### <u>Attachment A</u>

### TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.6.2

### ADDITION OF CHECK VALVES TO TABLE 3.4-1

#### A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST

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This license amendment request (LAR) proposes to add the following check valves to Technical Specification 3.4.6.2, "Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage," Table 3.4-1.

8949 A, B, C and DRHR and SIS first off check values from RCS hot<br/>legs8905 A, B, C and DSIS second off check values from RCS hot legs8740 A and BRHR second off check values from RCS hot legs8802 A and BSIS to RCS hot legs isolation values8703RHR to RCS hot legs isolation value

A footnote was also added to the above valves stating that for flow paths with 3 pressure isolation valves in series, at least 2 of the 3 valves shall meet the requirements of Specification 3.4.6.2f. Also, additional changes were made to the Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirements of Specification 3.4.6.2 to facilitate the addition of the check valves.

Changes to the Technical Specifications of Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82 are noted in the revised copy of the applicable Technical Specification (Attachment B).

B. JUSTIFICATION

The changes are in accordance with the NRC Staff request in Diablo Canyon SSER 31, Section 5.2.8.1, and NRC meeting minutes dated December 9, 1985. The NRC Staff required that two series check valves from both the Safety Injection (SI) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) systems be included in Specification 3.4.6.2 to ensure adequate pressure isolation between the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the lower pressure support systems. Since there are three series valves in each RCS high pressure boundary of the safety injection and residual heat removal systems, three valves for each flowpath will be included in Table 3.4-1 with the requirement that any two out of the three valves meet the requirements of Specification 3.4.6.2f.

Attachment C contains the system drawings as requested by the NRC Staff showing the location of the valves to be added to Table 3.4-1 of Specification 3.4.6.2.

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#### C. SAFETY EVALUATION

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company has evaluated the hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the ... procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards considerations, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

- (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated; or
- (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."

The following evaluation is provided for the significant hazards consideration standards.

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The addition of check valves to Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 is a change that constitutes an additional restriction by requiring leakage testing of the valves. The leakage testing does not affect the accident analysis. Therefore, this license amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change does not necessitate physical alteration of the plant or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

As indicated above, the proposed change constitutes an additional restriction that is not presently included in the DCPP Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications and, therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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### D. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

In conclusion, based on the above safety evaluation, PGandE concludes that the activities associated with this license amendment request satisfy the significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards finding is justified.

E. ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

The proposed changes will not affect the environmental analyses in the FSAR Update, Environmental Report, or the Final Environmental Impact Statement. Therefore, there are no unreviewed environmental questions involved.

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
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# <u>Attachment B</u>

# REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.6.2

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-19	3/4 4-19
3/4 4-20	3/4 4-20
3/4 4-21	3/4 4-21

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

## **OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE**

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:
  - a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,
  - b. 1 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,
  - c. 1 gpm total reactor-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators and 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator.
  - d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System,
  - e. 40 gpm CONTROLLED LEAKAGE at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2235  $\pm$  20 psig, and
  - f. I gpm leakage at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2235  $\pm$  20 psig for Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves as specified in Table 3.4-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

### ACTION:

- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With any Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least two closed manual and/or deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

4.4.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

- a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere particulate or gaseous radioactivity monitor at least once per 12 hours;
- b. Monitoring the containment structure sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours;
- c. Measurement of the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE to the reactor coolant pump seals at least once per 31 days when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is  $2235 \pm 20$  psig with the modulating valve fully open. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.
- d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours, except when Tavg is being changed by greater than 5°F/hour or when diverting reactor coolant to the liquid holdup tank, in which cases the required inventory balance shall be performed within 12 hours after completion of the excepted operation; and
- e. Monitoring the Reactor Head Flange Leakoff System at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.6.2.2 As specified in Table 3.4-1, Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, except that in lieu of any leakage testing required by Specification 4.0.5, each valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit:

- a. Every refueling outage during startup,
- b. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve, and
- c. Within 24 hours following valve actuation due to automatic or manual action or flow through the valve. After each disturbance of the valve, in lieu of measuring leak rate, leak-tight integrity may be verified by absence of pressure buildup in the test line downstream of the valve.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.

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AMENDMENT NOS.

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# TABLE 3.4-1

	ι ·	REACTOR COULANT STSTEM PRESSURE	ISULATION VALVES
Í <u>VALV</u>	E NUMBER		FUNCTION
1.	8948 A, B, (	C, and D	Accumulator, RHR and SIS first off check valves from RCS cold legs
2.	8819 A, B, (	C, and D	SIS second off check valves from RCS cold legs
3.	8818 A, B, (	C, and D	RHR second off check valves from RCS cold legs
4.	8956 A, B, (	C, and D	Accumulator second off check valves from RCS cold legs
5.	8701* and 87	702*	RHR suction isolation valves
6.	8949 <sup>#</sup> A, B,	C, and D	RHR and SIS first off check valves from RCS hot legs
7.	8905 <sup>#</sup> A, B,	C, and D	SIS second off check valves from RCS hot legs
8.	8740 <sup>#</sup> A and	В	RHR second off check valves from RCS hot legs
9.	8802 <sup>*</sup> # A ar	nd B	SIS to RCS hot legs isolation valves
10.	8703* #		RHR to RCS hot legs isolation valve

# REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 4-21

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<sup>\*</sup> Testing per Specification 4.4.6.2.2c. not required.

<sup>#</sup> For flowpaths with 3 pressure isolation valves in series, at least 2 of the 3
valves shall meet the requirements of Specification 3.4.6.2f.

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<u>Attachment C</u>

# SYSTEM DRAWINGS

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
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
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
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September 1985 Revision 1



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