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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

Subcommittee on Diablo Canyon

Holiday Inn
1020 S. Figueroa
Los Angeles, California

Thursday, 19 January 1984

The Subcommittee on Diablo Canyon convened pursuant to notice, at 8:33 a.m., Chester Siess, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

PRESENT FOR THE ACRS:

C. SIESS, Chairman
C. MICHELSON, Member
D. OKRENT, Member
J. EBERSOLE, Member
D. WARD, Member
F. REMICK, Member
H. ETHERINGTON, Member

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MR. SCHIERLING: The issues of concern to the Intervenors and also to the Governor.

MR. OKRENT: The Governor, I gather, is an intervenor?

MR. SCHIERLING: Joint Intervenors and the Governor. There were discussed and testimony was taken on all of these issues that are of concern to these parties at the recent hearings in Laguna Beach. Currently all parties have filed their findings and we are awaiting a decision by the Board, but these are in essence the issues where Joint Intervenors and the Governor have expressed concern that something is outstanding.

Do you want to add to that, Jim?

MR. KNIGHT: Yes. I think to the best of my knowledge, there are very few specific contentions that this feature or that feature of the plant is -- has been demonstrated to be inadequate. The thrust of much of the Intervenors' concern went to the depth of the IDVP, whether or not the process, which was largely based on a sample taken on judgment and followed through, then, and the results in many cases reviewed, the extrapolation of those results based on the judgment, whether or not that process as opposed to a process based on some sound or well-recognized statistical base, x number of pipe supports and therefore a sample of such and such number, a confidence level established and some method

of relating the problems found to that confidence level would be a better process, in fact the process should be used.

That, to me, was the crux of much of the concern. There were then other questions raised, and many times those questions were the result of Staff review. That is, the Staff identified the problem, the Intervenor would then care to perhaps carry that review of that particular aspect of the plant to their own expert and get his opinion. But again, I cannot sit here and identify any particular area or item of the plant that is now a standing contention as to its inadequacy.

MR. OKRENT: Let's take your answer, which was in two parts. Is it your opinion that there are no identified -- I will call them deficiencies or potential deficiencies, where the Intervenor, including the Governor, disagrees with the Staff?

MR. KNIGHT: There is none that is outstanding in my mind. There were several things brought up, and the testimony on them got fairly complex, to the point where a number of these issues, even while testimony was ongoing, were fairly well-resolved, I believe. There were questions of containment toppling, questions on the soil-structure interaction analyses that were performed. In a number of cases the contentions arose out of a lack of information, and when

the information was made available, they were no longer of concern.

MR. OKRENT: Jim, you are sort of answering the other part of the question.

MR. KNIGHT: I am sorry.

MR. OKRENT: I am trying to find out if there remain some technical issues that are not resolved by provision of information, in your opinion, where in fact you have one opinion but they have another opinion.

MR. SIESS: Let me try to understand this. As I understand it, all parties to the hearing have submitted their proposed finding of facts.

MR. KNIGHT: Yes.

MR. SIESS: And there must be one by the Joint Intervenors, one by the Governor, one by the Staff and one by PG&E.

MR. SCHIERLING: That is correct.

MR. SIESS: I think, and Dave will correct me, but I think he is asking if there are any areas where the NRC's proposed findings of fact, which I assume, although it is written by a lawyer, was proposed by engineers, any instances where the NRC's proposed findings of fact differ from those of the Joint Intervenors or the Governor.

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MR. KNIGHT: I am sure there are, but I think the central thrust will go to the depth --

MR. OKRENT: Let's leave aside the depth of the review momentarily. I am talking about individual components or systems or buildings or something, you know.

MR. KNIGHT: I have not had the opportunity to sit down and do a one-for-one comparison on the findings. I cannot give you that direct answer. I will try during the day today to get back to our attorneys in Washington who are involved in that process and see if I can get a list out of them.

MR. OKRENT: I think it would be of interest --

MR. SIESS: Since this was not on the agenda, we cannot expect the Staff to be prepared. I think we will have to take it on that basis. If by later this afternoon you have something, you will let us know.

MR. OKRENT: I guess I would have thought the Staff would have in mind technical areas, if there are any of significance, where there remain differences of opinion. I certainly think it is relevant to have the Staff's assessment of whether there are any.

MR. SIESS: I agree, Dave, but it was not the subject of this meeting and it was not stated as part of the agenda, so they were not prepared to address that.

MR. OKRENT: All right. Let me ask you one

question, Chet. With regard to the other aspect concerning differences, the residual difference in opinion between the Intervenors and the Staff concerning what I guess you might call the methodology chosen used for the sampling and so forth, did you have in mind having that discussed by the Staff or the Applicant or at all?

MR. SIESS: I had no hearing issues in mind when we set up the agenda. The proposal was to look at the things that were found, the corrections that were made and the significance of them. The hearing items were not even a part of this. I had not even heard of it until yesterday.

MR. OKRENT: Since there is an issue, which I am not taking any sides on by asking the question, but since I know there is a technical issue concerning the -- I suppose you might call it the validity of the chosen sampling --

MR. SIESS: It has been suggested that we might ask the Staff to come in to the next full committee meeting and present that, and if the Committee thinks they want to reopen the review, that would be a basis for doing it.

MR. OKRENT: Or it may be that -- this was testified to at length, I have to assume, at the hearings.

MR. KNIGHT: Yes, indeed.

MR. OKRENT: And there may be a reasonably lengthy written Staff position which says why what they have done -- that is, what PG&E has done.

MR. SIESS: I am sure we could find some hearing transcripts.

MR. OKRENT: That is not the easiest way.

MR. SIESS: If Staff could reference those, that would be one way to get some background on it, and we could have another subcommittee meeting sometime to look into that, either specifically or generically. I think it has generic implications.

MR. KNIGHT: Given the format of the hearing, the fact that the contentions were drawn down as narrowly as they could be so that they would be tractable, and then the use of question and answer format for testimony, it does not lend itself to the type of discussion I think you have in mind.

MR. OKRENT: But in your concluding statement did you provide some summary as to why you felt -- in detail the approach taken was adequate? Did you just say engineering judgment or something?

MR. KNIGHT: There was a good deal more than that. A good deal of that argument is brought out in cross-examinatio. in the transcript. I do not think there is -- there does not exist at this moment a succinct, cogent statement.

MR. SIESS: But the proposed findings of fact must address this issue in summary form.

MR. KNIGHT: Summary form, yes.

MR. SIESS: It is an interesting issue. I have

some concerns about statistical sampling out of a universe that I do not think is anywhere near homogeneous, pipe supports. There are probably 20 categories in there of how you sample out of that kind of a thing. I think it is an issue that might be worth exploring. I think it has some generic implications. There are other design verification programs going on in other plants that we will be hearing about.

MR. OKRENT: Since it was a major point raised at the hearing, it seems to me at some point we at least ought to hear, in what I would call an extended summary fashion without having to read the transcript, at least what the Staff thought was the appropriate dispensation of it. That's all.

MR. KNIGHT: I have just been handed a list by a party that has had the opportunity to review the findings of fact. They certainly can talk at greater length, but just to put the list out for perhaps your thoughts: containment uplift, soil structure interaction analysis on the auxiliary building, analyses for the buried tank and CCW pipe from intake, which is essentially a soil structure again, and the criteria applied for the determination of the location of pipe breaks, that is, whether it is the 200 degrees, 275 psi, that must be --

MR. SIESS: Inside containment or outside?

MR. KNIGHT: Inside containment. It must be considered -- both taken, or whether, as was the case here --

whether both are required before b[redacted]k or whether one of those two conditions is sufficient. Those seem to be --

MR. SIESS: You did not have the sampling on that list?

MR. KNIGHT: No.

MR. SIESS: It was an issue, right?

MR. KNIGHT: It certainly was an issue. I have to go by this list of technical facts.

MR. EBERSOLE: Jim, this seismic investigation also precipitated a reinvestigation in a good many other areas. I think we called this the Category II reinvestigation.

MR. KNIGHT: The so-called Phase II.

MR. EBERSOLE: I would like to find a summary of how that was approached in the findings, of not how easy they were to fix but how significant they were if they had not been fixed.

MR. SIESS: That is part of the discussion today, Jesse.

MR. EBERSOLE: I think we will not have time to get into many of these today.

MR. SIESS: We will get into the major ones. We will get into those covered by the project and the Stone & Webster aspects.

MR. KNIGHT: Yes.

MR. SIESS: Any other questions, then? Before we

go on to the next item, I would like to make a brief announcement. We do have an attendance list. There may be some people who have come in since it was passed out. If they have and they would like to sign it, if they will just raise their hand, we will pass it out to you. It is not mandatory but we would like to have a list of those present if they wish to sign. Thank you.

Okay, we will proceed now with the presentation from Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and we will start off with Mr. John Hoch, Diablo Canyon Project Manager..

MR. HOCH: Thank you, Dr. Sieś.

My introductory remarks are very brief. I am John Hoch, Project Manager for the Diablo Canyon Project for Pacific Gas and Electric Company. With me today are other members of the project and representatives from the independent design verification program.

Additionally I will note that Howard Friend of Bechtel, the Diablo Canyon Project Completion Manager, and George Maheatis, the Executive Vice President of Utilities Resources Development for PG&E, are also here due to their interest in this matter.

We are pleased to be here today to hear the Staff briefing on the NRC actions regarding the IDVP and to discuss the safety significance of plant modifications at Diablo Canyon resulting from the extensive design verificati

MR. SIESS: The meeting will reconvene.

I think we will take up first a report from PG&E and some of the things they found in their seismic systems interaction study.

As I recall, that was done at our suggestion, was it not?

MR. HOCH: That is correct, Dr. Siess.

MR. SIESS: Is "suggestion" the right word?

MR. HOCH: In response to the committee's concern.

MR. SIESS: Okay.

MR. HOCH: The seismically-induced systems interaction program at Diablo Canyon was implemented in late 1979 to respond to a concern by the committee. The program was formulated to consider seismically-induced events only. It was formulated with the advice of an independent review board, which we employed, used, to help formulate the program, give us suggestions.

That board was composed of a number of people. Let me just mention two. Dr. Spencer Bush, who was formerly with the committee, was on that board; as well as Dr. Victor Weingarten from USC.

We had, I think, five total people on the board. The program was formulated, was discussed, I believe, on two occasions with the committee. The NRC Staff formed at

that time a brand new branch, if you will, which they called the Systems Interaction Branch, to review the program, give us comments and suggestions and work with us during its formulation, and that indeed was done.

The Staff reported on the program, in I believe Supplement 9 to its Safety Evaluation Report for Diablo Canyon. I think I have the number correct.

I will try to keep this very general. Diablo Canyon seismically-induced systems interaction program identified potential seismically-induced interactions between non-design Class 1 or Category 1 items which we called sources, and targets, and targets in the program were structures, systems and components that had an important role or a role in achieving cold shutdown, or were involved in accident mitigation.

There were some accident mitigating systems and components that were considered in the program. In some instances, design Class 1 or Category 1 items were also potential sources. That kind of thing happens when even though the design Class 1, Category 1 item will not fail, because if it has an event, it might displace or move or swim or somehow interact with another Category 1 item.

The program made use of walkdown teams. Walkdown teams were interdisciplinary teams composed of people from Instrumentation, Electrical, Piping, and

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interdisciplinary groups who identify potential system interactions to write up, if you will, those interactions and present them to Engineering prior to the establishment of the Diablo Canyon project.

It was PG&E's engineering department during the course of the project. It has been the Diablo Canyon project that has responded to those system interaction or potential system interactions.

The walkdown team, in the conduct of the program, has been accomplished by, if you will, a group somewhat independent from project engineering, a group out of a little special project department at PG&E.

Those potential interactions as given to Engineering are responded to and resolved in a number of possible ways:

In some instances, an analysis is performed to establish whether the item identified can really affect a safety -- an item important to safety.

In other instances, the modification has been identified, design-issued and performed to prevent a potential adverse interaction.

To give you a few examples, some observable at the site, some simple examples: fluorescent lighting fixtures that are hung from chaings were identified as potential sources of interaction when they were above

fragile or potentially fragile safety-related items.

For example, fluorescent lights over safety-related batteries. Engineering's resolution for that particular item was to issue a design which installed a redundant heavier chain on the light to assure that it indeed would not fall on the batteries.

Other examples are monorail hoists installed over safety-related pumps and motors. We have installed stops so that the hoist section, the hoist on the monorail, is not normally stowed over the pump or the motor.

Other examples -- lots of examples involve the fire system. The reason for that, of course, is originally fire system components at Diablo Canyon were not Category 1, were not seismically designed, and so the two over one, if you will, criteria was not applicable.

A lot of our modifications have been to modify non-Category 1 items which were over portions of the fire system which now are seismically qualified.

Another example might be displacement swinging items joining lines that were suspended on rod hangers that -- where it was determined that they could, in a seismic event, possibly swing and impact some safety-related item.

The seismic-induced system interaction program has been considerably more extensive than originally anticipated. The walkdown teams have been at work for a

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number of years, since '79.

I think probably the main reason the program has been more extensive is we have continued to make modifications to the plant. As modifications are made, the program is a continuing one, and the walkdown team goes back and looks at the modifications again, and repeats the process.

The system interaction program was complete, including modifications in the containment, prior to fuel loading, which was our commitment. It will be complete in the remainder of the plant, in the remainder of Unit 1, prior to full power operation, prior to exceeding 5 percent power. We are somewhat ahead of that schedule right now in terms of completing the program and implementing all of the modifications.

We have submitted preliminary reports to the Staff, I believe in November, late November or early December, describing the system interaction program and its results in a summary form.

A more detailed complete report will be provided to the Staff. That is presently scheduled for submittal some time in February.

Dr. Siess, I think that is really all I have to summarize what we have done with that system.

MR. SIESS: The kinds of interactions you describe are mostly sort of mechanical. Did you find any

interactions, say, electrical interactions, between systems, nonseismic and safety systems, or hydraulic?

MR. HOCH: The answer is yes, although the potential interactions that were looked at began in all cases with some kind of a postulation of a mechanical interaction; something hitting something; something falling on something; something spilling on something, if you will.

The reason the interaction was postulated in many instances was because that mechanical interaction might have conceivably resulted in some kind of an adverse effect on an electrical component or --

MR. SIESS: What I was thinking of, sometimes we simply assume that if a system or piece of equipment is not seismic Category 1, it simply disappears from view when we have the earthquake and this obviously is not true, but there is some probability that it will fail due to the earthquake, and then the loss of that system could conceivably have some effect on a seismically qualified system needed for safe shutdown.

Were those things looked at? That would not necessarily be a walkdown type thing. That can be a paper type thing.

MR. HOCH: We did not assume in general that non-Category 1 things disappeared or arbitrarily failed. When a potential interaction was identified between a

non-Category thing and a safety-related target, if you relate, an evaluation was made which could include an analysis of that nonqualified source to show that it indeed would not fail. It could have considered an evaluation that showed if it would fail, it would not affect the target, and finally could simply fix the source, either to completely do something, from completely bringing it up to Class 1 or Category 1 standards, to simply restraining it from an unacceptable range of motion.

So, in general, we did not do something as simple as simply assuming that the thing disappeared or arbitrarily failed because it was not explicitly seismically qualified.

MR. WARD: What do you think about the program now that it is essentially finished? Has it turned up things that are useful? Has it been anything like cost-effective? Have you burned up a lot of engineering time, identifying a lot of Mickey Mouse stuff? What is your bottom line opinion?

MR. HOCH: I think all of us think the program has been rather expensive, partially because it has lasted so long. It has had to last through all of this modification period. If you look at the results of the program, you will find examples ranging from, yes, that is something that should have been identified, I'm glad

we found that, although there may not have been an adverse effect. It is significant enough that I am glad we fixed to, to some things that appear -- I will not use the word "Mickey Mouse" -- but appear to be on their face, at least, rather unnecessary when you look at them.

For example, as you go around the plant, you will find certainly everywhere in the containment -- and I think the rest of the plant is nearly done -- fire extinguishers, for example, were identified as potential missiles wherever they occurred, and some rather -- I guess I will call them some rather absurd postulations were made about the extent to which a fire extinguisher could hurl itself sideways in a seismic event and impact something. And rather than deal with the difficult task of making quantitative analysis of that, the solution was simply to use a rather extensive system of restraining fire extinguishers in their storage locations.

I know this is a simplistic answer, but everything you have said we found, we found the program to be, I think -- I think in retrospect it was useful, I'm glad we did it. It gives us additional assurance that none of these interactions, seismically-induced interactions, were beyond acceptable.

In retrospect, however, it was expensive. I think if we had to begin again from the beginning, we would

perhaps do it in a better fashion in terms of less lost motion. It was the first of its kind.

One of the reasons the Staff wanted such an extensive report, I believe, is I think the Staff is looking toward some of the material in our report to use as a basis for formulation of its policy in this area.

MR. SIESS: Are there questions, gentlemen?

MR. EBERSOLE: I have just a few of these, and I believe it is called Category 2 area.

I notice in reference to the topic of jet impingement, that all of the statements in here are qualified by saying that they pertain to jet impingement effects inside of containment.

Were jet effects accommodated outside of containment on critical equipment?

MR. MOORE: Yes. The reason the reference is only with regard to inside of containment was that as part of the IDVP's program, specifically that program that addressed quality assurance area, the Roger Reedy effort, they were unable to identify any what they call objective evidence with regard to a jet impingement analysis being done inside of containment.

It was based on that finding out of the IDVP that we then undertook a state-of-the-art, if you will, current day rigorous analysis for jet impingement, and that

is why it is identified.

MR. EBERSOLE: And you do have such an analysis outside of containment that was considered?

MR. MOORE: Yes.

MR. EBERSOLE: I have a few other items here, the sources of which, besides being my own, they come from various directions, and I am going to mention these, not in a context that I think we have to rely on them today, but we will sooner or later, I am sure.

One of these pertains to the actual real experience of the board operations that you intend to use. I do not mean the supervisory staff; I mean the people who are going to be on the board. Not the bosses, but the other fellows.

Could you comment on whether or not you believe these people, who are really going to run the boards, have adequate experience and give us some idea what sort of real operating experience on reactors they have got?

MR. MOORE: I do not think I am qualified to speak to that subject.

MR. EBERSOLE: Maybe nobody here is. We can take that up later on. I am only advising you in advance that these may be matters that will be brought up later.

MR. SIESS: I'm not sure what you mean by "later," Jesse.

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MR. EBERSOLE: I'm not, either.

MR. SIESS: Are you proposing that we reopen the review?

MR. EBERSOLE: I suspect we will see these fellows again. And they can turn up some answers that will be very short and simple.

MR. SIESS: Before you go on any farther, I think maybe we ought to think a little bit about what we are going to report to the full committee.

The committee has asked us to come in next month and report on our subcommittee meeting. I will be prepared, of course, to summarize our findings regarding the design verification program, what we were told and the questions we asked, which were, what was done, why was it done, what was the consequence if it were not done, and then any other recommendations we have to make.

Now one possible recommendation is that we reopen our review of Diablo Canyon. We have written a letter on the operating license and it has gone to hearing. They are awaiting the decision of the Hearing Board, and the Commission has two more stages before full power, and there is a question then as to whether the ACRS wants to provide further review and advice to the Commission on what would be step 2, which is criticality and 5 percent power; and step 3, which is full power.

If the committee decides or the subcommittee recommends to reopen that, we are into a new era of review matters, really reviewing issues, I would say, that have come up since our previous review; not things that the Staff has not reviewed, but -- let's see. When did we do the operating license review for Diablo? '78. That is five years ago. Since then the committee has gotten interested in, among other things, the question that Mr. Ebersole just raised about operator qualifications. In fact, everybody has become interested in operator qualifications following TMI.

We have been looking at that on plants which we probably did not at the time of Diablo. There are a number of other things that come up on other plants and licensing actions that we get into.

There is a question as to whether the ACRS wants to reopen its review and provide the Commission some advice on their actions. If we so decide, then the Commission will probably hold up any action until they have got another letter from us.

If we tell them we think they should wait until we get a letter, then that is a decision, I think, that the full committee needs to make.

I would suggest to the subcommittee that we not initiate such a review until the full committee has

told us to.

MR. EBERSOLE: How will the full committee make such a decision in the absence of identifying a set of --

MR. SIESS: I would suggest, if we have a list of items, either developed by individual members, that those be presented to the committee at the next meeting, and let the committee decide.

MR. EBERSOLE: What if they can be resolved right here on the floor?

MR. SIESS: Well, they cannot be. If they are new issues, the committee has got to resolve them. The subcommittee cannot really resolve these things.

MR. EBERSOLE: Let me give you an example. I got notice, or I got wind of a little problem in the RHR system. I learned that there was found a single pump failure in the RHR system with a fuse failing on open circuit that would lead to closure of valves on the section lines, and the problems that result from a pump continuing to operate without any suction and probable damage to pumps operating under that condition. It sounds like it might really be a generic matter.

The absence of suction protection is the general topic. This may be something, Chet, that can be answered right off here. Do you have suction protection?

MR. KNIGHTON: Let me make a statement --

MR. SIESS: I am not sure we are asking questions that we are not -- we are asking questions not on our agenda. The Applicant might have the right people here and he might not.

MR. EBERSOLE: I understand.

MR. SIESS: I just do not know how far to go. If we really reopen this thing, there are a number of areas that we want to go into, and always find them. I do not know whether this is the appropriate time to do it.. I hate to spring questions on the Applicant that he has not seen on the agenda.

MR. EBERSOLE: My impression is the Applicant may probably want questions to be raised now that he might see later on, and he does not want to be surprised by them coming in later.

MR. SIESS: If he is going to see them later on, because we reopen the review, we will inform him of what -- they are, and we will have at least one subcommittee meeting, and probably more, to explore them thoroughly.

MR. WARD: Jesse, I might suggest even if the Applicant or the Licensee is --

MR. SIESS: Little bit of both.

MR. WARD: -- is in a position to answer some of the questions, I doubt that he is all of them. So there does not seem to me any particular merit in going into them.

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I think that list of questions, or whatever questions we might have, might be something suitable to, as Chet suggested, review with the full committee as part of a basis for whether we want to open up --

MR. EBERSOLE: An alternative is to give them to the Staff and get resolution through the correspondence line.

MR. SIESS: Incidentally the Staff does not have all of the people here they need. The project manager is not here. Although George is branch chief, I suspect there are things that Hans knows that George does not, that have been reviewed by the Staff. So even the Staff cannot respond to these.

I am not trying to say we should not do it, but I think this is the wrong forum to go into those issues. If we want to have another subcommittee meeting to decide whether we are going to reopen the review, I am not sure how that differs from reopening the review. I think we can get enough time at the full committee meeting to bring up a list of items that concern you or anybody else.

Okrent had a question about something that we passed off this morning and he could not be here, and let the committee decide whether these should be reviewed as a part of the licensing operation, which we always had the privilege of reopening. The time elapsed has been

considerable. Or whether there is something that the committee thinks could be reviewed in a generic fashion or with the Licensee after, irrespective of the licensing operation. I do not know.

I do think that the proper procedure, in fairness to everybody, would say let's take this to the full committee at the next meeting. It will be on the agenda. And see what develops. And the Staff will be there. Clearly we want the Staff there.

If we are going to do that, I think the Licensee -- Applicant-Licensee should be invited. I do not know that his presence is necessary, because again you cannot get into answering those questions in a couple of hours that we will have there.

MR. EBERSOLE: I cannot characterize any of these as being an impediment to the continued startup.

MR. SIESS: We have made reviews where we listed a number of items that we wanted considered and said that these are not an impediment. We have written letters to that effect. We could do it in that context, but it seems to me it is almost 5:00 o'clock now, and I suspect the list is a little more than we could get into as thoroughly as I would like at this time. We could easily do it -- I think if you feel they are no impediment to license, we can simply decide that when we report it to the committee and tell them

that, and they will tell us, okay, go ahead and explore it and we will do it. We may not even write a letter.

Do you think there is any reason to write a letter on it?

MR. EBERSOLE: No.

MR. SIESS: That brings me to the main question. The main purpose of this meeting was to get information, get insight into what had happened at the plant. We are all swamped with long lists of errors and open items. We had seen lists of hundreds of changes to pipe supports without really understanding why all of these changes had to be made.

It was not completely clear to some of us, and not to me, to what extent seismic original margins had been infringed on, et cetera, et cetera.

I think this has been a very enlightening meeting in all of those respects.

The other plants -- there are some other plants doing design verification. This gives a lot of insight into how one was done, I think, in a very excellent manner. What kinds of things were found. I think we have got a feeling for the significance of them.

Now we can report this to the full committee, and I would intend to report rather briefly to that effect, and ask other people to add comments.

Jesse feels that although there are some things he would like to explore about this plant, probably

both individually and prototypically, he does not think that they represent any impediment to steps 2 and 3 of the licensing process, subject to the Staff's clearing up the items they have.

Does anybody else feel that the ACRS should propose any actions or take any actions at this point regarding steps 2 and 3 of the licensing process? That is essentially going to 100 percent full power within the next few weeks, months?

MR. EBERSOLE: Months, I am sure.

MR. SIESS: Carl, how do you feel?

MR. MICHELSON: I think the Applicant or Licensee has made a very fine presentation and has answered all of the questions I had. I think I have seen a few things that raised what I would call generic questions, but certainly not to be pursued in Diablo Canyon as such, but rather in an appropriate arena where such generic questions are raised.

At this time I have no reservation with proceeding to we issue the license or take it out as a suspension, or whatever you call the term.

MR. EBERSOLE: I take no issue with that. I am almost certain we can easily resolve some of these things that just appear to be a bit muddy, only probably to me.

MR. SIESS: For a plant of this vintage, it is

in pretty good shape. The word "vintage" got in there a few times.

MR. EBERSOLE: In a relative sense I don't think I have seen any plant that has been subject to such intensive examination as this one.

MR. WARD: I think we should report to the full committee and get the opinion of all the members. My personal opinion is that the plant is ready to go. I think the review has certainly been thorough, and I do not think the questions that remain are substantial.

MR. SIESS: Forrest?

MR. REMICK: Although I think an ACRS letter, which I feel would probably be in a positive tone, might be helpful, I do not propose that the ACRS needs or should write a letter. I do not think it needs to do that. If the ACRS full committee were to decide that it wanted to reopen the review, I would have some questions, but I am also convinced that those would be satisfactorily answered. It would be more to satisfy my curiosity on staffing and shifts and STAs, the number of SROs and things like that. And I know the Applicant is going to be required to meet the current regulations by the Staff, so I think that would just be satisfying my curiosity.

I do not feel that the ACRS needs to write a letter, and I am satisfied that the plant is ready to

proceed ahead.

MR. SIESS: Harold?

MR. ETHERINGTON: If the full committee meets on this, it will probably feel it should write a letter. I do not think a letter should be written unless one is requested by the Commission.

MR. SIESS: No letter has been requested by the Commission. They sort of indicated that if we found anything wrong, to please tell them. That reflects well on the Staff.

The unanimous opinion of the subcommittee is we do not really see any objections to the plant going ahead on the schedule with the Staff review as it completes its open items, to criticality, and eventually to full power.

I guess we could put it -- as far as writing a letter, I would not recommend to the committee to write a letter. I do not think it is quite right to say we still think this plant is okay. We said it once. There are a lot of plants we could say that about. It would seem a little bit of a strange letter.

But we will get to the Commission by appropriate means other than a letter -- and we have those means -- that the committee does not have any objection. That is done and our methods are summaries. There are clear-cut ways of passing that information along.

I know what kinds of recommendations we can make

to the full committee. We will schedule -- I would like to schedule a couple of hours, at least, at the full committee meeting to talk about this.

There will be some questions from the other members. We can bring up this list of things and get their approval to go ahead on the sort of post-licensing generic type review of some current issues as to how they apply to Diablo. I think that would be a very appropriate thing.

I think this is a good plan, to look at some of those things on, because the depth in which they have gone into some of this stuff.

Are there any other comments?

MR. EBERSOLE: One other thing. I got a substantial document which I took the trouble of looking into. I guess I could call it the Stokes allegation.

MR. SIESS: You got an even more substantial one with 103 allegations in it. I do not know if you have looked at it.

MR. EBERSOLE: This is a very recent date.

MR. SIESS: It's in --

MR. EBERSOLE: How are they being resolved?

MR. SIESS: They are too recent. They are in SSER 21 and those are all in the category of being too recent for the Staff to have gotten into them. That is what George was talking about.

MR. KNIGHT: From the standpoint of the process of being resolved, we have had a team of people at the site for -- close to two weeks looking at the specific areas. We will be meeting -- we met -- Mr. Stokes was interviewed at some length at the plant. Now that we have had a chance to develop our own views and gather some information and digest it, we will meet with Mr. Stokes again, probably next week, to be certain that we have understood his concerns, and make him aware of where we are today in looking at them.

MR. SIESS: Anything else?

(No response.)

MR. SIESS: The meeting is adjourned. Thank you very much.

I would like to say personally, and I speak, I think, for most of the committee, we have had some very fine presentations from PG&E today. I thought you did an excellent job of understanding what we were looking for and giving us a good picture of it. I appreciate it very much. Thank you. And the meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock p.m., the meeting was adjourned.)

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This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NRC COMMISSION

In the matter of: ACRS Subcommittee on Diablo Canyon

Date of Proceeding: Thursday, January 19, 1984

Place of Proceeding: Los Angeles, California

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission.

Barbara Whitlock

Official Reporter - Typed

Barbara Whitlock

Official Reporter - Signature