

CATEGORY 1

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 FACIL: 50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275
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 OATLEY, D.H. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 99-004-00: on 990706, TS 3.8.1.1c was not met. Caused by
 personnel error. Event summary was issued to all operating
 personnel. With 990805 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 7
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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***Pacific Gas and
Electric Company***

David H. Oatley
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August 5, 1999

PG&E Letter DCL-99-093

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
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Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 1-1999-004-00
Technical Specification 3.8.1.1c, Not Met Due to Personnel Error

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

PG&E is submitting the enclosed licensee event report regarding Technical Specification 3.8.1.1c., not being met due to personnel error.

This event was not risk significant and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,

David H. Oatley

cc: Steven D. Bloom
Ellis W. Merschoff
David L. Proulx
Diablo Distribution
INPO

Attachment

TLH/2246/N0002099

9908100232 990805
PDR ADOCK 05000275
S PDR

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Diablo Canyon Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5						PAGE (3) 1 OF 6	
TITLE (4) Technical Specification 3.8.1.1c, Not Met Due to Personnel Error																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME						DOCKET NUMBER		
07	06	1999	1999	- 0 0 4 -	0 0	08	05	1999									
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR: (11)															
1		<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <u> X </u> 10 CFR <u>50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)</u> </div>															
POWER LEVEL (10)		<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <u> </u> OTHER <u> </u> </div>															
1 0 0		(SPECIFY IN ABSTRACT BELOW AND IN TEXT, NRC FORM 366A)															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
Roger Russell - Senior Regulatory Services Engineer														TELEPHONE NUMBER			
														AREA CODE		545-4327	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX								
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MON	DAY	YR	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO							
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines.) (16)																	
<p>On July 6, 1999, at 1105 PDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, "A.C. Sources," Action c, was exceeded when TS 4.8.1.1a was not performed within 1 hour of declaring the offsite 230 kV startup power source inoperable with a diesel generator inoperable.</p> <p>On July 6, 1999, at 1112 PDT, TS 4.8.1.1a was performed successfully by demonstrating the operability of the remaining A.C. sources.</p> <p>The condition was discovered by a licensed shift foreman (SFM) in the control room and was caused by personnel error. The SFM became distracted with other impending plant activities and failed to direct performance of the surveillance within the required time limit.</p> <p>An event summary was issued to all operating personnel. The summary discussed the event and defined operations expectations for performing nonroutine conditional surveillances. Surveillance Test Procedure M-75, "4kV Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration," will be enhanced to assure the operators perform conditional surveillance within required times. Similar surveillance procedures will be reviewed to incorporate lessons learned from this event.</p>																	

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Diablo Canyon Unit 1	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	5	1999	-	0	0	4	-	0	0	2	OF	6

TEXT

I. Plant Conditions

Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 100 percent power.

I. Description of Problem

A. Summary

On July 6, 1999, at 1105 PDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, "A.C. Sources," Action c, was exceeded when TS 4.8.1.1.1a was not performed within 1 hour of declaring the offsite 230 kV startup power source (JX) inoperable and a diesel generator (DG)(EK) inoperable.

On July 6, 1999, at 1112 PDT, TS 4.8.1.1.1a was performed successfully by demonstrating the operability of the remaining A.C. sources.

B. Background

TS 3.8.1.1, limiting condition for operation (LCO) Action c, requires that operability of the remaining A.C. power sources be demonstrated operable by performing TS 4.8.1.1.1a within 1 hour of declaring one offsite circuit and one DG inoperable.

TS 4.8.1.1.1a requires that each of the required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (EJ) be determined operable by verifying correct breaker (EJ)(BKR) alignments and indicated power availability. Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) I-1C, "Operability Checks Of Independent Circuits," is performed to meet the routine surveillance requirement, and a partial STP I-1C, consisting of Attachment 11.4, is performed to meet the conditional surveillance requirement.

TS 4.3.2.1 and Table 4.3-2, items 7a and 7b, requires that the 4 kV undervoltage and time delay relays be surveillance tested. STP M-75, "4kV Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration," is performed to meet this routine surveillance requirement.

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TEXT

C. Event Description

STP M-75 is a complex procedure that is performed to calibrate multiple 4 kV sensing and time delay relays. During the performance of this test, multiple TS entries are required. Due to the test complexity requiring multiple LCO entries, a TS Tracking Sheet is included with the procedure as an aid to the control room operators to identify and track the TS status.

On July 6, 1999, at 0400 PDT, plant operators verified that both offsite power sources were operable, then removed DG 1-1 from service. This action was taken to prevent an inadvertent DG start while calibrating the vital 4 kV undervoltage and time delay relays in accordance with STP M-75.

On July 6, 1999, at 0746 PDT, the oncoming operating shift declared auxiliary power inoperable and entered TS 3.8.1.1c for 4 kV relay calibration in accordance with STP M-75.

On July 6, 1999, at 0750 PDT, the auxiliary power was declared operable.

On July 6, 1999, at 0758 PDT, TS 4.8.1.1.1a was satisfied by performing a partial STP I-1C.

On July 6, 1999, at 1005 PDT, plant operators entered TS 3.8.1.1c and declared startup power inoperable per STP M-75.

On July 6, 1999, at 1105 PDT, the 1 hour allowed to perform TS 4.8.1.1.1a, required by TS 3.8.1.1c with one offsite power circuit and one DG inoperable, was exceeded. During this event the licensed shift foreman (SFM) in the control room self-identified the need to perform the conditional surveillance, and it was performed 7 minutes late.

On July 6, 1999, at 1112 PDT, TS 4.8.1.1.1a was satisfied by performing a partial STP I-1C demonstrating the operability of the remaining A.C. sources.

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TEXT

D. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event

None

E. Dates and Approximate Times for Major Occurrences

1. July 6, 1999, at 0400 PDT: DG 1-1 was declared inoperable.
2. July 6, 1999, at 1005 PDT: Startup power was declared inoperable.
3. July 6, 1999, at 1105 PDT: TS 3.8.1.1c was not met.
4. July 6, 1999, at 1112 PDT: TS 4.8.1.1.1a was completed successfully.

F. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

None.

G. Method of Discovery

The event was discovered by a licensed SFM in the control room.

H. Operator Actions

Licensed plant operators in the control room identified the missed TS surveillance and promptly completed a partial STP I-1C.

I. Safety System Responses

None.

III. Cause of the Problem

A. Immediate Cause

The A.C. offsite power verification surveillance required by TS 3.8.1.1c was not performed within 1 hour of declaring startup power inoperable with DG 1-1 inoperable.

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TEXT

B. Root Cause

The condition was discovered by a licensed SFM in the control room and was caused by personnel error. The SFM became distracted with other impending plant activities and failed to perform the surveillance within the required time limit.

IV. Analysis of the Event

The successful completion of a partial STP I-1C confirmed that all applicable independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system were operable, and the offsite power sources were available. Therefore, the missed surveillance is not considered risk significant and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

V. Corrective Actions

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

An event summary was issued to all operating personnel. The summary discussed the event and defined the Operations management expectations for performing nonroutine conditional surveillances.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

1. STP M-75 will be enhanced to assure the operators perform conditional TS actions within required times.
2. Similar surveillance procedures will be reviewed to incorporate the lessons learned from this event.
3. The SFM involved has been counseled regarding management's expectation for immediately for completing conditional surveillances and properly prioritization of items demanding attention.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed Components

None.

B. Previous Similar Events

LER 2-97-001, "Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action b, Not Met Due to Personnel Error," reported a missed conditional surveillance required within 1 hour by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b, due to personnel error (cognitive) by the SFM. The corrective action consisted of counseling the SFM who reviewed the STP.

LER 1-97-014, "Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action b, Not Met Due to Personnel Error," reported a missed conditional surveillance required within 8 hours by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b, due to personnel error (cognitive) by the shift technical advisor (STA) and the SFM. The corrective actions consisted of counseling the STA and SFM and adding timing devices.

LER 1-98-005, "Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action b, Not Met Due to Personnel Error," reported a missed conditional surveillance required within 1 hour by TS 3.8.1.1, Action b, due to personnel error (cognitive) by the two licensed SFM. The corrective action consisted of counseling the SFM, adding an annunciator note to identify the surveillance requirement when a DG is in manual mode, and requiring a log entry when a DG is placed in manual mode to document the observation of offsite power source status.

The corrective actions taken for these LERs would not have prevented this event due to the unique conditions and multiple TS action entries required during performance of STP M-75.

