

**NO DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCUMENT MATERIAL.
(TEMPORARY FORM)**

CONTROL NO: 538

FILE: _____

FROM: Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. San Francisco, Calif. 94106 Philip A. Crane, Jr.			DATE OF DOC 1-13-76	DATE REC'D 1-19-76	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. O. D. Parr			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT NRC PDR <u>XX</u>		SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 80-275 323		

DESCRIPTION: Ltr re our 12-10-75 ltr....
furn info on design bases for the reactor
vessel support system at Diablo Canyon 1 & 2.

ENCLOSURES:

Do NOT Remove

ACKNOWLEDGED

PLANT NAME: Diablo Canyon Unit 1 & 2

SAFETY	FOR ACTION/INFORMATION	ENVIRO	DHL 1-22-76
ASSIGNED AD <u>DeYoung</u>	ASSIGNED BRANCH CHIEF _____		
BRANCH CHIEF <u>PARR</u>	PROJECT MANAGER _____		
PROJECT MANAGER <u>ALLISON</u>	LIC ASST. _____ W/ ACRS		
LIC. ASST. <u>GOULBOURNE</u> W/16 CYS ACRS			

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|--|
| <u>REG FILES (2)</u> | <u>SYSTEMS SAFETY</u> | <u>PLANT SYSTEMS</u> | <u>SITE SAFETY & ENVIRO ANALYSIS</u> |
| ✓NRC PDR (2) | HEINEMAN | TEDESCO | DENTON MULLER. |
| OELD | SCHROEDER | BENAROYA | |
| GOSSICK/STAFF | | LAINAS | <u>ENVIRO TECH.</u> |
| ✓I&E (2) | <u>ENGINEERING</u> | IPPOLITO | ERNST |
| MIPC | MACCARY | | BALLARD |
| | ✓KNIGHT | <u>OPERATING REACTORS</u> | SPANGLER |
| <u>PROJECT MANAGEMENT</u> | ✓IHWEIL | STELLO | <u>SITE TECH.</u> |
| BOYD | ✓PAWLICKI | | GAMMILL |
| P. COLLINS | | <u>OPERATING TECH.</u> | STEPP |
| HOUSTON | <u>REACTOR SAFETY</u> | EISENHUT | HULMAN |
| PETERSON | ROSS | SHAO | |
| MELTZ | NOVAK | BAER | |
| HELTEMES | ROSETOCZY | SCHWENCER | |
| | CHECK | GRIMES | |
- MISCELLANEOUS TRAMMELL
BOSNAK BARANOWSKY

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| LOCAL PDR <u>San Luis Obispo, Calif</u> | NATIONAL LAB _____ W/ CYS | BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB |
| ✓MTC | ✓REGION V-I&E--(WALNUT CREEK) | ULRIKSON (ORNL) |
| ✓NSIC | LA PDR | |
| ASLB | CONSULTANTS | |

9/14

1971

... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..

...

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

...

...

...

...

... ..



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E + 77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94106 • (415) 781-4211

JOHN C. MORRISSEY
VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL
MALCOLM H. FURBUSH
ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL
CHARLES T. VAN DEUSEN
MALCOLM A. MACKILLOP
PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
HENRY J. LAPLANTE
RICHARD A. CLARKE
JOHN B. GIBSON
ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL

January 13, 1976

NOEL KELLY
EDWARD J. MCGANNEY
ARTHUR L. HILLMAN, JR.
ROBERT D. HUBBACH
DAN GRAYSON LUBBOCK
SENIOR COUNSEL
GILBERT L. HARRICK
GLENN WEST, JR.
CHARLES W. THIBBELL
DANIEL E. GIBSON
BERNARD J. DELLABANTA
HOWARD V. GOLUB
JAMES C. LOBSON
LOUIS F. SCHOFIELD
DENNIS C. SULLIVAN
ROBERT L. HARRIS
J. PETER BAUMGARTNER
JACK W. SHUCK
RICHARD L. WEISS
ANNETTE GREEN
BRUCE R. WORTHINGTON
DAVID J. WILLIAMS
SHIRLEY WOOD
ATTORNEYS



Mr. Olan D. Parr, Chief
Light Water Reactors
Project Branch 1-3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Re: Dockets 50-275-01
50-323-01
Diablo Canyon Site
Units 1 and 2

Dear Mr. Parr:

Your letter dated December 10, 1975 asked that we review the design bases for the reactor vessel support system for Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2, to determine whether certain transient loads were taken into account appropriately in the design.

The design bases for the reactor vessel support system did not include all of the specific transient loads described in the enclosure to your letter. However, the reactor coolant system supports, including the reactor vessel supports, were designed to accommodate the faulted condition load combinations given in Sections 3.6 and 5.2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. These faulted condition loads included loads resulting from blowdown forces on reactor coolant loop piping and loads resulting from forces acting on the reactor internals and vessel inner wall. As shown in Section 3.6 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, the break locations considered included guillotine breaks in reactor coolant loop piping outside the primary shield wall but did not include coolant loop breaks within the shield wall. None of the break locations considered would result in asymmetric reactor cavity pressure forces around the reactor vessel.

We believe that the restraint afforded by the various elements of the reactor coolant system supports would provide the necessary integrity to protect the public in the very unlikely event of a pipe rupture in the immediate vicinity of the reactor vessel.

Very truly yours,

Philip A. Crane, Jr.

CC: ASLB
Parties

