


RICHARD G. PETERSON  
1525 15th ST.  
LOS OSOS, CALIF. 93402

MR. JOSEPH REIDRIE  
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
1717 H. STREET N.W.  
WASHINGTON DC. 20555



APRIL 3, 1981

DOCKET NUMBER 50-275,323  
PROD. & UTIL. FAC.

Dear Sir:-

I worked at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant for two years, as a pipe support designer for M.W. Kellogg. Bluntly, if Diablo starts up, I will leave the area! Being presently working for the City of San Luis Obispo as an engineer and having worked in other areas of construction, I can unequivocally say that the quality of workmanship demonstrated to me and other associates, including quality control people out at Diablo, was the worst I have ever seen.

Pipe supports ranged from simple cantilever beams to complex structural steel supports. The vast majority of them are attached to concrete walls or floors by steel plates anchored by Hilti or Phillips concrete anchor bolts (redheads). During start-up testing of individual systems throughout the plant, many plates were ripped right off the walls because workers would hit rebar in the wall, and rather than reposition the plates slightly to avoid the rebar, they cut off the heads of the redheads and tack welded them to the steel plates to make it appear as if they were actually there in the wall securing the plates! In many instances, hangers were connected to the wall with only one or two redheads! Some

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Exhibit 1

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Faint, illegible markings or characters on the right edge of the page.



Handwritten text, possibly a signature or initials, located in the lower-left quadrant of the page.



(1) Bolt heads were actually held on by gum!  
I have witnesses to all this.

(2) Pipes that went through pre-cast conduits through walls were not allowed to touch the sides of the conduits. Frequently I found instances of this happening, and notified the proper people, but never once did I see this situation remedied!

(3) It's a publicly known fact that many (hundreds, perhaps thousands) of Class A welds (very important welds that have to be X-rayed) were falsified. That is, either the X-rays were never taken and they were okayed anyway or they were taken, found to be defective, but still okayed!

This goes on and on. The attitude of the workers in general was also the worst I have ever seen. Their work reflected this attitude. And this is a nuclear power plant they are building!

(4) And as far as plant security goes, at least when I was working there, it was a joke. To get past the front gate, all one needs is to ride in with someone with a pass, or to have a pass visible in your front window yourself. Several times I forgot my pass and stuck a Kleenex box in the front dash approximately the same color as the pass and was

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②  
I'd just right on through! Then, all one needed  
to get past the parking lot was a hard hat.  
Do you realize how easy it is to acquire a  
hard hat? Extremely. I had a couple of my  
own while I was there and I could have got  
others. I still have one because I kept it after  
I got laid off, and many people do the same.  
So anybody could get to that plant as easy  
as pie. The possibility of terrorists infiltrating  
that plant seems imminent to me.

The Hosgri fault being so close by, the  
seeming lack of adequate emergency planning,  
the problem of waste storage and transportation,  
the problems and expense of decommissioning,  
and low-level emissions are all very grave  
problems, that, along with the human error  
factor mentioned throughout my letter, convince  
me that Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant  
is a tremendous and dangerous liability.

Let us have some much needed foresight  
for mankind and start developing alternative  
forms of energy, and start learning and  
practicing more efficient ways of conservation.

Very truly yours,  
Richard L. Peterson

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San Luis Obispo, California  
June 3, 1981  
Time: 4:55 p.m.

I, Richard G. Peterson, hereby make the following voluntary statement to James H. Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector and Owen C. Shackleton Jr., Investigator who have identified themselves to me as employees of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me. Mr. Shackleton wrote this statement with my permission.

I am 32 years old and I am employed as an Engineer Technician for the City of San Luis Obispo, California. I worked as a Draftsman for the M. W. Kellogg Company at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant from February 13, 1974 until August 1, 1974 and as a Pipe Support Designer from November 19, 1974 until September 18, 1975. The Kellogg Co. had a contract to install much of the plant's piping, pipe hangers and pipe restraints. I attended four years of college at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, majoring in Aeronautical Engineering and Mathematics.

I wrote a letter dated April 3, 1981 to Mr. Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the NRC about the concerns I have over the quality of the construction work performed at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

The information I wrote in that letter about pipe hangers breaking loose during start-up testing because of not being properly fastened to the walls was not known to me first hand, but was told to me by a friend, Bruce Willard, who had worked on the project as a Quality Control Inspector for the M. W. Kellogg Company.

I personally observed pipes on the third floor of the turbine building that in violation of code were touching the pre-cast conduits that they passed through. To my recollection these were one inch to three inch diameter pipe lines. I informed the quality assurance people from Kellogg about the pipes touching the conduits and they gave me negative responses like, "Don't worry about it." I recall that several months after I reported these violations that no corrective action had been taken.

From the general knowledge at the site I heard about the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Class A welds that had x-rays that were falsified. That is, either the x-rays were never taken and they were okayed anyway or they were taken, found to be defective, but still were approved.





From first hand experience, as far as plant security goes, at least when I was working there, it was not effective. To get past the front gate, all a person needed was to ride to the plant with someone with a pass, or to have a pass visible in your front window yourself. Several times I forgot my pass and stuck a kleenex box on the front dash approximately the same color as the pass and was waived right on through the gate by the guard. Then, all one needed to get past the parking lot was a hardhat. The possibility of terrorists infiltrating the plant seems imminent to me.

The Hosgri fault being so close to Diablo Canyon, the seeming lack of adequate emergency planning, the problem of waste storage and transportation, the problems, and expense of decommissioning, and low-level emissions are all very grave problems, that, along with the human error factor mentioned throughout my letter, convince me that the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant is a tremendous and dangerous liability.

I do not have any other information to furnish to the NRC concerning the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant at this time.

This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 3, 1981 at 4:55 p.m.

/S/

Richard G. Peterson

Witnesses:

/S/

Owen C. Shackleton, Jr., Senior Investigator, U.S.N.R.C.

/S/

James Eckhardt, Inspector, U.S.N.R.C.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy auditing of the accounts.

In addition, it is noted that the records should be kept up-to-date and organized in a logical manner. This will facilitate the preparation of financial statements and help in identifying trends and anomalies in the data.

The second part of the document provides a detailed breakdown of the various types of transactions that should be recorded. This includes sales, purchases, and transfers between different departments or branches of the organization.

It is also mentioned that the records should be reviewed regularly to ensure their accuracy and completeness. Any discrepancies should be investigated and corrected immediately to prevent errors from accumulating.

The following table shows the summary of transactions for the month of January.

Date	Description	Amount
1/1	Opening Balance	1000.00
1/5	Sales	250.00
1/10	Purchases	150.00
1/15	Transfers	75.00
1/20	Sales	300.00
1/25	Purchases	200.00
1/31	Closing Balance	1125.00