# U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

#### REGION V

Report No.	50-323/79-06	
Docket No.	50-275 & 50-323 License No. CPPR-39 & CPPR-69	Safeguards Group
Licensee:	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	•
	77 Beale Street	•
	San Francisco, California 94106	
Facility Na	nme: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2	,
:Inspection	at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, Califor	nia
Inspection conducted: April 1-20, 1979		
Inspectors	dollert Uning Jo.	5/8/79
•	T. Young, Jr., Resident Reactor Inspector	Pate Signed
		Date Signed
*Approved By	D. M. Sternberg, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch	Date Signed  5/14/7 9  Date Signed
Summary:	•	

<u>Inspection on April 1-20, 1979 (Report No. 50-275/79-11 and 50-323/79-06)</u>

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of preoperational testing, plant tour, emergency procedures, witnessing of testing in progress and fire prevention/protection. This inspection involved 82 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC Resident Inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

S TO THE STATE OF THE STATE OF

### **DETAILS**

# 1. Persons Contacted

- \*R. D. Ramsay, Plant Superintendent
  - R. D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
- \*M. N. Norem, Resident Startup Engineer
- M. E. Leppke, QA Supervisor
- \*J. S. Diamonon, QC Supervisor
- \*R. Patterson, Supervisor of Operations
- \*J. M. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer
- \*D. A. Backons, Supervisor of Maintenance

The inspector also talked with and interviewed a number of other licensee employees including members of general construction, the operations staff and QA organization personnel.

\*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

# 2. Followup on Previously Identified Items

# Volume Control Tank (VCT)

(50-323/78-08)(Open) The inspector witnessed the requalifying hydrostatic test on the VCT. The pressure was raised to 150% of design (113 lbs.) and held for ten minutes. The pressure was then reduced to design (75 lbs.) and the tank and connecting piping visually inspected. Subsequently, the NDE inspection revealed some irregularities so the engineering evaluation is continuing. This item remains open. (79-06-01)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.


# 3. Fire Protection/Prevention

The control room and the cable spreading rooms were inspected. The fire alarm, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls and fire-fighting equipment were verified to be operable in the cable spreading rooms and 25% of the balance of the plant. The new cable penetration seal material was verified not to be flammable. The modification consisting of the expansion of the sprinkler system and additional piping restraints is continuing.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

# 4. Plant Tour

The inspector walked through various areas of the plant on a weekly basis to observe activities in progress; to inspect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection



rules; to check the proper approval of "man on the line, caution and clearance" tags on equipment, and to review with operations the status of various systems in the plant.


The inspector noted that the status of the systems and the house-keeping appeared consistent with construction activities. Extra personnel are still assigned to cleanup crews and cleanliness of the plant is still improving.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

# 5. <u>Procedures</u>

The inspector examined the plant's emergency procedures for completeness and for conformance with the FSAR, the proposed technical specifications and RG 1.33. Following is a list of emergency procedures not yet written:

- a. Loss of Containment Integrity
- b. Loss of Protective System Channel
- c. Inability to Drive Control Rods
- d. Combating Hydrogen Explosions
- e. Irradiated Fuel Damage While Refueling
- f. Fuel Handling Accident
- g. Single Reactor Coolant Pump Locked Rotor
- h. Rupture of a Control Rod Mechanism Housing (RCCA Ejection)
- i. Rupture of a Volume Control Tank
- j. Under Frequency Accident
- k. Uncontrolled Boron Dilution
- 1. Excessive Heat Removal Due to FW System Malfunction
- m. Excessive Load Increase
- n. Accidental Depressurization of the RCS
- o. Accidental Depressurization of the MSS
- p. Spurious Operation of SIS at Power
- q. Abnormal, Offnormal and Alarm Conditions



A licensee representative stated that some of these procedures were being written; however, all with the exception of 5f and 5e would be written prior to fuel loading. The other two would be written prior to the subject activities taking place. These procedures will be examined prior to fuel loading. (79-11-01)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

# 6. Preoperational Testing

Only part of one safety-related test was performed during this report period. The inspector witnessed part of that test (31.1.1 Security System Power Supply). The inspector verified that the procedure was technically adequate; the latest version was available and approved; and the overall crew performance was adequate.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

# 7. Exit Interview

The inspector met with a senior licensee representative on a weekly basis and with the representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on April 20, 1979. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized by the inspector. The licensee made no additional comments or commitments aside from those in Paragraph 5.

4 7 .