Mr. James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Taylor:

SUBJECT: EDO RESPONSE TO ACRS REPORT DATED DECEMBER 12, 1990 ON

THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN APPROVAL FOR THE RESAR SP/90

DESIGN

In our December 12, 1990 report to Chairman Carr regarding Westinghouse's Application for Preliminary Design Approval for the RESAR SP/90 Design, we expressed a concern (item 4.1) about the location of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) on the same floor and corridor as the control room.

In our report we stated that, "We believe that another location for the EDG room should be specified in view of the potential for fire and/or explosions associated with the operation of large diesel generators."

Item 8 of the enclosure to your response of January 14, 1991 states that, "The staff has not in the past considered, and does not now consider, credible an explosion in the EDG room of sufficient size to cause catastrophic failure of the reinforced concrete enclosure of these rooms."

Your response did not address the large door that separates the EDG from the corridor leading to the control room. We ask that you expand your reply to include consideration of this door and give us your views on the size of a fire and/or explosion that you would consider credible, and some estimate of the structural capability of this door under differential pressure conditions. Also, we ask that you address the potential for a fire resulting from combustibles such as fuel oil that may flow under the door into the corridor.

Sincerely,

David A. Ward Chairman

Reference:

Letter dated January 14, 1991, from James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, to David Ward, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subject: Report by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on the RESAR SP/90, December 12, 1990.