

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8903300158 DOC. DATE: 89/03/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 MARBURGER, D.C. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 SHIFFER, J.D. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 84-040-00: on 840720, CCW & ASW sys design basis requirements not incorporated into plant procedures.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 10
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

| | RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME | COPIES LTR ENCL | RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME | COPIES LTR ENCL |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| | PD5 LA | 1 1 | PD5 PD | 1 1 |
| | ROOD, H | 1 1 | | |
| INTERNAL: | ACRS MICHELSON | 1 1 | ACRS MOELLER | 2 2 |
| | ACRS WYLIE | 1 1 | AEOD/DOA | 1 1 |
| | AEOD/DSP/TPAB | 1 1 | AEOD/ROAB/DSP | 2 2 |
| | DEDRO | 1 1 | IRM/DCTS/DAB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/ADE 8H | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/ADS 7E | 1 0 |
| | NRR/DEST/CEB 8H | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/ESB 8D | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/MEB 9H | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/MTB 9H | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/PSB 8D | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/RSB 8E | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/SGB 8D | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 | 1 1 | NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 | 1 1 | NRR/DREP/RAB 10 | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DREP/RPB 10 | 2 2 | NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A | 1 1 |
| | NUDOCS-ABSTRACT | 1 1 | <u>REG FILE</u> 02 | 1 1 |
| | RES/DSIR/EIB | 1 1 | RES/DSR/PRAB | 1 1 |
| | RGN5 FILE 01 | 1 1 | | |
| EXTERNAL: | EG&G WILLIAMS, S | 4 4 | FORD BLDG HOY, A | 1 1 |
| | H ST LOBBY WARD | 1 1 | LPDR | 1 1 |
| | NRC PDR | 1 1 | NSIC MAYS, G | 1 1 |
| | NSIC MURPHY, G.A | 1 1 | | |

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTR 45 ENCL 44

A104 cc

R
I
D
S
/
A
D
D
S
/
A
D
D
S



2
V

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
050000275

PAGE (3)
1 OF 9

TITLE (4)
CCH AND ASH SYSTEMS DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENTS NOT INCORPORATED INTO PLANT PROCEDURES DUE TO INADEQUATE TRACKING OF RESOLUTION FOR CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATION

| EVENT DATE (6) | | | LER NUMBER (8) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5) | | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|--|--|-------------------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENCE NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | | | DOCKET NUMBER (1) |
| 07 | 20 | 84 | 84 | 040 | 00 | 03 | 24 | 89 | Diablo Canyon Unit 2 | | | 050000323 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | 050000 |

OPERATING MODE (9): **3**

POWER LEVEL (10): **090**

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (11)

10 CFR **50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)**

OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 352A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

DAVID C. MARBURGER, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER

TELEPHONE NUMBER
810091595-4554

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFAC TURE | REPORTABLE TO NRC | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFAC TURE | REPORTABLE TO NRC | |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|--|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

| | | |
|-------|-----|------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
| | | |

ABSTRACT (16)

On February 22, 1989, at 1615 hours PST, DCPD determined that engineering recommendations for plant operation to assure compliance with the design basis for the CCH system and the ASW system were not incorporated in plant operating and emergency procedures. This resulted in a lack of detailed procedural guidance to assure that DCPD would remain within design requirements under all conditions. A one hour non-emergency notification was made on February 22, 1989, at 1615 hours PST, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(i)(B).

Operating requirements to ensure compliance with the CCH and ASW systems design bases were identified by Engineering. The plant procedures were not revised to incorporate these requirements. Appropriate plant procedures were revised on February 2, 1989, to implement these requirements.

The root cause of this event is inadequate tracking of resolution for correspondence and communication specific to engineering design basis constraints on plant operation.

To prevent recurrence, correspondence files and operating procedures will be reviewed to ensure engineering constraints on plant operations have been incorporated into plant procedures. An expeditious review of the FSAR will be performed by June 30, 1989, to ensure design bases summarized in the FSAR are implemented in plant procedures. A detailed review of plant procedures will be performed to assure proper incorporation of appropriate system design bases. The applicable Engineering procedure will be revised to provide instructions for communicating information to the plant.

2580S/0067K

8903300158 890324
PDR ADDCK 05000275
S PIC

FE 22 11



2

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|-----|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | 8 4 | 0 4 0 | 0 0 | 0 2 | 0 9 |
| OF | | | | | | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Initial Conditions

Both Units 1 and 2 have operated in various modes and at various power levels without procedural guidance to place the second CCW heat exchanger in service (1) following a LOCA or (2) in the event a bus F or G CCW pump was removed from service.

II. Description of Event

A. Event:

1. Background

The performance of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System (CC) has been analyzed for accident response under various combinations of heat loads, component alignments and water temperatures.

Acceptance criteria were established for the peak temperature of the CCW water temperature. To satisfy the acceptance criteria, certain actions are required by the operator in order to be consistent with the assumptions used in the calculations and to keep the CCW temperature within specified limits. This information was provided by two Engineering letters dated January 3, 1984, and February 14, 1984.

2. January 3, 1984 letter.

On January 3, 1984, an Engineering letter was issued to Nuclear Plant Operations (NPO) regarding CCW temperature criteria to assure compliance with the design basis. This letter was based on a worst case CCW heat load resulting from the single failure loss of one Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW)(BS)(P) pump with all safeguards and vital buses active following a LOCA. The CCW temperatures did not exceed 132°F peak; however, at the end of 20 minutes CCW temperature remained above 120°F. To ensure that CCW temperature returns below 120°F, the operator is required to reduce the heat load or to add more cooling capacity within 20 minutes.

This requirement and the calculation results were submitted to the NRC on April 4, 1983 and are documented in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement 16, pages 9-5, 6, and 7, August, 1983, and in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Update page 9.2-5. The procedural requirement to take action to reduce CCW temperature is contained in Annunciator Response Procedure PK01-06, "CCW Vital Header A-B," which directs the operators to place a second CCW heat exchanger in service on high CCW water temperature. However, this action was not included in appropriate plant operating and emergency procedures.

2580S/0067K



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

| | | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------|----|-----|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | LER NUMBER (8) | | | PAGE (3) | | |
| | | YEAR 8 4 | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 0 | REVISION NUMBER 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 0 3 | OF | 0 9 |

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

3. February 14, 1984, letter.

On October 27, 1983, an Engineering letter was written to NPO indicating that in a condition where either CCH pump (P) 1-1 or 1-2 was out of service for greater than 72 hours, the second CCH heat exchanger (HX) should be placed in service to assure that the CCH system provides sufficient cooling to various components upon a LOCA with concurrent failure of vital bus H (EB)(BU). Failure of bus H would make a second CCH pump inoperable and would prevent automatic isolation of the non-vital "C" header.

This information was incorporated in a February 14, 1984 letter from NPO to the plant. This letter recommended that Operating Procedure (OP) F-2, "Component Cooling Water System," and Emergency Procedures (EP) OP-1, "Loss of Coolant Accident," and EP OP-11, "Loss of CCH," be modified to accomplish the intent of the October 27, 1983 letter.

4. Event.

On July 20, 1984, Unit 1 initially entered Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). The plant procedures did not reflect the operator actions recommended by the Engineering letters.

5. Discovery and Initial Report to NRC.

On January 26, 1989, the NRC SSFI/SSOMI Team questioned whether Operations had revised procedures as recommended by the NPO letter of February 14, 1984.

On January 27, 1989, Operations determined that the plant operating and emergency procedures had not incorporated the recommendations transmitted in the NPO February 14, 1984 letter. The investigation also identified the January 3, 1984 Project Engineering letter which had transmitted criteria for the operation of the CCH and ASW systems to NPO. The January 3, 1984, letter was not sent to the plant, and these criteria were not incorporated in plant operating procedures.

On February 2, 1989, Emergency Procedure EP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," Operating Procedure OP E-5:II, "Auxiliary Saltwater System - Two CCH Heat Exchanger Operation," and other interfacing procedures were revised to include the recommended information.

2580S/0067K



2
V

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|---|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | OF | 9 |
| | | 8 4 | 0 4 0 | 0 0 | | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A Nonconformance Report was written and a Technical Review Group (TRG) met on February 22, 1989. The TRG determined that the operating requirements to assure compliance with the design bases for the ASW and CCH systems had not been incorporated into plant procedures, resulting in a lack of procedural guidance to assure that DCPP would remain within design requirements under all conditions, i.e., there were no directions to the operator to place a second CCH heat exchanger into service, within 20 minutes following a LOCA when one ASW pump is out of service or when a bus F or G CCH pump is removed from service.

A one hour non-emergency notification was made at 1639 hours PST on February 22, 1989, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B).

B. Inoperable structures, components, or systems that contributed to the event:

None.

C. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

1. August, 1983: Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement 16 was issued.
2. October 27, 1983: Engineering letter to NPO.
3. January 3, 1984: Engineering letter to NPO which transmitted operating requirements to assure compliance with the design bases for the CCH and ASW systems.
4. February 14, 1984: NPO letter to the plant recommending revision of plant procedures, as identified by the October 27, 1983 Engineering letter.
5. July 20, 1984: Event Date--Initial entry of DCPP Unit 1 into Mode 3.
6. January 26, 1989: The NRC SSFI/SSOMI Team questioned whether Operations had revised procedures as recommended by NPO letter of February 14, 1984.
7. January 27, 1989: Operations identified that the February 14, 1984, recommendation had not been incorporated into the plant procedures.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | LER NUMBER (5) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR 8 4 | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 0 | REVISION NUMBER 0 0 | 0 5 | 0 9 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

- 8. February 2, 1989: Procedures EP E-0 and OP E-5:II and other interfacing procedures were revised to include the recommended information.
- 9. February 22, 1989: Discovery Date - It was determined that there was a lack of procedural guidance to assure that DCPD would remain within design requirements under all conditions.
- 10. February 22, 1989: One hour notification was made to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B) at 1639 hours PST

D. Other systems or secondary functions affected.

None.

E. Method of discovery:

During the January, 1989, NRC SSFI/SSOMI Team inspection, the February 14, 1984, NPO letter was reviewed and Operations was asked if the appropriate plant procedures had been reviewed. Subsequent investigation showed that the letter information had not been incorporated into the procedures. The January 3, 1984, letter was identified during the investigation. A TRG subsequently determined that the letters, license basis and design basis were mutually consistent and the plant operating and emergency procedures did not specify the appropriate actions in accordance with the basis.

F. Operator actions:

None.

G. Safety system responses:

None.

III. Cause of Event

A. Immediate Cause:

Operating requirements to assure compliance with the design bases for the CCW and ASW systems were established by Engineering and transmitted by letters to NPO. However, the recommendations of the letters were not incorporated in the appropriate plant operating and emergency procedures.

2580S/0067K



| | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|-----|
| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | 8 4 | 0 4 0 | 0 0 | 0 6 | 0 9 |
| DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | | | | | OF |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

B. Root Cause:

The root cause was determined to be inadequate tracking of resolution of correspondence and communications specific to engineering design basis constraints on plant operations. The tracking methods governed only design information related to hardware and did not apply for design basis (non-hardware) related subjects.

IV. Analysis of Event

The CCH system supplies cooling to a number of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) equipment including the containment fan cooler units (CFCU)(BK)(CLR) and cooling for the ECCS motors and pumps.

Following a LOCA, the CFCU heat load increases in response to increased containment temperature. This causes increased temperature of the CCH water leaving the heat exchanger. The amount of increase is of concern as the CCH system is still supplying cooling flow to safety related components other than the CFCUs. Acceptance criteria are established to define the limit of the increase which can be accepted by these other components without impairment of their function.

The ASW system provides transfer of heat from the CCH heat exchangers to the ultimate heat sink. Consequently the configuration of the two systems is intertied and directly affects their performance and the operation of the two systems is closely interrelated. CCH and ASW performance is evaluated to show the expected maximum temperatures reached for various assumed parameters.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12, "Ultimate Heat Sink," requires that if the ASW temperature were to increase to 64°F, the second CCH heat exchanger must be placed in service for continued plant operation.

As described in Section II, Description of Event, there are two Engineering letters which identified actions to be taken regarding:

- A loss of an ASW pump during a LOCA and
- A CCH pump being out of service.

These are discussed as follows.

Loss of ASW Pump

An analysis performed by Westinghouse in 1983 concluded that a single failure of an ASW pump coincident with a LOCA would result in CCH temperatures that

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------|--------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR 8 4 | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 0 | REVISION NUMBER 0 0 | 0 7 | OF 0 9 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

require operator action within 20 minutes (i.e., place a second CCW heat exchanger into service). However, a refined analysis performed by PG&E Nuclear Engineering and Construction Services (NECS) and Westinghouse (letter PGE 89-570, February 16, 1989) shows that the CCW temperature does not rise beyond the limits of operation of the cooled ESF components for the condition of one heat exchanger and one ASW pump in operation; with ASW temperature of 64°F; with ASW flow of 10,500 gallons per minute; and with initial CCW water temperature of 75°F. These limits should not be exceeded in plant operation.

CCW Pump Out of Service

PG&E calculation No. M-464, dated August 17, 1983, concluded that for one CCW pump and one CCW heat exchanger in operation and the non vital "C" CCW header not isolated, the CCW flow supplied to the safety related equipment is reduced to approximately 75 percent of design flow until operator action can be taken to manually isolate the "C" header (reference: February 14, 1983 NPO letter).

The February 14, 1983, letter requested that a second CCW heat exchanger be put in service in the event that CCW pumps 1-1 or 1-2 were out of service. This would assure sufficient cooling to the vital components. This requirement was not reflected in plant operating procedures and, as a result, there have been instances where a CCW pump was out of service with one operating CCW heat exchanger.

Based on an assessment performed by Westinghouse, with one CCW pump supplying all three CCW headers the maximum CCW temperature will peak at less than 132°F and will reduce to less than 120°F within 20 minutes. Further, this preliminary Westinghouse assessment concluded that the FSAR containment integrity analysis remained valid.

Although the effect of the short term reduced CCW flow was not quantitatively evaluated for all individual components, the probability of a concurrent loss of coolant accident, loss of bus H, and a high sea water temperature, is low. Further, a review of 1987 and 1988 clearance records determined that the bus F and G CCW pumps out-of-service time during operation was low. Therefore, the probability of a concurrent LOCA, a bus F or G CCW pump being taken out of service, high sea water temperature, loss of bus H, and failure of a safety related component due to the short term reduction in flow, was very low.

Therefore, although DCPD was operated without the recommended procedure changes, based on the above, there was no compromise to the safe operation of the plant. Accordingly, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

| | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) 0 8 OF 0 9 |
| | | YEAR 8 4 | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 0 | REVISION NUMBER 0 0 | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

V. Corrective Actions

A. Immediate Corrective Actions:

1. Changes were made on February 2, 1989, to appropriate plant procedures as follows:
 - a. Emergency Procedure EP E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," has been revised to add a new step to verify that both ASW pumps started following a safety injection. If one pump starts, the operator is instructed to place the second CCH heat exchanger in service in accordance with operating procedure E-5:II, "Auxiliary Saltwater System-Two CCH Heat Exchanger Operation."
 - b. Operating Procedure OP E-5:II, "Auxiliary Saltwater System - Two CCH Heat Exchanger Operation," has been completely revised to provide clear, adequate guidance regarding actions necessary to meet the design requirements.
2. Corresponding reference changes were made to interfacing procedures:
 - OP E-5 "Auxiliary Saltwater System"
 - OP E-5:I "Auxiliary Saltwater System - Make Available"
 - OP F-2 "Component Cooling Water System"
 - OP F-2:V "Component Cooling Water System - Operation During Plant Cooldown"
 - OP AP-11 Abnormal Procedure - "Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System"
 - PK01-01 Annunciator Response - "ASW System Heat Exchanger Dp/Hdr Pressure"
 - PK01-06 Annunciator Response - "CCH Vital Hdr A/B"
3. A plant Operations Shift Order was immediately issued to provide interim instructions until these procedure changes were implemented. Shift training sessions were immediately conducted.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

1. PG&E will review the correspondence files and plant operating procedures to ensure that engineering correspondence and communications specific to constraints on plant operations have been appropriately incorporated into plant procedures.
2. An expeditious review of the FSAR will be performed by system and design engineers to ensure that the design bases summarized in the FSAR are appropriately implemented in plant procedures. This review will be completed by June 30, 1989. A more thorough review of the FSAR design bases will be performed during the development of the DCMs discussed in item 3 below.

2580S/0067K



3

4

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|---|-----|
| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (8) | | | PAGE (3) | | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | | |
| | | 8 4 | 0 4 0 | 0 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 9 |

DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1

0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5

0 9 OF 0 9

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

3. A Configuration Management Program was initiated in late 1988 to incorporate detailed system design basis information into existing Design Criteria Memoranda (DCM) and prepare additional DCMs as necessary. After completion of the system DCMs, the plant will perform a detailed review of plant procedures to assure the proper incorporation of appropriate system design bases. An Action Plan will be developed to track this procedure review process. PG&E is confident that the procedural deficiencies discussed in this LER would have been identified and corrected as part of the Configuration Management Program.
4. Nuclear Engineering Manual Procedure (NEMP) 3.6 ON, "Operating Nuclear Power Plant Design Changes," will be revised to specify that Engineering-identified constraints on operating practices will be communicated to the plant via the design change process.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed Components:

None.

B. Previous LERs:

None.

2580S/0067K

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

77 Beale Street
San Francisco, CA 94106
415/972-7000
TWX 910-372-6587

James D. Shiffer
Vice President
Nuclear Power Generation

March 24, 1989

PG&E Letter No. DCL-89-078



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 1-84-040-00
CCW and ASW System Design Basis Requirements Not Incorporated
into Plant Procedures Due to Inadequate Tracking of Resolution
for Correspondence and Communication

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), PG&E is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report regarding component cooling water (CCW) system and auxiliary saltwater (ASW) system design basis requirements not being incorporated into plant operating and emergency procedures.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'J. D. Shiffer'.

J. D. Shiffer

cc: J. B. Martin
M. M. Mendonca
P. P. Narbut
B. Norton
H. Rood
B. H. Vogler
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

Enclosure

DCO-89-TN-N015

2580S/0067K/JHA/2246

DE22
11

