ACCESSION NBR:9105300097 DOC.DATE: 91/05/23 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL:50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HUG,M.T. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. SHIFFER,A.P. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

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SUBJECT: LER 91-008-00:on 910424, plant operator manually tripped reactor due to inability to manually move control rods into core.Cause unknown.Labeling of fused disconnect panels for control sys & tailboarding of maint personnel.W/910523 ltr.

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

77 Beale Street San Francisco, CA 94106 415/973-4684 TWX 910-372-6587 James D. Shiffer Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation



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May 23, 1991

PG&E Letter No. DCL-91-137

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 1-91-008-00 Manual Reactor Trip Caused by Rod Control Power Supply Fuse Failure Due to Personnel Error

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PG&E is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning a manual reactor trip caused by a rod control power supply fuse failure due to personnel error.

This event has in no way affected the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely, J. D. Shi

cc: Ann P. Hodgdon John B. Martin Phillip J. Morrill Paul P. Narbut Harry Rood CPUC Diablo Distribution INPO

DC1-91-EM-N046

Enclosure

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DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 1 0 7
PERSONNEL ERROR
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) HOH DAY YR YR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MON DAY YR DOCKET NUMBER (5)
OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR: (11)
$\begin{array}{c c} POWER \\ LEVEL \\ (10) $
OTHEROTHE
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) TELEPHONE NUMBER
Martin T. Hug, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer 805 545-4005
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE
TURER TO NPRDS
B A A F U S 1 5 6 Yes
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
SUBMISSION DATE X NO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (16)
On April 24, 1991, at 1827 PDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 (Startup) at 2 percent power, a plant operator manually tripped the reactor due to inability to manually move control rods into the core due to a rod control urgent failure alarm condition. Immediately preceeding the trip, on April 24, 1991, at 1819 PDT, the unit had been taken critical and reactor power stabilized for plant testing. Following initial data collection, the plant operator stepped control rods out to increase power to approximately 2.0 percent reactor thermal power (RTP) for further testing. At 1822 PDT, a rod control urgent failure alarm was received in the control room. Plant operators confirmed that manual rod control was inhibited, confirmed locally that rod control power cabinet PNIAC had an urgent failure, and initiated a manual reactor trip to terminate the power increase at approximately 2.5 percent RTP. On April 24, 1991, at 2054 PDT, a four-hour, non-emergency notification was made in

The root cause of this event is unknown. However, based on investigations of possible causes, PG&E believes that the most probable root cause is personnel error. Due to misleading information contained in a 1989 work order, a contract electrician had replaced the power supply fuses in the wrong electrical cabinet thereby inadvertently leaving low reliability fuses in the system. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence include labeling of the fused disconnect panels for the rod control system and tailboarding of maintenance personnel.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)	
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DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	91 - 0 0 8 - 0 0 2 0 7	,
(EXT (17)			_

I. <u>Plant Conditions</u>

Unit 1 was in Mode 2 (Startup) at 2.5 percent power.

II. <u>Description of Event</u>

A. Event:

On April 24, 1991, at 1819 PDT, Unit 1 was taken critical and Reactor Thermal Power (RTP) was stabilized at 10 E-08 amps as indicated on the intermediate range nuclear instrumentation (IG) to record plant data. Following data collection, the control operator began withdrawal of the control rods (AA) to establish a positive start-up rate to take RTP to the point of adding heat.

On April 24, 1991, at 1822 PDT, "Rod Control Urgent Failure" (PK03-17) alarmed in the control room. This alarm inhibited the rod control system (AA) from moving the control rods into the core to terminate the power increase.

Operations personnel were sent to the rod control power supply (AA) cabinet to determine the cause of the urgent failure alarm. The senior control operator reported that power supply cabinet PNIAC had the urgent failure alarm. Due to a slightly positive moderator temperature coefficient at Beginning of Life (BOL) core conditions, RTP increased beyond the intended power level and continued to rise. Plant operators attempted to insert Control Bank D (AA) in the individual bank select from the control room selector. When this was unsuccessful, the shift foreman and shift supervisor concluded that a manual reactor trip was warranted, and the shift foreman ordered the control operator to manually trip the reactor (AC).

On April 24, 1991, at 1827 PDT, the control operator tripped the reactor from a RTP of approximately 2.5 percent.

On April 24, 1991, at 2054 PDT, a four-hour, non-emergency notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).

B. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:

None.

C. Dates and Approximate Times for Major Occurrences.

1. April 24, 1991, at 1822 PDT:

A rod control urgent failure alarm was received in the control room.

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	(-/)													
			2. April 24, 1991, a	it 1827	PDT:	Unit afte to r cont	t 1 w er un regai trol.	as suc n p	manual cessfu ositiv	l]y l] a ve n	tripp attemp rod	oed ots		
	,		3. April 24, 1991, a	at 2054	PDT:	The repo 50.7	four ort r 72 (b	-ho equ) (2	ur, no ired b)(ii)	on-e oy 1 was	emerge 10 CFF 5 made	ency ≀ ≥.	1	
	h É	D.	Other Systems or Second	lary Fun	ctions Af	fected:	:							
			None.											
	E. Method of Discovery:													
			The event was immediate received in the control	ly known room.	n to plan	t opera	ators	du	e to a	lar	ms			
		F.	Operators Actions:											
	4		Plant operators initiat as directed by the shif	ed a man t forema	nual reac an.	tor tri	ip to	te	rminat	e t	he ev:	/ent	,	
		G.	Safety System Responses	:										
	. *		The reactor trip breake the core terminating th	ers (AA) e event	(BKR) ope •	ned and	l rod	s w	ere in	ser	ted i	into)	
	III.	<u>Cause</u>	<u>e_of_the_Event</u>											
		Α.	Immediate Cause:						I					
			One of the three phase fused disconnect panels (PN1AC) failed.	fuses (/ for the	AA)(FU) i e rod con	nside o trol po	one o [.] ower :	f t sup	he thr ply ca	ee bin	bus d et	luct	,	
		Β.	Root Cause:											
			Upon inspection of the fuses were of an "old" and technicians to have 1987 nonconformance rep related LER 1-87-016). corrective action that system be replaced with orders to replace the " the Unit 1 third refuel	fuses, style fu had rel ort (NCF Resolut all "old "new" s old" fus ing outa	it was de use that (liability () DC1-87 tion of t ustyle fus style fus ses were age in 198	termine was kno proble -TI-N10 his pro 30 amp es. Co issued 89.	ed that when by ms, a 19 (so blem fuses orrect and	at y p as ee re s i tiv imp	three lant o docume Sectio quired n the e acti lement	of per nte as rod on ed	the n ators d in .B fo a cont work durin	ine a r rol	2	

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The corrective ac recently failed b order C0038363 fo being properly re	tion work orders were reviewe us duct fuses were not replac und that the "old" bus duct f placed on October 19, 1989.	ed to determine why th ced. A review of work fuses were documented	ie K as
The root cause of unknown. However Based on investig the most probable	the failure to replace the ' , three possible cause scenar ations of these possible caus root cause is personnel erro	"old" bus duct fuses i rios were identified. ses, PG&E believes tha or (scenario no. 3).	is at Due

1. The wrong part may have been withdrawn from warehouse stock.

The possible root cause scenarios and investigations are summarized

to misleading information contained in 1989 corrective action work order COO38363, a contract electrician replaced power supply fuses in the wrong electrical cabinet. The electrician replaced nine fuses in

disconnect, thereby inadvertently leaving low reliability fuses in the

panel PNIAC instead of the intended three fuses in the bus duct

system.

below:

<u>Investigation</u>. This possible cause was eliminated because corrective action taken for the initial problem identified in 1987 (NCR DC1-87-TI-N109) included the removal of all "old" fuses from warehouse stock and required receipt inspection of "new" replacement fuses. Also, an examination of the present warehouse stock found no further evidence of "old" fuses.

2. The wrong part may have been obtained and installed from other stock.

<u>Investigation</u>. This possible cause was eliminated because the replacement work order (C0038363) specified the correct part for the failed location. This was confirmed by an attached warehouse withdrawal slip from a receipt inspected "new" fuse purchase order.

3. The wrong fuses (i.e., the rod control power cabinet instead of the bus duct disconnect) were replaced, leaving the "old" fuses in place.

<u>Investigation</u>. This possible cause is considered credible. A review of the replacement work order (C0038363) identified that the following misleading information was provided to the contract electrician:

a. The scope of the work order identified the location of the bus duct disconnect as "above panel PNIAC"; however, the

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LICENSE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION										
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TEXT (17)										

work plan activity line only stated "replace fuses in fused disconnects."

- b. The job required replacement of three bus duct disconnect fuses; however, nine fuses were provided with the work order. Coincidentally, nine fuses identical to those provided with the work order are located within panel PNIAC.
- C. Contributory Cause:
 - 1. The issuance of the corrective action work orders in 1989 was based on a verbal request between I&C and electrical maintenance work planning department personnel. PG&E believes that this verbal request led to a miscommunication, resulting in the work planning department staging a total of nine fuses rather than the intended three fuses.
 - 2. The bus duct fused disconnect panels were not uniquely labeled. This may have led the contract electrician to believe that he had replaced the fuses at the correct location.
- IV. Analysis of the Event

The rod control system is a Design Class II system for positioning of the reactor control rods for reactor power modulation by manual or automatic control of control rod banks in a preselected sequence, and for manual operation of individual banks. The urgent failure alarm is actuated when any one of the preset parameters is actuated. This alarm, when received due to a power supply failure, inhibits further rod motion until the alarm condition is resolved. This control feature is provided to stop further rod action that may result in an unintended rod position. The rod control system is provided electrical power from the nonsafety-related motor generator set through the safety-related reactor trip breakers to the rod control system and the control rod grippers. The failure described in this LER had no effect on any safety-related portion of the reactor trip system. Therefore, the manual reactor trip initiated during this event represents a conservative course of action.

In the event of an increase in neutron flux at low power, the nuclear instrumentation system is designed to provide automatic reactor trip signals. Two of these signals were available to terminate the unintended power increase in the unlikely event that manual operator action was not taken. The intermediate range neutron flux reactor trip is designed to trip the reactor when one of two intermediate range channels measures a power level greater than 25 percent RTP as stated in FSAR Update Section 15.2.1.1.2. The power range high neutron flux reactor trip (low setting) is designed to trip the reactor when two of four power range channels indicate a power level greater than 25 percent RTP as stated in FSAR Update Section

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DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1

TEXT (17)

15.2.1.1.3. Both of these reactor trips require manual operator action to block the trips in order to intentionally increase RTP above 25 percent. Therefore, in the event that plant operators had not tripped the reactor manually, the reactor would have automatically tripped when the 25 percent RTP threshold was exceeded.

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Therefore, based upon the above analysis, the health and safety of the public were not adversely effected, and there were no adverse consequences or safety implications resulting from this event.

- V. <u>Corrective Actions</u>
 - A. Immediate Corrective Actions:

All the bus duct disconnect fuses for the rod drive control system were replaced.

- B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
 - 1. The bus duct disconnect panels will be uniquely labeled consistent with plant procedures.
 - 2. The electrical maintenance manager will provide a tailboard briefing to maintenance personnel regarding this event, emphasizing how informal communication contributed to this event.
 - 3. A review was conducted of plant procedures that administratively control the implementation of corrective actions required as the result of nonconforming conditions. This review concluded that these administrative controls have been significantly strengthened since 1989 and, therefore, no further procedural changes are required.

VI. <u>Additional Information</u>

A. Failed Components:

Fuse (Shawmut model A60X30-1, Amp Trap, Type 1, Form 101, Gould Inc., Newbury Port, Ma.)

B. Previous LERs on Similar Events:

LER 1-87-016-01 (NCR DC1-87-TI-N109) - Control Rod Power Fuses

This LER addressed the failure of power fuses used in control rod drive cabinet 2AC, which caused control bank A to lock up. The cause of the fuse failure was poor connection of the end cap with the fusible link. A corrective action to prevent recurrence required

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