

December 22, 1994

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-IV-94-064A

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas on this date.

<u>Facility</u> Pacific Gas & Electric Co. Diablo Canyon 2 Avila Beach, California Dockets: 50-323	<u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u> Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency X Not Applicable
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Subject: UPDATE OF MANUAL TRIP OF DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2

As mentioned in the preliminary notification for this event, Diablo Canyon Unit 2 was manually tripped from 50 percent power on December 19, 1994, due to an impending loss of main condenser circulating water flow and vacuum as a result of kelp intrusion from the unusually high seas. The 10 percent atmospheric dump valves (ADV) on Steam Generators (SGs) 2-1 and 2-4 opened as designed but did not control the SG pressure increases, resulting in the opening of the associated Code safety valves. The licensee has traced the cause of the problem on the SG 2-4 ADV to a faulty control circuit which transmitted a lower than actual SG pressure reading. The problem has been corrected. The cause of the operating anomalies on the SG 2-1 ADV are still being investigated by the licensee. The licensee is also continuing its investigation as to the cause of the reduced seal flow to the reactor coolant pumps.

With regard to the issue of the high differential pressure at the Unit 2 main condenser water boxes, in addition to the kelp fouling of the intake travelling screens, the licensee found pieces of 1/8-inch thick epoxy resin sheet inside of the Unit 2 west condenser. The total amount of sheet found in the condenser is approximately 550 square feet of material. The material was identified as the liner material for the transition spool between the intake tunnel and condenser water box. Approximately 70 square feet of liner material remains connected to the transition piece. The liner material in the condenser has been removed and all of the liner material appears to be accounted for. However, as a further precautionary measure, the licensee plans to send divers into the area to verify that no other loose liner material is present. The transition piece which is made of carbon steel still has its primer coating. The licensee is deciding on a course of action to protect the carbon steel transition piece. Preliminary investigation of the incident indicates that the liner material may have been stripped away by flow oscillations at the time that Circulating Water Pump 2-2 was manually tripped. The licensee is also investigating whether the Unit 1 condenser transition pieces may be susceptible to the loss of the liner material. The safety-related cooling for the component cooling water system at Diablo Canyon is provided by the auxiliary salt water system (ASW). The

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inlets and travelling screens associated with the ASW are separate from those of the circulating water screens. The ASW has two 100 percent redundant trains for each unit. In addition, each ASW pump has the capability of taking suction from either circulating water inlet within the unit it supplies, as well as being able to cross tie to the ASW of the other unit. The ASW piping from the intake structure to the heat exchangers is coated with about 1/8 inch of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) which is thermally bonded to the interior of the piping. According to the licensee, the ASW system, which has a much lower flow than the circulating water system (about 11,000 GPM versus 430,000 GPM) is less susceptible to fouling and, in fact, has not experienced any significant problems with clogging of their travelling screens. It was also noted that the licensee's inspections of the ASW intake area in response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," did not identify any significant problems with macrofouling at the ASW intake area.

The state of California has been notified. Region IV has informed the EDO, NRR, and PAO.

This information herein has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of 8 a.m. (PST) on December 22, 1994.

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