



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION

GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 2)  
VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS (RTS COMPONENTS)  
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1&2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-275/323

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Salem. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station." As a result of this investigation, the NRC requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983<sup>1</sup>) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

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This report is an evaluation of the response submitted by Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the licensee for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1&2, for Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.

Item 2.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee to confirm that an interface has been established with the NSSS or with the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System which includes:

- a. Periodic communication between the licensee/applicant and the NSSS or the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System, and,
- b. A system of positive feedback which confirms receipt by the licensee/applicant of transmittals of vendor technical information.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1&2 responded to the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) with submittals dated April 18, 1985<sup>2</sup> and March 24, 1987<sup>3</sup>. The licensee stated in these submittals that Westinghouse is the NSSS vendor for the Diablo Canyon units and that the RTS is included as part of the Westinghouse interface program established for these plants. The response also confirms that this interface program includes both periodic communication between Westinghouse and the licensee and positive feedback from the licensee in the form of signed receipts for technical information transmitted by Westinghouse.



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### 3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review of these responses, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.

### 4.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
2. Pacific Gas & Electric Company letter to NRC, J. D. Schiffer to G. W. Knighton, Chief, Division of Licensing, "Generic Letter 83-28 Additional Information," April 18, 1985.
3. Pacific Gas & Electric Company letter to NRC, J. D. Schiffer to Document Control Desk, March 24, 1987

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