U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-275/78-15
50-323/78-15

Docket No. 50-275 50-323 License No. CPPR-39 CPPR-69 Safeguards Group _____

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco, California 94106

Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2

Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California

Inspection Conducted: November 6-9, 1978

Inspectors: D. F. Kirsch, Reactor Inspector — 11-27-78 Date Signed

T. W. Bishop, Reactor Inspector — 12/1/78 Date Signed

J. H. Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector — 11/27/78 Date Signed

P. P. Narbut, Reactor Inspector — 12/1/78 Date Signed

J. O. Elin, Reactor Inspector — 12/1/78 Date Signed

Approved by: for R. C. Haynes, Chief, Project Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch — 12/1/78 Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection during period of November 6-9, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-275/78-15 and 50-323/78-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee action on reported 50.55(e) items (discrepant welds on pipe supports and auxiliary feedwater pump

Summary: (Report Nos. 50-275/78-15 and 50-323/78-15) (Continued)

power capacity); component and pipe support installation work and records; structural steel bolting and welding work and records; various electrical and instrumentation seismic modifications; fire protection and suppression system installation QA procedures, work observation and records; records of steam generator primary nozzle closure ring fillet weld nondestructive examinations; QA audits and nonconformance system review. The inspection involved 122 inspector hours by five NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in eight areas and one unresolved item was identified in the area of component and pipe supports (Paragraph 6).

DETAILS

1. Individuals Contacted

a. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)

*R. D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
*M. E. Leppke, QA Supervisor
*M. N. Norem, Startup Engineer
*D. A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical Engineer
*J. N. Cochran, Resident Civil Engineer
*V. L. Killpack, Resident Mechanical Engineer
*J. Arnold, Coordinating QC Engineer
C. Braff, Pipe Support Supervisor
C. M. Seward, QA Engineer
J. E. Herbst, Electrical Engineer
J. Bell, QC Inspector
J. A. Holley, Piping Inspection Group Supervisor
J. Bratton, Field Engineer
J. B. Martin, Civil Inspector
J. Hanna, NSSS Group Supervisor
A. Cordone, Field Engineer
O. Crass, Electrical Inspector
J. Cucco, Field Engineer
K. Graf, Electrical Inspector
P. Gilbreath, Electrical Engineer
R. Whitd, Electrical Inspector
R. Campbell, Electrical Inspector
J. Grant, Electrical Inspector
J. Langley, Electrical Inspector
T. Bowls, Field Engineer - Mechanical
J. Grant, Field Engineer - Electrical
R. Johnson, Field Engineer - Civil
R. A. Young, Electrical Engineer

b. Guy F. Atkinson Co. (GFA)

M. M. Walsh, QA Manager
D. Hedrick, Welding Inspector
K. Brainard, Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Inspector
D. Karr, QC Inspector
M. Anderson, Lead Inspector
J. McDermott, QC Inspector

c. Endurance Metal Products Company (EMPCO)

D. J. Gragg, QC Manager
J. N. Vrooman, QC Inspector

d. Pullman Power Products (Pullman)

D. Geske, Assistant QA Manager
J. P. Runyon, QA Manager
V. Casey, Level II Examiner
K. Guy, Lead Field QC Inspector

e. Westinghouse Electric Corporation

G. Glassbergen, Site Manager

f. H. P. Foley Company (Foley)

H. Domingo, QC Inspector
R. Llewellyn, QC Inspector
C. Waechter, Clerk

g. Tech-Sil

J. Robertson, Manager
V. Talbert, QC Representative

2. General

The licensee plans to load Unit 1 fuel on or about the end of February 1979 pending completion of the operating license hearings and issuance of an operating license.

Licensee representatives onsite informed the inspector that the Quality Assurance Director had been promoted to project responsibility, effective at a later date, and that a successor had not yet been announced. It was noted that the QA Director would retain his duties until a replacement assumed the duties.

3. Licensee Action on Open Items of Enforcement

(Open) Infraction - Failure to separate mutually redundant circuits in control room panels in a manner required by the PSAR and licensee (50-275 and 323/78-12)

The licensee was engaged in wrapping certain control board circuits with Scotch 7700 tape and tying other circuits in a manner such

that the PSAR specified separations criteria are satisfied. Licensee representatives stated that General Office Engineering Department personnel would, in addition, inspect the control board vertical sections, Auxiliary Relay Racks and Solid State Protection Racks. The inspection results would be documented. This item will be examined during a future NRC inspection. (275/323/78-12/01)

4. Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Items

a. Adequacy of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

The licensee submitted an interim report on March 23, 1978, identifying that the operating current of the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps exceeded the name plate rating. The licensee subsequently returned a motor to the manufacturer for determination of motor adequacy. Based upon the results of manufacturer's tests, the current capability of the motor was upgraded and new nameplates were installed on the four pump motors. The licensee was in the process of submitting a final 50.55(e) report identifying the corrective actions taken to resolve the discrepancy.

The inspector reviewed the recording traces of AFW pumps 1-2 and 1-3 diesel generator loading (bus voltage and frequency) for compliance with the voltage and droop criteria specified by the FSAR and test procedure. The traces showed that the voltage and frequency droop remained well within the established acceptance criteria.

This item remains open pending receipt and satisfactory review of the licensee's final report on this matter.

b. Discrepant Welds on Pipe Supports (Reference Inspection Report Nos. 50-323/78-07 and 78-12.)

The inspector examined the completed work and records for seven of the 19 repaired Code Class 1 welds in Unit 2. The Field Welds and Component Supports inspected were as follows:

Field Weld	Support
379	71/8SL
1069	71/4SL
1068	71/3SL
378	71/5SL
305	92/71A
177	92/23A
310	71/25SL

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

This item will be examined during a future inspection and following the submission of the final 50.55(e) report. (50-275/323/78-15/02)

5. Safety Related Pipe Weld Preservice Examination Results

Licensee preservice examination personnel had identified approximately 54 reportable indications (arc strikes and weld spatter resulting from the pipe support repair program work) in the course of liquid penetrant (LP) examination of Unit 1 Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pressure boundaries, and reported these on Nuclear Plant Problem Reports DC 1-78-QC-P0016, P0017 and P0018. Kellogg personnel were unsuccessful in repeating the findings during subsequent LP examinations. Licensee representatives stated that the preservice examination and Kellogg personnel would reexamine the areas in question and provide more precise locating information to facilitate repair. This item will be examined during a future inspection. (50-275/323/78-15/03)

6. Component Supports and Piping Restraints

The inspector examined the following spring and mechanical hangers in Unit 2 safety related systems for compliance with Pullman procedure No. ESD-223 (Installation and Inspection of Class 1 Pipe Supports) and applicable installation drawings: Support Nos. 2626-1V, 2042-9V, 70-35SL, 564-90, 564-160, 564-95, 5-9R, 15-23R, and 889-4.

The inspector observed that support 564-90, which had been inspected and accepted on 1-6-77, did not have the proper clearance between the pipe and U-bolt. In addition, he observed that support 564-95, which had been inspected and accepted on 9-16-76, had a loose turnbuckle and a loose bolted fastener on the pipe clamp. Licensee representatives stated that the contractor was performing a final audit and walkdown of mechanical hangers to identify such discrepancies, and that discrepancies noted during the final walkdown would be corrected.

The final walkdown/audit results will be examined during a future inspection. (50-323/78-15/04)

It was observed that a stainless steel pipe to stanchion weld on support 89-25R in Unit 2, appeared to be rough and the inspector questioned the ability to adequately perform a liquid penetrant

examination of the surface. This was a shop weld and licensee representatives stated that it had been liquid penetrant examined and accepted by the manufacturer, Pullman-Kellogg onsite inspectors and the licensee's inservice inspection personnel. The weld in question was reexamined with liquid penetrant methods by a qualified Level II examiner at the inspector's request. The examination disclosed an apparent 1/8" long linear indication and a Vee-shaped apparent linear indication with each leg being about 1/16" long. Pullman procedure ESD-255 states that linear indications are unacceptable and indications suspected of being non-relevant be regarded as unacceptable until shown otherwise. The licensee stated that the weld joint would be evaluated by the Level III examiner. This is an unresolved item. (50-323/78-15/05)

7. Containment Spray Line Support Modifications

Certain Unit 1 containment spray line support modification work was examined by the inspector to ascertain compliance with PG&E pipe support drawing 049282. Two hangers (No. 176-30A on spray ring 1-S3-2375-6 and No. 176-42A on spray ring 1-S3-2377-6) were inspected. The modification of each of these hangers was approximately 50 percent complete and appeared to be in compliance with the applicable drawings. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Piping Modifications

a. Observation of Work and Work Activities

The inspector examined the diesel fuel oil transfer piping modification work in the fuel oil and CO_2 pipe trench. The pipe welding was compared with the requirements of the ASME B31.7 Power Piping Code and the pipe support installations were compared with applicable support drawings and requirements of Kellogg Engineering Specification ESD-223 (Requirements for Installation and Inspection of All Class I Pipe Supports). Specifically, welds 272, 280, 330, 339, 340, and 356 were visually examined by the NRC inspector. Also, numerous pipe supports were examined, although final QC inspection had not yet been performed. No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

b. Review of Quality Records

Quality records including field process sheets, liquid penetrant examination records, and weld rod withdrawal records were reviewed for the pipe welds noted above. No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

9. Verification of Steam Generator Primary Nozzle Closure Ring Fillet Weld Liquid Penetrant Test Records

The inspector reviewed liquid penetrant (LP) test records (retained onsite by Westinghouse Electric Corporation) of fillet welds of the S/G primary nozzle closure hold down rings. The records were for LP tests performed to the requirements of process specification 84350-JA and included tests for both the inlet and outlet nozzles for all Unit 1 and 2 steam generators. The final Unit 1 LP tests were performed October 2, 1975, and Unit 2 tests performed November 18-20, 1975. The records documented that the tests had been witnessed by an ASME Code inspector. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. Protection of Safety Related Components

During the inspector's plant tour, a manway on the primary side of Steam Generator 2-2 channel head was observed to be open and there did not appear to be any work in progress necessitating the opening. The visually accessible areas inside the opening appeared to be free of foreign material. Due to inaccessibility, an inspection of the attached main coolant piping was not performed.

Discussions with the cognizant licensee engineer indicated that he was not aware of any recent work authorizations necessitating the opening and that openings, when not actively being worked, were to be covered with Visquine and taped shut. Licensee representatives did note however, that inspection personnel had been engaged in nondestructive examination of the root pass for several welds in Unit 2 reactor coolant loop piping.

The inspector noted that licensee procedure MFI-3-2 and Specification 8752 require that component openings remain closed except for installation or fitup, that contractors must assure components are protected through the use of protective seals and that clean areas are required for reactor coolant flow components which will be inaccessible for postwork cleanup.

The licensee's program for verifying cleanliness inside primary system openings, prior to closure, will be examined during a subsequent inspection. (50-323/78-15/06)

11. Structural Concrete

a. Safety Related Outside Tank Foundations

The licensee was engaged in excavating to bedrock below the outside safety related tanks. The volume will be filled with lean concrete and grout as a replacement for the removed backfill material. The tank foundations are to be anchored to the lean concrete using rebar dowels.

The inspector examined the rebar dowel to plate welds, the welding procedure utilized, welder qualification records and weld inspection documentation for six bar-to-plate welds for compliance with licensee procedures and the AWS D12.1 reinforcing steel welding code. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

The licensee noted, in response to the inspector's concerns, that void formation would be precluded by pumping grout into the last portion of the foundation through five holes drilled through the existing tank and foundation (one at the center and one in each quadrant). In addition, the existing concrete foundation would be sloped to a 1% grade, with the high point in the tank center, and inspected to preclude void formation. This area will be examined during a future inspection. (50-275/323/78-15/07)

b. Alleged Performance of Work Without Approved Instructions

On October 15, 1978, the NRC resident inspector received a note requesting that the NRC check into a particular modification since the individual believed that the work was being performed without proper authorization; consequently, the work would not be inspected by QA personnel. The NRC inspector determined that the work in question involved moving a single piece of rebar, due to interference, more than one bar diameter from the location specified by approved drawings. In addition, the inspector determined that the licensee had not yet obtained approval for the relocation of the rebar but had taken action to obtain the required approvals.

The NRC inspector contacted the individual submitting the note on November 7, 1978, to discuss the situation and identify any other concerns. The individual stated that work was being performed by GFA production crews on orders from licensee personnel and without prior written approval as is required by the GFA QA program. He supplied the inspector with two specific areas of concern. These two areas of concern (reinforcing steel placement in Unit 1 lift T31F and Unit 2 lifts S31C and D) had been documented in GFA nonconformance report Nos. 175 and 174, respectively, after the individual notified the GFA QA department. The nonconformances were each dispositioned "accept as-is" based upon approval by the licensee's responsible engineer and documentation of the change on "as-built" drawings.

The inspector discussed the concerns with licensee management, the licensee civil inspector involved and GFA QA management. The licensee's civil inspector stated that all of the NCR identified "dowel holes grouted to an unknown depth" had been measured by himself prior to grouting and that GFA production crews had grouted the dowels, in error, prior to the GFA QA inspection. Furthermore, the civil inspector stated that there may have been some instances where GFA production crews had proceeded with work while the civil inspector was contacting the responsible engineer for drawing change approval. However, the approvals had been obtained prior to completion of work. The NRC inspector examined reinforcing steel welding inspection documentation, licensee engineering department design change documentation and telecon documentation showing the change approvals for the lifts in question. The above documentation appeared satisfactory and indicated that work had been adequately controlled. Licensee management stated that meetings had been held with GFA QA and production management to reemphasize the GFA QA program requirement that work may not proceed without prior written approval. They also noted that the stop-work authority delegated to GFA QA department provides adequate control to assure that QA program directives are implemented.

The NRC inspector examined lift T31F for reinforcing steel placement and configuration and noted that GFA QC had not yet inspected the area. One horizontal bar was not placed within one bar diameter of nominal spacing due to a doorway interference; but GFA QC personnel stated that this was known and would be resolved prior to final preplacement acceptance.

The inspector had no further questions on these matters and no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12. Structural Steel Erection

a. GFA Activities

The GFA storage areas on the 140' level of the Turbine Building and on the crane scaffold were examined by the inspector. In addition, eight high strength bolts in four Bay 27 joints were tested by site personnel at the inspector's request for proper bolt torque. Acceptance criteria for the above examinations were contained in GFA QA procedures and the AISC supplement on high strength bolting.

The contents and temperatures of three GFA welding electrode ovens and the associated welding electrode issue logs were examined for compliance with QA procedures and the AWS D1.1 structural steel welding standard. The rod ovens were not locked but were manned by QC personnel. The contents of one welder's electrode can were compared with the issue log entry and found satisfactory.

GFA had prepared and satisfactorily resolved three nonconformance reports documenting the minor discrepancies noted by the NRC inspector during the previous inspection (see IE Inspection Report No. 50-275 and 323/78-12).

The inspector sampled and examined the Field Erection Inspection documentation for structural steel bolting and welding performed in Bay 26 of the Turbine Building trusswork.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b. EMPCO Activities

The inspector examined the installation of approximately 30 concrete anchor bolts attaching ledger angle iron to the Turbine Building walls for compliance with QCP-11 (Field Installation-Stud Anchors). In addition, the inspector sampled and examined certain anchor bolt and ledger angle receipt inspection and field installation inspection documentation.

The installation, and associated field installation inspection documentation of thirteen installed Unit 1 and 2 checker plates were examined for compliance with QC procedures and AWS D1.1.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

13. Electrical and Instrumentation

a. 10% Steam Dump System Modifications

The licensee had installed a seismically qualified 10% Steam Dump Valve actuation system (consisting of air bottles and associated piping) to augment the instrument air system supply to the valve operation. The inspector reviewed the Engineering Change Order (ECO) authorizing the modification, examined the installation instructions and examined selected portions of the air and electrical systems for compliance with the ECO and installation instructions. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b. Seismic Strong Motion Indication and Reactor Trip System

The Engineering Change Order authorizing the modifications was examined. The inspector noted that conduit installation has recently started and observed that only a small amount of wiring had been installed. This area will be examined during a future inspection. (50-275/323/78-15/08)

c. Replacement of Unit 2 Motor Controller Solenoid Springs (Reference: 10 CFR 21 Item - IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-275/78-05, 50-323/78-06, and 50-275 and 323/78-09.)

The licensee was inspecting Unit 1 motor controller solenoid springs with a Go/No-Go gage to assure that the Unit 1 motor controllers have the required heavy spring installed. This work was scheduled to be completed prior to fuel loading. Replacement of the Unit 2 spring with the heavier springs will begin sometime after January 1, 1979. This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection. (50-275/323/78-15/09)

d. Switchgear Modifications

(1) 480 Volt Switchgear

The licensee was replacing Unit 1 compression type cable terminations at individual controllers with lug type terminations. The Unit 2 controllers were installed with lug cable terminations. The installation procedure and circuit termination/determination logs were examined. Work activities were observed on the 1F, 1G and 1H 480 volt vital busses for procedure compliance. The work appeared to be adequately controlled and no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

(2) 4160 Volt Switchgear

Seismic testing at Wiley Laboratories resulted in the necessity for certain 4KV switchgear cell modifications, which the licensee was performing. General Electric changed the design and supplied drawings detailing the modifications required. Licensee representatives stated that a modified 4KV switchgear cell had been retested satisfactorily at Wiley Laboratories to verify acceptability of the design change.

The following documents and activities were examined:

(a) H. P. Foley QC procedures applicable to the work and Welding Procedure Specifications WPS-1-SG-1 through 7 for compliance with applicable welding codes.

(b) Circuit termination/determination log sections applicable to the modification.

(c) A sample of completed weld inspection documentation.

(d) Work in progress and completed work on vital switchgear 1H for compliance with applicable QC procedures.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

e. Dedicated Shutdown Panel

The licensee was installing a dedicated shutdown system capable of monitoring the parameters of Steam Generator and Pressurizer fluid levels and the pressure and temperature of one loop. The above parameters, with the exception of loop temperature, are measured by separate redundant transmitters installed on taps of existing sensing lines. The parameters monitored are quality class 1, with the exception of loop temperature. Licensee personnel noted that the transmitters utilized for sensing the Dedicated Shutdown Panel parameters of level and pressure would not be environmentally qualified to worst case containment atmospheric conditions.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

14. Fire Protection and Suppression System

a. Review of Implementing Procedures

The inspector examined the following procedures which related to upgrading of the installed fire suppression system and current work activities for fire protection:

(1) PG&E Drawing No. 049243, Rev. 9, "Pipe Supports for Field Run, Design Class 1 Piping"

(2) PG&E Specification No. 2552, "Specification for Furnishing and Installing Silicone Foam Penetration Seals, Diablo Canyon Unit 2"

(3) Cardox Mechanical Specifications (no number), Revised February 16, 1965

(4) PG&E Procedure (no number) "Unit 1 Fire Stop Inspection," Rev. 0, June 9, 1978

The procedures appeared adequate for the work in progress. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b. Observations of Work and Work Activities (50-275/323/78-15-10)

Completed and in-process work activities related to fire protection and suppression were examined. This included observations of: fire protection for Unit 1 auxiliary sea water pumps, component cooling water pumps, and residual heat removal pumps; installation of fire stops in penetrations and cable trays; fire door ratings; containment of flammable liquids including associated curbing and drains; fire water hose reel system installation; fire water sprinkler piping to Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps; and Cardox suppression system piping and hose reel installations. The work activities and completed work were compared to requirements provided in the procedures identified in Paragraph 14.a, above, and amendment No. 51 to the FSAR (titled "Diablo Canyon Fire Protection Review"). No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, but the following conditions were noted:

(1) Installation of ten randomly selected cable trays in Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms revealed one tray in Unit 1 which had fire stops installed at an interval of 12 feet, whereas, the specification requires stops at 10±1 feet intervals. The inspector then examined 30 additional trays to determine if similar discrepancies existed. All other trays were found to be within specification requirements. Licensee representatives stated that the one tray identified would be brought into specification requirements. In addition, licensee representatives stated that the Unit 1 fire stop inspection, currently in progress, would identify such discrepancies. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

(2) Of 25 fire doors and frames inspected, only three were found to have adequate identification of fire rating. Discussions with licensee representatives established that this problem had been previously identified and that corrective action was underway. The fire door manufacturer has been requested to inspect each door/frame which does not have labels and provide certification of the fire rating. In addition, action is currently in progress to replace approximately 80 doors which have ratings known to be less than required.

(3) Drains located in fuel piping sumps for all Unit 1 and 2 diesel generator rooms were found to be blocked with debris. Licensee representatives stated that the drains would be cleaned prior to use of the fuel lines. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

(4) One fire water hose reel system piping support (No. FPS-18) was found to be anchored to a concrete block type wall. Licensee representatives could not readily provide evidence that anchorage in this type of wall structure was adequate for seismic loading, but stated that the situation would be examined and appropriate action taken. This item will be re-examined during a subsequent NRC inspection.

(5) Existing nonseismic pipe supports used for restraining fire water hose reel piping in the vicinity of the fire pumps were found to have numerous inadequately tightened threaded fasteners. Licensee representatives stated that actions are currently in progress to install seismic pipe supports for the fire water system and that no credit will be taken for support provided by existing nonseismic restraints. It was further stated that the seismic upgrading of the system is scheduled to be completed by mid-March 1979. This subject will be re-examined during a subsequent inspection.

(6) One of five fire water sprinkler heads surrounding Unit 1 reactor coolant pump No. 1-3 was found to be taped. The tape was removed during the inspection. Subsequent examination of all sprinkler heads for each of the other Unit 1 reactor coolant pump sprinkler heads revealed that they were free of foreign material. The inspector had no further questions on this matter.

(7) One cardox pipe support for the 2½" cardox supply header outside diesel generator room 1-3 was found to have loose locking nuts and was missing one U-bolt nut. In addition, it was not immediately possible to verify the seismic adequacy of the support. Licensee representatives stated that this situation would be reviewed and appropriate action taken. This subject will be re-examined during a subsequent inspection.

(8) The two 1500 gpm fire pumps were found to be located in the same room without a fire barrier between the pumps. Subsequent to the inspection, licensee representatives

stated that the separation of the pumps was adequate and that a fire barrier would not be provided. This information is under evaluation. This matter will be examined during a subsequent inspection pending the results of the NRC evaluation.

c. Review of Quality Records

Records associated with the Unit 2 cable spreading room tray and east wall fire stop installation, and Unit 1 cable spreading room fire stop repairs were examined by the inspector. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

15. QA Audits

The licensee's internal audit system was inspected by examining 15 QA audits performed since September 26, 1978. In the conduct of these audits, the licensee identified nine findings which required corrective action. The corrective actions had been initiated and/or completed in accordance with the licensee's nonconformance reporting system or open item resolution system. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

16. Nonconformance Reporting

The licensee's nonconformance and minor variation reporting systems were examined by selectively reviewing reports in the civil and mechanical disciplines and the general category. The documented deficiencies appeared to have been properly classified and resolved in accordance with the licensee's QA implementing procedures.

17. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 6.

18. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 9, 1978, and summarized the inspection purpose, scope and findings. The inspector discussed the findings resulting from an individual's concerns which had been brought to NRC attention (see Paragraph 11.b) and noted that, while control of work in the field appeared to be satisfactory, care should be exercised to assure that work

was performed in accordance with prior approved written instructions as required by the GFA QA manual. The licensee noted that requirements for prior approval of work had been re-emphasized to field personnel.