

# CATEGORY 1

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FACIL: 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific Ga    05000323  
AUTH. NAME                    AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
BACKMAN, V.                   Pacific Gas & Electric Co.  
POWERS, R.                    Pacific Gas & Electric Co.  
RECIP. NAME                   RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 97-001-01: on 970304, operations personnel commenced surveillance required by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b, after operations shift foreman discovered missed verification. Caused by personnel error. Foreman counseled. W/970403 ltr.

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant  
P.O. Box 56  
Avila Beach, CA 93424  
805/545-6000

Robert P. Powers  
Vice President—Diablo Canyon  
Operations and Plant Manager

April 3, 1997

PG&E Letter DCL-97-053



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-80  
Diablo Canyon Unit 2  
Licensee Event Report 2-97-001-00  
Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action b, Not Met Due to Personnel Error

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PG&E is submitting the enclosed licensee event report regarding Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action b., not being met due to personnel error.

This event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'R. P. Powers'.

Robert P. Powers

cc: Steven D. Bloom  
Ellis W. Merschoff  
Kenneth E. Perkins  
Michael D. Tschiltz  
Diablo Distribution  
INPO

Enclosure

RM/2246/A0425416

IE29/1

9704160276 970403  
PDR ADOCK 05000323  
S PDR

150194





# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>Diablo Canyon Unit 2</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1</b> OF <b>5</b>
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TITLE (4) **Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Not Met Due to Personnel Error**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MON	DAY	YR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MON	DAY	YR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER (5)		
03	04	97	97	- 0 0 1	- 0 0	04	03	97			0 5 0 0 0		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR: (11)											
1													

POWER LEVEL (10)	1   0   0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 10 CFR <u>50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)</u> <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER - _____ (Specify in Abstract below and in text, NRC Form 366A)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

<b>Vickie Backman, Senior Regulatory Services Engineer</b>	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE <b>805</b>   <b>545-4289</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

ABSTRACT (16)

On March 4, 1997, at 0559 PST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, the action time allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, Action b., was exceeded. The conditional A.C. offsite power verification surveillance required by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b., was not performed within one hour of declaring Diesel Generator (DG) 2-3 inoperable.

On March 4, 1997, at 0950 PST, Operations personnel commenced the surveillance required by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b., after an Operations shift foreman (SFM) discovered the missed verification. The surveillance was completed satisfactorily at 0953 PST on March 4, 1997, confirming that appropriate offsite power sources were present.

The cause of this event was personnel error (cognitive), in that the SFM who authorized clearing DG 2-3 failed to recognize that a conditional surveillance was required within one hour by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b.

As a corrective action for this event, the SFM will be counseled on the requirements of the TS tracking program.



# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	-	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	-	REVISION NUMBER		OF	
Diablo Canyon Unit 2	0   5   0   0   0   3   2   3	97	-	0   0   1	-	0   0	2	OF	5

TEXT (17)

**I. Plant Conditions**

Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 100 percent power.

**II. Description of Problem**

**A. Summary:**

On March 4, 1997, at 0559 PST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, the action time allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, Action b., was exceeded. The conditional A.C. offsite power verification surveillance described in TS 4.8.1.1.1a was not performed within one hour of declaring Diesel Generator (DG) 2-3 (EK)(DG) inoperable.

**B. Background:**

TS 3.8.1.1, Action b., requires that operability of one A.C. offsite power source be demonstrated by performing TS 4.8.1.1.1a within one hour of a DG being declared inoperable. TS 4.8.1.1.1a must also be performed at least once per eight hours until the DG is declared operable.

TS 4.8.1.1.1a requires that all applicable independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (EJ) shall be determined operable by verifying correct breaker (EJ)(BKR) alignments and indicated power availability. Performing Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) I-1C, Attachment 11.4, "Operability Checks Of Independent Circuits," meets this requirement.

Prior to the event, Operations had been performing conditional A.C. offsite power verifications (STP I-1C) to support diesel fuel oil (DFO) tank (EK)(TK) replacement every eight hours as required by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b. The last conditional STP I-1C performed on Unit 2, prior to DG 2-3 being declared inoperable, was completed at 0105 PST on March 4, 1997.

**C. Event Description:**

On March 4, 1997, at 0459 PST, DG 2-3 was cleared and declared inoperable. The shift foreman (SFM) initiating the TS tracking sheet for the DG; did not notice the requirement to perform a conditional A.C. offsite power verification.





## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	OF	5
Diablo Canyon Unit 2	0   5   0   0   0   3   2   3	97	- 0 0 1	- 0 0	3	OF 5

TEXT (17)

On March 4, 1997, at 0559 PST, TS 3.8.1.1b one-hour duration time was exceeded by a failure to perform applicable parts of STP I-1C.

On March 4, 1997, at 0950 PST, Operations recognized that the required surveillance had not been performed within one hour and initiated a conditional STP I-1C.

On March 4, 1997, at 0953 PST, Operations satisfactorily completed the conditional STP I-1C and confirmed that all appropriate offsite power sources were available.

**D. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:**

None.

**E. Dates and Approximate Times for Major Occurrences:**

- |    |                          |   |
|----|--------------------------|---|
| 1. | March 4, 1997, 0459 PST: | Event date: DG 2-3 was declared inoperable by Operations.   |
| 2. | March 4, 1997, 0559 PST: | Event date: TS 3.8.1.1b. one-hour time requirement was exceeded.  |
| 3. | March 4, 1997, 0953 PST: | Discovery date: Operations discovered that TS 3.8.1.1b one-hour time requirement had been exceeded and commenced a conditional A.C. offsite power verification. |
| 4. | March 4, 1997 0953 PST   | Operations satisfactorily completed a conditional STP I-1C, confirming that all A.C. offsite power sources were available.                                      |

**F. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:**

None.



# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	OF	PAGE
Diablo Canyon Unit 2	0   5   0   0   0   3   2   3	97	- 0 0 1	- 0 0	4	5

TEXT (17)

**G. Method of Discovery:**

During preparations to perform STP I-1C to meet the requirements of related DFO tank maintenance activities, Operations discovered that the initial one-hour verification requirement after declaring a DG inoperable had not been met.

**H. Operator Actions:**

On March 4, 1997, plant operators completed a partial STP I-1C in order to verify appropriate offsite electrical power.

**I. Safety System Responses:**

None required.

**III. Cause of the Problem**

**A. Immediate Cause:**

The A.C. offsite power verification surveillance described in TS 4.8.1.1.1a was not performed within one hour of declaring DG 2-3 inoperable.

**B. Root Cause:**

The cause of this event is personnel error (cognitive), inattention to detail, in that the SFM who authorized clearing DG 2-3 failed to recognize that a conditional surveillance was required within the one-hour time frame required by TS 3.8.1.1.

**IV. Analysis of the Event**

Successful completion of the conditional STP I-1C confirmed that all appropriate offsite power sources were available. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.



# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	-	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	-	REVISION NUMBER			OF
Diablo Canyon Unit 2	0   5   0   0   0   3   2   3	97	-	0   0   1	-	0   0	5	OF	5

TEXT (17)

**V. Corrective Actions**

**A. Immediate Corrective Action:**

Operations personnel completed a partial STP I-1C, Attachment 11.4, on March 4, 1997, at 0953 PST, confirming operability of the A.C. offsite power sources.

**B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:**

The SFM who failed to identify the TS requirement will be counseled for failure to properly follow TS requirements.

**VI. Additional Information**

**A. Failed Components:**

None.

**B. Previous LERs on Similar Problems:**

LER 1-96-002-00, "Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Not Met Due to Personnel Error," reported the TS action time was exceeded when a valve position verification required by STP I-1D, "Routine Monthly Checks Required By Licenses," was not performed for a manual containment isolation valve within the time limit for TS 4.6.1.1, including the extension allowed by TS 4.0.2. The corrective action of counseling the SFM who reviewed the STP did not prevent the current event since the current event involved an unrelated human error.

