LICENSE	E EVENT I	REF	PORT (LER)								
FACILITY NAME (3) Diablo Canyon Unit 1 TITLE (4) Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 Not M Systems Inoperable Due to Personne	et with the I Error	Rea	ctor Co	0 olant Sy	5 (yster	n Leak	2 7 age De	tection) of 7			
EVENT DATE (5) LER NAMBER (5) REVISION MON MON DAY YR YR SEQUENTIAL NAMBER REVISION MON 06 22 95 95 - 0 0 5 - 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (9) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENT	ORT DATE (7) 1 DAY YR 7 28 95 5 OF 10 CFR: (11)		FACIL	O ITY NAMES	DTHER FAC	DOCKE	T NAMSER (S) 5 0 0 5 0 0	0				
1 1 POWER 10 CFR (10) 0 THER - 0 THER - (Specify in Abstract below and in text, NRC Form 366A) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												
Deneld H. Behnke, Senier Begulater (Seni							AREA CODI	E AE O	ER			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EAC		ULURE	DESCRIBED	O IN THIS RE	PORT (1	3)	FACTURER	REPORTABLE	029			
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	SUPPLEMENTIAL REPORT EXPECTED (1+) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR [] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [X] NO DATE (15) Image: Complete Expected (1+)											
On June 22, 1995, at 0938 PDT, with power, Technical Specification 3.4.6. monitoring system was taken out of s leakage detection systems (radiation sample selector switch for the contain inadvertently placed in the detector p With both RMs inoperable and the co of service, TS 3.4.6.1 was not met.	Unit 1 in M I was not m ervice with monitor [RM ment atmo urge positio ntainment f	lode net. two M] 11 sphe on ra fan c	1 (Pow The co of the r RM-11 a ere radi ther tha cooler c	ver Ope ntainme eactor 6 & 1RM- oactivit an the n ollection	eratio ent fa coola (12) i y mo nain n mo	n) at 10 ant cool ant sys nopera nitoring sample nitoring	00 perc ler colle tem (R(ble. Th g syster e positic g syster	ent ection CS) ne m was on. m out				
The root cause of this event is persor either an I&C technician during the person control room operators during sample	nel error (c rformance pump re-s	ogn of s tart a	itive). 1 urveilla: activitie	The erro nce tes s.	or wa t pro	is com cedure	mitted b s or by	у				
The applicable procedures will be rev returning 1RM-11 and 1RM-12 to sen regarding the need for self-verification equipment to service when subseque operability. PG&E will review all critic contains adequate details on operabil	sed to verifice. I&C ten and the in and the in at activities al RM proce	fy co echn npor occ edur ion.	orrect sa icians a tance o cur that res to e	ample p and ope of re-ver potentiansure th	oath a erator rifying ally a hat e	alignmo rs will b g steps iffect e ach pro	ent prio be tailbo that re quipme bocedure	r to barded iturn nt e				
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Diablo Ca	nyon	Unit 1	0	50	0	02	7	5	95	-	0	0	5	- 0	0	2	<u> </u>	7
TEXT (17)																		
									v	+						·•		
1.	Plan	t Conditions						•										
	Unit	1 was in Mode 1 (Po	wer	Oper	ation	n) at 10	00%	po\	ver.									
11.	<u>Desc</u>	cription of Problem														•		
	Α.	Summary:																
		On June 22, 1995, percent power, Teo cooler collection m coolant system (RC 1RM-11 & 1RM-12 inadvertently made containment atmos detector purge pos inoperable and the service, TS 3.4.6.1	at 09 chnica onito CS)(A) inop inop pher ition cont Limit	938 F al Sp ring s B) le perab erab erab rathe ainm ling (PDT, ecific syste akag le. T le wh lioac er tha ent f Cond	with U cation on was ge dete The tw hen the tivity n an the an coo lition fo	Init 1 3.4. s tak ectio ro R(e sa nonif mair oler o or O	l in 6.1 en c S i mpi torir n sa colle pera	Mode was i out of ystem eaka e sele ag sys mple ection ation	e 1 (not i f sei ge (ecto sten pos n mo was	(Po me rvic J) (dete or sv n (II sitic onit s nc	wer t. T e w (rad ection witc L) w on. orinot m	Ope The c ith to iatio on s ch (IL vas p With ng sy net.	erati wo o n mo yste)(HS)lace i bol ster	on) a ainme of the onitor ms ha S) for ed in th RM n (BK	t 100 ent fa reac [RM ad be the the ls () out	in tor] en	`

B. Background:

TS 3.4.6.1 requires that the following RCS leakage detection systems be operable: (a) the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system (1RM-11), (b) the containment structure sump (WD) and the reactor cavity sump level and flow monitoring system (WD) and (c) either the containment fan cooler collection monitoring system or the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system (1RM-12). With only two of the above required leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours when the required gaseous and/or particulate radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

1RM-11 monitors containment air particulate radioactivity. 1RM-12 monitors containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity. Both RMs use a common sample pump and path to obtain air samples from containment. The sample pump start switch and high pressure switch are adjacent to the detector sample selector switch (IL)(HS) on the monitor control module.

Flow verification of the sample pump is performed in accordance with STP I-120B3, "Radiation Source Presentation (Isotopic) Calibration of Containment Air Particulate Monitor 1RM-11," STP I-120B4, "Reinstatement to Service: Containment Air Particulate Monitor 1RM-11" and STP I-100B4, "Reinstatement to Service: Containment Air Radiogas Monitor 1RM-12."

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iablo Canyon	<u>Unit 1 ·</u>	0	50	00	2 7	5 8	95 -	0	<u>0 ' 5</u>	-	0 0	3	OF
	During the pe team is used verification te other, then the repeat the ste then the perso of using verifi	rformand to perfor chnique e person p back. on manip cation pr	ce of ST m all pro that req manipu The ve pulating actices	Ps I-12 ocedur uires o ulating rificatio switch reduce	20B4 ar e steps one pers switche on perso es will p es the cl	nd I-1 . This on to s will perfor hance	00B4, s team read place verify m the e of a	a tw n use the p a ha that actic switc	o per d a s proced and or the s on. Th th bei	son tand dura n the step he s ng n	I&C teo ard pra I step t switch is corre tandare nisposi	chnic actice o the a anc act a d pra lione	ian e I nd ctice d.
C.	Event Descrip	otion:			-								
	On June 20, and TS 3.4.6. sample pump and the reacted fan cooler col leakage deted	1995, at 1 action and ala or cavity lection m ction.	1548 Pl stateme m relay sump le nonitorin	DT, 1R ent was s (IL)(7 evel an ig syste	M-11 ar s entere 74). At t d flow n ems we	nd 1R d in p this ti nonito re be	M-12 prepar me, th pring s ing rel	were ation ie co syste ied u	e plac i for re ntaini m, an ipon f	ed ii epla men id th to pr	nto pur cemen t struct e conta ovide f	ge m t of ti ure s ainme RCS	ode he sump ent
	Between June the sample pur room operato switch and the pump power s selector switc sample select	e 21 and ump faile rs were r e high pr switch ar h. The c tor switch	22, 199 d to sta requesta essure ind the hi control ro in the	95, dur rt. Dui ed to a switch igh pre oom op purge	ing perf ring acti ssist in f from the ssure s perators position	orma vities manin e mon witch may durir	nce of to re- oulatin nitor c are a have ng the	f san start ig the ontro djace inad se sv	the s the s sam of mod ent to verter vitch i	ump amp ple fule. the ntly man	o flow v ple pum pump p The s detecto placed ipulatic	erific p, co bowe amp or sa the ons.	ation ontro r le mple
`	Step 9.6 of S aligned from o performed. It If it was perfo inadvertently STPs could h purge position	TP I-120 detector may hav rmed pri mispositi ave beei	B4 and purge to ve been or to the oned th n compl	STP I- p main perfor samp le sam eted w	100B4 (sample med pri le pump ple sele ith the s	requir . It is or to o re-s ctor s ampl	res that not k the sa tart ac switch re sele	at the nown imple stivition durin ector	e sam n whe e pum es an ng the switcl	ple s n st p re d th ese a h in	selecto ep 9.6 -start a e opera activitie the def	r swit was ictivil itors s, the ecto	ich b ies. e
	The sample s STP I-120B4. in accordance 1RM-11/1RM are required t switch The I	elector s Step 9. with ST -12 Func o manipu	witch m 12 of S P I-100 tional T Ilate RM	ay also TP I-12 A, "Con est." [I contr	o have t 20B4 ree ntainme During p ol switc	peen quires nt Ail erfor hes a	mispo s that Parti mance djace	sition a fur culat e of S nt to	ned di iction: e/Gas STP I- the d	uring al te s Ra 100 etec	g step 9 st be p diation A, I&C tor san	9.12 erfor Mon pers ple	of med itor onne

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (17)	Onici		0 3			4 1	13	30	<u> </u>		0	-	00	4		
•	On Ju satisfa On Ju Check becau contai time, 7 TS 3.4 operat	ine 22, 1995, actorily and the rise 22, 1995, iss Required by isse they were inment fan co 1RM-11 and 4.6.1 was re-o ble and the a	at 0938 at 1606 by Licens operation oler coll 1RM-12 entered. ction sta	PDT, stated PDT, ses," 1 ng in th ection were c At 16 itemer	STP ment durir RM- ne de mon decla 50 P nt for	s I-12 of TS ng per 11 an etecto itorin red o 2DT, 1 TS 3	10B4 S 3.4 d 1F or pu g sy out o IRM .4.6	l and 4.6.1 Nanco RM-12 Irge n stem f serv -11 a .1 wa	I-1(was e of 2 wa nod wa vice nd s e	DOB4 s exite STP ere dis e. Su s plac and t 1RM- xited.	were ed. I-1A scov ibse iced in the a 12 w	, "F ere que nto ictic	omplete coutine d inope ently, the service on state declare	d Shift rable a . At ment ad	e this t for	
	On Ju Opera the sa contai contai Also, f contai atmos collect	ne 22, 1995, ation) at 100 p imple selecto inment atmos the containment inment atmos phere gaseo tion system in	from 09 percent p r switch phere p phere p ent fan c phere p us radio noperabl	38 PD power, for 1R articula aseous cooler articula activity e, TS	T to Tec M-11 ate rad s rad colle ate ra v moi 3.4.6	1606 chnica l and adioa lioacti ction adioa nitorir 5.1 Lir	PD al Sp 1RN ctivit syst ctivit ng sy mitin	T, with becific A-12 i ty mo moni em w ty mo ystem g Col	h U catio in th nito torin vas nito naito ndit	nit 1 i on 3.4 ne pur oring s ng sys taken oring s oring s od the ion fo	n Mc I.6.1 rge p syste stem out syste cont r Op	ode wa oosi m a we of s m, tain era	1 (Pow ition, the and the ere inop service. the con ment fa ation wa	er et \ erabl Witi tainn n co s not	With le. h the nent oler t met.	
D.	Inoper	Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:														
	None.															
E.	Dates	and Approxi	nate Tin	nes foi	r Maj	or Oc	cun	ence	s:							
	1.	Between Ju	ne 21 ai	nd 22,	199	5:	I&C ina swi det	corco dverte tch fo ector	ontr entl or 11 pur	rol roc y plac RM-1 rge pc	om o ed ti 1 an ositio	per he d 1 n.	ators sample RM-12 i	seleo n the	ctor e	
	2.	June 22, 19	95, 093	B PDT	:		Eve con fan out inoj	ent Da itrol ro coole of se perab	ate. oon er c ervic ole.	TS 3 n oper ollecti ce with	.4.6. rator ion n n 1R	1 w s to non M-1	vas not i bok cont iitoring s 11 and 2	met v ainm syste I-RM	when hent m I-12	
	3.	June 22, .19	95, 1608	6 PDT:	:		Dis disc duri con moi and was	cover cover ing ro itainm nitorir I the a s ente	y D ed o outir nent ng s actioned	eate. opera ne shi t fan c systen on sta I	1RM ting ft ch coole n wa atem	in t eck er c s p ent	and 1F he purg (s. The ollectior laced in for TS	RM-12 e mc to se 3.4.6	2 ode ervice 5.1	
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Diable Canyon Unit 1 0 5 0 0 1	FACILITY NAME (1)	·····	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) YEAR *** SEQUENTIAL *** REVISION
 June 22, 1995, 1650 PDT: The action statement for TS 3.4.6.1 was exited when both 1RM-11 and 1RM-12 were returned to service. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected: None. Method of Discovery: Operations personnel discovered the inoperable radiation monitors during the performance of scheduled shift checks in accordance with STP I-1A, "Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses." Operations personnel, upon discovery of the inoperable RM (1RM-11 and 1RM-12) placed containment fan cooler collection monitoring system in service. Safety System Responses: 	Diablo Canyon	Unit 1	0 5 0 0 2 7	5 95 - 0 0 5 - 0 0 5 ^{OF} 7
 F. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected: None. G. Method of Discovery: Operations personnel discovered the inoperable radiation monitors during the performance of scheduled shift checks in accordance with STP I-1A, "Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses." H. Operator Actions: Operations personnel, upon discovery of the inoperable RM (1RM-11 and 1RM-12) placed containment fan cooler collection monitoring system in service. I. Safety System Responses: None. III. <u>Cause of the Problem</u> A. Immediate Cause: The immediate cause of this event is that the detector purge switch was mispositioned during performance of the STPs or during activities to re-start the sample pump. B. Root Cause: The root cause of this event is personnel error (cognitive). The error may have been committed by a utility I&C technician during the performance of surveillance test procedures (STPs) I-120B4, I-100B4 and I-100A, or by control room operators during sample pump re-start activities in which manipulations of RM control switches were required. 		4. June 22, 19	95, 1650 PDT:	The action statement for TS 3.4.6.1 was exited when both 1RM-11 and 1RM-12 were returned to service.
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 G. Method of Discovery: Operations personnel discovered the inoperable radiation monitors during the performance of scheduled shift checks in accordance with STP I-1A, "Routine Shift Checks Required by Licenses." H. Operator Actions: Operations personnel, upon discovery of the inoperable RM (1RM-11 and 1RM-12) placed containment fan cooler collection monitoring system in service. I. Safety System Responses: None. III. Cause of the Problem A. Immediate Cause: The immediate cause of this event is that the detector purge switch was mispositioned during performance of the STPs or during activities to re-start the sample pump. B. Root Cause: The root cause of this event is personnel error (cognitive). The error may have been committed by a utility I&C technician during the performance of surveillance test procedures (STPs) I-120B4, I-100B4 and I-100A, or by control room operators during sample pump re-start activities in which manipulations of RM control switches were required. 		None.		
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None. III. <u>Cause of the Problem</u> A. Immediate Cause: The immediate cause of this event is that the detector purge switch was mispositioned during performance of the STPs or during activities to re-start the sample pump. B. Root Cause: The root cause of this event is personnel error (cognitive). The error may have been committed by a utility I&C technician during the performance of surveillance test procedures (STPs) I-120B4, I-100B4 and I-100A, or by control room operators during sample pump re-start activities in which manipulations of RM control switches were required.	Ι.	Safety System Res	ponses:	
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The root cause of this event is personnel error (cognitive). The error may have been committed by a utility I&C technician during the performance of surveillance test procedures (STPs) I-120B4, I-100B4 and I-100A, or by control room operators during sample pump re-start activities in which manipulations of RM control switches were required.	В.	Root Cause:	<i>.</i> .	
	•	The root cause of the been committed by surveillance test pro room operators dur of RM control switch	his event is personnel e a utility I&C technician ocedures (STPs) I-120E ing sample pump re-sta hes were required.	rror (cognitive). The error may have during the performance of 4, I-100B4 and I-100A, or by control rt activities in which manipulations
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Diablo Canyon Ur		0 5 0	010	2 7	5	95	-	<u> </u>	5	-	0 0	6		1	
C. C	contributory Cause	:													
1.	Procedural v I-120B4 allo perform syst of STP I-100 alignment fo performed a returning the performed a of the RM co 100B4 and I RM switch m the potential misalignmen	weakness in w I&C techn tem adjustn DB4 and I-1 DIlowing ma t this time, e equipmen s part of th Dontrol switch -120B4 are hay be report for additiont.	n that th nicians nents c 20B4 r intenar they ar t to ser e return nes. Th perfor sitione nal swi	he retu to exi luring nay be nce. If re not vice. n to se herefo med a d afte tch po	urn f it an critic e pe f the perf In a ervic ore, i as pa r crito sitic	to ser d re-ec cal sy rform se rei ormed dditio e. Th dditio e. Th if the art of tical so n ma	vice ste ed turr d a n, f retu the syst nip	e sect er from m alig as pain to se gain in function test re urn to e norm em ali ulation	ions n the rt of ervic n the onal equir servic nal s ignn n an	of eprent. no es pr tes vice ysten ds	STP I-1 rocedure Certain rmal sys ections rocess o at STP I- changin esection em align t, thus in ystem	00B4 to sec tem are f 100A g pos of S ment ntrode	is sitions TP I to the ucing	 ; ;	
2.	. Inadequate positioning s the return to subsequent	verification witches for service po activities o	by I&C 1RM- rtion of ccur the	techr 11 and the p at pote	nicia d 1R roce entia	ns or M-12 edure ally af	a c . A we fec	control Iso, s re not t equi	l roo teps t re-\ pme	em (pe veri ent (operator rformed ified who operabil	whe durir en ity.	n ng		
IV. <u>Analysi</u>	s of the Event			p.		٠									
1i m co R su fu	1RM-11 is used to measure air particulate activity inside the containment. 1RM-12 monitors gaseous activity inside containment at the same location as 1RM-11 via a common sample line. 1RM-11 and 1RM-12 are used to warn of leakage from the RCS. 1RM-11 and 1RM-12 do not automatically initiate emergency related functions such as isolating lines containing liquid or gaseous activity or initiating emergency function signals.														
W cc op cc sy an "F id cc su le cc to lo	Vith 1RM-11 and 1 ollection monitoring peration, backup n ontainment structury ystem. The reactor nd flow monitoring Reactor Coolant Sy lentify and evaluat ontainment sump f ummed and divide eakage from the RC omponent cooling by yield the unidenti 1A and STP R-100 bserved.	RM-12 inor g system bineans of de re sumps a or containm system Wate e any RCS flow totalize d by the tin CS to the c water to the fied RCS le C were perf	perable e opera- etecting and the ent stru- is oper- er Bala leakage ors are inter- ontainre containre containre akage	, the T able and reactor able d nce In read. val to nent, s inmer to the satisf	rS raises for the second secon	equire n use. within avity s nps an g this tory," ordan e diffe d the ondar nd prin ntainn rily ar	es t N Co sum nd f ev are sui y sy mai nen nd i	hat th /ithou ontain op leve the re- ent. Se ent. Se ent. Se with the mp co /stems y wate t. Du no uni	e co t eith men el ar acto STP: orme hese tota llect s to er le ring iden	nta ner t cond f r ca s l- s l- lize tion the athis tific	inment system onsists of low mor avity sur 1A and once per rocedure r readin rate. Ic contain off are s s event, ed leaka	fan ce in of the nitorir np le R-100 shift ss, the gs ar lentifi ment ubtra both ge wa	oole yel C, to e ed STF as	r	

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FACILITY NAME (1)	<u>`</u>	, 	DOCKET NUMBER (2)				LER NAMBE	R (6)	PETACYAN	<u></u>	PAGE (3)
Diablo Canyo	on Unit 1		0 5 0	00	2 7 5	95	- 0	NUMBER O 5	· x(5 -	NAMBER	7	⁰ғ 7
	Also, taken unide availa inope	in preparation and analyzed ntified contain able to determi rable.	for a Unit I. Analysis ment leaka ne RCS le	1 contai of the c age had akage d	inment ve containme not occu luring the	ent, a c ent gra rred. time f	conta ab sai Thero that 1	inmen mple ir efore, RM-1	t grat ndica adeq 1 and	o samp tes tha uate m 1RM-	ole wa it ieans 12 wo	as s were ere
	Thus,	this event had	d no adver	se effec	t on the h	nealth	and	safety	of the	e publi	с.	
V. <u>Co</u>	prrective /	Actions		8								
A.	Imme	diate Correctiv	e Actions:									
	<u>.</u> a.)	The contain service and	ment fan c TS 3.4.6.1	ooler co was en	llection m tered.	onito	ring s	ystem	1-4 v	vas pla	aced	into
	b.)	1RM-11 and	1RM-12 v	vere retu	urned to s	ervice	ə. [′]			п		
В.	Corre	ctive Actions t	o Prevent	Recurre	nce:		4					
,	์ 1.	STP I-100A returning 1R	will be revi M-11 and	ised to v 1RM-12	erify correction	ect sa e.	mple	path a	alignn	nent pi	rior to)
	2.	Utility I&C te performing v need to re-v procedures v operability.	chnicians verification erify steps when subs	will be ta activitie perform equent	ailboarded s before i ned during activities	d rega return g the r occur	ing ed ing ed return that p	the in quipme to ser potenti	nporta ent to vice ially a	ance o servic portion affect e	f e an i of equip:	d the ment
,	3.	An operatior need for self activities tha	n incident s f-verificatio t return eq	summan on and th uipment	y will be is ne importa t to servic	ssued ance o e.	to op of atte	erating ention	g crev to de	ws reg tail dui	ardin ring	g the `
•	4.	PG&E will re procedure co If the proced applicable p	view all cri ontains ad lures do no rocedures	itical rad equate o ot contai will be r	liation mo details on in adequa evised.	onitor (opera ite op	proce ability erabil	dures verific ity ver	to en cation ificati	sure the of equination of equination of equination of the other section	nat ea uipmo ne	ach ent.
VI. <u>Ad</u>	ditional İ	nformation										
A.	Failed	I Components	:					.*				
	None	•	¥		,		-			*	*	
B.	Previo	ous LERs on S	Similar Prol	blems:								
	None								÷	5		
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