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 FACIL: 50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 KELLEY, W.J. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 SHIFFER, J.D. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 86-024-00: on 860104, missed surveillance on PORV discharge temp channel due to personnel error. W/8 ltr.

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 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

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James D. Shiffer
Vice President
Nuclear Power Generation

May 24, 1989

PG&E Letter No. DCL-89-144



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
Licensee Event Report 1-86-024-00
Missed Surveillance on PORV Discharge Temperature Channel due
to Personnel Error

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PG&E is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning a missed surveillance on PORV discharge temperature channel due to personnel error.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'J. D. Shiffer'. The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

J. D. Shiffer

cc: J. B. Martin
M. M. Mendonca
P. P. Narbut
H. Rood
B. H. Vogler
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

Enclosure

DCO-89-TN-N050

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0500012751	OF 05

TITLE (4) **MISSED SURVEILLANCE ON PORV DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE CHANNEL DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	INVESTIGATION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	04	86	86	024	000	05	24	89	Diablo Canyon Unit 2			050001323
												050001

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 100

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE: 805 595-4740

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If you complete expected submission date) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (16)

On January 4, 1986, for Unit 1 and December 11, 1986, for Unit 2, the surveillance interval for Technical Specification (TS) 4.3.3.6, item 13, including the 25 percent extension allowed by TS 4.0.2, was exceeded. These events were discovered on April 28, 1989 during a review of the preventive maintenance overdue report. It was discovered that a surveillance calibration test procedure was not issued for temperature channel TE-463, PORV Common Discharge Header Temperature. Upon discovery, the Shift Foreman for each unit was notified and TE-463 was declared inoperable for both units at 1230 PDT April 28, 1989.

These events were caused by personnel error, cognitive, in that plant personnel reviewing the TS changes for required surveillances failed to identify TE-463 as being applicable to TS 4.3.3.6, item 13. A surveillance calibration test procedure was issued, and performed on TE-463 on May 3, 1989 for Unit 1 and May 2, 1989 for Unit 2, and the affected instruments were declared operable.

To preclude recurrence, an independent review of the TS and the Surveillance Test Procedures will be performed to ensure all required surveillances are identified, proceduralized, and are being performed.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

I. Initial Conditions

Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at various modes and at various power levels while this condition existed.

II. Description of Event

A. Event:

On January 4, 1986, for Unit 1 and December 11, 1986, for Unit 2, the surveillance interval for Technical Specification (TS) 4.3.3.6, item 13, including the 25 percent extension allowed by TS 4.0.2, was exceeded. These events were discovered on April 28, 1989 during a review of the preventive maintenance overdue report. It was discovered that a surveillance calibration test procedure was not issued for temperature channel TE-463, PORV Common Discharge Header Temperature(AB)(TI). Upon discovery, the Shift Foreman for each unit was notified and TE-463 was declared inoperable for both units at 1230 PDT April 28, 1989.

The requirement to perform a channel calibration at least once every 18 months was added to the Combined Units 1 and 2 TS. The Combined Units 1 and 2 TS were issued with the Full Power Operating License for Unit 2 on August 26, 1985. During this time period, Unit 1 was in the final stages of the startup test program, and achieved initial commercial operation. Unit 2 had received a low power license, and was in the process of achieving initial criticality. Plant departments conducted a review of the Combined TS and compared them to surveillance test procedures to ensure all required surveillances were proceduralized. However, this review did not identify that a separate calibration procedure was required for TE-463.

B. Inoperable structures, components, or systems that contributed to the event:

None

C. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

1. August 26, 1985: Combined TS issued with a new 18 month surveillance requirement.
2. January 4, 1986: Event date for Unit 1. TE-463 calibration surveillance test not performed in accordance with TS.
3. December 11, 1986: Event date for Unit 2. TE-463 calibration surveillance test not performed in accordance with TS.

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FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

- 4. April 28, 1989, at 1230 PDT: Discovery Date. TE-463 for both units declared inoperable.
- 5. May 2, 1989: Surveillance test was performed on Unit 2,
- 6. May 3, 1989: Surveillance test was performed on Unit 1.

D. Other systems or secondary functions affected:
None

E. Method of discovery:
These events were discovered by an I&C Engineer during the routine review of overdue preventive maintenance activities.

F. Operator actions:
Upon notification of the problem, the Shift Foreman of each unit declared TE-463 for each unit inoperable, entering TS action statement 3.3.3.6.a.

G. Safety system responses:
None

III. Cause of event:

- A. Immediate cause:
The cause of this event was failure to perform an adequate review of the TS changes by plant departments.
- B. Root cause:
Personnel error, cognitive, in that personnel responsible for identifying equipment after the issuance of the combined TS requiring surveillance tests failed to identify that TE-463 required a surveillance calibration test procedure.

IV. Analysis of Event:

The PORV tailpipe temperature indicator, TE-463, provides additional indication of a PORV that is not fully closed. The calibration check performed May 3, 1989 for Unit 1 and May 2, 1989 for Unit 2, confirmed TE-463 to be within calibration limits

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

and fully functional. A review of maintenance history records disclosed that TE-463 was not removed from service for any time greater than the seven days allowed by TS 3.3.3.6.a.

Therefore, for both units, TE-463 was calibrated and with the exception of maintenance, was fully functional throughout the period of this event, and would have performed its intended safety function.

Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

V. Corrective Actions:

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

1. A surveillance calibration test procedure was issued and performed on TE-463 on May 3, 1989 for Unit 1 and May 2, 1989 for Unit 2, and the affected instruments were declared operable. STP I-83C, "Calibration of Pressurizer PORV Temperature Channel 463," was added to the Recurring Task Scheduler, and AP C-3S1, "Surveillance Testing and Inspection," Attachment 6.3 and 6.4 of the Master Markup was modified to include the surveillance requirement.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

1. An independent review of the TS and the Surveillance Test Procedures will be performed to ensure all required surveillances are identified, proceduralized, and are being performed.
2. PG&E Quality Assurance will conduct an audit of the recent license amendments to ensure that all new and revised regulatory requirements requiring surveillances are identified, implemented in procedures, and are performed when required.
3. AP C-3S1, "Surveillance Testing and Inspection" and AP A-55, "Technical Specification Change Process," will be revised to provide further guidance regarding the responsibility for updating AP C-3S1 due to license amendments.

VI. Additional Information:

A. Failed components:

None

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	PREVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 266A's) (17)

B. Previous LERs on similar events:

LER 2-88-026-00 concerned the failure to perform a surveillance test on the reactor vessel head vent valves in accordance with TS 4.0.5. This event was caused by personnel error, in that, engineering and operations personnel reviewing the test requirements for the reactor vessel head vent valves concluded that the surveillance frequency requirements of TS 4.4.11 met the IST Program requirements. Corrective actions included revising the Recurring Task Scheduler and the applicable STP. Since that event involved a different TS surveillance requirement, and occurred after this event, the corrective actions taken for LER 2-88-026-00 would not have prevented this occurrence.

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