

MAR 22 1978

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Brent W. Rushforth, Esq.
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Dear Mr. Rushforth:

This is in reference to your letter dated January 3, 1978, addressed to the Commission, in which you requested that the Commission order the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) "to cease further work on modifications to the Diablo Canyon facility until the NRC Staff can show it has adequately reviewed the modifications and informed the ACRS of the applicant's intention to proceed with them." On January 12, 1978 PG&E submitted a reply to your request opposing it. The Secretary of the Commission by his letter to you dated January 18, 1978, referred your request to my office for action and indicated that it should be treated as a request for an Order to Show Cause pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. By letter, dated January 31, 1978, I informed you that your request was under consideration. Notice of your request was published in the Federal Register at 43 FR 5603 (February 9, 1978).


The basis for your request appears to be that PG&E's current efforts to modify the Diablo Canyon facility would preclude effective review of the seismic reevaluation necessitated by the discovery of the Hosgri fault.

You contend that the staff practice of approving design criteria without reviewing the actual plans for modifications in advance is not sufficient in view of the controversy over the seismic issues arising out of the discovery of the Hosgri fault. Specifically, you contend that because of the extensive nature of the modifications and the "enormous expense of time and money" full and effective review of the modifications by the staff will be inhibited after the modifications have been completed. You also question whether ACRS has been informed of the modifications.

The existence of the Hosgri fault, approximately three and one half miles offshore from the Diablo Canyon facility, came to light in 1971 after the construction permits for the Diablo Canyon facility were issued. In 1973,

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when PG&E applied for an operating license, further investigations of the Hosgri fault began.*/ In 1976, after evaluating the Hosgri fault, the NRC staff advised PG&E that the plant's seismic capabilities should be reevaluated to determine what modifications might be necessary for the plant to safely withstand a magnitude 7.5 earthquake on that fault. The staff has approved the revised design basis and the associated design criteria (0.75g horizontal acceleration as opposed to 0.4g originally).**/ However, the staff has not completed its review of the specific modifications necessary to withstand the more severe potential ground motion. PG&E has recently begun installation of the modifications.

The construction of Units 1 and 2 was authorized by the issuance of construction permits in 1968 and 1970, respectively. These permits authorized construction in accordance with the principal architectural and engineering criteria established for these plants. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.35(b) the issuance of a construction permit does not constitute Commission approval of the safety of any design, feature or specification of the plant. Such approval is necessary prior to the issuance of an operating license.

*/ After the operating license review began, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rejected requests to suspend construction stating:


- "1. Continued construction of the plant poses no risk to the health and safety of the public, regardless of any geologic problems which might exist. Operation of the plant is, of course, a quite different matter. The Board thus feels that consideration of seismic issues is properly carried out in the operating license proceeding.
- "2. Argument that the incremental cost of continued construction could have an effect upon the eventual granting of an operating license is, from a health and safety standpoint, invalid. Economic factors cannot be considered in any matter which involves a risk to the public health and safety.
- "3. Continued construction will neither conceal nor render inaccessible any of the geologic features of the site not already affected."

In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323, unpublished Licensing Board Orders (April 3, 1974, November 4, 1974).

These same reasons are equally true today.

**/ Although it is not accurate to characterize the two sets of seismic design criteria by the single numbers given, the numbers are often used and are thus included here for reference.

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Under the Commission's regulatory scheme the holder of a construction permit is permitted to construct a plant subject to the constraints of the principal architectural and engineering criteria established in the construction permit proceedings and to either meet or exceed the principal criteria.*/ The construction of a nuclear facility is always at the risk of the applicant for an operating license since the issuance of a construction permit in no way guarantees the issuance of an operating license.**/

Enclosed is an evaluation of the safety aspects of your request - primarily whether or not the modification work will preclude an effective review.


I have reviewed the above considerations and the enclosed safety evaluation and conclude that:

- (1) The ACRS has been informed that PE&E is proceeding with modifications on the basis of the seismic reevaluation and the general nature of the modifications has been discussed with the ACRS.
- (2) The staff has approved the principal criteria upon which the seismic reevaluation is based.
- (3) The licensee is authorized, but is not required, to construct the Diablo Canyon facility to exceed the seismic design criteria established in the construction permit proceedings (0.4g horizontal acceleration) without further staff review.
- (4) Upgrading the plant's earthquake resistant capabilities does not, of itself, conflict with any of the principal architectural and engineering criteria. Furthermore, based on its review to date, the staff does not believe that the modifications will have any significant effect on any safety aspects of the plant's design other than the plant's earthquake resistance which the staff believes will be enhanced.
- (5) The staff considers it has sufficient information to understand the nature of the modifications and has or can obtain sufficient information to continue its review of the seismic reevaluation.

*/ The licensee is not required to exceed the criteria established in the construction permit. By choosing to exceed a criterion, a licensee is not permitted to adversely impact any other criteria since at a minimum all criteria must be met.

**/ Power Reactor Company v Electricians, 375 U.S. 396 (1961); In the Matter of Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC__, February 14, 1978, slip opinion, p. 31. See also 10 CFR Part 50.55e.

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- (6) The staff has performed considerable review of PG&E's seismic reevaluation and, based on this review, does not believe that the modifications will preclude further strengthening if that should be necessary.
- (7) The modifications will not physically obscure any needed information for the staff's review nor will the fact that PG&E has expended resources ("time and money") for these modifications prevent the staff from completing a proper review of PG&E's seismic reevaluation.
- (8) PG&E is proceeding with the modifications at the risk of subsequent disapproval by the Commission.
- (9) Both the design basis and the resulting design modifications are contentions that will be considered in the upcoming public hearings.

Accordingly, for the above reasons, I find that the question of notifying ACRS of the modifications is moot, and that suspension of the modification work pending staff approval is neither required nor necessary to protect the public health and safety. Therefore, your request is denied.

A copy of this determination will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555 and the local Public Document Room for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station located at the San Luis Obispo County Free Library, P. O. Box X, San Luis Obispo, California 93406. A copy of this determination will also be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for its review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations.

Sincerely,

Edson G. Case, Acting Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
Staff Safety Evaluation


ALSO, MINOR CHANGES SUGGESTED BY SCINTO ON PAGE 3 OF LETTER HAVE BEEN ENTERED. OBTAINED TELEPHONE CONCURRENCE FROM GROSSMAN, TOURTELLOTTE, DAVIS, SCINTO, LIEBERMAN & MURRAY. D. Mattson 3/21/78

*See previous yellow for concurrence

*OSD:AD
Henton
3/17/78*

*OSD:DIR
RMattson
3/17/78*

X27391	OFFICE >	LOPM:LWR #1 D. Mattson: c1b	DPM:AD/LWR	ELD	DPM:DD:IS	DPM:DIR	NRR
	SURNAME >	J Stoiz	OVassallo	*	RDeYoung	RBoyd	ECase
	DATE >	3/17/78	3/17/78	3/17/78	3/17/78	3/17/78	3/17/78



SAFETY EVALUATION

BY THE

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OF A REQUEST FROM THE


CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

IN THE MATTER OF

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY


DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323



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1. Introduction

Construction permits for Units 1 and 2 of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, located on the California coast about 12 miles from San Luis Obispo, were issued in 1968 and 1970, respectively. The review of geology and seismology matters conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) included independent reviews performed for the AEC by its consultants the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. Based on these reviews, which included consideration of information obtained by the applicant's investigations, the units were designed and constructed to withstand the maximum earthquake potential identified for the site at that time (0.4g horizontal acceleration).*

In 1971, the existence of a fault—now known as the Hosgri Fault—passing about 3.5 miles offshore from the plant site came to light. When application was made in 1973 to the AEC (now NRC) for an operating license, detailed investigation of the Hosgri Fault began, leading to a conclusion by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC Staff) and the USGS that the maximum potential earthquake ground motion at the site may be more severe than that for which the plant had been originally designed. Thus, in April 1976, the applicant for an operating license-- the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)—was advised by the NRC Staff that the plant's seismic capabilities should be reanalyzed to determine what modifications would be necessary to withstand a more severe potential ground motion (0.75g).*


*Although it is not accurate to characterize the two sets of seismic design criteria by the single numbers given, the numbers are often used and are thus included here for reference.



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PG&E has nearly completed the reanalysis and has submitted reports including descriptions of its work to date and the results of that work. This material is currently under review by the NRC staff. At a meeting on November 15, 1977 it was made clear to the NRC staff and to the Center for Law in the Public Interest (CLPI), which represents intervenors in the operating license proceeding, that PG&E intended to proceed immediately and rapidly with installing the modifications indicated by the reanalysis. PG&E estimated that the work would be completed about July 1978 for Unit 1. At a subsequent meeting on December 15, 1977 CLPI discussed with the NRC staff the advisability of allowing the modification work to proceed before the staff's review of the reanalysis was completed.

On January 3, 1978, in a letter addressed directly to the Commissioners, CLPI requested that the modification work be halted until the NRC staff had completed its review of the seismic reevaluation and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) had been notified that the modification work was proceeding. PG&E responded in a letter dated January 12, 1978 to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) opposing CLPI's request. On January 18, 1978 the Commission directed the NRC staff to treat CLPI's letter as a request for an order to show cause pursuant to section 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations:



This means that CLPI's letter is to be treated as a request, to the Director of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to issue an order to show cause pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202. Such an order, if issued, would institute formal Commission proceedings to consider halting the modification work. If the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that the public health, safety or interest so required, such an order could also be temporarily effective pending further order. In these circumstances 10 CFR 2.206 provides that, within a reasonable time, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation shall either institute the proceeding requested or inform the person who made the request in writing that no proceeding will be instituted, in whole or in part, with respect to his request, and the reasons therefor. If a proceeding is not instituted the record of the decision is provided to the Commission which may then review the decision.

The NRC staff's evaluation of the safety aspects of CLPI's request, in support of a decision by the Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation, is provided below. In this case, the staff has concluded that an order to show cause is not warranted because: the staff believes that the modification work is authorized under the present construction permits and the Commission's regulations since it enhances the plant's earthquake resistant capabilities and does not have any significant effect on other safety aspects of the plant's design; the principal design criteria regarding seismic reevaluation have been previously reviewed and been found acceptable




by the staff; the staff believes that the modification work will not preclude the possibility of further upgrading if that should later be required; and, in any event, the staff does not believe that allowing the modification work to proceed will preclude full and effective review of the seismic reevaluation.

2. Principal Criteria for Seismic Reevaluation

In Section 3.7 of Supplement No. 4 to the Safety Evaluation Report for Diablo Canyon, dated May 11, 1976, the staff formally set forth basic criteria that would be acceptable to the staff for use in reevaluating the plant. These criteria included the effective acceleration at the site to be used for purpose of engineering calculations and criteria concerning the use of ductility in evaluating structures and the reduction of ground motion spectra to account for building size effects.

In Section 3.7 of Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report, dated September 9, 1976, the staff formally set forth more detailed definitions of these criteria and stated that the applicant was proceeding with the reevaluation on the basis of those definitions. Supplement No. 5 described the specific design spectra that were acceptable to the staff and included specifications on how ductility and the reduction in acceleration due to building size effects could be employed for various structures.



These principal criteria were discussed with the ACRS at subcommittee meetings on May 21, June 25, June 26 and October 11, 1976 and at full committee meetings on July 8 and November 13, 1976. The ACRS did not issue a recommendation to the Commission on the criteria. Instead, in a memorandum dated December 20, 1976, the ACRS transmitted its consultants' comments on the criteria to the staff. Subsequently, in a report to the Commission dated June 10, 1977 the ACRS stated that it would prefer to review the site seismicity and the reevaluation together since the subjects were not readily separable. The staff currently expects to complete its review of the reevaluation and present both subjects to the ACRS Subcommittee in May 1978, or shortly thereafter.

At a meeting on February 4, 1977, the staff reviewed PG&E's proposed specification for reevaluation of the plant's major structures. This specification described in further detail the procedures and criteria to be used. The scope of the specification included evaluating the adequacy of the structures themselves and determining the motions to be used as an input in evaluating systems and equipment inside the structures. The scope did not include evaluating the systems and equipment within the major structures. After some revisions were made to the specification, the staff informed PG&E that the proposed procedures would be acceptable to the staff. This finding and the revised specification were documented in the staff's summary of that meeting, dated May 18, 1977.



PG&E also provided, in April 1977, informal drafts of specifications for reanalysis of piping, equipment and outdoor storage tanks. They were placed in the public document rooms with a staff memorandum dated June 17, 1977. PG&E did not receive staff approval of the specifications for evaluating piping, equipment and tanks prior to performing the reevaluation. Rather, similar information was included in Amendment 50 to the operating license application on June 3, 1977. The staff issued comments on the proposed specifications in a letter dated July 18, 1977 and the staff's review of this information has since been combined with its review of Amendment 50, which is discussed further below.

Thus, before PG&E performed its reevaluation, the staff had approved principal criteria as specified in the SER supplements. The staff had also reviewed and approved more detailed procedures and criteria to be used in reevaluating structures—but not piping, equipment and tanks.

The staff has since performed a great deal more review and has a more detailed understanding of the reanalysis and the modifications. This additional review is discussed below.

3. NRC Staff Review of Seismic Reevaluation


On June 3, 1977 PG&E submitted Amendment 50 to the operating license application consisting of four volumes including a description of the reanalysis of the major structures, a brief description of the modifications that would be needed for the turbine building, and a description



of the reanalysis of some of the systems and components. Extensive presentations on this material were made by PG&E at an ACRS Subcommittee meeting held on June 21, 22 & 23, 1977. On November 15, 1977 PG&E submitted Amendment 56 providing a description of most of the reanalysis work that had remained outstanding when Amendment 50 was submitted. On January 20, 1978 Westinghouse submitted a report on the reanalysis of the Diablo Canyon reactor coolant system. Descriptions of nearly all of the reanalysis work have now been submitted for the staff's review and the staff has performed a considerable amount of review. As a general rule, the material submitted goes into more detail than is usually required for the staff's review. A simplified summary of the staff's review work to date is as follows:

- (1) Numerous meetings and discussions with PG&E were held.
- (2) Requests for additional information were issued concerning Amendment 50 and the responses were received and reviewed.
- (3) Amendment 56 was reviewed.
- (4) Criteria implementation review meetings, of 3 weeks duration, were held with applicant personnel who are familiar with the details of the reevaluation.

The staff review is not yet completed and some requests for further information remain outstanding. Nevertheless, the staff has performed




enough review to have an understanding of the status of PG&E's reevaluation and the nature of the modifications PG&E is making to the plant. A description of these modifications, based on the staff's understanding as gained in its review to date, is provided below.

4. Nature of Modifications to the Plant

The modifications currently proposed by PG&E fall mostly into five categories.


The first category involves individual components which are qualified for seismic conditions by analysis or testing or a combination of analysis and testing. For some components PG&E's reevaluation indicates that the original seismic qualification is no longer valid and requalification is necessary. If the original equipment cannot be qualified for the revised seismic criteria it will be modified or replaced. The work that PG&E is performing with regard to seismic qualification of individual components consists of reanalysis, retesting, modification (consisting primarily of support modification) and, possibly, replacement. If further upgrading of components should later be required the same techniques could then be applied as necessary--namely reanalysis, retesting, modification or replacement. Thus the staff believes that, if further upgrading should later be necessary, it would not be precluded by this work.



The second category involves piping systems. The PG&E reevaluation indicates some locations where more or stronger supports are needed in order to meet acceptance criteria for piping system seismic analysis. Supports are being added or strengthened in these locations. If further upgrading of piping systems should later be required the same techniques could then be applied as necessary - namely adding or modifying supports. Thus the staff believes that, if further upgrading should later be necessary, it would not be precluded by this work.

The third category involves strengthening the structural steel frameworks that comprise the upper parts of the turbine building and the fuel handling building and that provide equipment support between the containment shell and the crane wall inside the containment structure. If further upgrading should later be required, similar techniques could be applied to these particular areas as necessary - namely modification of structural steel frameworks. Thus, the staff believes that, if further upgrading should later be required, it would not be precluded by this work.

The fourth category involves adding reinforced concrete buttresses on the outside of the turbine building, adding steel floor plate in place of floor grating inside the turbine building and adding reinforced concrete shear walls inside of the turbine building. The concrete buttresses and shear walls constitute extensive work which is not readily reversible. However, if further upgrading should later be required, similar techniques could be applied to these particular areas as necessary - namely providing additional walls and buttresses or strengthening



the existing walls and buttresses. Thus, the staff believes that, if further upgrading should later be necessary, it would not be precluded by this work.

The fifth category involves adding integral reinforced concrete walls to the outside of certain steel storage tanks - the condensate storage tanks, the refueling water tanks, the primary water storage tanks and the transfer storage and firewater tank. In the event that further upgrading should later be required, similar techniques could be applied to these tanks as necessary - namely further strengthening with additional reinforced concrete or with structural steel. Thus, if further upgrading should later be necessary, the staff believes that it would not be precluded by this work.

There will also be some other modifications that are more minor in nature than those discussed above. If further upgrading should later be necessary, the staff believes that it would not be precluded by these other, more minor modifications.

In summary, based on its review to date, the staff does not believe that the modification work PG&E is performing will preclude further strengthening of the plant if that should later be required and thus the work is not expected to foreclose significant safety options. This does not mean that the staff has found the modifications acceptable nor does it mean that any hypothetical amount of further upgrading is feasible or economical. It only states the staff's opinion that the modification work that PG&E is currently performing will not preclude further upgrading.




In addition, based on its review to date, the staff does not believe that the modifications will have any significant effect on any safety aspects of the plant's design other than the plant's earthquake resistance which the staff believes will be enhanced.

5. Evaluation of Request to Stop Work


CLPI's petition requests that modification work be halted until the staff has completed and documented its review of the seismic reevaluation and the ACRS has been informed that the modifications are proceeding. It concedes that the regulations contemplate the applicant proceeding with work at its own risk, subject to subsequent Commission review and possible disapproval. Nevertheless, it argues that such practice would be inappropriate in this case. The reason given is that allowing modifications to proceed would preclude full and effective review of the seismic reevaluation.

The staff believes that the modification work is authorized by the construction permits and the Commission's regulations because: (1) the staff believes that the modifications will enhance the plant's earthquake resistant capability, resulting in a plant that meets or exceeds the seismic design requirements of the principal architectural and engineering criteria approved during the construction permit proceedings;



and (2) the staff does not believe that the modifications will have any significant effect on safety aspects of the plant's design other than the plant's earthquake resistant capabilities.

Aside from the question of authorization under the regulations, the petition's arguments could be relevant to safety if allowing the work to proceed would create a situation where there would be reluctance to perform a complete and effective review and then, possibly, to impose more stringent requirements. The staff believes this argument to be meritless. In the first place, as discussed above, the staff has previously reviewed and approved the principal criteria and some of the procedures upon which the reanalysis was based. In the second place, as also discussed above, the staff has now performed considerable review of the reanalysis, and based on the knowledge gained in that review, does not believe that proceeding with the modifications will preclude further strengthening of the plant. In addition the modifications will not in any way physically obscure information needed in the staff's review. Finally, the staff fully intends to perform a complete and effective review regardless of whether or not the modifications have been installed. The fact that PG&E has spent time and money on the modifications will not, nor could it ever, serve as an impetus to generate staff approval of the modifications. In this respect, allowing the modifications to proceed is similar to allowing the construction of nuclear power plants to proceed before operating license reviews are performed. However, the time and money involved in the modifications are much less than what is involved in




building an entire plant. The NRC staff will urge further modifications to the plant if it deems them necessary from its review and will not urge further modifications unless it does consider them necessary.

As to the notification of the ACRS, the ACRS has been informed that the modification work is proceeding and thus this point is moot. The nature and scope of the modifications was discussed with the ACRS subcommittee during a three-day meeting on June 21, 22 and 23, 1977. The ACRS was sent copies of the staff's summary of a meeting held on November 3, 1977. The meeting summary was dated November 10, 1977 and specifically indicated that PG&E expected to complete the modification work in July 1978. Further, on January 6, 1978 the staff briefed the ACRS on the status of the Diablo Canyon review. During this briefing the Committee was specifically told that PG&E was proceeding at its own risk with the modifications and that the staff had not yet completed its review of these modifications. This discussion was recorded in the transcript of the Committee's 213th general meeting on pages 396 through 404.

6. NRC Staff Conclusion

CLPI requested halting modification work on the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant pending: (1) completion of the NRC staff's review of seismic reevaluation of the plant, upon which the modifications are based, and (2) notification of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that the modification work is in progress. The stated



reason for CLPI's request was that allowing modification work to proceed would preclude complete and effective review of the seismic reevaluation.


Based on the evaluation described above it is the staff's conclusion that issuance of a show cause order instituting proceedings to consider halting the modification work is not warranted. The reasons for the staff's conclusion are discussed above and are summarized as follows:

1. The work is authorized by the construction permits and the regulations since it enhances the plant's earthquake resistant capabilities and does not have any significant effect on other safety aspects of the plant's design, and
2. Notwithstanding that, with respect to completion of the NRC staff's review:
 - a. The staff has previously reviewed and approved the principal criteria upon which the reanalysis was based;
 - b. Based on the knowledge of the modifications gained in its review to date the staff does not believe that proceeding with the modification work would preclude further strengthening; and
 - c. In any event, the staff intends to perform a complete and effective review of the seismic reanalysis, regardless of whether or not the modifications have been installed.



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3. With respect to notification of the ACRS, the ACRS has been notified and thus this point is moot.



ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
15TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

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ASSISTANT REGIONAL WHIP

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

March 1, 1978

FILE NUMBER

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
Mr. Carlton C. Kammerer
Director
Congressional Affairs
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Kammerer:

Enclosed is self-explanatory correspondence from my constituent, Dennis Morris; regarding his interest in the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. As you will note, he has specific questions about safety and environmental factors.

I will appreciate any information or assistance you may be able to provide.

Sincerely


ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
Member of Congress

RJL:cbt


Enclosure

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


SUBCOMMITTEE:
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
NATIONAL PARKS AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS



677 Watersorth
P.O. Beach, CA 934
February 23, 1978



Congressman Huber Lagomastri
Washington, D.C. 20541

Dear Sir,

I am 14 years-old and I attend Judkins Intermediate School and I would like to know your opinion on the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. I have heard that it is built approximately 3 miles away the San Andreas earthquake fault. Do you think this could be hazardous?

Another thing I would like to know is what effects would occur to the ocean environment in that area due to the warmer water being dumped into ocean? Will the water be contaminated?

I feel that the warm water will probably benefit the area because more plankton would grow and bring in small fish. But it would bring problems like less abalone and more sharks.

I would really appreciate a letter from you containing information and your opinion on the situation.

Thank-you,
Dennis Morris
Dennis Morris