UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 24, 2001

ML012390312

Mr. L. W. Myers
Senior Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Beaver Valley Power Station
Post Office Box 4
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SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITS (TAC NO. MB1575)

Dear Mr. Myers:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 242 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 28, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated May 18, June 15, and July 18, 2001.

The amendment approves changes to the BVPS-1 TS boron concentration limits for the refueling water storage tank, accumulators, boron injection tank (BIT), and the reactor coolant system/refueling canal during Mode 6. In conjunction with the reduction in the maximum boron concentration in the BIT, the temperature controls on the BIT are eliminated.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

Lawrence J. Burkhart, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-334

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 242 to DPR-66
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 242
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (the licensee) dated March 28, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated May 18, June 15, and July 18, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 242, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Patrick D. Milano, Acting Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 24, 2001

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 242

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3/4 1-15	3/4 1-15
3/4 1-16	3/4 1-16
3/4 5-1	3/4 5-1
3/4 5-7	3/4 5-7
3/4 9-1	3/4 9-1
B 3/4 1-3	B 3/4 1-3
B 3/4 5-2	B 3/4 5-2
B 3/4 9-1	B 3/4 9-1

BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A boric acid storage system with:

1. A minimum contained volume of 5000 gallons,

2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A minimum contained volume of 175,000 gallons,

2. A minimum boron concentration of 2400 ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 45°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2. Verifying the water level of the tank, and

3. Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside ambient air temperature is <45°F.

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.8 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2.

a. A boric acid storage system with:

1. A minimum contained volume of 11,336 gallons,

2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A contained volume between 439,050 gallons and 441,100 gallons of borated water,

2. A boron concentration between 2400 and 2600 ppm, and

3. A solution temperature of $\geq$ 45°F and $\leq$ 55°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid storage system inoperable, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore the boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.8 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. Between 7664 and 7816 gallons of borated water,

c. Between 2300 and 2600 ppm of boron, and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 605 and 661 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by:

1. Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and

2. Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

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* Pressurizer Pressure above 1000 psig.

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM - BORON INJECTION TANK ≥ 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4.1.1 The boron injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

* a. A minimum contained volume of 900 gallons of borated water,

+* b. Between 2400 and 2600 ppm of boron.

* 1 hour deviation is permitted to correct the out of specification condition.

\+ To permit adequate recirculation and sampling following actions taken to correct the boron concentration, 4 hours is allowed for verification of the sample results providing corrective action was taken within the first hour.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3.

ACTION:

With the boron injection tank inoperable, be in HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4.1.1 The boron injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying the water level in the surge tank at least once per 7 days.

b. Verifying the boron concentration of the water in the surge tank at least once per 7 days.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 With the reactor vessel head unbolted or removed, the boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met:

a. Either a K_{eff} of 0.95 or less, which includes a 1% $\Delta k/k$ conservative allowance for uncertainties, or

b. A boron concentration of $\geq$ 2400 ppm, which includes a 50 ppm conservative allowance for uncertainties.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6*.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at $\geq$ 30 gpm of 7000 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until K_{eff} is reduced to $\leq$ 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to $\geq$ 2400 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b. Withdrawal of any full length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the reactor coolant system and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least 3 times per 7 days with a maximum time interval between samples of 72 hours.

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* The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum boration capability requirements occur at BOL from full power peak xenon conditions and requires 11,336 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 65,000 gallons of 2400 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boration capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 5000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 175,000 gallons of 2400 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the movable control assemblies is established by observing rod motion and determining that rods are positioned within ± 12 steps (indicated position), of the respective group demand counter position. The OPERABILITY of the rod position indication system is established by appropriate periodic CHANNEL CHECKS, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS and CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod position and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. The OPERABLE condition for the analog rod position indicators is defined as being capable of indicating rod position within ± 12 steps of the associated group demand indicator. For power levels below 50 percent, the specifications of this section permit a one hour stabilization period to permit stabilization of known thermal drift in the analog rod position indicator channels. During this stabilization period, greater reliance is placed upon the group demand position indicators to determine rod position. Above 50 percent power, rod motion is not expected to induce thermal transients of sufficient magnitude to exceed the rod position indicator instrument accuracy of ± 12 steps. Limited use of rod position indication primary detector voltages is allowed as a backup method of determining control rod positions. Comparison of the group demand indicator to the calibration curve is sufficient to allow determination that a control rod is indeed misaligned from its bank when primary voltage measurements are used. Comparison of the group demand counters to the bank insertion limits with verification of rod position with the analog rod

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to limit any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The boron injection tank is required to be isolated when RCS temperature is ≤ the enable temperature set forth in Specification 3.4.9.3 to prevent a potential overpressurization due to an inadvertent safety injection signal.

The analysis of a main steam pipe rupture is performed to demonstrate that the following criteria are satisfied:

1. Assuming a stuck rod cluster control assembly, with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the engineered safeguards, there is no consequential damage to the primary system and the core remains in place and intact.

2. Energy release to containment from the worst steam pipe break does not cause failure of the containment structure.

3. Radiation doses are not expected to exceed the guidelines of the 10 CFR 100.

The limits on injection tank minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met.

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2400 ppm) ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The Limitation of K_{eff} of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core when performing those evolutions with the potential to initiate criticality. Suitable detectors used in place of primary source range neutron flux monitors N-31 and N-32 are recognized as alternate detectors. Alternate detectors may be used in place of primary source range neutron flux monitors as long as the required indication is provided. Since installation of the upper internals does not involve movement of fuel or a significant positive reactivity addition to the core, one primary or alternate source range neutron flux monitor with continuous visual indication in the control room provides adequate neutron flux monitoring capability during this evolution.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The LCO is applicable during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies and during movement of fuel assemblies over recently irradiated fuel assemblies because there is a potential for the limiting fuel handling accident (FHA) to occur. Therefore, the requirements of this Specification may be required to limit leakage of radioactive material within the containment to the environment. A FHA which does not involve recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 100 hours) will result in radiation exposures that are within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 50.67 without any reliance on

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 242 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-334

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 28, 2001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No. ML010950314), as supplemented by letters dated May 18 (ADAMS Accession No. ML011440053), June 15 (ADAMS Accession No. ML011770185), and July 18 (ADAMS Accession No. ML012070178), 2001, the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC; the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1) Technical Specifications (TSs).

The requested changes would revise the BVPS-1 TS boron concentration limits for the refueling water storage tank (RWST), accumulators, boron injection tank (BIT), and the reactor coolant system/refueling canal during Mode 6. In conjunction with the reduction in the maximum boron concentration in the BIT, the temperature controls on the BIT would be eliminated.

These changes in the boron concentration limits in the RWST and accumulators are needed to accommodate the higher reactor core reactivity associated with the operation of the core at higher plant capacity factors. The higher reactivity of the core requires higher boron concentrations in the RWST, accumulators and BIT to offset the increased reactivity at the beginning-of-life cycle and to remain within the limits for the design-basis accidents. These changes are expected to apply beginning with the next core reload design.

The minimum boron concentration specified for the RWST in limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.1.2.7.b.2 would be revised from "2000 [parts-per-million] (ppm)" to "2400 ppm."

The range of boron concentration specified for the RWST in LCO 3.1.2.8.b.2 would be revised from between "2000 and 2100 ppm" to between "2400 and 2600 ppm".

The range of boron concentration specified for the accumulators in LCO 3.5.1.c would be revised from between "1900 and 2100 ppm" to between "2300 and 2600 ppm."

The range of boron concentration specified for the BIT in LCO 3.5.4.1.1.b would be revised from between "2,000 and 7,700 ppm" to between "2400 and 2600 ppm."

The temperature controls for the BIT specified in the LCO, Action statement, and surveillance requirement in TS 3/4.5.4 would be eliminated.

The minimum boron concentration specified in LCO 3.9.1.b would be revised from "2000 ppm" to "≥2400 ppm."

The minimum boron concentration specified in the Action statement for LCO 3.9.1 would be revised from "2000 ppm" to "2400 ppm."

The May 18, June 15, and July 18, 2001, letters provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination or expand the scope of the initial *Federal Register* notice.

2.0 EVALUATION

The requested increment to the minimum boron concentration TS limits in the RWST, accumulators, and BIT is 400 ppm. This value is based on scoping calculations by the licensee of expected boron concentration requirements due to increases in the energy load of BVPS-1. The increased energy load will be met through an increase in the core reactivity by increasing the enrichment of the fuel. Scoping analyses of post-loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) boron concentration requirements, performed by the licensee, indicated that at least an additional 100 ppm of boron is required in the RWST to ensure sufficient shutdown margin. The largest increase in the calculated reactor core boron concentration requirement was 270 ppm, which correlates with a slightly higher increase in the minimum RWST/accumulator/ BIT boron concentrations. Based on these analyses, a conservative value of 400 ppm was chosen which addresses the immediate and near future core design requirements. Increases much greater than 400 ppm were judged to adversely affect the cost associated with maintaining boric acid inventories and on the operation of boron recovery and reactor coolant system (RCS) cleanup systems, as well as potential post-accident consequences.

The current upper limit of the boron concentration in the BIT is above the upper limit of the RWST. This is not required with respect to applicable safety analyses. Consequently, the upper limit of the boron concentration in the BIT is being reduced from 7700 ppm to the proposed 2600 ppm to be consistent with that of the RWST. The proposed allowable boron concentration in the BIT of 2600 ppm does not approach the solubility limit at the lowest operating temperatures of the BIT. This, thereby, removes the need to maintain the associated temperature controls and their associated surveillance requirements on the BIT.

In principle, increasing the boron concentration limit is conservative for most safety criteria. However, an increase in the boron concentration limits, for a fixed volume, affects the pH of the water. This may adversely affect the post-LOCA radio-iodine removal and retention, and increase the potential for stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel components in containment. The licensee's analyses indicate that the proposed change in the limits of the boron concentrations will exceed neither the minimum pH limit to ensure adequate post-LOCA radio-iodine removal and retention, nor the maximum pH limit which is set to minimize the

potential for stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel components and minimize the release of hydrogen from the corrosion of aluminum.

In addition to considerations of change in the pH of water, an increase in the boron concentration in the RWST, accumulators and BIT reduces the solubility at low temperatures. Since water with boron concentrations of less than 4000 ppm remains soluble at temperatures above 32° F, the existing requirements for freeze protection are satisfied. This eliminates the need for associated temperature controls on the BIT.

Given the boron concentration increases, the switchover from cold leg to hot leg injection, following a postulated LOCA, must occur sooner to avoid boron precipitation in the reactor vessel. The licensee has performed analyses supporting a reduced hot leg switchover time of 8.0 hours based on maximum boron concentrations and borated water volumes. The licensee stated in its March 28, 2001, letter that the reduced cold-to-hot leg switchover time of 8.0 hours will be incorporated into the BVPS-1 Emergency Operating Procedures upon approval and implementation of this amendment.

The change in the boron concentration limits is in conjunction with an increase in the fuel enrichment; and the latter must be taken into account in all scoping analyses, in particular, with regard to a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident. The licensee has determined that the parameters and values used in the analysis of the rod cluster control assembly ejection accident, and listed in the BVPS-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USFAR) in Table 14.2-3, remain bounding and valid with fuel up to 5.0 weight percent enrichment and with the changes requested in this license amendment. This accident and other non-LOCA accidents will be explicitly considered in reload evaluations.

The NRC staff finds that the proposed increases in the minimum boron concentrations and ranges of acceptable boron concentrations are conservative. The increases in boron concentrations do not adversely affect the solubility of boron in the RCS, the potential for stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel components, the release of hydrogen from the corrosion of aluminum, or the validity of the evaluation of a postulated rod cluster control assembly design-basis accident. Furthermore, the reduced cold-to-hot leg switchover time will be implemented in BVPS-1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes to the boron concentration limits for the RWST, accumulators, BIT, and the RCS/Refueling Canal during Mode 6 acceptable. Due to the continued solubility of boron in water at the proposed concentrations, the NRC staff also finds the elimination of the temperature controls on the BIT acceptable. Under these changes, there is reasonable assurance that the facility will operate within the acceptance criteria of the UFSAR and the health and safety of the public will not be endangered. The proposed changes are, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes

surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (66 FR 38763). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Yuri Orechwa

Date: September 24, 2001