soil samples.

**Re-entry:** Decisions must be made on location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding an individual's objectives and locations expected to be visited, and associated time frames; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also include monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment, the implementation decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimeters and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions.

They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for the farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or to retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone(s). The extent to which OROs need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by scenario events.,

**Return:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and business on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision making include conditions that permit the cancellation of the ECL and relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration, Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

**All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.**

#### **MEMA EXTENT OF PLAY:**

SEOC – Members of the ERT will demonstrate the ability through discussion to evaluate which course of action is most appropriate for the known conditions.

<b>Sub-element 3.a—Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control</b>
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#### **Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent record dosimeters; reading of direct-reading dosimeters by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of PAGs, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the ALARA, “as low as is reasonably achievable principle as appropriate”.

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**Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/ Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of the Administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.3.a, b, K.4)**

#### **ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency,

ORO must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimetry chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities contained in the OROs plans/procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just in time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans/procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans/procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g. written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g. EOCs, communication center within the EPZ, reception centers, counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimeters (i.e. direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his/or her own permanent record dosimetry.

Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their mission.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., lifesaving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where lifesaving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency Workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

### **MEMA Extent of Play**

The Maine Radiological Program will provide 1 Sample Field Team to conduct joint operations with NH sampling teams. This team will not be evaluated but use this as a training exercise.

Traffic Control Points – Maine State Police and others will be available in the SEOC to discuss the Traffic Control Plan and how it would be implemented.

**NOTE:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant. After an “on the spot” re-training by the State, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

### **Sub-element 3.b—Implementation of KI Decision**

#### **Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan/ procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option, and must be reflected as such in ORO plans/procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution KI.

**Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e.f)**

#### **Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan/procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on the using KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans/procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the ingestion of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

### **MEMA Extent of Play**

#### **SEOC through MEMA**

The evaluator will check the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of KI distribution, to include forms and equipment to be used.

<b>Sub-element 3.c—Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations</b>
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#### **Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access /functional needs that are or (potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

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**Criterion 3.c.1: Precautionary and/or Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than school within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)**

#### **Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time,

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Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (e.g., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions) to persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed day cares nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility-impaired individuals, transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs in accordance with plans/procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access/functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actual contacted, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate hospitals in the EPZ that need to evacuate, or the facilities that are receiving these evacuees nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry to these hospitals/facilities. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent-of-play agreement.

### **MEMA Extent of Play**

This will be demonstrated at York County through their functional needs registry (See York County extent of play for more information)

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### **Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement Precautionary and/or protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)**

#### **Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

School systems/districts (these include public and private schools, kindergartens, and preschools) must demonstrate the ability to implement precautionary and/or protective actions decisions for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: Each school system/district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system/district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus drivers escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan/procedures, must be verified.

If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview pursuant to the OROs plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement. Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

Additionally hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP Program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

### **MEMA Extent of Play**

N/A - Maine has no schools within the EPZ.

#### **Sub-element 3.d—Implementation of Traffic and Access Control**

##### **Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans/procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

**Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)**

##### **Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit or by means of drills conducted at anytime

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g. evacuating, Sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency workers and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent-of-Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies that have the needed authority as agreed upon in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated in the Extent-of- play agreement.

**MEMA Extent of Play**

N/A in Ingestion Pathway Exercise

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**Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)**

**Assessment/ Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

ORO's must demonstrate the capability, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. In demonstrating this capability, the impediment must remain in place during the evacuation long enough that re-routing of traffic is required and must also result in demonstration of decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate to evacuees

When due to specifics of the scenario or jurisdiction, the impediment cannot be located on an evacuation route, it must be located so as to impact the evacuation. When not possible, actual dispatch of resources need not be physically demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated in the Extent- of-Play Agreement.

**MEMA Extent of Play**

Evaluator will conduct a discussion with appropriate official in York County should an impediment occur at a major roundabout or intersection in York County or at traffic caused by cross border actions.

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## EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

### Sub-element 3.e– Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

#### INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current FDA guidance, for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ planning zone (IPZ), (e.g., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP). This Sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions.

**Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J. 11)**

#### ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and utilize current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ.

ORO's use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources, (e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

#### MEMA EXTENT OF PLAY:

**No Exception**

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## EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

### Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

#### INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current FDA guidance, for the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone (IPZ), the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP. This sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1; J.9, 11.)

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## ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion This includes either pre-distributed public information material in the Ingestion Pathway Zone or the capability for rapid distribution of appropriate camera-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play should include demonstration of communications and coordination between organizations to implement protective actions. Actual field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the IPZ should be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

**All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.**

SEOC EXTENT OF PLAY: This will be a discussion based evaluation in the SEOC regarding plans and means of contact with the various agricultural and fisheries producers and processors.

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## EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

### Sub-element 3.f. – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1., 3.)

#### INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for relocation, re-entry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a commercial nuclear power plant.

#### ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial, or a tabletop exercise, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

**Relocation:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals, located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in area(s) that has residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and fifty-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of the procedures for relocation, and the notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their Homes, due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate term housing for relocated persons.

**Re-entry:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to control re-entry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily re-enter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside of the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

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Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading dosimeters for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker; dosimeters; (8) maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

**Return:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools. Communications among OROs for relocation, reentry and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

**All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.**

**MEMA EXTENT OF PLAY:**

**Command staff will conduct discussions on implementation of plan.  
SEOC may have discussion with York County EMA on implementation of decision.**

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## **EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement and Analysis**

<b>Sub-element 4.a—Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses</b>
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### **Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that offsite response organizations (ORO) should have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume emergency planning zone to measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to detect radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume.

In the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in order to help characterize any radiological release. This does not imply that plume exposure projections should be made from the field data. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

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**Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)**

### **Extent of Play**

Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans and procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 R/hr) and for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

## **MEMA Extent of Play**

N/A to Maine

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**Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)**

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### **Extent of Play**

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated.

ORO's should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FREPP), and other resources (e.g., compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

### **MEMA Extent of Play**

N/A to Maine

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**Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I. 9)**

#### ***Extent of Play***

*Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.*

*OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., compacts, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.*

*All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.*

## **MEMA Extent of Play**

N/A to Maine

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### **Sub-element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS**

#### **INTENT**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, re-entry and return decisions. This sub-element focuses on the collecting of environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protecting the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

**Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; I.8; J.11.)**

#### ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY

Assessment of the Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The ORO FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

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OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources, participating in the exercise.

All activities must be must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play-Agreement.

**MEMA EXTENT OF PLAY:**

**Only one team will participate. They will conduct joint operations with NH Rad Health as a training event but will not be evaluated.**

**Maine's Radiological Control Program will have rosters available, if needed, to show they have the ability to have two or more sampling teams available.**

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## EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

### Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operation

#### INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision-making.

**Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)**

### ASSESSMENT/EXTENT OF PLAY

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial, tabletop exercise, or an actual event. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide upon request, timely analyses of media, as requested of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as anticipated by the ORO's plans/procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans/procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g. transuranic or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

**OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g. compacts, the licensee or nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.**

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

#### MEMA REGION EXTENT OF PLAY:

Laboratory will not be exercised during this exercise.

## **EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification & Public Information**

### **Sub-element 5.a—Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System**

#### ***Intent***

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A of this manual, Alert and Notification Systems.

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

#### **Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system. OROs must complete system activation for primary alert/notification and disseminate the information/instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as “with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.” If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not required. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed.

Evaluations of EAS broadcasts stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system. Including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements;

- Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message.
- Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;
- Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and

- A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the OROs plan/procedures and the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along route(s) must be simulated (that is the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

All activities must be based on their OROs plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

**MEMA Extent of Play**

N/A for Maine

***Sub-element 5.b—Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media***

**Intent**

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions including any recommended protective actions to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires that OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the “public inquiry hotline.”

**Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c)**

**Assessment/Extent of Play**

Assessment of the Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise or drills.

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The responsible ORO personnel/representatives must demonstrate actions to disseminate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as “with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.” If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

**Message Elements:** The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception centers locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools, and persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, and public inquiry hotline number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified. The OROs should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. Information about any rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments should also be included. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans/procedures.

ORO must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans/procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.

**Media Information:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and press releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media.

**Public Inquiry:** OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

**HAB Considerations:** The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorists) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated/communicated with appropriate security authorities, e.g., law enforcement, and NPP security agencies, in accordance with ORO plans/procedures

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

### **MEMA Extent of Play**

**Joint Information Center (JIC):** Information generated as a result of incoming calls to the JIC Public Information Line phones will be included in news briefings. Rumor trends will be identified and properly handled.

During this time the JIC will generate 1 press release along with 2 public information bulletins.

**State EOC:** There will be one news briefing available during the exercise if FEMA evaluator would like this demonstrated.

**NOTE:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant. After an "on the spot" re-training by the State, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

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## APPENDIX D: BEST PRACTICES

### 1. Demonstrated Strengths

#### 4.0 New Hampshire

##### 4.1 SEOC

- The New Hampshire (NH) State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) decision making staff was very proactive in looking ahead toward the following 24-hour operations period and beyond. The SEOC decision making staff had discussions with NH State Environmental Services staff concerning municipal water supplies for the affected areas and neighboring areas.
- The NH SEOC staff were alerted of two real world events in two Emergency Planning Zone Communities and notified FEMA staff that there may be a delay in staffing and/or opening the communities' respective Emergency Operation Centers. Kudos to those involved for handling both real world events and exercise play with no negative impact.
- All present at the NH SEOC displayed excellent commitment to tasks at hand. All the while leaning forward for any anticipated protective action recommendations and/or protective action decisions.

##### 4.2 IFO Portsmouth

- The State of New Hampshire IFO staff continued to remain engaged with local Governments through relaying timely information, monitoring of WEBEOC for accuracy, and notifying local Governments when information needed corrected or clarified. IFO staff is well trained and has developed an obviously trustworthy and long standing rapport with local Governments.
- The Radiological Officer representing the New Hampshire State Police, Troop A, demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of his duties through a detailed radiological briefing, issuing of dosimetry, awareness of exposure limits, and dispatching of law enforcement personnel during the implementation of Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control evaluation at the Incident Field Office (IFO). The State Police Sergeant exemplified a commitment in protecting EWs by applying leadership traits, knowledge of radiation hazards, and implementing regimented radiological briefing procedures.

##### 4.3 FMT #1

- On April 4th, 2016 NH Field Monitoring Team 1 (FMT-1) exhibited adherence to observing procedural protocol. This was observed while FMT-1 inventoried and function checked field supplies and equipment. FMT-1 consistently followed Chapter 2 "Pre-departure" of the DPHS field team manual instructions having one individual directly read from the manual with the two other individuals assisting in actually finding every item on the inventory and performing

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equipment function checks. It was observed that this evolution was a real team effort.

- On April 5th, 2016 FMT-1 noticed that their air sampling unit's battery had failed midway through pulling a background air sample. The team quickly and smoothly adjusted to the situation and used the air sampling unit's back-up system (car charger) in order to obtain the sample. FMT-1 also indicated that they could use an inverter or another AC power source to power the unit. This was a clear demonstration of knowledge of equipment limitations and capabilities.

#### 4.4 FMT #2

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.5 JIC

- Kudos for having realistic media present. Excellent, hard questions provided a realistic environment and tested the JIC Team.

#### 4.6 State Police Warning

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.7 Rockingham Dispatch

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.8 Seabrook EOC

- The Radiological Officer for the Town of Seabrook did an excellent job briefing emergency workers on their dosimetry and KI. There were questions that came up during the exercise on use of the dosimetry and KI, and questions on radiation in general. The Radiological Officer addressed these questions in a professional manner that was easy to understand.
- The Seabrook EMD demonstrated good leadership and was experienced at working through the problems which came his way during the exercise. I was also impressed that the selectmen, selectwomen and town manager participated throughout the exercise, making citizen safety a priority.
- Overall, the town of Seabrook EOC staff coordinated emergency response activities efficiently and effectively. Communications between each agency and their ability to plan ahead utilizing their checklist were commendable.

#### 4.9 Brentwood EOC

- Brentwood Town Selectmen, Police Chief and Fire Chief participated in the EOC throughout the exercise. Their responses in accomplishing their respective duties and relationship with the EMD demonstrated mutual trust and respect. All updated emergency information was relayed immediately upon receipt. Agency responses were discussed thoroughly among the group and decisions were based on which actions resulted in the highest level of safety for their emergency workers and public. The EMD's vast experience showed in his calm leadership ensuring total cooperation from every responding agency even while sending key staff to respond to two (2) "real life emergencies".
- The RADEF Officer was well prepared with Dosimetry/KI kits ready for distribution after each emergency worker watched a Radiological/KI briefing

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played on a computer CD. He utilized laminated poster-sized copies of the Dosimetry-KI Report Form to enhance the personal dosimetry information he provided each worker. His briefings were effective and enabled a better understanding of RADEF instructions by the entire EOC staff.

4.10 East Kingston

- Used exercise to train less experienced EOC staff.
- Experienced EOC staff anticipated needs of others and mentored them.
- An upbeat group with a good sense of humor.

4.11 Exeter EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

4.12 Greenland EOC

- The EOC personnel were knowledgeable, followed their procedures and demonstrated good team work. When issues were identified they moved rapidly and effectively to resolve them.

4.13 Hampton EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

4.14 Hampton Falls EOC

- The Hampton Falls EOC uses the IamResponding.com system for notifying EOC member in the event of an activation. The Emergency Management Director was able to fully initiate his call out procedures to all staff in only 45 seconds after receiving the notice of the Alert ECL from Seabrook Station.
- The facility was improved. The use of a 75" flat screen LCD display at the front of the EOC and two smaller LCD displays at the rear of the EOC enabled widespread view ability to all of the EOC staff (including the radio room) for the WebEOC updates and situational Awareness products. The EOC staff make comment that this was a dramatic improvement to the EOC and their ability to see and know what was transpiring on the event.
- The leadership at the Hampton Falls EOC was exceptional. The Emergency Management Director (EMD) had this down to a science. Briefings were concise, detailed, factual, and used the round robin approach. His presence and use of humor carried a lot into the workings of the EOC. Everything was shared with the whole EOC. This was one of the best run EOC's that the evaluator has seen in the REP Program.
- The Hampton Falls EOC has an exceptional focus for Public information. They not only supply information to the State for the JIC but they also have an intense focus on informing their citizens. The Emergency Management Director posted critical information to Hampton Falls Website, Facebook page and Twitter account. This provides a multi-generational focus to using information tools available to a multi-generational citizenry. This was a great effort on Hampton Falls' part.

4.15 Kensington EOC

- The Kensington, NH, Emergency Operations Center staff worked as an integrated team in all areas. An exemplary demonstration of direction and control was

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rendered by the Kensington Emergency Management Director. Documentation of events, communications, and activities were commendable.

#### 4.16 Kingston EOC

- The Town of Kingston Radiological Emergency Response for Nuclear Facilities Local EPZ Community Plan has detailed maps of each traffic and access control point. The details on these maps includes the placement of traffic cones. This level of detail allows the Town of Kingston to employ mutual aid to assist in staffing the traffic and access control points without delay.
- The Town of Kingston EOC uses the same organizational structure for every emergency. EOC staff adjust the organization for REP exercises or real world events as needed. Consistent use of an all hazards organizational structure ensures that EOC staff are familiar with their responsibilities.

#### 4.17 New Castle EOC

- The New Castle Local Emergency Operations Center showed an exceedingly high level of professionalism in how they conducted operations. From the Emergency Management Director down each member moved with a sense of purpose and dedication to the mission at hand. Each member of the Offsite Response Organization leveraged tactics, techniques, training, procedures and past experiences to excel during the exercise.

#### 4.18 Newfields EOC

- The Newfields EOC was a smooth efficient operation. Staff arrived promptly, knew their roles and carried them out swiftly at the appropriate time.

#### 4.19 Newton EOC

- The Radiological Officer at the Newton Emergency Operations Center did an outstanding job with this his radiological briefing to the emergency workers.

#### 4.20 North Hampton EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.21 Portsmouth EOC

- The RADEF Officer at the Portsmouth EOC, in addition to performing his checklist activities per plan and procedure, provided detailed information to the EOC staff, as well as field EW workers regarding exposure control. He consistently communicated with the EOC leadership and staff and had a great sense of situational awareness regarding ECLs and actions required.

#### 4.22 Rye EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.23 South Hampton EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.24 Stratham EOC

- The Radiological Defense (RADEF) Officer recognized the need to streamline the EOC check-in process of activated staff. The RADEF Officer has developed a barcode process that will allow an Excel spreadsheet to act as a database that will contain dosimeter, Thermoluminescent dosimeter serial numbers and EOC staff position information.

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- Upon the next activation of the Stratham's EOC the RADEF Officer will utilize the spreadsheet, and pre-assign dosimetry and relevant forms required for each staff position.

#### 4.25 Dover EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

#### 4.26 Manchester EOC

- The participation by senior city officials in the exercise was noteworthy. The Mayor and the Directors from all participating agencies showed up and participated in the exercise in the capacity as senior decision makers. Often, the senior EOC representatives at exercises such as this are not of such a high level.

#### 4.27 Rochester EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

### 5.0 Commonwealth of Massachusetts

#### 5.1 MA 211

- The public information line operators went above and beyond to make sure they were providing accurate information to the public. Prior to the start of the exercise they coordinated with one another and the vice president regarding possible areas of concern that would need to be addressed when answering calls.
- The operators were invested in understanding the information received from MEMA so it could be accurately conveyed to callers. If they weren't sure how to respond to an inquiry they put the caller on hold, gathered the correct information (calendar page reference, clarification from the vice president, etc.) and then responded.

#### 5.2 MEMA Region I

- Staff at the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency performed in an exemplary manner during this exercise. The Director provided outstanding leadership and set an excellent example for the staff. Everyone involved in the response was engaged, enthusiastic, and highly skilled. The level of competency and dedication displayed by the staff throughout the exercise was a model for emergency response.
- The Public Information personnel functioned as a well-trained and highly experienced team. Each individual displayed in-depth knowledge and expertise in executing his/her responsibilities and duties. Their high level of competency, their great attitude, and their working relationships were very impressive.
- In addition, staff from the Department of Public Health provided Protective Action Recommendations to the Director in a very timely manner.

#### 5.3 JIC

- Kudos for having realistic media present. Excellent, hard questions provided a realistic environment and tested the JIC Team.

#### 5.4 EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

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### 5.5 FMT #1

- Outstanding maintenance of instrument logs noting daily preoperational and response checks. Massachusetts instrument logs and documentation practices should be the model for other organizations.

### 5.6 FMT #2

- Demonstrated Strength: During an FEMA evaluated full-scale exercise, the senior, more experienced FMT member allowed a less experienced member perform several key tasks under her direction and guidance. She emphasized the need to use procedures and treated the exercise as a training session, asking questions and obtaining feedback.

### 5.7 Merrimac EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

### 5.8 Amesbury EOC

- The use of a 15 minute timer by the Radiological Officer in the EOC enhanced the ability of emergency workers to comply with the requirement to read their Direct Reading Dosimeters every 15 minutes, and therefore ensure proper radiological exposure awareness, reporting, and control.
- The use of a large display board to indicate transportation resource needs for Amesbury schools, days care centers, and special facilities greatly facilitated the ability of all EOC staff to quickly view and understand transportation resource needs of the City
- EOC staff demonstrated good conduct of operations in use and adherence to checklist procedures and in proper log keeping.
- The RADEF Officer at the Portsmouth EOC, in addition to performing his checklist activities per plan and procedure, provided detailed information to the EOC staff, as well as field EW workers regarding exposure control. He consistently communicated with the EOC leadership and staff and had a great sense of situational awareness regarding ECLs and actions required.

### 5.9 Newburyport EOC

- The staff at the Newburyport Emergency Operations Center are dedicated to protecting the public health and safety to the residents. Their commitment to following the plans, procedures and ensuring all emergency functions were carried out in timely and accurate manner, was outstanding.
- The Fire Chief serving as the Emergency Management Director for Newburyport demonstrated strong leadership skills. The Newburyport EOC staff was entirely new and the EMD ensured that all staff were ready to perform their mission.

### 5.10 Salisbury EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

### 5.11 West Newbury EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

### 5.12 Newbury EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.
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## 6.0 Maine

### 6.1 SEOC

- Maine put forth a very impressive effort in this exercise considering this was not an evaluated exercise for Maine. Twenty State and Federal Agencies participated with an average of two persons per position. Participants showed a sense of urgency and teamwork. Participants worked diligently in addressing possible challenges presented by the scenario until ENDEX was declared.
- Briefings were held regularly for senior leadership and information from these meetings were shared in briefings with all agencies present in a SEOC briefing. Participating agencies coordinated with their headquarters, field offices, fellow state agencies and counterparts in New Hampshire. Decisions were formed in a timely manner with input from all pertinent agencies.
- Maine EMA made extensive use of communications assets available. Systems were not only tested but message traffic was routed through them throughout the exercise. All systems were operating and available for use.

### 6.2 York EOC

- No demonstrated strengths.

**APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

**APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE**

**APPENDIX C: EXTENT OF PLAY for (THE STATE OF NEW HAMPHIRE,  
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE STATE OF  
MAINE)**

**APPEXDIX D: BEST PRACTICES**

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