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SUBJECT: Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-008, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to RCS."

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

77 Beale Street San Francisco, CA 94106 415/972-7000 TWX 910-372-6587 James D. Shiffer Vice President

Nuclear Power Generation

January 4, 1990

PG&E Letter No. DCL-90-004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Response to NRC Bulletin 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems"

Gentlemen:

Howard V. Golub Richard F. Locke

By

Attorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric Company

In accordance with reporting requirement 2 of NRC Bulletin 88-08 (Bulletin), dated June 22, 1988, enclosed is PG&E's confirmation of completion of Bulletin Actions 2 and 3 for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1. The completion of these actions fulfills all requirements of the Bulletin.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Subscribed to in San Francisco, California this 4th day of January 1990.

Respectfully submitted,

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

By D. Shiffer

Vice President Nuclear Power Generation

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of January 1990

Bianca E. Zelnyk, Notary Public for the City and County of San Francisco State of California

TEIG

My commission expires July 30, 1991.



Richard F. Locke

cc: A. P. Hodgdon J. B. Martin M. M. Mendonca P. P. Narbut B. Norton H. Rood CPUC Diablo Distribution

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ENCLOSURE

DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 88-08, "THERMAL STRESSES IN PIPING CONNECTED TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS"

In accordance with reporting requirement 2 of NRC Bulletin 88-08 (Bulletin), dated June 22, 1988, the following provides PG&E's confirmation of completion of Bulletin Actions 2 and 3 for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 1. In December 1989, during the third refueling outage, all actions were completed for Unit 1 in accordance with PG&E's commitments submitted in PG&E letter DCL-88-217, dated October 6, 1988.

Bulletin Action 2

For any unisolable sections of piping connected to the RCS that may have been subjected to excessive thermal stresses, examine nondestructively the welds, heat-affected zones and high stress locations, including geometric discontinuities, in that piping to provide assurance that there are no existing flaws.

... Action 2 should be completed before the end of the next refueling outage.

PG&E Response

To provide assurance that no flaws existed in piping susceptible to thermal stresses, PG&E performed radiographic examination of the welds, heat affected zones and high stress locations, including geometric discontinuities, in unisolable sections of the four DCPP Unit 1 BIT injection lines connected to the RCS (i.e., between the RCS and the first check valve from the RCS). These examinations found no evidence of existing flaws.

Bulletin Action 3

Plan and implement a program to provide continuing assurance that unisolable sections of all piping connected to the RCS will not be subjected to combined cyclic and static thermal and other stresses that could cause fatigue failure during the remaining life of the unit. This assurance may be provided by (1) redesigning and modifying these sections of piping to withstand combined stresses caused by various loads including temporal and spatial distributions of temperature resulting from leakage across valve seats, (2) instrumenting this piping to detect adverse temperature distributions and establishing appropriate limits on temperature distributions, or (3) providing means for ensuring that pressure upstream from

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block valves which might leak is monitored and does not exceed RCS pressure.

... Action 3 should be completed before the end of the next refueling outage.

PG&E Response

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To provide continued assurance that unisolable sections of BIT injection piping connected to the RCS will not be subjected to combined cyclic and static thermal and other stresses that could cause fatigue failure during the remaining life of the unit, option (3) of Bulletin Action 3 was implemented for DCPP Unit 1. As shown in the Attachment, a new isolation valve and pressure indicator (PI) have been installed in the BIT bypass line. Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) I-IC, "Routine Weekly Checks," has been revised to require verification that the PI indicates less than RCS pressure during modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, thereby eliminating the possibility of undetected leakage past the BIT bypass valve.







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