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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
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November 13, 1980

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/80-14. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2), which concerns operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:scs
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P.O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/80-14

Report Date: November 13, 1980

Occurrence Date: October 30, 1980

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Deficiencies In the Monthly Firehose Station
Inspection

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 3 - 100%

Description of Occurrence:

During the period of September 2nd through 12th, 1980, the Quality Assurance Audit division completed a Departmental Audit Report. This audit went back to June 20, 1979. Deficiencies were identified in the fire protection equipment and reported to the appropriate personnel. As a result, a monthly fire protection reinspection was conducted on all three units. Oconee personnel did the reinspection in order for them to have a complete understanding of the deficiencies. During the reinspection and the audit of the completed procedures and work request issue record cards, other deficiencies were found.

Unit 1: The monthly fire protection equipment inspection was completed on November 21, 1979. The next completion date was January 8, 1980, thus resulting in 48 days between inspections. This constituted inoperability of the fire hose stations per Technical Specification 3.17.4 during the 3-day period from January 5, 1980 to January 8, 1980, due to the fact that the Technical Specification required surveillance exceeded the maximum interval.

The monthly fire protection inspection was not conducted for the month of February. A work request had not been issued for that month, thus resulting in 61 days between inspections. This constituted inoperability of the fire hose stations per Technical Specification 3.17.4 during the 15-day period from February 22, 1980 to March 10, 1980, due to the fact that the Technical Specification required surveillance exceeded the maximum interval.

The monthly fire protection inspection for the month of March 1980 was not conducted, but the annual inspection was conducted in lieu of the monthly inspection. The annual inspection includes all of the steps of the monthly inspection. Since the annual surveillance was performed, no inoperability resulted from the failure to perform the monthly inspection.

Unit 2: The annual fire protection equipment inspection was conducted on March 14, 1980, in lieu of the monthly inspection. Since the annual surveillance was performed, no inoperability resulted from the failure to perform the monthly inspection.

Unit 3: The monthly fire protection equipment inspection work request was not issued for the month of April. The equipment tags were dated April 1980, but no inspection had been conducted for that month. The equipment tags omitted the May date although there was a completed procedure on file for the month of May. This resulted in a 48-day period between inspections. This constituted inoperability of the fire hose stations per Technical Specification 3.17.4 during the 3-day period from May 4, 1980 to May 7, 1980, due to the fact that the Technical Specification required surveillance exceeded the maximum interval.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The actual event, the missed surveillance on the fire hose station, was the result of administrative procedural deficiency due to the fact that the surveillance program was deficient in assuring that surveillance be performed on schedule. Although personnel errors have been identified, these were not the principal cause of the problem.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The responsibility for issuing the surveillance work requests is assigned to the Planning section. There are two cases, February 1980 for Unit 1 and April 1980 for Unit 3, that this section failed to issue work requests for the fire protection equipment inspections. Previously, certain surveillance work requests have not been identified as Technical Specification requirements, nor has emphasis been placed on the completion dates of these work requests. It was evident that the personnel did not have a clear understanding of the work. The fact that the annual inspection was done in lieu of the monthly inspection was another case of misinterpretation. The annual fire protection equipment procedure states that, "This procedure should be made concurrently with the monthly fire protection equipment inspection."

This incident did not impair the fire fighting capabilities of the Station. The reinspection of the fire protection equipment did not identify any deficiencies that would have impaired the operation of this equipment. Thus this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

Immediate corrective action was taken to reinspect all fire protection equipment on all three Units to insure operability. The action progressed as follows:

1. The program that now exist will be changed to uniquely identify the work requests that are Technical Specification requirements. The completion date is January 1, 1981.
2. All personnel in Maintenance sections will be trained as to how the new program works and how to identify work requests that are Technical Specification requirements. The completion date is January 10, 1981.
3. A reporting system which will notify Planning and Maintenance of completion of test or inspections performed will be improved or developed. The completion date is January 10, 1981.

4. The computer program KRONOS will be updated, and with the reporting system KRONOS will be utilized for scheduling. The completion date is January 10, 1981.
5. A system where the Section Head, and if need be, the Superintendent is notified when a work request or test is not performed in a timely fashion will be implemented. The completion date is January 10, 1981.
6. A Station Directive to incorporate items 3 and 4 above will be revised. The completion date is January 10, 1981.
7. The monthly and annual fire protection equipment inspection procedures will be revised to require only one procedure to be performed in any one month, either the monthly or the annual. The completion date is January 10, 1981.
8. All Oconee personnel will review this incident. The completion date is January 10, 1981.
9. All personnel involved in this incident have been counseled.

The final corrective action is scheduled to be completed by January 10, 1981.