

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

February 15, 1979

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2.1b(2) of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/79-4.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

SRL:scs

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

7903010286

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/79-4

Report Date: February 16, 1979

Occurrence Date: January 17, 1979

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Inoperable Hydraulic Suppressor

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 97% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On January 17, 1979 while conducting an inspection of accessible shock suppressors Hydraulic Suppressor 1-01A-1-1-401A-R11 was discovered to have rotated to the inverted position. This suppressor, which is located on the B main steam line, is used to dampen horizontal movement and does not support any weight. Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.14.2 allows 72 hours to repair or replace a hydraulic suppressor subsequent to discovering its inoperability. On January 18, 1979 the suppressor was removed from service, determined to be operable by a functional test and, after oil was added, reinstalled.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This is the second such occurrence within a month. Although the exact cause has yet to be determined, it is believed that the low frequency vibration of the main steam line caused the locking nut to loosen, allowing the suppressor to rotate.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Although the suppressor appeared to be inoperable during the visual inspection, following the functional testing it was determined to be operable. Therefore, it would have fulfilled its purpose in restraining pipe motion under dynamic loads. In addition, the suppressor was tested and returned to service well within the time period allowed by Technical Specification 3.14.2. Therefore, safe operation of the plant was not affected, and the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

The suppressor was removed from service and functionally tested to assure operability. Oil was added, and it was reinstalled. The locking devices on this and similar suppressors will be modified to preclude such rotation in the future.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	S	C	N	E	E	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
LICENSEE CODE														LICENSE NUMBER						LICENSE TYPE					CAT 68			

01	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	9	7	0	1	1	7	7	9	8	0	2	1	6	7	9	9	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
REPORT SOURCE											DOCKET NUMBER						EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE					

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On January 17, 1979 Hydraulic Suppressor 1-01A-1-1-401A-R11 was discovered
 03 to be inverted. It was removed from service on January 18, functionally test-
 04 ed and declared operable, and returned to service. Since its protection is
 05 required only during low probability events, 72 hours is allowed to repair or
 06 replace it. Therefore, public health and safety were not endangered.
 07
 08

09	A	D	B	A	S	U	P	O	R	T	D	Z	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE
17	7	9	0	0	4	0	3	L	0	0	0	0	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
LER/NO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN	
D		F		Z		Z		0		0		0	
23		24		25		26		27		28		29	
ACTION TAKEN		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NRC-4 FORM NO.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
D		Z		Z		0		Y		Y		L	
33		34		35		36		37		38		39	
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)													

10 Rotation is believed to result from main steam line vibration loosening the
 11 locking nut. The suppressor was removed from service, tested, and reinstalled.
 12 The locking devices on this and similar suppressors will be modified to pre-
 13 clude rotation in the future.
 14

15	E	0	9	7	NA	C	Non-routine inspection
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
FACILITY STATUS					OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY
ACTIVITY RELEASED					AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE
Z					Z		NA
23					24		25
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES					DESCRIPTION		
0					Z		
7					8		
PERSONNEL INJURIES					DESCRIPTION		
0					0		
7					8		
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY					DESCRIPTION		
Z					NA		
7					8		
PUBLICITY RESULTS					DESCRIPTION		
N					NA		
7					8		