

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

Central File

*50-269
270
287*

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 9, 1977

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4063

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Oconee Nuclear Station Appendix B Technical Specification 1.2A requires that all water discharged to the Hartwell Reservoir have a pH between 6.0 and 9.0. On May 1, 1977, a routine review of the strip chart recording of the pH, as monitored at the point of release to Hartwell Reservoir, indicated a pH reading greater than 9.0 for a period of one and three-fourths hours. The maximum pH recorded was 9.2. The following is a description of the events leading to this incident.

Since January 20, 1977, flow to the waste water collection basins (WWCB) has been controlled to provide holdup of radioactivity released to the WWCB during a January 17, 1977 incident described in Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/77-3. To reduce flow to the basins in order to enhance holdup time, the two water treatment room (WTR) sump pumps have been used only during the regeneration of a demineralizer or during acid or caustic additions to the WWCB.

Demineralizer regeneration involves an acid/caustic injection followed by a demineralized water flush (approximately two hours in duration) to remove all traces of the addition from the system. On April 20, 1977, a change to the procedure for regeneration of the makeup demineralizer was initiated. The revision was part of corrective action taken for an incident reported in my letter of April 25, 1977. The purpose of the change was to assure that the entire volume of water used in the regeneration of the demineralizer was diverted to the WWCB. The procedure, as revised, required that the WTR sump pumps be placed in operation for the duration of a demineralizer regeneration. The approved procedure change was placed in the control copy of the procedure on April 28, 1977; however, due to a personnel error the change was not inserted in the working copy of the procedure located in the WTR.


*Misc
1
B*

On May 1, 1977, a demineralizer regeneration was performed using the unrevised working copy of the regeneration procedure. Following the unrevised procedure, the WTR sump pumps were placed in operation prior to the acid/caustic injection and were secured after one hour of flush water had been added. After the sump pumps were secured, the slightly caustic flush water overflowed to the storm drains. The storm drains empty into the oil collection pond which provides treatment before the water reached the Keowee tailrace. The protection of the health of aquatic organisms and the downstream water quality was assured in this incident by the continuous dilution resulting from mixing of the effluent with the Keowee tailrace. Considering this dilution factor, the pH of water actually leaving the site, i.e., flow passing under the Highway 183 bridge, was approximately 8.4.

The procedure change has been inserted into the working copies of the makeup demineralizer procedure. Administrative action, which included disciplinary proceedings and a review of the incident with appropriate personnel was taken. Since this incident was due to personnel error, it is felt that the action taken was appropriate and should eliminate recurrence of the incident.

Our present policy of recording pH readings of the settling basins and yard drains every four hours and before and after completion of demineralizer regeneration will continue. Any abnormal change in pH will be reported to the duty chemist who will take appropriate measures. Implementation of the audible alarms on the yard drain pH monitors will be completed by June 1, 1977.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge