



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 21, 2016

Mr. Shane M. Marik
Site Vice President and Chief
Nuclear Officer
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station
9610 Power Lane, Mail Stop FC-2-4
Blair, NE 68008

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT 1 - RELAXATION OF THE SCHEDULE REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDER EA-12-049 "ISSUANCE OF ORDER TO MODIFY LICENSES WITH REGARD TO REQUIREMENTS FOR MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR BEYOND-DESIGN-BASIS EXTERNAL EVENTS" (CAC NO. MF0969)

Dear Mr. Marik:

By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12054A735), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ordered Omaha Public Power District (OPPD, the licensee), to take certain actions at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS), associated with the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations. Order EA-12-049 directed that actions be taken by licensees to develop and implement strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities during beyond-design-basis external events (BDBEEs).

Section IV of the order states that licensees proposing to deviate from requirements contained in NRC Order EA-12-049 may request that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, relax or rescind certain conditions, upon demonstration of good cause. By letter dated August 12, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16225A539), OPPD submitted a request for an extension of the Order EA-12-049 full compliance date from December 31, 2016, to August 31, 2017. This OPPD letter also requested a similar relaxation for NRC Order EA-12-051, regarding SFP instrumentation. By letter dated September 9, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16253A181), the SFP instrumentation relaxation request was superseded by a request to rescind Order EA-12-051. This rescission request will be dispositioned separately by the NRC staff.

The licensee's letter, dated August 12, 2016, explains the rationale for the requested relaxation as being related to OPPD's decision to permanently cease operations at the site. By letter dated June 24, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16176A213), OPPD notified the NRC that it plans to permanently cease operations at FCS by December 31, 2016. This notification was updated by letter dated August 25, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16242A127), in which OPPD certified October 24, 2016, as a planned date for permanent cessation of operations. By letter dated November 13, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A254), FCS certified to the NRC that it had permanently ceased power operations at FCS, effective October 24, 2016, and it had permanently defueled the FCS reactor vessel and placed the fuel in the SFP.

The licensee's letter dated August 12, 2016, provides a description of the capabilities that will be in place to respond to a potential BDBEE at FCS during the period of the requested extension. Given the removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, which obviates the need for the core cooling and containment safety functions, these mitigation capabilities relate to maintaining the integrity of fuel in the SFP. They include:

- 1) Existing SFP makeup capability intended for use during a station blackout. This capability would provide makeup water from onsite sources such as the Blair water main, Fire Water Storage Tank, or river water using the diesel-driven fire pump.
- 2) Existing SFP makeup capability established for Section B.5.b of NRC Order EA-02-026. This capability would utilize a fire engine supplied by the plant fire main or a trailer-mounted pump supplied by the Missouri River to add water to the SFP.
- 3) Existing procedures for SFP makeup capability specifically designed for a flooding scenario. This capability would use a submersible pump placed in the Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank to provide makeup to the SFP. Power for the submersible pump would be supplied by mobile diesel generators. This strategy also establishes venting capability for the SFP area.

In light of the facts presented in the licensee's August 12, 2016, letter, the NRC staff has determined that the licensee has demonstrated good cause for relaxation of the order implementation date. The NRC staff also considered that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the United States based on the current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities. Given the plant-specific circumstances at FCS, the NRC staff approves the requested relaxation for Order EA-12-049.

Accordingly, based upon the authority granted to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the requirement of Order EA-12-049 for full order implementation at FCS is relaxed until August 31, 2017.

If you have any questions, please contact Peter Bamford, Senior Project Manager, at 301-415-2833.

Sincerely,



William M. Dean, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-285

cc: Listserv

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/RA/
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 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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