Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

| Title: | Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3&4 |
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| Docket Number: | 52-025-LA-2 and 52-026-LA-2 |

Location: teleconference

Date: Wednesday, August 3, 2016

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Pages 1-132

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| 1 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | |
| 2 | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |
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| 4 | ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL | |
| 5 | + + + + | |
| 6 | HEARING | |
| 7 | x | |
| 8 | In the Matter of: : Docket Nos. | |
| 9 | SOUTHERN NUCLEAR : 52-025-LA-2 | |
| 10 | OPERATING COMPANY, INC.: 52-026-LA-2 | |
| 11 | : ASLBP No. | |
| 12 | (Vogtle Electric : 16-946-02-LA-BD01 | |
| 13 | Generating Plant, : | |
| 14 | Units 3 and 4) : | |
| 15 | x | |
| 16 | Wednesday, August 3, 2016 | |
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| 18 | Teleconference | |
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| 20 | BEFORE: | |
| 21 | RONALD M. SPRITZER, Chairman | |
| 22 | NICHOLAS G. TRIKOUROS, Administrative Judge | |
| 23 | GARY S. ARNOLD, Administrative Judge | |
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| 17 | | Arnold Gunderson |
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| PROCEEDINGS |
| 9:33 a.m. |
| CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Let's go ahead and go |
| on the record. |
| My name is Ronald Spritzer. I am the |
| Chairman of this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. |
| We are here in the case of Southern |
| Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating |
| Plant Units 3 and 4. This is Docket Number, or |
| Numbers 52-025-LA-2 and 52-026-LA-2, also ASLBP Number |
| 16-946-02-LA-BD01. |
| And we are here on the Petition for Leave |
| to Intervene and Request for Hearing by the Blue Ridge |
| Environmental Defense League and its chapter Concerned |
| Citizens of Shell Bluff regarding Southern Nuclear |
| Company's request for license amendment for |
| containment hydrogen igniters, LAR-15-003. And that |
| petition was originally filed on May 2, 2016. |
| And we're here to hear argument on |
| standing and contention admissibility. |
| I've already introduced myself. Again, |
| I'm Ron Spritzer. I am an Administrative Judge, legal |
| |
| judge here. My background, of course, is as an |
| judge here. My background, of course, is as an attorney. |
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| 1 | to me to introduce themselves, starting on my right. |
| 2 | JUDGE ARNOLD: I'm Judge Arnold. I'm a |
| 3 | nuclear engineer and my background has been with the |
| 4 | Naval Reactors Program prior to the NRC. |
| 5 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I'm Nick Trikouros. I'm |
| 6 | a nuclear engineer. My background is the commercial |
| 7 | nuclear industry and a number of years a private |
| 8 | consultant. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Why don't we go around |
| 10 | from the participants in the case? Let me ask the |
| 11 | persons who will actually be speaking, the |
| 12 | representatives, to identify themselves. And if you |
| 13 | have anybody with you in the room who in the room |
| 14 | with you that will not be participating, please |
| 15 | identify them as well. |
| 16 | Why don't we start with the Petitioners? |
| 17 | MR. ZELLER: Good morning. This is Lou |
| 18 | Zeller representing the Blue Ridge Environmental |
| 19 | Defense League and the Concerned Citizens of Shell |
| 20 | Bluff. |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: And are you by |
| 22 | yourself there, Mr. Zeller? |
| 23 | MR. ZELLER: I am alone here in the |
| 24 | office. I have my technical expert, Arnold Gundersen, |
| 25 | also online. |
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| 1 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. I see Mr. |
| 2 | Gundersen. |
| 3 | All right, why don't we move on to the NRC |
| 4 | staff? I think you have two representatives. Why |
| 5 | don't you identify both of those and anyone else who's |
| 6 | with you in the room? |
| 7 | MR. IRVIN: All right. My name is Ian |
| 8 | Irvin and I'm representing the NRC staff, at least |
| 9 | regarding standing. With me is Ms. Marcia Carpentier, |
| 10 | she'll be representing NRC staff concerning contention |
| 11 | admissibility. |
| 12 | With us are Mr. Clinton Ashley, Jonathan |
| 13 | Barr, Ms. Anita Ghosh, Ms. Anne-Marie Grady and Mr. |
| 14 | Chandu Patel. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: And for the Southern |
| 16 | Nuclear Company? |
| 17 | MS. RONNLUND: Good morning. This is |
| 18 | Milli Ronnlund with Balch & Bingham for Southern |
| 19 | Nuclear. In the room with me I have Jason Redd and |
| 20 | Amy Chamberlain of Southern Nuclear. I also have Stan |
| 21 | Blanton and Alan Lovett with Balch & Bingham. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Very good, thank you. |
| 23 | We do have some members of the public who |
| 24 | are listening on telephone lines. Let me briefly give |
| 25 | an introduction to what we're doing here today. |
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8 1 For their benefit, as I've indicated, a 2 Petition for Leave to Intervene in a License Amendment 3 has been filed by the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 4 League and its chapter Concerned Citizens of Shell 5 Bluff. The license amendment relates to the 6 7 addition of two hydrogen igniters in the -- in or near 8 something called the in-containment refueling water 9 storage tank, which we may abbreviate as IRWST so 10 we're not challenged by that rather long phrase every time we mention it. And the Petitioners 11 are challenging the support or justification for that 12 amendment. 13 14 We will be hearing argument today on their 15 standing, that is, whether they have an actual or threatened injury sufficient enough to justify their 16 17 participation in the case. And then we'll also be hearing argument on 18 19 the admissibility of their contentions. Contentions are generally what you might refer to as their claims, 20 their arguments why the amendment should not be 21 Before we can proceed to an evidentiary 22 granted. hearing, however, those contentions have to meet some 23 24 rather strict requirements. So, that's the second issue we'll 25 be

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hearing argument on today. There are no witnesses. We will not be taking any evidence. We will simply be listening to the arguments presented by the parties' representatives.

5 We won't be using time cards today. We do have a rough -- we do have allotted time for all of 6 7 the representatives. For technical reasons, we'll 8 dispense with the time card. But I'll give you a 9 warning. Generally, we will let you speak, certainly 10 long enough to answer all the judges' questions that we may have. And I think we've given everybody enough 11 time, but you should also have time to make whatever 12 presentation you may have prepared. 13

Now, we do have a little different issue here than when you were in person as far as if you need to confer with someone who's there with you, or in the case of Mr. Zeller, Mr. Gundersen who is in a different location, we'll allow you to do that and I won't penalize you in terms of your time unless it really gets out of hand.

But you need to let us know that and you can mute the phones, I believe. Let me check with our technical person. You'll have to mute your phones so you can confer. We will, however, allow you to do that, so just let me know "I need to confer with

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| 1 | someone who's here with me" or with Mr. Gundersen for |
| 2 | Mr. Zeller, and we'll give you time to do that. |
| 3 | As I understand, the argument well, the |
| 4 | argument order will be the Petitioners go first. We |
| 5 | didn't say whether the staff or Southern Nuclear would |
| 6 | go second. Have you all agreed among yourselves as to |
| 7 | who will speak second? |
| 8 | MS. RONNLUND: No, Your Honor. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Do have your |
| 10 | preference? Who wants to speak first for the staff or |
| 11 | Southern Nuclear? |
| 12 | MS. RONNLUND: I'll leave it up to the |
| 13 | staff, whatever they prefer. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
| 15 | MS. CARPENTIER: This is Marcia Carpentier |
| 16 | for the staff. It is usually the case in these |
| 17 | matters that staff goes third, and we would have no |
| 18 | problem with following that, or reversing it, if |
| 19 | necessary. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. Well, I |
| 21 | think Southern Nuclear deferred to you. So, if the |
| 22 | normal procedure is the staff goes third, we'll follow |
| 23 | that. We'll see if my colleagues prefer some |
| 24 | different order. |
| 25 | All right. And Petitioners have 30 |
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| 1 | minutes. I understand Mr. Zeller will be speaking for |
| 2 | the Petitioners. Be sure to speak into the microphone |
| 3 | and identify yourself for the benefit of the court |
| 4 | reporter. I think that's all I have in the way of |
| 5 | housekeeping, introductory matters. |
| 6 | Well, we will take a break, probably ,it's |
| 7 | about 20 of, we'll go probably for an hour and |
| 8 | hopefully get through the Petitioners and Southern |
| 9 | Nuclear, and then take a break and move on to the |
| 10 | staff. |
| 11 | Are there any questions before we get |
| 12 | started? Procedural questions? |
| 13 | Hearing none, why don't we move ahead then |
| 14 | and let's hear from the Petitioners. Mr. Zeller? |
| 15 | MR. ZELLER: Yes, thank you, Judge |
| 16 | Spritzer. |
| 17 | I would like to reserve, from our 30 |
| 18 | minutes, ten minutes for rebuttal, if I might. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: We told you you could |
| 20 | reserve five, but unless there's some objection, we'll |
| 21 | allow you to reserve ten. |
| 22 | MR. ZELLER: That would be sufficient. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: Well, good morning, Judge |
| 25 | Chairman Spritzer, Judge Trikouros and Judge Arnold. |

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| 1 | We welcome this opportunity to present our arguments |
| 2 | on the standing and contention admissibility. |
| 3 | Today, it is incumbent upon the |
| 4 | Petitioners to make a showing sufficient to require |
| 5 | reasonable minds to inquire further. |
| 6 | Issues raised in our contentions are |
| 7 | serious safety matters which will rise to the highest |
| 8 | levels of concern for public safety. |
| 9 | Our focus today is not on a procedural |
| 10 | matter, such as environmental impacts or water |
| 11 | quality, which we have argued in other proceedings. |
| 12 | No, our contention is the potential for hydrogen |
| 13 | explosions at Plant Vogtle. |
| 14 | (Cell phone ringing.) |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Can we pause here for |
| 16 | a second? We seem to be getting a telephone. |
| 17 | MR. ZELLER: I apologize. That was a |
| 18 | wrong number. |
| 19 | As important as environmental concerns |
| 20 | are, it's the need to protect public safety that |
| 21 | deserves the highest consideration of the Atomic |
| 22 | Safety Licensing Board, because people's lives are at |
| 23 | stake. And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, of |
| 24 | course, is the governmental body primarily responsible |
| 25 | for regulation and safety of nuclear activities. |
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As outlined in NRC's procedures, the threshold test is whether we will have made a showing necessary to initiate an inquiry into a specific alternative.

5 Before us is Southern Company's license 6 amendment request to add two auxiliary hydrogen 7 igniters, spark plugs which prevent excessive levels 8 of hydrogen within the containment of the nuclear 9 power plant. An error here by Southern Company could 10 spell catastrophe for the residences of Shell Bluff, 11 Georgia.

12 Therefore, two contentions believe we 13 merit exploration are that, one, the proposed 14 modification by Southern Nuclear Company creates an 15 extremely dangerous situation rather than mitigating 16 it.

And that, two, Southern Company's engineering and support of the proposed modification fails to evaluate historical precedence of hydrogen explosions as a significant contributor to atomic reactor risk.

In other words, we contend that Southern Company's request puts igniters perhaps in the wrong place and lacks confidence of analysis and support. Both NRC staff and Southern Company

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| 1 | contend that our contentions cannot be admitted |
| 2 | because they challenge rules of basic design of the |
| 3 | AP1000 reactor. |
| 4 | For example, in their answer to our |
| 5 | Petition, NRC staff said igniter placement has met the |
| 6 | requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 and NUREG-1793. That is |
| 7 | the federal regulations and the final safety |
| 8 | evaluation report related to certification of the |
| 9 | AP1000 standard design. |
| 10 | Likewise, Southern Company answers our |
| 11 | Petition saying the two contentions in the Petition |
| 12 | bar them from attacks on the AP1000 DCD, the Design |
| 13 | Control Document, analysis underlying the addition of |
| 14 | two new igniters at the in-containment refueling water |
| 15 | storage tank roof vents. That's the Southern's answer |
| 16 | at three. |
| 17 | Both documents attempt to drive |
| 18 | Petitioners' contention into the indefensible corner |
| 19 | of challenging the AP1000 Design Control Document in |
| 20 | a rule change. |
| 21 | However, Petitioners have studiously |
| 22 | avoided these areas, totally cognizant of the finality |
| 23 | provisions of federal regulations at 10 CFR |
| 24 | 52.63(a)(1). |
| 25 | First, we specifically did not challenge |

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| 1 | the initial 64 igniter locations of the AP1000 design, |
| 2 | only the two new ones. This placement is based solely |
| 3 | on so-called engineering judgment. |
| 4 | If Southern Company's original submittal |
| 5 | had been accompanied by hard analysis our argument |
| 6 | would have been more difficult to make. For example, |
| 7 | there are flame propagation analysis techniques that |
| 8 | could have and should have been used. |
| 9 | Second, we did not compare the AP1000 to |
| 10 | Fukushima Daiichi, except to note that at Daiichi Unit |
| 11 | 1, the deflagration appears to have begun at the top |
| 12 | floor; on Daiichi 3, the detonation appears to have |
| 13 | been initiated in the basement. Hence, the need at |
| 14 | Vogtle for a detailed analysis rather than a judgment |
| 15 | call. |
| 16 | Third, the possibility of failure by the |
| 17 | AP1000 containment was discussed in a historical |
| 18 | context dating back to an Advisory Committee on |
| 19 | Reactor Safeguards meeting in 2010. |
| 20 | Consequences of containment failure are |
| 21 | grave in this matter, and the AP1000 chimney effect |
| 22 | makes it even worse. So a thorough analysis is |
| 23 | required, rather than an engineering judgment. |
| 24 | Fourth, Section (c)(5) of 10 CFR 50.44 on |
| 25 | structural analysis applies to the AP1000 and states, |

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| quote, an applicant must perform an analysis that |
| demonstrates containment structural integrity, end |
| quote. However, there was no analysis. Note the law |
| says "must perform." Engineering judgment is not that |
| same as analysis. |

Fifth, Section 10 6 CFR 50.44(c)(3), 7 equipment survivability, also applies here and states, "environmental conditions caused by local detonations 8 9 hydrogen must also be included unless of such detonations can be shown unlikely to occur." 10

But Southern Company has shown that denotation is likely, not unlikely. In fact, the reason for the license amendment request in the first place was that they believed excessive hydrogen might actually accumulate. The burden is on that to show a solution, not to use engineering judgment.

Finally, under 10 CFR Part 52, of course, all nuclear power plant construction must be in accord with the plant design's current licensing basis as well as the applicable statutes and regulations.

The process of modify the licensing basis is set forth in 10 CFR 52.98(f), which states any modification to terms and conditions of a combined license is a proposed amendment to the license. Therefore, there now must be an opportunity for

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| 1 | hearing on the amendment. |
| 2 | A licensee that requests an amendment must |
| 3 | perform, one, an applicability determination |
| 4 | evaluation; two, a safety/security interface |
| 5 | evaluation; three, construction impacts evaluation; |
| 6 | and, four, a 10 CFR 50.59 like screening evaluation. |
| 7 | For guidance, the Nuclear Regulatory |
| 8 | Commission has used COL Interim Staff Guidance 025 |
| 9 | during construction of plant license under Part 52. |
| 10 | The Interim Guidance will be included in the next |
| 11 | update of Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for |
| 12 | Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests and |
| 13 | Experiments. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Mr. Zeller, let me ask |
| 15 | you a question related to this argument. |
| 16 | The DCD and the updated final safety |
| 17 | analysis report have a table, I'm sure you're familiar |
| 18 | with it, it's Table 6.2.4-6, which requires, among |
| 19 | other things, that hydrogen igniters be placed as |
| 20 | close to the source of hydrogen as close to the |
| 21 | hydrogen source as feasible. |
| 22 | Are you claiming that that instruction was |
| 23 | not complied with? |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: What we're saying is that the |
| 25 | addition of the hydrogen igniters, the placement of |

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| 1 | them, is absolutely critical, and that engineering |
| 2 | judgment used to comply, as you have pointed out, as |
| 3 | close as feasible is based on an engineering judgment. |
| 4 | In other words, a best guess by an engineer, not |
| 5 | actual tests which were demonstrations, which would |
| 6 | show that that is the proper location. |
| 7 | Five inches one way or another is not |
| 8 | spelled out in 6.2.4-6. It just says as close as |
| 9 | possible. How as close as possible or as feasible |
| 10 | mean exactly? There's interpretation there in a sense |
| 11 | where the analysis fall short and actually should be |
| 12 | done. |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Well, are you saying |
| 14 | that these could have been placed in compliance with |
| 15 | that requirement in Table 6.2.4-6, they could have |
| 16 | been placed somewhere else other than where they were? |
| 17 | MR. ZELLER: Two additional igniters? |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Yes. |
| 19 | MR. ZELLER: That's right. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: They could have been |
| 21 | placed closer to the source of hydrogen, then? |
| 22 | MR. ZELLER: Absent analysis, we can't say |
| 23 | where they should be. That's the failure here that we |
| 24 | are pointing out in our contention. |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
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| 1 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, let me just ask a |
| 2 | question on that same issue. |
| 3 | Now, what that table says is, one of the |
| 4 | potential locations is the locations where the |
| 5 | potential hydrogen release location can be defined, |
| 6 | i.e., above the IRWST spargers, at IRWST vents, et |
| 7 | cetera. |
| 8 | Now, it seems to me that this license |
| 9 | amendment is making the actual design of the plant |
| 10 | better reflect the DCD than the original placement of |
| 11 | igniters. Do you not agree with that? |
| 12 | MR. ZELLER: We're talking additional |
| 13 | igniters, which are not outlined in the Design Control |
| 14 | Document. So, how do we know that? There's no |
| 15 | analysis to show where they should be located. |
| 16 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, I doesn't that |
| 17 | table say near the IRWST vents? And aren't they being |
| 18 | more consistent with these new igniters than they were |
| 19 | with the original igniters? |
| 20 | MR. ZELLER: We cannot tell that. This is |
| 21 | based on a best guess scenario, not an actual |
| 22 | analysis. Because of that's why we raised the |
| 23 | issues of previous deflagration impacts and hydrogen |
| 24 | igniter failures, is that this must be done properly |
| 25 | at Plant Vogtle. The license amendment request for |
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20 1 LA-2 calls into question where that should be. In other words, there's an interpretation as to "close as 2 3 feasible" and where the hydrogen emission point can be 4 defined. 5 Those are subjective determinations, which are spelled out in 6.2.4-6, "as close as feasible," 6 7 and where the hydrogen can be defined. That doesn't 8 tell me where to put the hydrogen igniter here or 9 here. 10 JUDGE ARNOLD: So, this change is certainly not resulting in hydrogen igniters further 11 from the IRWST vents, correct? 12 13 MR. ZELLER: Can't say. 14 JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay, thank you. 15 MR. ZELLER: The question, exactly , you 16 put your finger on it. 17 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, I'd like to follow up on that. We're talking about hydrogen that's in 18 19 the IRWST, that the only release for that hydrogen would be through the hooded vents or the roof vent, 20 21 correct? That's right. 22 MR. ZELLER: JUDGE TRIKOUROS: There are igniters in 23 24 the IRWST at various other locations. There are igniters, if I remember correctly, about 30 feet above 25

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| 1 | the roof vents along the doghouse, steam generator |
| 2 | doghouse wall. |
| 3 | Just in terms of logic, it doesn't appear |
| 4 | that there would be any analysis that would tell you |
| 5 | to place them further away from the IRWST or further |
| 6 | into the IRWST. So, what type of analysis are you |
| 7 | referring to? |
| 8 | MR. ZELLER: The |
| 9 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Is this a 3D mixing |
| 10 | analysis of some sort? I don't understand it. |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: Well, that's an engineering |
| 12 | question, and I think that is precisely what is |
| 13 | lacking here. I mean, these are technical questions |
| 14 | which we would hope to bring up, with the assistance |
| 15 | of our technical expert and nuclear engineer himself, |
| 16 | Arnie Gundersen. |
| 17 | But he has pointed out, and we have |
| 18 | spelled out in our filings, the tests that we would |
| 19 | recommend that Southern Company do before the actual |
| 20 | determination of where these two additional hydrogen |
| 21 | igniters should be located. |
| 22 | It was Southern Company, in their request, |
| 23 | which said that design reviews in 2011 identified a |
| 24 | credible scenario in which the applicable plant damage |
| 25 | state meets the core damage frequency cutoff to be |
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| 1 | considered as part of the severe accident analysis. |
| 2 | It's convoluted, but what it says is that |
| 3 | this bad stuff could happen. |
| 4 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, there's some |
| 5 | confusion there, too, which we'll ask later on, but |
| 6 | that is not the only scenario, I would assume, in |
| 7 | which hydrogen ends up being vented from the primary |
| 8 | the reactor pressure vessel to the IRWST via those |
| 9 | Stage 1, 2, 3 ADS State 1, 2, 3 spargers. |
| 10 | I get the impression, and I will ask this |
| 11 | question later, that perhaps the partial failure of |
| 12 | ADS 4, Stage 4, valves results in a more significant |
| 13 | release than the other events. But I don't think that |
| 14 | there's anything unusual going on here. I still don't |
| 15 | quite understand a number of things regarding those |
| 16 | vents, but I'll ask that later. |
| 17 | But, Mr. Gundersen, then, or whoever could |
| 18 | answer this question, would it does it make sense |
| 19 | that an analysis would result in telling you to put |
| 20 | igniters further away from the IRWST or further in the |
| 21 | IRWST? I don't understand where there already are |
| 22 | other igniters. I don't understand that point. |
| 23 | MR. ZELLER: You don't understand why |
| 24 | there is a problem I'm sorry, Judge Trikouros. |
| 25 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, what I don't |
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understand is what this analysis is that you're referring to that might tell you to put the igniters either further away from the IRWST or further into the IRWST.

There's logical reasons I could provide that say neither of those make any sense. Therefore, if an analysis told me to do that, I would tell you that I would review that analysis and purely try to understand why it's telling me to do such a thing.

10 MR. ZELLER: Well, for example, if flame propagation analysis could have been done in this 11 It was not done, so that is one potential 12 case. technical analysis that should have been done, which 13 14 was not. That would provide a basis for determination 15 of where the additional igniters would be located. 16 That's just one example.

17 CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Well, if I understand the position of the staff and Southern Nuclear, it's 18 19 basically, look, we've done all this analysis from the original 64 igniters, so there's no need to repeat it 20 here because we're only adding two additional igniters 21 and we're following the criteria that was developed 22 for placement of those -- for placement of 23 any 24 igniters in the containment, whether they happen to be 25 near the IRWST or somewhere else. What's wrong with

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| 1 | that argument? |
| 2 | MR. ZELLER: That's what they say. But |
| 3 | there is no analysis to support it. I mean |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: They've done the |
| 5 | analysis, that's what they're saying. Why do they |
| 6 | need to do are you saying they need to go back to |
| 7 | square one and repeat the analysis for all the |
| 8 | igniters? Or that they need to a separate analysis |
| 9 | for just these two additional igniters? |
| 10 | MR. ZELLER: The Design Control Document |
| 11 | calls for 64 igniters. So we're not challenging the |
| 12 | placement of the 64 igniters. What we have raised in |
| 13 | our contention is the two additional hydrogen |
| 14 | igniters, which are identified by the applicant, by |
| 15 | Southern Company, as being necessary because of a |
| 16 | credible scenario for hydrogen deflagration from a |
| 17 | fire within the containment structure, which would add |
| 18 | to the pressure within the reactor building which is |
| 19 | also which is already very close to its upper |
| 20 | limits as currently designed. |
| 21 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, when we first |
| 22 | reviewed your petition, the words are very clear in |
| 23 | your explanation of your contention that what you |
| 24 | referred to as the proposed solution, which is the two |
| 25 | additional hydrogen igniters, introduces as a new |
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| 1 | threat to the already vulnerable AP1000 containment. |
| 2 | And I have not been able to understand what that new |
| 3 | threat is. Perhaps you can explain that to me now. |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: From what we know in the |
| 5 | historical record and that's why the allusion to |
| 6 | what happened at Fukushima Daiichi, where there were |
| 7 | propagation of hydrogen proceeded from either the |
| 8 | basement story or from the top story. |
| 9 | So there are uncertainties with regards to |
| 10 | hydrogen, and there are omissions in terms of where |
| 11 | hydrogen comes from within the reactor shell which |
| 12 | were overlooked or not even addressed by Southern |
| 13 | Company in their license amendment request. |
| 14 | So there is certainly additional analysis |
| 15 | that needs to be done. |
| 16 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay, again, I do not |
| 17 | understand what these additional analyses are and I |
| 18 | haven't yet heard from you what they are. |
| 19 | And with respect to Fukushima, we'll |
| 20 | discuss this later, I believe. But, fundamentally, it |
| 21 | isn't clear at all what the applicability of the Unit |
| 22 | 1 versus Unit 3 explosion locations have anything to |
| 23 | do with this particular case. And I would like to |
| 24 | hear that, if I could, as well. |
| 25 | You know, the secondary the reactor |
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| 1 | building at Units 1 or 3 Fukushima have no hydrogen |
| 2 | control at all. Therefore, the minute you reach a low |
| 3 | level flammability point, it's going to explode. It |
| 4 | could be anywhere at any time. |
| 5 | So I just don't understand how one can |
| 6 | make that comparison. So I'll look forward to that |
| 7 | explanation as well. |
| 8 | MR. ZELLER: Well |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Mr. Zeller, maybe it |
| 10 | would be useful, I mean, what we're all trying to |
| 11 | understand, get some better idea or at least I'm |
| 12 | trying to understand, and I think Judge Trikouros is |
| 13 | also what specific additional analysis you think |
| 14 | should take place here? |
| 15 | Maybe it would be helpful for you to talk |
| 16 | with Mr. Gundersen off, you know, and mute your phone |
| 17 | and talk with Mr. Gundersen briefly. If you want to |
| 18 | do that, we'll give you a couple minutes to do that. |
| 19 | MR. ZELLER: Well, I would welcome that, |
| 20 | Your Honor. But, in brief, rather than performing a |
| 21 | rigorous gaseous diffusion and flame propagation |
| 22 | analysis, Southern Company chose to place two hydrogen |
| 23 | igniters, the two extra igniters, in what they say "a |
| 24 | likely area" by relying on the personal engineering |
| 25 | judgment of its engineers. |
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27 1 From a chemical standpoint, I'm told, 2 hydrogen has been known to stratify. It could cause the very explosion Westinghouse and Southern Company's 3 4 proposed igniters are being supplied to prevent. That 5 is the basis for the much more rigorous analysis we It's the basis of Contention 2, 6 feel is warranted. 7 which targets the failures by Southern Company in its 8 license amendment at Plant Vogtle. 9 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, you know, that's 10 MR. ZELLER: And 11 it supports the Company's 12 contentions Southern license amendment assumes a concentration of hydrogen that is uniform 13 14 throughout the AP1000, including sub-compartments. 15 The company hypothesizes that the only 16 source hydrogen is emitted from the reaction between 17 zirconium and water. Other sources of hydrogen production are ignored. Radiolytic decomposition of 18 19 water has been ignored as a source of both hydrogen 20 and oxygen. And, finally, Southern Company's analysis 21 ignores the possibility that an igniter can create a 22 flame that blows back due to the in-containment 23 24 refueling water storage tank roof vents along the steam generator doghouse wall into the sub-compartment 25

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28 1 causing a serious detonation. The phenomenon is not 2 speculative; such backflow did occur after Fukushima 3 Daiichi. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yeah, I understand what 4 you're saying and we will get to all of that. 5 But we're right now dealing specifically with the question 6 7 of what the new threat is that's posed by these two 8 igniters, and the question of what analysis would be 9 necessary to place these two igniters, other than the 10 very logical argument that's been provided by Southern Nuclear. 11 12 Ι said earlier, the only Now, as possibilities are you would place the igniters either 13 14 away from the IRWST or further in the IRWST. There 15 are no other options. Let me be more specific. With respect to 16 17 the analysis further away from the IRWST, the LAR itself specifically says that the region between the 18 19 IRWST vent and the igniters that are located 30 feet above it -- and not be evaluated to determine, for 20 example, if those igniters 30 feet above it would be 21 And the reason for that is they, in their 22 effective. words, the region is too complex to be accurately 23 24 modeled. So, since they can't determine if those 25

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| 1 | two igniters that are up there would be effective, |
| 2 | they decided to put them at the release point on the |
| 3 | IRWST. Now, all of that makes sense. |
| 4 | It's not clear to me what an analysis |
| 5 | what analysis you would do, especially since the |
| 6 | region above it is too complex to be accurately |
| 7 | modeled. Therefore, what that means, to me, is that |
| 8 | it would not be able to discern individual igniters' |
| 9 | effectiveness, which is I think what they're saying. |
| 10 | But we'll talk about that later. |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: So |
| 12 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I don't understand I |
| 13 | just don't understand where you're going with this new |
| 14 | threat and this new analysis. |
| 15 | MR. ZELLER: In my work with Blue Ridge |
| 16 | Environmental Defense League on air pollution and air |
| 17 | pollution modeling at various industrial sites, the |
| 18 | Savannah River Site and coal-fired power plants and |
| 19 | smaller industrial sources, we have run computer |
| 20 | models, gassing dispersion models, which are designed |
| 21 | to cope with simple situations, area sources, volume |
| 22 | sources, complex sources, hilly terrain and any other |
| 23 | variables within the realm of computer analysis. |
| 24 | Computer analysis is done on a routine |
| 25 | basis, and so I would call upon our technical expert |

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| 1 | at this point, Mr. Gundersen, to point out what other |
| 2 | type of analysis might could actually be done. |
| 3 | In fact, I believe that the outfit he |
| 4 | works for has investigated such scenarios. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Mr. Zeller, if you |
| 6 | want to talk with him, as I suggested, that's fine. |
| 7 | But we want to hear from you. We don't want him |
| 8 | testifying. As we said, this is not an evidentiary |
| 9 | hearing. |
| 10 | So if you want to talk to him and he can |
| 11 | point you to some parts in his declaration or |
| 12 | somewhere else in the Petition that he wants to draw |
| 13 | out attention, that's fine. But we don't want to hear |
| 14 | from him directly because that would be the equivalent |
| 15 | of testimony or something like it. |
| 16 | But if you want to talk to him off the |
| 17 | record, mute your phone and go ahead and do that. |
| 18 | MR. ZELLER: With all due respect, then, |
| 19 | are we now talking about evidentiary information in |
| 20 | answer to the question of the technical nature of |
| 21 | where the actual additional hydrogen igniters are to |
| 22 | go? Or are we just simply laying out what the LAR |
| 23 | requires? |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: What I'm trying to say |
| 25 | is, if there is some part of the record Mr. Gundersen |
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| 1 | would like to cite to us, you can talk to him about it |
| 2 | and he can tell you and you can tell us. |
| 3 | You don't have to do that. I'm simply |
| 4 | giving you the option. But we don't want to hear from |
| 5 | him directly because it would be the equivalent or |
| 6 | very much like testimony. |
| 7 | JUDGE ARNOLD: It seems to me if he's only |
| 8 | clarifying what's already in the Petition, I'd like to |
| 9 | hear from him. That's not testimony. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, as long as |
| 11 | he's limited to that, we'll go ahead and do that. |
| 12 | MR. ZELLER: I have made provisions to |
| 13 | talk to Mr. Gundersen alternatively, so I would ask |
| 14 | the Court's permission to do that now. |
| 15 | JUDGE ARNOLD: All right, very good. |
| 16 | (Pause.) |
| 17 | MR. ZELLER: Hello, Arnie? Yes, the phone |
| 18 | needs to be muted. Is the phone muted through the |
| 19 | system? |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: We can |
| 21 | MR. ZELLER: Or is it star six? I never |
| 22 | got that information. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: We can hear you just |
| 24 | fine. We can hear you right now. We couldn't hear |
| 25 | you earlier. |
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| 1 | MR. ZELLER: How do I mute that phone? |
| 2 | Can anyone tell me? |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Mute what phone? |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: The audio that you are |
| 5 | hearing. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: You have to do it at |
| 7 | your phone. Do you have a mute button on your phone? |
| 8 | MR. ZELLER: I may lose you, I'll try it. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: We'll get you back, if |
| 10 | necessary. |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: Can you hear me now? |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Yes. |
| 13 | MR. ZELLER: Can you hear me now? |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Yes. |
| 15 | MR. ZELLER: My phone will not do that. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, can you |
| 17 | hang up and get it? |
| 18 | MR. ZELLER: I have a telephone which |
| 19 | helps me hear, because I have a hearing impairment. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Well, do you have |
| 21 | another phone? You can you don't have to sit |
| 22 | there, you can go to another phone, call Mr. Gundersen |
| 23 | and speak to him where we can't hear you. |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: Okay, I'll be back shortly. |
| 25 | (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went |

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| 1 | off the record at 10:12 a.m. and resumed at 10:19 |
| 2 | a.m.) |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, Mr. Zeller, |
| 4 | it sounds like you're back with us, as is everyone |
| 5 | else. Let's go back on the record. |
| 6 | MR. ZELLER: Okay, yes. Can you hear me? |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Yes, we can. Can you |
| 8 | hear us? |
| 9 | MR. ZELLER: Yes, I can. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Very good. |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: Thank you, Judge Spritzer, I |
| 12 | appreciate that. And, okay, so I have talked to Mr. |
| 13 | Gundersen, and there are actually four points. |
| 14 | The question that you asked about what new |
| 15 | threat has been identified is the wrong question. The |
| 16 | threat has been identified by Southern Company, and I |
| 17 | read to you, that the design reviews in 2011 |
| 18 | identified a credible scenario in which the applicable |
| 19 | plant damage meets the core damage frequency cutoff. |
| 20 | he job at hand is to mitigate the new leakage path |
| 21 | that the 64 igniters do not resolve. |
| 22 | Number two, by placing the igniters, the |
| 23 | additional igniters, where they are, you can get flame |
| 24 | to propagate back into an area where the new threat |
| 25 | was identified. Hydrogen is lighter than oxygen. |
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So, the assumption is that it is pure hydrogen. But there's a stoichiometric mix caused by 2 the hydrolysis of water, H2O, two hydrogens per oxygen. So it's a stoichiometric mix of hydrogen and oxygen, which is highly flammable. And so that is in part of the analysis that would need to be done and 6 has not been done by Southern Company.

Number three is that the flame propagation 8 9 analysis is available and they chose not to do it. 10 They, Southern Company, chose not to do a flame propagation analysis. These are available, I'm told 11 by our nuclear engineer. Southern Company simply 12 chose not to. 13

14 And the question of modeling, even complex 15 areas can be modeled. I started to go into that myself 16 based on my own experience, but it's 17 corroborated by Mr. Gundersen, who believes that, in fact, such a basis could be modeled. 18

And so that's the very question that we're 19 20 putting before the Board.

CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Do you challenge the 21 the hydrogen igniters as a whole, 22 need for the 23 original 64 hydrogen igniters? Do you have any 24 problem with them?

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MR. ZELLER: No.

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| 1 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Was the flame propagation |
| 2 | analysis performed for placing the original 64 |
| 3 | igniters? |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: You've kind of got two |
| 5 | questions there. Do you want to answer Judge Arnold's |
| 6 | first? |
| 7 | (Off-microphone comments.) |
| 8 | JUDGE ARNOLD: No, no, I'm just trying to |
| 9 | find out if you believe that they did it for the |
| 10 | original igniters and aren't doing it now, or whether |
| 11 | or not the placement of these two final igniters was |
| 12 | done in a method consistent with the original |
| 13 | igniters? |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: I'd have to check with Mr. |
| 15 | Gundersen about that. I'm unsure. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Well, why don't |
| 17 | we'll give you some time. You'll have some time to |
| 18 | talk to him again during the break. |
| 19 | The question I had was, do you challenge, |
| 20 | or in this petition, are you challenging anything |
| 21 | about the original 64 igniters? |
| 22 | MR. ZELLER: No, Your Honor. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: Not a point of our |
| 25 | contention. |

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| 1 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Only the two new |
| 2 | igniters? |
| 3 | MR. ZELLER: Correct. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. And what |
| 5 | specifically so you say additional analysis ought |
| 6 | to be done. That seems to be your primary argument. |
| 7 | Is there any other problem you have with the placement |
| 8 | of the two new igniters? |
| 9 | MR. ZELLER: That's it, in a nutshell. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Okay. All right. |
| 11 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, while we're paused |
| 12 | here, let me I have a few questions concerning your |
| 13 | expert witness. |
| 14 | Now, the evolution, transport and |
| 15 | combustion of hydrogen during a severe accident are |
| 16 | topics of interest to nuclear engineering for which |
| 17 | there are few experts worldwide. |
| 18 | Now, I closely reviewed Mr. Gundersen's CV |
| 19 | and wasn't able to find anything that would suggest |
| 20 | that he has an in-depth knowledge of the hydrogen |
| 21 | behavior during a severe accident. |
| 22 | So, along the lines of his qualifications, |
| 23 | can you tell me, has Mr. Gundersen ever taken any |
| 24 | courses dealing with or performing experimentation or |
| 25 | analysis of hydrogen generation during a reactor |

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| 1 | accident? |
| 2 | MR. ZELLER: I would be happy to provide |
| 3 | that information, Judge Arnold. |
| 4 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Has he taken any courses |
| 5 | dealing with or performed experimentation or analysis |
| 6 | of hydrogen transport in containment during a reactor |
| 7 | accident? |
| 8 | MR. ZELLER: Again, we would be happy to |
| 9 | provide that information, yes sir. |
| 10 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay, so you don't know? |
| 11 | Has he taken any courses dealing with or performed |
| 12 | experiments or analysis of hydrogen combustion during |
| 13 | a reactor accident? |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: With all due respect, I was |
| 15 | not aware we were talking about the qualifications of |
| 16 | our expert in this matter today. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, basically |
| 18 | MR. ZELLER: We would be happy to provide |
| 19 | further documentation and explanation, in detail, of |
| 20 | Mr. Arnold's (sic) qualifications as a nuclear reactor |
| 21 | operator with four decades of experience. I cannot |
| 22 | tell you off the top of my head what he has done, what |
| 23 | courses he has attended in the course of that four |
| 24 | decade career as a nuclear operator. |
| 25 | But we're happy to do that. And, in fact, |
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| 1 | I would ask this Court's permission to provide that |
| 2 | information as soon as this proceeding is ready for |
| 3 | it. |
| 4 | JUDGE ARNOLD: You see, the reason I have |
| 5 | this question is you've stated that there was a new |
| 6 | hazard and you've based it entirely upon an expert |
| 7 | witness opinion that I haven't seen any support for |
| 8 | his opinion. And I'm trying to determine his |
| 9 | qualifications. |
| 10 | Now, since that new hazard basically is |
| 11 | important to you to establish standing, we have to |
| 12 | know his qualifications at this point rather than |
| 13 | delay that to a hearing. Do you understand that? |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: I do, totally. And Mr. |
| 15 | Gundersen's role would be in the area of providing an |
| 16 | alternative. The threat has already been identified |
| 17 | by Southern Nuclear Company. Otherwise, there would |
| 18 | be no need for a license amendment in this matter and |
| 19 | we wouldn't be sitting here today. |
| 20 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. On your petition, |
| 21 | pages three to five, you address standing. Now, my |
| 22 | understanding of it, you know, you cite the 10 CFR |
| 23 | 2.309(d) for the requirements for standing. But it |
| 24 | appears that you're saying your members have standing |
| 25 | both under 309(d) and both by proximity. Is that a |
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| 1 | correct understanding of the petition? |
| 2 | MR. ZELLER: The members are members of |
| 3 | Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, and our |
| 4 | chapter, Concerned Citizens of Shell Bluff, would |
| 5 | suffer, you know, possible harm, injury in fact, which |
| 6 | is the basis for representational standing in this |
| 7 | case. That's what we seek. |
| 8 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, okay, that would be |
| 9 | standing under Section 2.309(d), where you supply the |
| 10 | name, the nature of their property and their losses |
| 11 | and all that. Do you also have a proximity argument |
| 12 | for their standing? |
| 13 | MR. ZELLER: Yes, we did point out that |
| 14 | members live very close, within seven miles, some of |
| 15 | them, and to the local nuclear power station in Burke |
| 16 | County, Georgia. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Now, you say on page four |
| 18 | of your petition, quote, "As in Vermont Yankee, the |
| 19 | LAR is an action with obvious potential for offsite |
| 20 | consequences. The purpose of the hydrogen ignition |
| 21 | system is to prevent levels of hydrogen created by a |
| 22 | reactor accident from reaching concentrations |
| 23 | sufficient to breach the containment. Granting of the |
| 24 | LAR by the NRC would allow conditions to lead to |
| 25 | unsafe levels of hydrogen." |
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| 1 | Now, is this statement relevant to both |
| 2 | your 10 CFR 2.309 argument for standing and for your |
| 3 | proximity argument? |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: That's correct. |
| 5 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Now, since this |
| 6 | license amendment only adds igniters, not moving or |
| 7 | deleting any, how can this change lead to a more |
| 8 | unsafe level of hydrogen? I mean, does placing |
| 9 | additional igniters produce a greater amount of |
| 10 | hydrogen, or permit a greater amount of hydrogen? |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: Of course not. |
| 12 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Do you have any |
| 13 | calculations or data to indicate that adding igniters |
| 14 | can lead to more severe hydrogen conditions? |
| 15 | MR. ZELLER: I just described to you in my |
| 16 | conversation with Mr. Gundersen the possibility of the |
| 17 | flame propagating back into the reactor core into |
| 18 | the integrated water |
| 19 | (Simultaneous speaking.) |
| 20 | JUDGE ARNOLD: IRWST. Okay. |
| 21 | MR. ZELLER: That's what I meant. |
| 22 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Which, in itself, has |
| 23 | igniters inside that tank. |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: Right. |
| 25 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. On page six and |
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| seven of your petition, you emphasize the time that |
| elapses between the licensee discovering the hydrogen |
| problem and the licensee initiating a license |
| amendment to correct that problem. |
| To your knowledge, was there any other |
| notification to the NRC of the issue prior to the |
| submittal of the license amendment request? |
| MR. ZELLER: Not that I'm aware of. |
| JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Do these sites have |
| a regulation requiring the licensee to notify the NRC |
| staff of this hydrogen issue at a time sooner than the |
| issuance of the LAR? |
| MR. ZELLER: I'm sorry, repeat the |
| question? |
| JUDGE ARNOLD: Can you cite to any |
| regulation requiring licensee to have notified the NRC |
| sooner than they did? |
| MR. ZELLER: No, I cannot. |
| JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Contention 1 states, |
| quote, "the proposed modification by the Southern |
| Company creates an extremely dangerous situation |
| rather than mitigating it," which makes me think that |
| you are opposed to a license amendment that makes |
| things less safe, and I can understand that. |
| But can you cite to a rule stating that |
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| 1 | all proposed license amendments must improve safety, |
| 2 | or at least are required to not reduce safety? |
| 3 | MR. ZELLER: Is there a rule requiring it |
| 4 | to be that it not be less safe? Is that the |
| 5 | question? |
| 6 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Yes, yes. |
| 7 | MR. ZELLER: The analysis, 59, it calls |
| 8 | for additional determinations and 50.59 analysis, |
| 9 | 50.59 like screening evaluation which is called for in |
| 10 | the Interim Staff Guidance that I pointed out before. |
| 11 | That is the basis for our contention. |
| 12 | JUDGE ARNOLD: On page eight of the |
| 13 | petition, regarding Contention 1, you state, quote, |
| 14 | "relying on an engineering judgment instead of |
| 15 | rigorous testing and analysis would result in an |
| 16 | unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises |
| 17 | plant safety." |
| 18 | Can you tell me, in what way is the method |
| 19 | of locating the additional igniters inconsistent with |
| 20 | the methodology to locate the original igniters? |
| 21 | MR. ZELLER: The flame propagation |
| 22 | occurring within the reactor containment is what needs |
| 23 | to be analyzed with respect to the additional hydrogen |
| 24 | igniters, which Southern Company says are necessary |
| 25 | based on the scenario which is plant damage exceeding |
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| 1 | safe levels. |
| 2 | JUDGE ARNOLD: In the middle of page nine, |
| 3 | you state, quote, "experience in Japan is illustrative |
| 4 | of the unanticipated problems that have been created |
| 5 | by the LAR placing hydrogen igniters near a source of |
| 6 | hydrogen based simply on engineering judgment and not |
| 7 | a root cause analysis determination." |
| 8 | Now, can you explain to us what ignition |
| 9 | sources caused the hydrogen combustions at Fukushima? |
| 10 | Because, to my knowledge, they're still not |
| 11 | identified. And how would analysis of their locations |
| 12 | have prevented the hydrogen combustion events at |
| 13 | Fukushima? |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: Well, with all due respect, |
| 15 | I believe that the analysis of Fukushima is not a part |
| 16 | of this proceeding, because that is a separate issue. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, I agree, it's not. |
| 18 | MR. ZELLER: We would be happy to talk |
| 19 | further about that, but it's brought up only in this |
| 20 | context to point out the serious nature of the damage |
| 21 | which could occur to the containment structure if this |
| 22 | is not done properly. |
| 23 | Our contention is that it has not been |
| 24 | done properly. It is not supported by any kind of |
| 25 | evidence by Southern Company, which is coming hat in |
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| <pre>hand for a license amendment. They have identified the problem. And what we are seeking to do is to make sure that their solution does not add to the problem, or, in fact, worse, create the very scenario which they seek to avoid. By not paying attention to the serious matters of stratification, hydrolysis and sources of hydrogen, the actual mixtures of chemicals of</pre> |
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| By not paying attention to the serious matters of stratification, hydrolysis and sources of hydrogen, the actual mixtures of chemicals of |
| matters of stratification, hydrolysis and sources of hydrogen, the actual mixtures of chemicals of |
| hydrogen, the actual mixtures of chemicals of |
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| atmospheric compounds which would be hydrogen and |
| oxygen and other compounds brought about by the |
| dissociation of the molecule and a serious reactor |
| accident where this zirconium cladding is separated |
| from the fuel bundles. |
| So, we are talking about a serious |
| accident. We are talking about an unanalyzed |
| situation here in terms of the addition and the need |
| for these two additional hydrogen igniters. It's all |
| about plant safety. |
| JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. On page ten of your |
| Petition concerning contention one, you state, quote, |
| the company has not done the prudent and required |
| evaluation. And you list four evaluations: the |
| applicability determination; safety-security |
| interface; a construction impact evaluation; and a 10 |
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| 1 | CFR 50.59-like screening. |
| 2 | Now, since you call them required |
| 3 | evaluations, can you tell me exactly what document |
| 4 | requires those evaluations? |
| 5 | MR. ZELLER: That's in the federal |
| 6 | regulations. |
| 7 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, I well, I looked |
| 8 | through the hydrogen requirements under the license |
| 9 | amendment requirements and I did not see that listed |
| 10 | evaluations. So, if you could be more specific? |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: The Interim Staff Guidance, |
| 12 | COL-ISG-025 which is used to determine questions |
| 13 | during construction of plants licensed under Part 52. |
| 14 | This is part of the regulatory guidance and it points |
| 15 | to federal regulations like 50.59 for a screening |
| 16 | evaluation. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: The statement of contention |
| 18 | two on page ten of the Petition is, the engineering |
| 19 | and support of the proposed modification fails to |
| 20 | evaluate the historical precedent of hydrogen |
| 21 | explosions as a significant contributor to atomic |
| 22 | reactor risk. |
| 23 | Can you point me to a requirement that an |
| 24 | LAR include an evaluation of related historical |
| 25 | events? |

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| 1 | MR. ZELLER: Well, in Metropolitan Edison |
| 2 | for Three Mile Island Commission decision COI-80-16, |
| 3 | the Commission held that, in view of the fact that |
| 4 | Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident resulted in |
| 5 | generation of hydrogen gas in excess of hydrogen |
| 6 | design basis assumptions that hydrogen gas control |
| 7 | could properly be litigated under Part 100. |
| 8 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. But, that doesn't |
| 9 | sound to me like a specific requirement that a |
| 10 | historical events evaluation be included in an LAR. |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: No, it's an analogous |
| 12 | situation, in answer to your question. |
| 13 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. On the top of page |
| 14 | 11 concerning contention two, you state, quote, rather |
| 15 | than performing a rigorous gaseous diffusion and flame |
| 16 | propagation analysis, the company chose to place two |
| 17 | hydrogen igniters in a likely area by relying upon the |
| 18 | personal engineering judgment of its engineers. |
| 19 | To your knowledge, has any licensee so far |
| 20 | used a rigorous gaseous diffusion and flame |
| 21 | propagation analysis to locate igniters? |
| 22 | MR. ZELLER: I am unaware of any other |
| 23 | nuclear power station which has reached this juncture. |
| 24 | So, I understand we may have perhaps gored the |
| 25 | engineer's ox by talking raising the issues in the |
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| 1 | way we did. But, engineering judgment is no |
| 2 | substitute for analysis. |
| 3 | I think Mr. Gundersen is quite right about |
| 4 | that. |
| 5 | JUDGE ARNOLD: But certainly with new |
| 6 | construction, they haven't reached this point. But |
| 7 | there are other plants with igniters and I'm just |
| 8 | trying to find out if gaseous diffusion and flame |
| 9 | propagation analysis is a typical method that has been |
| 10 | used to locate the igniters. |
| 11 | MR. ZELLER: We are staying within the |
| 12 | bounds of the license amendment request. We, like I |
| 13 | said, we are studiously avoiding being cornered and |
| 14 | having to talk about things which are generic issues |
| 15 | having to do with Westinghouse AP1000, having to do |
| 16 | with rules of which are under Part 52, Part 50 or Part |
| 17 | 51. |
| 18 | But, we believe that, when we get into |
| 19 | if and when we are permitted to get to the evidentiary |
| 20 | stage, all this will become plain and would be spelled |
| 21 | out. |
| 22 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. I have a question or |
| 23 | two concerning Mr. Gundersen's declaration. |
| 24 | In paragraph 14 on page four of 16, Mr. |
| 25 | Gundersen states, in violation of its license and the |

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| 1 | known containment flaws shown to the world by the 2011 |
| 2 | Fukushima Daiichi triple meltdown, the Southern |
| 3 | Company belatedly notified the NRC that critical |
| 4 | atomic reactor safety features supposedly designed |
| 5 | specifically for the AP1000 containment have a design |
| 6 | that remains fluid and incomplete. |
| 7 | Now, you've said that in violation of its |
| 8 | license. And, what exactly is that violation of the |
| 9 | license that he is referring to? |
| 10 | MR. ZELLER: You're reading from Mr. |
| 11 | Gundersen's CV? |
| 12 | JUDGE ARNOLD: From his declaration that |
| 13 | you submitted with the Petition. |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: Right. This license has a |
| 15 | cloud over it and maybe you have identified that cloud |
| 16 | in that it was there was a dissenting opinion with |
| 17 | the issuance of the license. That's not a matter for |
| 18 | us to decide here today or to explain. It is simply |
| 19 | there. |
| 20 | And it does place a cloud over what has |
| 21 | been done and what is being done at Plant Vogtle Units |
| 22 | 3 and 4 in Shell Bluff. |
| 23 | So, the problem was created by others, not |
| 24 | by Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League in terms of |
| 25 | the whether or not the questions unresolved |
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49 1 questions were a part of the license for Units 3 and 2 4. 3 JUDGE ARNOLD: Right. 4 MR. ZELLER: There was wording back in 2011 which said that, you know, these things will be 5 I believe it was Chairman Jaczko 6 taken care of. 7 pointed it out in his dissent. And again, we're not trying to raise the 8 9 issue of the license itself in this proceeding. But 10 the cloud is there and you have exactly identified part of that problem. 11 And again, if allowed to go to further 12 hearing, we would be able to explain that further. 13 14 JUDGE ARNOLD: You all -- okay, the second 15 part, that sentence also states "known containment laws shown to the world." 16 17 Okay, these are features that came to light in the Fukushima disaster which was before the 18 19 license was granted, correct? 20 MR. ZELLER: Yes. JUDGE ARNOLD: So, these are -- if there 21 22 containment flaws, then they were deemed are by the Commission 23 acceptable in issuing those 24 licenses? MR. ZELLER: Is there a question? 25 I'm

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| 1 | sorry. |
| 2 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. I'm just trying to |
| 3 | understand that the time pattern. Let me just skip |
| 4 | ahead. |
| 5 | Paragraph 30 on page 11 of 16, Mr. |
| 6 | Gundersen states, it is well-known that the AP1000 |
| 7 | containment was flawed well before the disaster at |
| 8 | Fukushima Daiichi. |
| 9 | Now, my understanding is that the COL was |
| 10 | issued on February 10th, 2012, whereas Fukushima |
| 11 | occurred on March 11th, 2011. |
| 12 | So |
| 13 | MR. ZELLER: Of course, the Design Control |
| 14 | Document was in process, that's why we refer to the |
| 15 | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards meetings |
| 16 | which happened in 2010 at which, I believe, Mr. |
| 17 | Gundersen participated and we were parties to in |
| 18 | pointing out the chimney effect in the design. |
| 19 | So, again, that's not a matter for this |
| 20 | panel or in this proceeding, however, those issues |
| 21 | were brought up, yes, before that. |
| 22 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. I'm done with my |
| 23 | questions. |
| 24 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right, I'll go |
| 25 | quick. I'll go very quickly as I can and try not to |

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| 1 | cover areas that have been covered. |
| 2 | We've determined that the new threat is |
| 3 | the ADS Stage 4 partial failure scenario that was |
| 4 | identified. And so, that's a so we can move |
| 5 | forward from there. |
| 6 | The NUREG-1793, the NRC Safety |
| 7 | Evaluations, Exhibit 1 of the Southern Nuclear filing, |
| 8 | indicates that the igniters have been placed in the |
| 9 | major regions of the containment where hydrogen may be |
| 10 | released through which it may flow or where it may |
| 11 | accumulate. |
| 12 | Do you disagree with that statement? Do |
| 13 | you think that that statement causes a problem if |
| 14 | followed in the igniter placement? |
| 15 | MR. ZELLER: Where they may be released or |
| 16 | may accumulate, that is difficult to dispute. But |
| 17 | that is not the I don't understand your question. |
| 18 | I'm sorry. |
| 19 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, you agree that if |
| 20 | you're going to place igniters they ought to be where |
| 21 | hydrogen is released, where it may flow, or where it |
| 22 | may accumulate. Do you have any problem with that? |
| 23 | MR. ZELLER: No, that's the basic idea. |
| 24 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. So, that is |
| 25 | somewhat contrary to your Petition. But, I'm not |

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| 1 | going to go there now. |
| 2 | All right. There's a on page nine of |
| 3 | the Petition, there's a discussion regarding a root |
| 4 | cause analysis determination. You indicate that |
| 5 | specifically, placing hydrogen igniters near a source |
| 6 | of hydrogen based simply on engineering judgment and |
| 7 | not a root cause analysis determination is a problem. |
| 8 | And you actually say that problem came out of the |
| 9 | experience with Fukushima. |
| 10 | But, again, I don't want to address that |
| 11 | right now. |
| 12 | What a root cause analysis, typically, |
| 13 | something happens and you do analysis to try and |
| 14 | understand why it happened and how it happened. I |
| 15 | don't understand how a root cause analysis would help |
| 16 | in the placement of hydrogen igniters. And perhaps |
| 17 | that's one the analyses that you were talking about |
| 18 | before. I don't know. |
| 19 | MR. ZELLER: A root cause analysis is |
| 20 | certainly a higher level of determination in this case |
| 21 | than an engineering judgment, of course. |
| 22 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, I |
| 23 | MR. ZELLER: That was one |
| 24 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I don't understand what |
| 25 | how one does a root cause analysis in this context |

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| 1 | and how it might help with hydrogen placement |
| 2 | hydrogen igniter placement. I'm just looking to |
| 3 | understand that better, that's all. |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: I get the problem here, you |
| 5 | know, that I see or maybe the understanding that could |
| 6 | be made clearer is that Southern Company has come |
| 7 | forward with an identified problem and we agree that |
| 8 | there is a problem here. |
| 9 | The solution is one which should relieve |
| 10 | the problem and not cause additional problems. Any |
| 11 | engineering question from building a bridge to |
| 12 | building an automobile introduces trade-offs. |
| 13 | So, whether the hydrogen igniters should |
| 14 | be located here or six inches further over in this |
| 15 | direction is not sufficient to say, well, let's put it |
| 16 | here because the rules say we just need to be near the |
| 17 | hydrogen source and then just let the devil take the |
| 18 | hindmost. |
| 19 | You've got to figure out where that should |
| 20 | go, and in our interests and the interests of our |
| 21 | members in Shell Bluff is that it be done properly |
| 22 | because two reactors next to two more reactors |
| 23 | presents even greater threat. |
| 24 | So, I believe we're all on the same page |
| 25 | and wanting the same thing in that the license |
| | I contraction of the second seco |

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| 1 | amendment would be done and two additional igniters |
| 2 | would be added in a supportable position within the |
| 3 | reactor containment, something which would actually do |
| 4 | what it's designed, or that we hope it would do which |
| 5 | would be to prevent excessive levels of hydrogen |
| 6 | within the containment. |
| 7 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right, okay. Let me |
| 8 | go on because we are we have a number of things to |
| 9 | cover. |
| 10 | You indicate in your Petition that a gross |
| 11 | containment failure from a detonation shockwave in a |
| 12 | sub-compartment is likely to occur because the |
| 13 | hydrogen igniter modification is poorly designed. |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: Yes. |
| 15 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: It's not clear to me |
| 16 | what that statement means, specifically in terms of |
| 17 | mechanism. |
| 18 | But is that true only of these two new |
| 19 | igniters or is that a general statement regarding all |
| 20 | the hydrogen igniters in the plant? |
| 21 | MR. ZELLER: It has to do with these two |
| 22 | igniters. |
| 23 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: There's something unique |
| 24 | about these two igniters that would cause a failure |
| 25 | a gross failure of the containment in a like that |

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| 1 | it's likely? Can you enlighten me on that? |
| 2 | MR. ZELLER: Yes, they are not part of the |
| 3 | Design Control Document. They are not a part of the |
| 4 | present engineering of the plant. |
| 5 | And therefore, they are an unknown factor. |
| 6 | And to simply take a guess as to where they might go |
| 7 | which simply complies with where the hydrogen is, |
| 8 | because the hydrogen is everywhere. |
| 9 | The hydrogen igniter needs to be in a |
| 10 | place where the hydrogen reaches a certain point where |
| 11 | it can be ignited but not exploded. |
| 12 | I mean, the ignition level is here, the |
| 13 | explosion level is here. So, you want to be sure that |
| 14 | the igniter ignites here, not causing the explosion |
| 15 | which would happen at this level. |
| 16 | So, the mixture of hydrogen with oxygen |
| 17 | and other compounds in the atmosphere of the reactor |
| 18 | containment is a critical factor. That analysis needs |
| 19 | to be done in light of the need identified by Southern |
| 20 | Company themselves. |
| 21 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And, you perceived |
| 22 | something different from the other four igniters that |
| 23 | are located on the adjacent vents? |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: My engineers did. |
| 25 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay, I understand that |
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| 1 | you perceived a difference. Now, I still don't |
| 2 | understand what that difference is. |
| 3 | MR. ZELLER: We would hope to present that |
| 4 | information to you, Your Honor. |
| 5 | The contention admissibility is where I |
| 6 | believe the crux of the argument is today, not |
| 7 | evidentiary hearings. We would be prepared for an |
| 8 | evidentiary hearing as soon as this Board deems it |
| 9 | proper. |
| 10 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. Let's go on. |
| 11 | There's a pathway of flame propagation |
| 12 | that's been identified, I think it's on in the |
| 13 | Petition somewhere, I think it's page 12 to 13, you |
| 14 | say, Southern Nuclear's analysis ignores the |
| 15 | possibility that the igniter can create a flame that |
| 16 | blows back through we talked about this through |
| 17 | the IRWST, along the steam generator doghouse, et |
| 18 | cetera. Is the concern there I don't understand |
| 19 | the pathway, number one. |
| 20 | You're going into the IRWST and then what? |
| 21 | Would it come out of the IRWST at some other point and |
| 22 | then detonate on the doghouse wall? |
| 23 | I don't quite understand that mechanism |
| 24 | given that there are igniters everywhere at inlets and |
| 25 | outlets. So, I don't understand that particular |
| I | |

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| 1 | pathway. |
| 2 | I could understand it if you said that it |
| 3 | might damage the IRWST. Is that part of this? |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: It could damage, yes, of |
| 5 | course, the water tank. |
| 6 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. But that |
| 7 | would only be that blow back would only be true of |
| 8 | the two new igniters, not the four existing igniters |
| 9 | at basically the same location? |
| 10 | MR. ZELLER: That's the question before |
| 11 | us, it has to do with the two additional igniters. |
| 12 | We're not going to question the Design Control |
| 13 | Document in the placement of the original 64, we've |
| 14 | said that more than once. |
| 15 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. You had |
| 16 | referenced 10 CFR 52.98(f) I don't think this |
| 17 | question was asked. You had indicated that the |
| 18 | applicant did not comply with or that specifically, |
| 19 | the granting of the company's license amendment |
| 20 | request didn't comply with 10 CFR 52.98(f). |
| 21 | Basically, 52.98(f) just says that there'd |
| 22 | be an opportunity for a hearing. In this regard, |
| 23 | we're in the middle of that right now. I don't |
| 24 | understand where the noncompliance is. |
| 25 | MR. ZELLER: Okay, I'm not sure I'm |

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| 1 | hearing you right. You said 50 |
| 2 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: 52.98(f) is what you |
| 3 | quote. I'll read it to you. |
| 4 | Any modification to, addition to, or |
| 5 | deletion from the terms and conditions of a combined |
| 6 | license, including any modification to, addition to, |
| 7 | or deletion from the inspection, tests, analyses or |
| 8 | related acceptance criteria contained in the license |
| 9 | is a proposed amendment to the license. There must be |
| 10 | an opportunity for hearing on the amendment. |
| 11 | All of that has happened. I don't |
| 12 | understand the why you say there's no compliance |
| 13 | with that. |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: That's in the case that the |
| 15 | license amendment were to be approved, which it has |
| 16 | not yet. So, that is the pitfall we're trying to |
| 17 | avoid here. |
| 18 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. Let me go on. |
| 19 | MR. ZELLER: Correct, we are in the middle |
| 20 | of that. |
| 21 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, as I understand it |
| 22 | then, you are not challenging the general use of |
| 23 | igniters, only the specific two igniters? |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: Correct. |
| 25 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: When you say that the |

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59 1 containment will fail from this deflagration -or 2 will only from these detonation that come two igniters, are you saying -- are you evaluating that on 3 4 the basis of design pressure or on the basis of the 5 higher ASME service level pressures, like service level C pressure that's typically used for PRAs and 6 7 severe accidents? 8 MR. ZELLER: Yes, the containment 9 structure in the design as, at maximum, is very close to the limit for the containment structure in terms of 10 the pressure within the reactor vessel. And we have 11 outlined that in our Petition. 12 Containment failure deflagration by two 13 14 additional igniters could push it over the edge. Yes, 15 that is our contention. Well, I don't think I 16 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: 17 heard the answer. In your analysis of this failure of 18 19 containment, are you assuming a service level C pressure or a design pressure? 20 MR. ZELLER: That's a question I'd like to 21 But the basic premise is that 22 refer to my engineer. the pressure within the reactor is already very close 23 24 to the limit and the addition of an unaccounted for or an unanalyzed condition, which this is, could push the 25

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| 1 | containment structure past its design. And that's |
| 2 | reflected, again, in the in Southern Company's |
| 3 | license amendment request. |
| 4 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The reason I'm asking |
| 5 | you the question, just for to be clear, that design |
| 6 | pressure is not the point of failure. The failure |
| 7 | point is higher levels of pressure that are used in |
| 8 | severe accidents. They're typically double the design |
| 9 | pressure. |
| 10 | So, I just want to make sure that you're |
| 11 | aware of that. You know, when you say it's going to |
| 12 | break, if you're telling me it's going to break |
| 13 | because it hits its design pressure, then that's |
| 14 | different if than if you're telling me it's going to |
| 15 | break because it achieved levels of pressure |
| 16 | associated with ASME higher level C or D. |
| 17 | MR. ZELLER: It is my understanding that |
| 18 | the containment is put at risk by this unaccounted for |
| 19 | and unanalyzed condition. In my understanding of it, |
| 20 | after having talked to the experts in this area, some |
| 21 | of the particulars you mention I think would bear |
| 22 | further explanation, certainly, in order to satisfy |
| 23 | that question. But that is my understanding and |
| 24 | that's the basis on which we are moving forward. |
| 25 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Right, thank you. |
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| 1 | All right, I don't have any other |
| 2 | questions. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Just one more and then |
| 4 | we'll take a break for everybody's benefit. |
| 5 | The license amendment request states that |
| 6 | the scenario addressed by the proposed amendment is, |
| 7 | I'll starting quoting here, too complex to be |
| 8 | accurately modeled by either quantitatively confirm |
| 9 | the need for additional igniters or confirm that the |
| 10 | current design could control the local hydrogen |
| 11 | releases from the roof vents. This is the license |
| 12 | amendment request at four. |
| 13 | Does BREDL dispute this conclusion? |
| 14 | MR. ZELLER: Yes. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: On what basis? |
| 16 | MR. ZELLER: An analysis could be done. |
| 17 | I have been told that the a modeling could indeed |
| 18 | be done. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: By who? Who told you |
| 20 | that? |
| 21 | MR. ZELLER: Mr. Gundersen. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. And, |
| 23 | you're saying we can look at his declaration and it |
| 24 | will explain to us what kind of modeling he thinks |
| 25 | could be done and why he disagrees with the company's |
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| 1 | position that it wouldn't be of any benefit? |
| 2 | MR. ZELLER: It's in the declaration. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Yes. |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: I just talked to him five |
| 5 | minutes ago. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: No, but I'm asking, I |
| 7 | mean, what we've got to base our decision on about |
| 8 | contention admissibility is what's in his declaration |
| 9 | or something else that you pointed to that's either |
| 10 | expert or factual support. |
| 11 | If there's something you can point me to |
| 12 | in what you've provided, either in his declaration or |
| 13 | any other support you provided, that would that |
| 14 | does, in fact, take issue with this statement in the |
| 15 | LAR that I just read to you. |
| 16 | MR. ZELLER: Okay. So, the evidence is |
| 17 | what you're asking for? |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: The support, right. |
| 19 | The support that's necessary, at this stage of the |
| 20 | case, the support necessary to prove that you're |
| 21 | correct, at least some support for your to show |
| 22 | that there is a dispute with this statement in the |
| 23 | LAR. |
| 24 | MR. ZELLER: There is a dispute and so, we |
| 25 | believe that is part of the nature of admissibility of |
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this contention. So, there is modeling which could be done by someone. Not Southern Nuclear, if they have elected not to do it, if they just haven't found the people to do it, but our expert believes that modeling could be done of that complicated space. And that's our position.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I want to repeat again,
the purpose of that modeling that they say was too
complex was to determine if the two igniters 30 feet
above the IRWST roof vents would be sufficient.

They determined, since we could not model it, to answer that question, we are adding two additional hydrogen igniters at the release point.

That was the purpose of the analysis that
would have been used. That is the purpose for which
that analysis would have been used.

So, they went conservative on this andadded two new igniters.

Now, so, I still don't understand the analysis that Mr. Gundersen is referring to. We never did get that cleared up in this hearing so far, or in this oral argument so far.

23 CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, well, maybe24 you can address that in rebuttal.

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We're already past 11:00, so we've gone

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| 1 | from a half hour for your presentation to an hour and |
| 2 | a half. |
| 3 | So, we need to move on at this point. |
| 4 | Let's take a ten minute break, come back within ten |
| 5 | minutes and get started with Southern Nuclear. |
| 6 | MR. ZELLER: All right, thank you. |
| 7 | (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went |
| 8 | off the record at 11:06 a.m. and resumed at 11:22 |
| 9 | a.m.) |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, Mr. Zeller |
| 11 | appears to be back with us at least. So, why don't we |
| 12 | go ahead and let's hear from Southern Nuclear. |
| 13 | MS. RONNLUND: Good morning, again, Your |
| 14 | Honors. |
| 15 | As we have previously discussed, this |
| 16 | proceeding involves Southern Nuclear's request for a |
| 17 | license amendment. In particular, this license |
| 18 | amendment request, the addition of two additional |
| 19 | hydrogen igniters in-containment. That's two |
| 20 | additional igniters in addition to the 64 which were |
| 21 | already placed in-containment in accordance with the |
| 22 | AP1000-certified design. |
| 23 | And, we've been thinking we'd discuss the |
| 24 | AP1000-certified design was certified by the Nuclear |
| 25 | Regulatory Commission in 2011. |
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| 1 | The COL relied on the design certification |
| 2 | and all of the applicable technical information in the |
| 3 | Vogtle COL to align the hydrogen control system was |
| 4 | referenced from the design certification. |
| 5 | The applicable standard for issuance of a |
| 6 | license amendment request is found in 10 CFR 50.98 and |
| 7 | that is that the considerations that govern the |
| 8 | issuance of the initial license also governs the |
| 9 | issuance of license amendment requests to the extent |
| 10 | that they're applicable and appropriate. |
| 11 | In this case, the regulatory standard at |
| 12 | issue is criterion 41 in 10 CFR 50.44. |
| 13 | This proceeding, as Your Honors discussed |
| 14 | earlier, involves the contention admissibility and |
| 15 | standing with regard to BREDL's petition challenging |
| 16 | the referenced license amendment. |
| 17 | The substantive issue here is whether |
| 18 | BREDL has shown it does have standing in accordance |
| 19 | with 2.309(d) and whether BREDL has offered an |
| 20 | admissible contention in accordance with 2.309(f). |
| 21 | It's Southern Nuclear's position that BREDL has |
| 22 | satisfied neither requirement. |
| 23 | At a fundamental level, both contentions |
| 24 | one and two are inadmissible because BREDL has not |
| 25 | offered any challenge to the fact that Southern |
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| 1 | Nuclear is locating these two additional igniters |
| 2 | explicitly consistent with the certified design |
| 3 | criteria for igniter location. |
| 4 | In particular, those criterion in the |
| 5 | certified design were why the igniters be located as |
| 6 | close to the source of hydrogen as reasonably feasible |
| 7 | and, in particular, where the source of hydrogen can |
| 8 | be defined such as in the IRWST vents. |
| 9 | Southern Nuclear is citing these two |
| 10 | additional reactors in compliance with those criteria. |
| 11 | Because BREDL has not challenged in any way that |
| 12 | Southern Nuclear is complying with those criteria, the |
| 13 | contention is an impermissible challenge to certified |
| 14 | design and is inadmissible. |
| 15 | Their contentions one and two include |
| 16 | statements that are otherwise challenges to the AP1000 |
| 17 | design. |
| 18 | By way of background, I'd like to give a |
| 19 | brief overview of the analysis that was performed in |
| 20 | the AP1000 that is the basis for this license |
| 21 | amendment request. |
| 22 | The AP1000 design included a hydrogen |
| 23 | analysis showing uniform concentration below ten |
| 24 | percent and shown structural integrity in accordance |
| 25 | with 10 CFR 50.44. |
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| 1 | The NRC reviewed these analyses and |
| 2 | concluded that, based on the existing 64 igniters, the |
| 3 | hydrogen control system in the AP1000 DCD and that |
| 4 | applicable requirement. |
| 5 | Southern Nuclear is not proposing to |
| 6 | change anything underlying these analysis in the |
| 7 | license amendment request. |
| 8 | In addition, BREDL's challenge did not set |
| 9 | the hydrogen analysis by arguing that additional |
| 10 | consideration should have been included such as |
| 11 | additional sources of hydrogen other than 100 percent |
| 12 | fuel clad metal-water reaction accident. |
| 13 | This is a challenge to the requirement of |
| 14 | 50.44 and thereby also inadmissible in this |
| 15 | proceeding. |
| 16 | The other basis for BREDL's two |
| 17 | contentions appears to be referenced to the Fukushima |
| 18 | accident. |
| 19 | While the Petition appeared initially to |
| 20 | present the claim that the events at Fukushima were |
| 21 | the basis for the challenge to the license amendment |
| 22 | request, we understand that he's already clarified |
| 23 | this morning that BREDL's position is simply that the |
| 24 | Fukushima event illustrates the unpredictability of |
| 25 | hydrogen behavior. |
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| 1 | The Fukushima event has been considered by |
| 2 | the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in particular, |
| 3 | considered whether the hydrogen aspect of that event |
| 4 | should change the AP1000 design certification or the |
| 5 | COL. |
| 6 | The Commission's various proceedings |
| 7 | including design certification amendment proceedings |
| 8 | rulemaking, this COL proceeding and the generic |
| 9 | considerations of the task force report has concluded |
| 10 | that there is no change necessary to hydrogen control |
| 11 | requirements to the AP1000 DCD. |
| 12 | BREDL's contention regarding Fukushima |
| 13 | events are simply without merit and do not warrant the |
| 14 | basis for admissible contentions. |
| 15 | In addition to these flaws, which |
| 16 | primarily include challenges that are outside the |
| 17 | scope of this proceeding, BREDL has also failed to |
| 18 | accurately support this contention and articulate a |
| 19 | genuine dispute for the license amendment request. |
| 20 | The license amendment request clearly |
| 21 | states that Southern Nuclear determined that the |
| 22 | additional igniters were consistent with the existing |
| 23 | hydrogen igniter location and clearly states that |
| 24 | Southern Nuclear considered the addition of the |
| 25 | original analysis to determine that no additional |
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| 1 | analysis was necessary because those original analysis |
| 2 | were unchanged. |
| 3 | This is consistent with the staff finding |
| 4 | in the AP1000 design certification amendment final |
| 5 | safety evaluation report, where the staff concluded |
| 6 | that igniters located consistent criteria did not |
| 7 | affect the underlying hydrogen analysis. |
| 8 | Therefore, since BREDL had failed to |
| 9 | articulate why these statements in the license |
| 10 | amendment request said no change to the underlying |
| 11 | analysis being made are incorrect. BREDL has failed |
| 12 | to articulated a dispute with the license amendment |
| 13 | request. |
| 14 | And further being, the crux of the matter |
| 15 | is the design certification tells Southern Nuclear |
| 16 | where hydrogen igniters ought to be located based on |
| 17 | thorough analysis that was approved by the NRC. |
| 18 | Southern Nuclear, following this criterion |
| 19 | in the addition of these two igniters and BREDL's |
| 20 | offered no challenge to those statements. |
| 21 | Therefore, the contentions one and two are |
| 22 | based uneventful. |
| 23 | Finally, with regard to standing, Southern |
| 24 | Nuclear's position has been BREDL has failed to |
| 25 | articulate an obvious potential for offsite |
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| 1 | consequences with respect to this license amendment |
| 2 | request or articulate their traditional standing |
| 3 | elements and, therefore, is not entitled to standing |
| 4 | in this proceeding. |
| 5 | Thank you. |
| 6 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay, I'll start out. |
| 7 | On page eight of the Petition regarding |
| 8 | contention one concerning locating the additional |
| 9 | igniters, Petitioner states, quote, relying on its |
| 10 | engineering judgment instead of rigorous testing and |
| 11 | analysis would result in an unanalyzed condition that |
| 12 | significantly compromises plant safety. |
| 13 | My question, is the method of locating the |
| 14 | two additional igniters consistent with the |
| 15 | methodology used for locating the original igniters? |
| 16 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. And did that involve |
| 18 | any gaseous diffusion or flame propagation |
| 19 | calculations? |
| 20 | MS. RONNLUND: The original analysis in |
| 21 | the AP1000 DCD included a flame propagation analysis. |
| 22 | However, that analysis was limited to igniters located |
| 23 | near walls because the issue being interoperator of |
| 24 | the thermal load on a wall. |
| 25 | In this case, since the igniters are |

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71 1 proposed to be located on the IRWST vents, nowhere special issue would 2 near any walls where a be 3 relevant, there is no effect on the original flame 4 propagation out load. 5 JUDGE ARNOLD: And, let's see, so, the methodology for locating igniters, the original set of 6 7 igniters, that was all reviewed and approved by the 8 NRC? 9 MS. RONNLUND: Yes. 10 JUDGE ARNOLD: And, you did nothing inconsistent with that? 11 Yes, that's correct. 12 MS. RONNLUND: JUDGE ARNOLD: The statement of contention 13 14 two on page ten of the Petition is, quote, the 15 engineering and support of the proposed modification fails to evaluate historical precedence of hydrogen 16 17 explosions as a significant contributor to atomic reactor risk. 18 19 Can you tell me if historical hydrogen events have any direct application when determining 20 the location of igniters? 21 MS. RONNLUND: If I need to, I may confer 22 with our subject matter expert. I think I can answer 23 24 your question at this point. No, historical events uniquely would not 25

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| 1 | have a direct effect on igniter locations. The |
| 2 | Commission considered historical events and lessons |
| 3 | learned and developed rules for hydrogen control. And |
| 4 | those rules are embodied in General Design Criteria |
| 5 | 41 and in the 10 CFR 50.4. |
| 6 | And those rules then were followed by |
| 7 | Westinghouse on the AP1000 DCD and our analysis was |
| 8 | approved. |
| 9 | So, there's no unique requirement or |
| 10 | additional requirement that a particular historical |
| 11 | events be analyzed. The rule is what determines how |
| 12 | the analysis is performed. |
| 13 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Are you aware of any |
| 14 | requirements to consider historical events when |
| 15 | submitting a license amendment request? |
| 16 | MS. RONNLUND: I am not, Your Honor. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: On page two of your answer |
| 18 | to the Petition, you state, quote, in certifying the |
| 19 | AP1000 design, the NRC reviewed and approved the |
| 20 | hydrogen igniter location criteria and the underlying |
| 21 | hydrogen analysis. |
| 22 | So, is it correct that the ignition |
| 23 | igniter location criteria are part of the DCD and it |
| 24 | and they received approval from the NRC? |
| 25 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
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| 1 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. And, on page ten of |
| 2 | the Petition, Petitioners asserted that there is a |
| 3 | requirement for four analyses: the applicability |
| 4 | determination evaluation; a safety-security interface |
| 5 | evaluation; a construction impact evaluation; and a 10 |
| 6 | CFR 50.59-like screening. |
| 7 | Do the igniter location criteria include |
| 8 | any of these requirements? |
| 9 | MS. RONNLUND: No, they do not. |
| 10 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Are you aware of any |
| 11 | document that makes these four items a requirement for |
| 12 | your license amendment? |
| 13 | MS. RONNLUND: No, these issues are |
| 14 | actually set out in hold on one minute, Your Honor, |
| 15 | let me just check my notes. |
| 16 | Excuse me, Your Honor, yes, I just wanted |
| 17 | to make sure I was clear when I answered that. |
| 18 | Before a LAR is submitted, in order to |
| 19 | determine whether a license amendment is necessary, a |
| 20 | 50.59 evaluation, actually, in this case, it would be |
| 21 | an evaluation under Appendix B of Part 52. |
| 22 | But the 50.59-like evaluation must be |
| 23 | performed and then, if it's determined a LAR is |
| 24 | necessary, one would be submitted. |
| 25 | So, to that extent, that requirement does |
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| 1 | exist and was followed here because we, in fact, have |
| 2 | submitted a license amendment request. |
| 3 | The other issues are not requirements for |
| 4 | license amendment requests. |
| 5 | JUDGE ARNOLD: The Petitioners are basing |
| 6 | their standing upon an obvious potential for offsite |
| 7 | consequences. |
| 8 | My question, can simply adding an |
| 9 | additional igniter, even if it's done randomly, |
| 10 | increase the potential or severity for a release of |
| 11 | radioactive material from the containment during an |
| 12 | accident? |
| 13 | MS. RONNLUND: No, this is directly |
| 14 | contrary to the Commission findings in the AP1000 DCD |
| 15 | which clearly states that igniters are used to limit |
| 16 | hydrogen concentrations. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Your answer on page |
| 18 | 30, you say that the accident scenario in which the |
| 19 | additional igniters may come into play has the |
| 20 | frequency of 5.8 times 10^8 per reactor year. Is that |
| 21 | correct? |
| 22 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 23 | JUDGE ARNOLD: So, basically, this is |
| 24 | saying that you would expect these new igniters to |
| 25 | have some effect approximately 5.8 times 10 to the |
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| 1 | negative 8 times per reactor year? |
| 2 | MS. RONNLUND: Actually, it's not even |
| 3 | that high of a probability. That probability is for |
| 4 | the scenario to even occur where hydrogen igniters |
| 5 | could be ignited. |
| 6 | So, the use of these igniters would |
| 7 | actually be some degree less. |
| 8 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Even less, okay. |
| 9 | And, have you found any other |
| 10 | circumstances under which the additional igniters |
| 11 | might affect safety? |
| 12 | MS. RONNLUND: No. |
| 13 | JUDGE ARNOLD: On page ten of your answer, |
| 14 | this is the table in the DCD about locating the |
| 15 | igniters. |
| 16 | Now, apparently, the DCD specifically |
| 17 | directs that the IRWST vents would be a good place for |
| 18 | igniters. But, for some reason, the initial set of |
| 19 | igniters did not include that exact location? |
| 20 | MS. RONNLUND: There were igniters at some |
| 21 | of the IRWST vents, but not these particular vents. |
| 22 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. So, now you're |
| 23 | basically making the actual igniter design closer to |
| 24 | what is recommended in the DCD? |
| 25 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
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| 1 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Is there anything |
| 2 | that the Petitioner said that you would like to |
| 3 | comment on? |
| 4 | MS. RONNLUND: Can you give me just one |
| 5 | moment to glance through my notes before I speak? |
| 6 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Of course. |
| 7 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, I see several |
| 8 | comments, but it's not really to the questioning, we |
| 9 | have already clarified these issues and we have no |
| 10 | further comments at this time. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Let me just follow up |
| 12 | on one of your, I guess, your next to last answer. |
| 13 | Maybe I didn't understand it correctly. |
| 14 | Did you say that you're actually putting |
| 15 | the igniters closer to the source of the hydrogen than |
| 16 | is required or recommended by the DCD? Or, did I |
| 17 | misunderstand you? |
| 18 | MS. RONNLUND: No, I think what I was |
| 19 | trying to explain is that there are multiple vents in |
| 20 | the IRWST and there were igniters in the original |
| 21 | design located at some of those vents. But the two in |
| 22 | question did not have igniters. |
| 23 | So, Southern Nuclear is simply requesting |
| 24 | consistent with the design certification criteria to |
| 25 | add igniters to those particular, which makes it |
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| 1 | consistent with the criteria. |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: If I understand, and |
| 3 | this is my understanding of the Petitioner's argument |
| 4 | and you can tell me if you understand it differently, |
| 5 | but they're basically saying, yes, the DCD says put |
| 6 | the new igniters or any igniter as close to the source |
| 7 | of hydrogen as feasible. |
| 8 | But all that the LAR says is, well, we |
| 9 | determined based on engineer judgment that we complied |
| 10 | with that. And they want some more rigorous or |
| 11 | quantitative, I guess, would be the right term, |
| 12 | analysis in that. |
| 13 | Tell me what's wrong with their argument, |
| 14 | assuming I've interpreted it correctly? |
| 15 | MS. RONNLUND: Well, I think that my first |
| 16 | clarification would be that argument is how Mr. Zeller |
| 17 | presented BREDL's position this morning. But that |
| 18 | does not appear to be the argument that was made in |
| 19 | BREDL's initial Petition or in the declaration of Mr. |
| 20 | Gundersen. |
| 21 | But with that clarification in mind, there |
| 22 | are two things two issues Southern Nuclear would |
| 23 | like to raise. |
| 24 | First is that the license amendment |
| 25 | request is in the context of the existing licensing |

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| 1 | basis. And so the design certification and analyses |
| 2 | as well, include a description of the other igniters, |
| 3 | particularly in discussion about the IRWST which |
| 4 | explains there are igniters located in the IRWST but |
| 5 | there's potential for that to be inert such as the |
| 6 | igniters wouldn't ignite. |
| 7 | And so, the scenario here was, you already |
| 8 | have hydrogen flowing the IRWST that's not already |
| 9 | ignited by the existing igniters, if that area in the |
| 10 | IRWST is inert. |
| 11 | And in that case, these igniters would be |
| 12 | used. So, Southern Nuclear's conclusion that the |
| 13 | igniters are being located as close to the source as |
| 14 | reasonably possible is backed up by the existing |
| 15 | licensing basis and doesn't require additional |
| 16 | analysis for that LAR certification. |
| 17 | In addition to that, Southern Nuclear also |
| 18 | would like to clarify that the criteria in the DCD |
| 19 | does not state that historical hydrogen must be found |
| 20 | to be exactly precise. |
| 21 | The criteria only say igniters should be |
| 22 | located close to the source where hydrogen may be |
| 23 | released, may accumulate, may flow. |
| 24 | And so, Southern Nuclear's using |
| 25 | engineering judgment to put the igniters as close to |
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| 1 | potential flowpath as possible is absolutely |
| 2 | consistent with the learning and the intent of the |
| 3 | criteria in the DCD. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: I thought, at least |
| 5 | part of your argument was, there's really no |
| 6 | quantitative further quantitative analysis you |
| 7 | could do here that would really help in terms of |
| 8 | specifying exactly where the igniters should go. |
| 9 | So, we necessarily have to rely on some |
| 10 | judgment, some engineering judgment. And, they |
| 11 | haven't shown that there is something more we could |
| 12 | do. |
| 13 | Did I misunderstand your position on that? |
| 14 | MS. RONNLUND: That's correct, in addition |
| 15 | to what Southern Nuclear's position that the analysis |
| 16 | is not required because the existing analysis already |
| 17 | support the igniter location. |
| 18 | Our position is also that there is no |
| 19 | model that is detailed enough that it would provide |
| 20 | additional information regarding location of these |
| 21 | igniters. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: One technical |
| 23 | question, which revision of the Design Control |
| 24 | Document is applicable to Vogtle Units 3 and 4? Is |
| 25 | that Revision 19? |
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| 1 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Okay. And somewhere |
| 3 | in your response you provide a citation that would |
| 4 | clarify that for us? |
| 5 | MS. RONNLUND: Just a moment, Your Honor. |
| 6 | It may take me a moment to find that, but |
| 7 | the license itself on if you look at the combined |
| 8 | license, it clearly states the reference rule 10 CFR |
| 9 | Part 52 Appendix B. And Appendix B is now Revision 19 |
| 10 | of the DCD after the amendment. |
| 11 | So, I think, if you follow that trail, our |
| 12 | reference to Appendix B of Part 52 on page two will |
| 13 | point to your Revision 19 of the DCD. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Okay. |
| 15 | Is there ever a I mean, I understand in |
| 16 | this case, you're adding two additional igniters, I |
| 17 | mean, suppose you were, and this is obviously a |
| 18 | hypothetical, but suppose you were doubling the number |
| 19 | of igniters. |
| 20 | Is there any I guess I'm trying to get |
| 21 | at, is there any point at which you really do have to |
| 22 | go back and redo some of the quantitative analysis |
| 23 | that went into the DCD with respect to hydrogen |
| 24 | igniters? |
| 25 | MS. RONNLUND: I'm going to give an |
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81 1 initial answer. If we go any further, I'll need to discuss with my igniter experts. 2 3 But in terms of the hydrogen analysis and the 50.44 analysis, I do not believe there is any 4 5 number of igniters that would change it because the 6 existing 64 were already held in the requirement. And 7 additional igniters, they don't function such that 8 they could undo that. 9 Now, at this juncture, that's as far as 10 I'm comfortable going. CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. 11 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. We heard earlier 12 13 that the new threat that's in the Petition, the words 14 new threat, is the ADS Stage 4 partial failure 15 scenario. Is this the only scenario in the PRA world 16 17 that results in hydrogen in the IRWST? MS. RONNLUND: No, it's not retaining this 18 19 as a bounding scenario. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, there were numerous 20 other scenarios that resulted in hydrogen, but this 21 one results in the most hydrogen? 22 MS. RONNLUND: That is my understanding, 23 24 yes. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. So, how did this 25

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| 1 | new threat lead to the need for the roof vent |
| 2 | igniters? Was there a determination made analytically |
| 3 | that the four existing igniters were inadequate to |
| 4 | handle this design this new threat? |
| 5 | MS. RONNLUND: So, I think, to begin with, |
| 6 | you have to keep in mind that there is an independent |
| 7 | requirement in the design certification including any |
| 8 | criteria that igniters located close to the source of |
| 9 | hydrogen as is feasible. |
| 10 | And so, in this case, the analysis or the |
| 11 | PRA scenario was discovered. It was determining there |
| 12 | is a potential for a hydrogen pathway to be through |
| 13 | these vents. |
| 14 | And so, because the modeling is not |
| 15 | sophisticated enough to confirm that the igniter 30 |
| 16 | feet above could adequately meet those criteria for |
| 17 | igniters located as close as reasonably feasible, the |
| 18 | decision was made to conservatively go and add two |
| 19 | additional igniters. |
| 20 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: In previous scenarios |
| 21 | where hydrogen was released to the IRWST, and given my |
| 22 | understanding of the open and closing set points for |
| 23 | release for the hooded vents and for the roof vents, |
| 24 | the roof vents would basically be where all the |
| 25 | hydrogen would be coming out of the IRWST with |
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| 1 | potentially none, actually, coming out of the hooded |
| 2 | vents for any scenario. |
| 3 | Well, specifically, and again, all from |
| 4 | the LAR itself, the roof vents are identified as the |
| 5 | primary release point for hydrogen from the IRWST. |
| 6 | Their relief pressure is half the relief pressure of |
| 7 | the hooded vents. |
| 8 | Once they open, they stay open. It is |
| 9 | entirely conceivable that the hooded vents would never |
| 10 | open. |
| 11 | And again, it's in the LAR, it's not |
| 12 | although I could reach the same conclusion very |
| 13 | easily. |
| 14 | So, therefore in any previous hydrogen |
| 15 | combustion analysis, mixing and combustion analysis |
| 16 | that was done by Westinghouse, there would have been |
| 17 | a significant amount of hydrogen coming through those |
| 18 | roof vents, not through the hooded vents. |
| 19 | But now, as a result of this change, there |
| 20 | is a totally different situation in that IRWST. Why |
| 21 | wouldn't that require at least a review of the |
| 22 | original analysis to make sure that was a main problem |
| 23 | with that? |
| 24 | MS. RONNLUND: I'd have to I'm afraid |
| 25 | I lost a little at the end of your question, Your |

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| 1 | Honor. You said now as a result of this change, I'm |
| 2 | a little confused on that part, can you clarify what |
| 3 | this needed change you were referring to was? |
| 4 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: No change. The way the |
| 5 | original design was set up, the hooded vents were a |
| 6 | backup means, if you will, to release hydrogen because |
| 7 | the pressure at which they open is double the pressure |
| 8 | at which the roof vents open. |
| 9 | When the hooded vents open, they reclose |
| 10 | at a somewhat lower pressure. The roof vents, which |
| 11 | open significantly earlier, never close once they |
| 12 | open. |
| 13 | So, not hard to conclude that the roof |
| 14 | vents are the primary release point for hydrogen from |
| 15 | the IRWST. Yet, they never had igniters. |
| 16 | I don't understand that, but, nonetheless, |
| 17 | it does alter the hydrogen mixing and combustion |
| 18 | analysis because now the hydrogen flow situation has |
| 19 | changed. |
| 20 | One could argue that it's gotten better in |
| 21 | the sense that the primary release point has hydrogen |
| 22 | igniters where it didn't before. |
| 23 | Has anyone at SNC at least considered |
| 24 | that? |
| 25 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, may I have a |
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| 1 | moment to confer with our subject matter experts? |
| 2 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes, thank you. |
| 3 | (Pause.) |
| 4 | MS. RONNLUND: Thank you for that time, |
| 5 | Your Honor, I appreciate it. |
| 6 | Yes, Southern Nuclear considered the issue |
| 7 | that you are raising. At a high level, the design |
| 8 | certification included a full analysis which the NRC |
| 9 | reviewed, approved and determined that the ten percent |
| 10 | heat up alarms, by volume, hydrogen concentration |
| 11 | requirements. |
| 12 | And after reviewing the available |
| 13 | information that the model can provide, which, again, |
| 14 | the space is limited, Southern Nuclear determined that |
| 15 | there is no information that would change that |
| 16 | original analysis available. |
| 17 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, they concluded that |
| 18 | the analysis conclusions would still be the same? Is |
| 19 | that what I'm hearing? |
| 20 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. |
| 21 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But, they did consider |
| 22 | the change in the hydrogen flow situation? |
| 23 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes, I would like to |
| 24 | clarify that that consideration of after the plume was |
| 25 | seen in the different model and that issue was |
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| 1 | identified, that consideration was done. But this |
| 2 | what's within the scope of this license amendment |
| 3 | request, is simply the addition of two igniters. |
| 4 | And it's clear that those two igniters do |
| 5 | not impact the original analysis. So, Southern |
| 6 | Nuclear considered both, I think what you're referring |
| 7 | to which is the initial issue and then also the impact |
| 8 | of two igniters completely, in neither case would the |
| 9 | original analysis be changed. |
| 10 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, they did do a review |
| 11 | of the original analysis? |
| 12 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 13 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: They didn't just ignore |
| 14 | the original analysis, they did look at it with |
| 15 | respect to the change in design circumstances and |
| 16 | concluded it would be the same conclusion? |
| 17 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. And, I believe |
| 18 | there's a statement in the LAR that indicates the |
| 19 | original license analysis is not impacted. |
| 20 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. |
| 21 | This modification is only being made to |
| 22 | Vogtle? |
| 23 | MS. RONNLUND: Right now, the license |
| 24 | amendment request at issue only involves Vogtle Units |
| 25 | 3 and 4. |
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| 1 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Not in Summer? Is there |
| 2 | a LAR for Summer? |
| 3 | MS. RONNLUND: I understand, Your Honor, |
| 4 | that Summer also has a LAR on this issue. |
| 5 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Has a what, I'm sorry? |
| 6 | MS. RONNLUND: I understand, Your Honor, |
| 7 | that Summer also has a license amendment request on |
| 8 | this issue. |
| 9 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. All right. So, |
| 10 | both Summer and Vogtle will have this modification |
| 11 | installed? |
| 12 | MS. RONNLUND: Assuming if both license |
| 13 | amendment requests are issued, yes. |
| 14 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. |
| 15 | In the opinion of Southern Nuclear, can a |
| 16 | hydrogen igniter provide a flame blow back to the |
| 17 | IRWST and potentially damage it? |
| 18 | MS. RONNLUND: No. |
| 19 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Is there anything |
| 20 | different about the two hydrogen igniters that are |
| 21 | being discussed here versus the other hydrogen |
| 22 | igniters anywhere, in any of the 64? |
| 23 | MS. RONNLUND: No, and, in fact, again, it |
| 24 | states that the DCD specifically consider igniters and |
| 25 | the danger of hydrogen in the IRWST, and those issues |
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| 1 | are resolved by using design certification. |
| 2 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Is there any basis for |
| 3 | saying that there's something about these two hydrogen |
| 4 | igniters that can be contested without any |
| 5 | consideration to the other 64 hydrogen igniters that |
| 6 | would not apply to the other 64 hydrogen igniters? |
| 7 | MS. RONNLUND: No. |
| 8 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Can hydrogen igniters |
| 9 | cause a back flow into any sub-compartments of |
| 10 | containment? |
| 11 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, based on the |
| 12 | analysis performed, the concentration of hydrogen in |
| 13 | containment for the AP1000 design would not support |
| 14 | such a phenomenon. |
| 15 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: These igniter location |
| 16 | criteria, were they developed from the hydrogen mixing |
| 17 | and combustion analyses performed by Westinghouse and |
| 18 | how were they elicited from that analysis? Was it |
| 19 | basically just judgment or judgment based on a review |
| 20 | of the analysis results? |
| 21 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, I can refer you |
| 22 | to the DCD section that discusses the hydrogen igniter |
| 23 | subsystem which is 6.2.4.2.3. And, it explains that |
| 24 | the igniters were done were placed based on |
| 25 | evaluation of hydrogen transport in-containment and |

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| 1 | hydrogen combustion characteristics. And, that their |
| 2 | number and location was selected considering hydrogen |
| 3 | behavior. |
| 4 | And, that process for locating the |
| 5 | igniters was reviewed by NRC staff and design |
| 6 | certification endeavors. |
| 7 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Is that also provided in |
| 8 | DCD Section 19.41? Is that are they basically the |
| 9 | same analysis? |
| 10 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, I believe I |
| 11 | don't have the full text here. I believe there is |
| 12 | some overlap between the two sections, but the |
| 13 | applicable section for the hydrogen igniters is the |
| 14 | 6.2.4.2.3. |
| 15 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: 19.41 specifically says |
| 16 | that the containment is assumed to fail if vessel |
| 17 | failure is predicted. I'm not making that up, it |
| 18 | actually it says that. I can get the exact |
| 19 | reference. |
| 20 | So, therefore, all of these phenomena that |
| 21 | we're discussing regarding other sources of hydrogen |
| 22 | and oxygen in terms of contention two, specifically, |
| 23 | are not considered for that reason, that the at |
| 24 | least in Section 19. Is that correct? |
| 25 | MS. RONNLUND: I believe they're not |
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| 1 | considered and I would have to reference Section 19 to |
| 2 | confirm. But, I think the reason they're not |
| 3 | considered is because they're not required by 10 CFR |
| 4 | 50.44. 50.44 is what set out the accident scenario |
| 5 | prior to being considered and added the 100 percent to |
| 6 | apply to water interaction and that would lead you to |
| 7 | AP1000 DCD analysis. |
| 8 | So, I think the answer to your question is |
| 9 | the reason that additional sources are not considered |
| 10 | is they're not required by radiation. |
| 11 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. Well, but in |
| 12 | the at least in the DCD Chapter 19, that's the |
| 13 | reason provided. Not that that is not a licensing |
| 14 | consideration, I believe. But, that is the reason |
| 15 | provided. I just wanted to confirm that. |
| 16 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes, I'm happy to take a |
| 17 | moment and review that section and get back with you |
| 18 | if you'd like me to. |
| 19 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. |
| 20 | The partial failure of ADS Stage 4 has |
| 21 | other effects, not just IRWST effects in terms of such |
| 22 | things as assuming the bulk of hydrogen is propagated |
| 23 | into the free area of the containment volume. It has |
| 24 | to be better mixed and that sort of thing as opposed |
| 25 | to dead-ended sub-compartments. |
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| 1 | Was the did anybody review the analysis |
| 2 | done by Westinghouse to see if that particular |
| 3 | scenario had any other impacts on it? |
| 4 | I mean, we identified one which was the |
| 5 | it became the primary hydrogen release to the IRWST. |
| 6 | And, a MOD was implemented as a result of that. |
| 7 | Were there any other implications of that |
| 8 | particular scenario in the plant? |
| 9 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, the subject of |
| 10 | this license amendment request is the merit request by |
| 11 | Southern Nuclear to add two additional igniters in |
| 12 | order to retroact the DCD requirement and what the |
| 13 | igniters places where hydrogen is reasonably feasible. |
| 14 | So, in the scope of the license amendment |
| 15 | request, that's the only issue that Southern Nuclear |
| 16 | is presenting. |
| 17 | As to your larger question whether there |
| 18 | may be any other impacts in the scenarios that's in |
| 19 | other systems, I can I'm not prepared to answer |
| 20 | that question at this time. I'm not aware of any, but |
| 21 | I'm not prepared to answer that question fully. |
| 22 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. |
| 23 | Is it correct to say that the staff, in |
| 24 | their review, could have required additional analyses |
| 25 | for this LAR 15003 if they deemed it necessary? I'll |
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| 1 | ask that |
| 2 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor |
| 3 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: of the staff later. |
| 4 | MS. RONNLUND: That's a difficult question |
| 5 | and I think 52.63(a) states that for additions to the |
| 6 | design certification that are not being changed are |
| 7 | subject to finality. |
| 8 | So, any analysis the staff might have |
| 9 | required would have to have been directly related to |
| 10 | a change in the design certification information. |
| 11 | Based on our review, there is no change |
| 12 | that would have allowed such a review or analysis. |
| 13 | However, obviously, if staff reviewed and they had |
| 14 | found such an impact and determined something was |
| 15 | being reopened or changed to design certification, at |
| 16 | that juncture, they could ask for additional analysis. |
| 17 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But, Southern Nuclear |
| 18 | didn't see any reason to change the Table 6.2.4-6 |
| 19 | igniter location criteria out of their in fact, not |
| 20 | at all? |
| 21 | MS. RONNLUND: Absolutely not. These |
| 22 | igniters are being added to comply with the |
| 23 | certification criteria. |
| 24 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. But, the |
| 25 | criteria were very specific where they said the hooded |
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| 1 | vents, and identified four. |
| 2 | MS. RONNLUND: One that |
| 3 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: In other words, it |
| 4 | didn't you didn't change the criteria to say or |
| 5 | IRWST vents, you basically left it that the criteria |
| 6 | were four igniters at the hooded vents, not never |
| 7 | mentioning the roof vents, correct? I don't think |
| 8 | that was a change. |
| 9 | MS. RONNLUND: Actually, I believe give |
| 10 | me one second and let me double check here. |
| 11 | In Table 6.2.4-6, it states that excuse |
| 12 | me one second, Your Honor. Thank you. |
| 13 | It states that there will be a location |
| 14 | for potential hydrogen release location can be |
| 15 | designed, i.e., above the IRWST quarters, at the IRWST |
| 16 | vents, et cetera, igniter coverage is provided. |
| 17 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, you felt that those |
| 18 | were general words about vents covered |
| 19 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 20 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: covered the addition |
| 21 | of the two roof |
| 22 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 23 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Even though the criteria |
| 24 | just specifically mentioned hooded vents and for I |
| 25 | just want to make sure you went through that thinking. |
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| 1 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes, yes. |
| 2 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And, therefore, it was |
| 3 | a decision that was made that the criteria applied? |
| 4 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes, that Southern |
| 5 | Nuclear reviewed the criteria and concluded these |
| 6 | igniters were consistent and complied with the |
| 7 | criteria. |
| 8 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And, again, they were |
| 9 | not originally included because? |
| 10 | MS. RONNLUND: Your Honor, that decision |
| 11 | was made by Westinghouse in the original design |
| 12 | certification. Southern Nuclear is not aware of the |
| 13 | particular reason for that design. |
| 14 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But, Southern Nuclear |
| 15 | made that determination, right? Southern Nuclear |
| 16 | created the igniter location criteria, right? |
| 17 | MS. RONNLUND: No, Your Honor, that's in |
| 18 | the design certification that was Westinghouse |
| 19 | submitted and was approved as part of the AP1000 DCD |
| 20 | design certification. And then, Southern Nuclear |
| 21 | referenced that pre-design certification. |
| 22 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes, okay, that's fine. |
| 23 | All right, thank you. |
| 24 | Are hydrogen igniters required to meet |
| 25 | 50.44(c) and GDC-41? |
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| 1 | MS. RONNLUND: In general, it's my |
| 2 | understanding that the regulation for all designs in |
| 3 | general does not necessarily require use of igniters. |
| 4 | However, the AP1000 design, that is the |
| 5 | method for meeting 50.44 that Westinghouse chose which |
| 6 | the NRC reviewed and approved. |
| 7 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, hopefully, I'll |
| 8 | find it before the end of this, but somewhere it says |
| 9 | that containment structural integrity is assured with |
| 10 | or without hydrogen igniters. I'll have to find that |
| 11 | in a few minutes. |
| 12 | So, as far as you're aware, that is not a |
| 13 | correct if I made that statement that the |
| 14 | containment structural integrity is assured with or |
| 15 | without hydrogen igniters, you would not agree with |
| 16 | that? |
| 17 | MS. RONNLUND: I do not disagree with that |
| 18 | statement. I just know that the particular |
| 19 | methodology to demonstrate compliance with 50.44 in |
| 20 | the DCD involved hydrogen igniters. |
| 21 | There may be additional information that |
| 22 | indicates the statement you are making is correct, but |
| 23 | for purposes of that regulatory requirement in which |
| 24 | that appears, the AP1000 design did need hydrogen |
| 25 | igniters. |
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| 1 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right, thank you. |
| 2 | That analysis of containment structural |
| 3 | integrity assumes the service level 6, as a service |
| 4 | level 6? |
| 5 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes, it's beyond design |
| 6 | basis analysis for severe accidents. |
| 7 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right, that's it for |
| 8 | me. Thank you. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Just a follow up to |
| 10 | the last couple of questions there. |
| 11 | I would think, as a non-expert, that if |
| 12 | the hydrogen igniter system doesn't work as it's |
| 13 | supposed to, and suppose the Petitioners are right |
| 14 | that there are some problems with it, there's at least |
| 15 | some risk to the containment structure. But, correct |
| 16 | me if I'm wrong on that. |
| 17 | MS. RONNLUND: Well, the hydrogen igniter |
| 18 | subsystem is designed as redundancy and required by |
| 19 | general design criterion 41. |
| 20 | So, there's actually two igniters to every |
| 21 | necessary location, which are controlled by different |
| 22 | power sources. |
| 23 | So, there's a built in redundancy to avoid |
| 24 | any kind of failure of one igniter or one power port. |
| 25 | So, we know, in general, when it's an issue or a |
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| 1 | problem would not cause any offsite impact. |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: So, even if these two |
| 3 | igniters are your position as the unit, these two |
| 4 | igniters are not where they should be, but there's no |
| 5 | risk to containment? |
| 6 | MS. RONNLUND: That's correct because the |
| 7 | existing analysis using only the 64 found that the |
| 8 | AP1000 design certification analysis using the 64 |
| 9 | existing igniters was one of the reasons the NRC staff |
| 10 | found that those 64 met all regulatory requirements |
| 11 | and protected for any containment failure caused by |
| 12 | hydrogen. |
| 13 | So, even without these igniters, the |
| 14 | existing analysis still meets all requirements. So, |
| 15 | there would be no offsite consequence. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: So, that seems to lead |
| 17 | to the conclusion that the whole amendment really |
| 18 | isn't necessary to meet regulatory requirements, am I |
| 19 | following you correctly on that? |
| 20 | MS. RONNLUND: It was a conservative |
| 21 | decision to meet the criterion of design certification |
| 22 | regarding location of igniters as close to the source |
| 23 | as reasonably feasible. |
| 24 | But, the existing analysis that confirmed |
| 25 | the current hydrogen control system in the AP1000 DCD |
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| 1 | meets our requirements and aren't changed. So, that |
| 2 | analysis is subject to finality. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, I can |
| 4 | understand your argument. |
| 5 | This number 5.8 times 10^{-8} per reactor |
| 6 | year, this is on page 30 of your response, for |
| 7 | standing purposes, wouldn't it be more relevant to |
| 8 | know what the risk of a severe accident or what's |
| 9 | the term beyond design basis accident scenario, the |
| 10 | frequency over the lifetime for the excuse me, not |
| 11 | the lifetime, but the license period for the reactor, |
| 12 | for standing purposes, if an accident, it doesn't make |
| 13 | a difference where an accident occurs in beyond design |
| 14 | basis accident scenario occurs in year one or ten or |
| 15 | whatever, wouldn't it be more appropriate for us to |
| 16 | look at what the risk is of an accident throughout the |
| 17 | entire life of license lifetime of the reactor? |
| 18 | MS. RONNLUND: Petitioner is required to |
| 19 | make a showing sufficient to meet the requirement for |
| 20 | standing. And, Petitioner made no offer or discussion |
| 21 | of the probability or likelihood or even how the |
| 22 | scenario that they posit could occur. |
| 23 | So, Southern Nuclear referenced |
| 24 | information included in the LAR where the possibility |
| 25 | for reactor here is simply offered to show that the |

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99 1 probability of this occurring is very low and to point 2 out that Petitioner has not met its burden to show 3 offsite consequence by offering any analysis that such 4 an accident could occur. 5 CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Of course --MS. RONNLUND: So, while it may be more 6 7 appropriate in general for Petitioner to have offered 8 some discussion about how likely such an accident is 9 over the life of the plant, the use of this position 10 was intended to point out the flaw in Petitioner's 11 argument. They're not really 12 CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: 13 challenging that, as I understand it. What they're 14 concerned with is the potential consequence if the 15 igniters are, as they believe, not properly designed 16 and not properly located. 17 But, I'm not sure why they would be required to challenge or present a probabilistic risk 18 19 analysis of the likelihood of the accident scenario that is sort of the prerequisite for the igniters 20 actually coming into play. 21 What they're focusing on is the -- well, 22 if there is a severe accident, are the igniters going 23 24 to actually perform their intended function? Are you saying they have to dispute the 25

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| 1 | likelihood of a beyond design basis accident scenario |
| 2 | probability that you've given in order to establish |
| 3 | standing? |
| 4 | MS. RONNLUND: No, Your Honor. They are |
| 5 | obligated to offer a probable scenario, however, where |
| 6 | the incident that they relied on for the consequence, |
| 7 | be it the offsite consequence or the injury could |
| 8 | occur. |
| 9 | And, Petitioner has offered only general |
| 10 | discussions of hydrogen behavior and did not offer any |
| 11 | probable scenario in which an accident could occur. |
| 12 | Southern Nuclear's reference to the |
| 13 | probability is simply used to point out that the |
| 14 | probability is so low for this situation to even be |
| 15 | possible that Petitioners have speculation based to a |
| 16 | statement do not meet the requirement for standing. |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Well, as I understand |
| 18 | the argument for the possibility of offsite |
| 19 | consequences, it's the circular design to control |
| 20 | hydrogen, if it doesn't work effectively, you don't |
| 21 | have adequate control of hydrogen, therefore, you have |
| 22 | at least potential for offsite consequences. |
| 23 | I understand you dispute that, but why |
| 24 | isn't that enough for purposes of standing given that |
| 25 | the obvious purpose of this whole system is to prevent |
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| 1 | damage to the containment or at least part of it? |
| 2 | MS. RONNLUND: I think Southern Nuclear |
| 3 | understands where the Board is coming from. On this |
| 4 | particular issue, though, it has been clarified |
| 5 | multiple times by Mr. Zeller this morning, the entire |
| 6 | hydrogen control system is not at issue. |
| 7 | The only thing at issue in this LAR is two |
| 8 | additional igniters. And so, the finding that already |
| 9 | exists that Mr. Zeller has told us multiple times he |
| 10 | is not challenging is that the original 64 igniters |
| 11 | control hydrogen such that detonation will not occur. |
| 12 | And so, this basis for standing here of a |
| 13 | general failure of hydrogen control system is not |
| 14 | addressable on this license amendment proceeding |
| 15 | because we're only talking about those two additional |
| 16 | igniters. |
| 17 | So, there is an issue between the general |
| 18 | failure of the hydrogen system, which is not at issue, |
| 19 | versus what is at issue with only these two additional |
| 20 | igniters. |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Okay. I would agree |
| 22 | with you if he were challenging the whole igniter |
| 23 | system. But one thing he's been quite clear on is |
| 24 | he's not challenging that, he's challenging these |
| 25 | additional two. |
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| I understand your position that, by |
| themselves, they're not enough to create an obvious |
| potential for offsite consequences, but they seem to |
| dispute that. |
| Let me ask another question on that line. |
| Have you read the Board's decision on contention |
| admissibility in the Calvert Cliffs case of the |
| Commission's decision upholding that? If you haven't, |
| that's all right, I'm not |
| MS. RONNLUND: The Calvert Cliffs case |
| CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: I don't think that |
| MS. RONNLUND: Do you have a year or |
| CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: I don't have the |
| citation and I'm just asking if you happened to have |
| read it. If you haven't, I'm not asking you |
| MS. RONNLUND: Off the top of my head, I'm |
| not sure, Your Honor. |
| CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: That was kind of the |
| issue that was raised there. Let me ask this, are you |
| aware of any case that is either from the Commission |
| or Supreme Court or Federal Court of Appeals that's |
| ever said in order to establish standing you have to |
| show a probability of an accident, some kind of |
| release into the environment that passes a specific |
| numerical threshold? |
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| 1 | MS. RONNLUND: I'm not aware of such a |
| 2 | case and that's not Southern Nuclear's position, Your |
| 3 | Honor. Our position is simply that the injury or |
| 4 | offsite consequences have to meet the probable and |
| 5 | cannot be based on mere speculation. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
| 7 | I have nothing else. Anything else? |
| 8 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I still have one area, |
| 9 | just one question I need a little more on. |
| 10 | The original analysis that was done |
| 11 | without these two igniters, would have assumed a |
| 12 | significant amount of hydrogen release from that |
| 13 | release point without being burned by the igniters. |
| 14 | Therefore, it would have been dealt with |
| 15 | by other igniters. |
| 16 | But, it was also mentioned that the two |
| 17 | closest igniters, the two at the 30 foot elevation |
| 18 | about the roof vents couldn't be determined whether or |
| 19 | not they would be successful in that regard because |
| 20 | the analysis was too complex. |
| 21 | But, yet, somehow the original design |
| 22 | basis of the plant, it got dealt with in that |
| 23 | analysis. And, that I'm still missing that |
| 24 | connection. |
| 25 | And, I don't think, you know, if I don't |
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| 1 | get that answer, I'm not sure that it means much here, |
| 2 | but that is and I will ask that question to the |
| 3 | staff as well. |
| 4 | MS. RONNLUND: May I have just have one |
| 5 | moment to confer with our expert? |
| 6 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Thank you. |
| 7 | (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went |
| 8 | off the record at 12:18 p.m. and resumed at 12:19 |
| 9 | p.m.) |
| 10 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes, Your Honor, thank you |
| 11 | for that. |
| 12 | The original analysis performed for design |
| 13 | certification considered the area above the IRWST as |
| 14 | including multiple release paths. And, the analysis |
| 15 | showed that the existing igniter location, a direct |
| 16 | path in conformance with all requirements. |
| 17 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, it wasn't too |
| 18 | complex to be modeled, it, in fact, was modeled? |
| 19 | MS. RONNLUND: There was the available |
| 20 | information is not the modeling is not |
| 21 | sophisticated enough to show any more detail in a |
| 22 | particular pathway. So, it only shows the existence |
| 23 | of hydrogen but cannot be used to show particular |
| 24 | pathways. It can only show the existence of hydrogen |
| 25 | in certain areas. |
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| 1 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, if hydrogen was |
| 2 | released from the roof vents, it went into this one |
| 3 | node, one volume and, on an average well mixed basis, |
| 4 | the two igniters that were in that volume were |
| 5 | sufficient? |
| 6 | MS. RONNLUND: Yes. |
| 7 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right, thank you. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, thank you, |
| 9 | Ms. Ronnlund. |
| 10 | I think we'll move on to the staff now. |
| 11 | Is we're okay with keeping going at this point to |
| 12 | finish up with the staff. Although, we also do have |
| 13 | ten minutes of rebuttal that we'll still allow for Mr. |
| 14 | Zeller. |
| 15 | Any thoughts from the representatives? |
| 16 | Would you rather take a break now for lunch and come |
| 17 | back in about 45 minutes or keep going and try and |
| 18 | finish now in about an hour? |
| 19 | MS. CARPENTIER: Your Honor, the staff |
| 20 | might lose this conference room if we go too long. |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, so we |
| 22 | should keep going then? |
| 23 | MS. CARPENTIER: I would say so because |
| 24 | we've had people outside looking like they want the |
| 25 | room and I'm not sure how long we can hold it. |
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| 1 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: How long do we have it |
| 2 | until? |
| 3 | MS. CARPENTIER: We hold it until 11:30 |
| 4 | but I know that what was going to be in here at 12:00 |
| 5 | has relocated, so, we'd like to continue. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. Anybody |
| 7 | have a serious problem with that? |
| 8 | Hearing no objections, we'll move on and |
| 9 | hear from the staff. |
| 10 | Mr. Irvin? |
| 11 | MR. IRVIN: Good afternoon, Your Honors. |
| 12 | Again, my name's Ian Irvin and I'm |
| 13 | representing the NRC staff and will be addressing |
| 14 | standing. With me is Ms. Marcia Carpentier who is |
| 15 | representing the NRC staff as well. |
| 16 | She'll be addressing contention |
| 17 | admissibility. |
| 18 | Based on the Petition and as articulated |
| 19 | in our answer, the NRC staff does not challenge the |
| 20 | standing of BREDL in this proceeding. |
| 21 | And, I'll turn it over to Ms. Carpentier |
| 22 | concerning contention admissibility. |
| 23 | Thank you. |
| 24 | MS. CARPENTIER: I'm in place with the |
| 25 | computer now. |

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| 1 | You've had a lot of information presented |
| 2 | already, so I will try to keep my remarks short. |
| 3 | For the reasons set forth in our pleading, |
| 4 | proposed contention one is inadmissible for failure to |
| 5 | meet the contention pleading requirements in 10 CFR |
| 6 | 2.309(f)(1) with regard to scope, materiality, factual |
| 7 | support and identification of a genuine dispute with |
| 8 | the applicant. |
| 9 | Regarding scope, the Petitioner's reply |
| 10 | and statements today clarify their contention is not |
| 11 | intended to challenge things that were settled by the |
| 12 | AP1000 rulemaking. |
| 13 | That clarification eliminates a number of |
| 14 | peripheral arguments in the original contention |
| 15 | related the use of hydrogen igniters generally, the 64 |
| 16 | igniters already in the certified design and general |
| 17 | criticisms of the robustness of the AP1000 containment |
| 18 | design. |
| 19 | The staff argues that these matters were |
| 20 | outside the scope of the license amendment and, |
| 21 | apparently, the Petitioners agree. |
| 22 | However, the remaining claims in the |
| 23 | contention still fail to satisfy the other |
| 24 | requirements of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(1) regarding |
| 25 | materiality, factual support and a demonstration of a |

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| 1 | genuine dispute with the applicant. |
| 2 | Most significantly, the Petitioners do not |
| 3 | engage with applicant's stated justification for the |
| 4 | addition of and placement of the two proposed hydrogen |
| 5 | igniters in containment. |
| 6 | As the Board has noted, they don't make a |
| 7 | safety argument for why adding two igniters creates a |
| 8 | new safety concern that's distinguishable from those |
| 9 | that have already been analyzed. |
| 10 | By failing to engage with the stated |
| 11 | justification and the license amendment request, |
| 12 | including the igniter placement criteria, the |
| 13 | Petitioners fail to demonstrate the existence of a |
| 14 | genuine dispute as required by regulation. |
| 15 | Rather than challenge the license |
| 16 | amendment request directly, the Petitioners discuss a |
| 17 | number of topics that might as the Court an admissible |
| 18 | contention nor represent admissible contentions in |
| 19 | their own right. |
| 20 | For example, the Petitioners argue that |
| 21 | the applicant failed to perform four specific analyses |
| 22 | in its license amendment request. |
| 23 | However, these analyses, which are taken |
| 24 | from the Interim Staff Guidance document mentioned by |
| 25 | Mr. Zeller are not regulatory requirements in this |
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| 1 | instance. They are analyses to determine whether a |
| 2 | proposed change to a licensed facility requires a |
| 3 | license amendment and associated exemption. |
| 4 | Here, the applicant has determined that |
| 5 | both are required because the change affects Tier 1 |
| 6 | information in the DCD and Petitioners have not |
| 7 | explained how these analyses would affect the license |
| 8 | amendment request which has already been submitted. |
| 9 | It, therefore, fails to satisfy the |
| 10 | materiality requirement of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(1). |
| 11 | The Petitioner has also raised several |
| 12 | topics related to the nuclear accident at Fukushima, |
| 13 | Japan, again, without specifying a relationship or a |
| 14 | connection to the license amendment under |
| 15 | consideration here. |
| 16 | I don't want to repeat all of the claims |
| 17 | about the arguments regarding this, they're in our |
| 18 | pleading, but the Petitioners did not explain and |
| 19 | that's key to, you know, in their pleadings, they do |
| 20 | not explain how the claims to the license amendment |
| 21 | are correct under consideration here. |
| 22 | And, the claims related to Fukushima, |
| 23 | therefore, fail to demonstrate a genuine dispute with |
| 24 | the applicant's petition under consideration. |
| 25 | And, both fail to satisfy other conditions |
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| 1 | of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(1) as well, especially with regard |
| 2 | to materiality and factual support. |
| 3 | For all these reasons, proposed contention |
| 4 | one is inadmissible and should be rejected. |
| 5 | Regarding proposed contention two, this |
| 6 | also focuses on analyses the Petitioner believes must |
| 7 | be performed to support the license amendment request. |
| 8 | Like proposed contention one, proposed |
| 9 | contention two includes a range of different claims |
| 10 | that, in the end, does not include any substantive |
| 11 | challenge to the license amendment request here. |
| 12 | Further, the proposed contention is |
| 13 | inadmissible for failure to BREDL to support a genuine |
| 14 | dispute with the applicant as required by 2.309(f)(1). |
| 15 | Like contention one, contention two raises |
| 16 | a number of issues that the staff argued were outside |
| 17 | the scope of the proceeding because they will result |
| 18 | in the rulemaking on the AP1000 design. |
| 19 | These include claims related to the |
| 20 | analyses of the generation of hydrogen containment as |
| 21 | well as claims related to containment integrity under |
| 22 | severe accident conditions. |
| 23 | The analyses of these matters to the |
| 24 | AP1000 falls in the requirements of regulation in 10 |
| 25 | CFR 50.44, Combustible Gas Control for Nuclear Power |
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| 1 | Reactors. |
| 2 | The staff pleading includes the section on |
| 3 | the content of that regulation and, in particular, the |
| 4 | changes made when the rule was revised in 2003. |
| 5 | Although these claims are discussed in the |
| 6 | Petitioner's initial pleading, the Petitioners have |
| 7 | stated that it is not their intent to challenge the |
| 8 | analyses performed for the AP1000. So, apparently, |
| 9 | they agree that claims related to these analyses are |
| 10 | outside the scope of this proceeding. |
| 11 | Many of the Petitioner's claims are also |
| 12 | inadmissible because they call for analyses not |
| 13 | particularly required by the relevant regulation. |
| 14 | And, which in some cases, they're specifically removed |
| 15 | from that regulation when the NRC revised it in 2003. |
| 16 | These include analyses related to sources |
| 17 | of hydrogen other than the reaction between zirconium |
| 18 | and water, other sources of hydrogen which the |
| 19 | Petitioners don't specify, radiolytic decomposition of |
| 20 | water and core concrete interaction and sources of |
| 21 | hydrogen and oxygen. |
| 22 | 10 CFR 2.335(a) prohibits contentions that |
| 23 | challenge NRC regulation and extends that prohibition |
| 24 | to contentions seeking to impose additional |
| 25 | requirements beyond those found in regulations. |
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| 1 | For this reason, the Petitioner's |
| 2 | assertion that these analyses are required cannot be |
| 3 | the basis for an admissible contention. |
| 4 | Proposed contention two also includes |
| 5 | statements that appear to be restatements of |
| 6 | contention one and that are inadmissible for the same |
| 7 | reasons. |
| 8 | For obvious reasons, proposed contention |
| 9 | two is inadmissible under 2.309(f)(1) and 2.335 and |
| 10 | should be rejected. |
| 11 | And, to summarize, although the staff does |
| 12 | not challenge the Petitioner's standing in this |
| 13 | proceeding, they have not submitted an admissible |
| 14 | contention and their Petition must, therefore, be |
| 15 | rejected. |
| 16 | JUDGE ARNOLD: I've got a question |
| 17 | concerning standing and I, frankly, do not understand |
| 18 | why you agree that Petitioners have established |
| 19 | standing. Can you explain that to me? |
| 20 | MR. IRVIN: Sure. We believe that for the |
| 21 | Petition and associated documents, when taken when |
| 22 | construed in favor of the Petitioners, has stated a |
| 23 | scenario where there may be an obvious potential for |
| 24 | offsite consequences. |
| 25 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Let me refer you to |
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| 1 | page 18 of your answer in which you say, the hydrogen |
| 2 | control system as a whole was analyzed extensively at |
| 3 | the design certification stage for the AP1000 and the |
| 4 | analysis was incorporated by reference at the combined |
| 5 | license stage for the VEGP Units 3 and 4. |
| 6 | And then, in the same paragraph, you say |
| 7 | the Petitioner fails to explain why the proposed |
| 8 | addition of two hydrogen igniters entailed a safety |
| 9 | concern with the technical justification for the LAR |
| 10 | that is distinguishable from the technical basis for |
| 11 | the prior analysis of hydrogen igniters. |
| 12 | It seems to me that you've stated right |
| 13 | there that there is that the Petitioners have not |
| 14 | stated a difference with the safety case whether you |
| 15 | add those two igniters or not. |
| 16 | So, what is the obvious potential that |
| 17 | they've established? |
| 18 | MR. IRVIN: Again, because we only look at |
| 19 | the Petition on face value concerns standing, because |
| 20 | of the lower bar, we accepted what the Petitioner said |
| 21 | in the Petition and the standing declaration just at |
| 22 | face value. |
| 23 | Concerning contention admissibility, we |
| 24 | looked at it in another aspect, which Ms. Carpentier |
| 25 | can address in greater detail. |
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| 1 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Contention one states, |
| 2 | quote, the proposed modifications by the Southern |
| 3 | Company creates an extremely dangerous situation |
| 4 | rather than mitigating it. |
| 5 | Is there any rule stating that all |
| 6 | proposed license amendments must increase safety? |
| 7 | MS. CARPENTIER: Well, proposed license |
| 8 | amendments have to meet all regulatory requirements. |
| 9 | If you get one that does not meet regulatory |
| 10 | requirements or that causes a new hazard, that would |
| 11 | be dealt with in the staff's review. |
| 12 | And, the lessons don't go too far on that |
| 13 | because the staff has not has not yet published its |
| 14 | safety evaluation. But, the general principle is that |
| 15 | we review them to make sure that they do not create |
| 16 | new hazards. |
| 17 | JUDGE ARNOLD: But, is there a requirement |
| 18 | that a license amendment not decrement safety? |
| 19 | MS. CARPENTIER: Your Honor, we found some |
| 20 | citations relevant here, it is in Appendix B, the |
| 21 | AP1000 design certification to Part 52, Roman Numeral |
| 22 | VIII, Number 4. |
| 23 | And, that says, the Commission will deny |
| 24 | a request for an exemption from Tier 1, which is what |
| 25 | we're dealing with here, if it finds that the design |

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| change will result in a significant decrease in the |
| level of safety otherwise provided by the design. |
| That's for exemption from Tier 1 |
| information for the AP1000. |
| JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. So, if it's |
| significant degradation to safety, it will be |
| rejected. But, that's suggests that there's no clear |
| requirement that a license amendment not decrement |
| safety in any way. |
| You could hypothesize a situation in which |
| there would be a slight decrement in safety and still |
| approve a license amendment? |
| MS. CARPENTIER: We'd have to look at the |
| totality of the amendment request, but, yes, if it's |
| not significant, then, you know, we would have to |
| evaluate that accordingly. |
| JUDGE ARNOLD: On page eight of the |
| Petition regarding contention one, Petitioners state |
| the proposed solution involves a new threat to the |
| already vulnerable AP1000 containment by placing |
| Vogtle Units 3 and 4 hydrogen igniters near the |
| location of excess concentrations of hydrogen. |
| Isn't placing the igniters near regions of |
| excess hydrogen desirable to produce the combustion at |
| the soonest possible time? |
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| 1 | MS. CARPENTIER: Yes, that is the intent, |
| 2 | to burn off the hydrogen close to the source to |
| 3 | prevent excess concentrations from developing. |
| 4 | JUDGE ARNOLD: The statement of contention |
| 5 | two on page ten is, the engineering and support of the |
| 6 | proposed modification fails to evaluate historical |
| 7 | precedence of hydrogen explosions. |
| 8 | Can you tell me, first, is there a |
| 9 | requirement for a license amendment to consider |
| 10 | historical precedence? |
| 11 | MS. CARPENTIER: No, there isn't. But, I |
| 12 | would also direct you to the Federal Register Notice |
| 13 | citation in the Statement of Consideration therein for |
| 14 | the 2003 rule change to 10 CFR 50.44 which does go |
| 15 | into the history there and how the provided rule looks |
| 16 | the way it does and the various analyses the NRC has |
| 17 | done over the years in support of that rule. |
| 18 | (Telephonic interference.) |
| 19 | MS. CARPENTIER: in the license |
| 20 | amendment request. |
| 21 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. That was my next |
| 22 | question. |
| 23 | Since the Petitioners specifically point |
| 24 | to Fukushima, have the hydrogen combustion events at |
| 25 | Fukushima been considered by staff regarding whether |
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| 1 | they would support changes to any hydrogen control |
| 2 | rules? |
| 3 | MS. CARPENTIER: I call your attention to |
| 4 | the footnote 114, I believe it is, in our pleading |
| 5 | which goes through some of that and it references a |
| 6 | recent SECY paper which I have here if I can find it, |
| 7 | SECY-16-0041 from earlier this year has a section |
| 8 | about what's been done up until now on evaluation of |
| 9 | hydrogen control and mitigation. |
| 10 | It reaches the conclusion that nothing |
| 11 | more remains to be done and it also cites to a letter |
| 12 | from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from |
| 13 | March of this year where they agree that no further |
| 14 | regulatory action is warranted for closure of the Near |
| 15 | Term Task Force report on hydrogen control. |
| 16 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay, thank you. |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: On the let me start |
| 18 | with page, I think it's page excuse me footnote |
| 19 | 113. I just wanted to make sure I understand. |
| 20 | There's a statement in there that you |
| 21 | quote referring to boiling water reactor facilities |
| 22 | with Mark I and Mark II, by the way, for the Court |
| 23 | Reporter, that's the word Mark, M-A-R-K, Mark I and |
| 24 | Mark II containment structures are required to operate |
| 25 | their containments with inerted atmospheres. |
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118 1 PWR, that is pressurized water reactor facilities, with large dry containments do not control 2 3 hydrogen build up inside the containment structure 4 because the containment volume is sufficient to keep 5 the pressure spike of potential hydrogen deflagrations within the design pressure of the structure. 6 7 Now, that confuses me because, Ι 8 understand that Vogtle Units 3 and 4 are pressurized 9 water reactors and you are attempting to control 10 hydrogen build up, at least unless I'm totally missing something here. 11 Can you explain what, at least to my non-12 expert mind, appears to be a certain inconsistency 13 14 there? MS. CARPENTIER: If I could have a moment 15 to consult with technical staff on that? 16 17 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 12:37 p.m. and resumed at 12:37 18 19 p.m.) 20 CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: We seem to have --Marcia, we can't hear you right now. You might need 21 to unmute yourself. 22 23 MS. CARPENTIER: I've muted the phone on 24 purpose because I'm posing your question to mν technical staff here. 25 Sorry.

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| 1 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Oh, I'm sorry. I |
| 2 | thought you were talking to us. Go ahead. |
| 3 | (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went |
| 4 | off the record at 12:37 p.m. and resumed at 12:38 |
| 5 | p.m.) |
| 6 | MS. CARPENTIER: Okay, to answer your |
| 7 | question, the statements here from SECY-11-0093 and, |
| 8 | I apologize if you hear grinding noises, there's |
| 9 | construction on the floor below us. I'm not sure if |
| 10 | you're picking up that sound. But, there's nothing we |
| 11 | can do to control that. |
| 12 | Back to the question, the statements that |
| 13 | you quoted in footnote 113 is a general ovation that |
| 14 | may or may not apply in any given case. |
| 15 | In this case, the AP1000 has elected to |
| 16 | credit hydrogen igniters and the staff evaluated that |
| 17 | decision by Westinghouse. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: One of my colleagues |
| 19 | suggested that the reason might be that the AP1000 |
| 20 | containment is actually smaller than containments used |
| 21 | in other pressurized water reactors. Is that accurate? |
| 22 | MS. CARPENTIER: I'm not certain of |
| 23 | Westinghouse's rationale. I'm not sure we have the |
| 24 | people here to answer that question. |
| 25 | They looked at local concentrations in |
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| 1 | that particular design and, apparently, decided that |
| 2 | that was the correct way to go. And, we evaluated |
| 3 | accordingly, but we are not privy to their decision |
| 4 | there. |
| 5 | Yes, and they credited that to meet 50.44 |
| 6 | and, again, we evaluated that. |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: On the question of |
| 8 | location of the igniters, they're supposed to be, I'm |
| 9 | looking at page 12 of the LAR, the locations where the |
| 10 | potential hydrogen release can be defined, i.e., above |
| 11 | the IRWST spargers, at IRWST vents, et cetera, igniter |
| 12 | coverage is provided as close to the source as |
| 13 | feasible. |
| 14 | And, I understand the position of Southern |
| 15 | Nuclear is they complied with that and the staff, |
| 16 | apparently, agreed. |
| 17 | I'm just curious, how do you define or how |
| 18 | do you decide whether they're as close to the source |
| 19 | as feasible? Is that just an engineering judgment or |
| 20 | is there some other way you go about making that |
| 21 | determination? |
| 22 | MS. CARPENTIER: Again, I'm going to put |
| 23 | you on mute and ask this question of technical staff. |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
| 25 | (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went |
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| 1 | off the record at 12:41 p.m. and resumed at 12:41 |
| 2 | p.m.) |
| 3 | MS. CARPENTIER: Okay, that would be no |
| 4 | roof vents are near the spargers and the spargers are |
| 5 | bringing the hydrogen and that's the basis for this |
| 6 | determination. |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Okay. Finally, let me |
| 8 | ask the question I also asked Southern Nuclear. Is |
| 9 | there a point at which changes in the number or |
| 10 | location of igniters would require some additional |
| 11 | quantitative analysis? |
| 12 | I understand it's the position that it's |
| 13 | not required in this case, but I'm curious what |
| 14 | will we ever get to the point at which you have to go |
| 15 | back and revisit the quantitative analysis that was |
| 16 | done initially for the hydrogen igniters to support |
| 17 | MS. CARPENTIER: I'm sure we could come up |
| 18 | with a hypothetical that is a sufficiently large |
| 19 | change to the hydrogen control system generally that |
| 20 | we would have to go back and revisit it. |
| 21 | But, this one is a small incremental |
| 22 | change within the criteria that have already been |
| 23 | established. And so, we don't think that we're close |
| 24 | to that with this here. |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: So, that sounds like |
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| 1 | that's also a judgment call that the licensee and the |
| 2 | staff make, is that correct? |
| 3 | MS. CARPENTIER: Well, the locations |
| 4 | themselves are in Tier 1 of the design certification |
| 5 | and that means they can't be changed without coming to |
| 6 | the staff. And, they'd have to come in for amendments |
| 7 | and exemptions and we'd have to look at the specifics |
| 8 | in any given case. |
| 9 | You know, just for the fact that it's Tier |
| 10 | 1 means we have to look at it. They can't make the |
| 11 | change without our consent. But, you know, if you |
| 12 | have to generalize about situations that are not |
| 13 | before us right now, they'd have to reach a technical |
| 14 | justification of some sort and we would evaluate on |
| 15 | based on what they submitted. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Are there any |
| 17 | regulations that address that issue when an additional |
| 18 | analysis might be required? |
| 19 | MS. CARPENTIER: About hydrogen igniters |
| 20 | particularly? |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Yes. |
| 22 | MS. CARPENTIER: Within the design |
| 23 | certification, no, they're codified in the rule itself |
| 24 | in Appendix D to Part 52. But, in terms of general |
| 25 | safety rules, I do not believe so. |
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| 1 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Can you hear me? |
| 2 | MS. CARPENTIER: Yes. |
| 3 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The scenario that |
| 4 | started all this was failure partial failure of ADS |
| 5 | 4, ADS Stage 4 which apparently has which |
| 6 | apparently is the new threat, according to the |
| 7 | Petitioner that they were referring to. |
| 8 | And, which form the new, I'll use the word |
| 9 | design basis, but it I mean it only in the sense |
| 10 | that it's the largest incursion of hydrogen into the |
| 11 | IRWST that have been considered earlier. |
| 12 | And, there were some issues regarding |
| 13 | adequacy of hydrogen igniters in the IRWST that came |
| 14 | out of this resulting in this LAR. |
| 15 | Does the staff did the staff review the |
| 16 | hydrogen mixing and combustion analyses of |
| 17 | Westinghouse to be sure that there were no other |
| 18 | that this was correct and that there were no other |
| 19 | implications with that of that scenario such that |
| 20 | no new revised analysis was required of the applicant? |
| 21 | MS. CARPENTIER: The staff did the |
| 22 | analysis at the initial design certification and at |
| 23 | the amendment, as noted. They have not done well, |
| 24 | let's put it a different way. |
| 25 | The SER for this license amendment request |
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| 1 | has not been published yet. So, I'm not sure what |
| 2 | else I can say about that. |
| 3 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: All right. So, there is |
| 4 | a there might even be a possibility that an |
| 5 | analysis modification would be required? You're not |
| 6 | going to answer that, either? |
| 7 | MS. CARPENTIER: I'm reluctant to go that |
| 8 | far at this point. |
| 9 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes, I understand. |
| 10 | MS. CARPENTIER: It's important to note |
| 11 | that, you know, we're looking for contention |
| 12 | admissibility purposes, at the pleadings, and whether |
| 13 | they've built that bridge between these two igniters |
| 14 | and the scenarios that they propose. |
| 15 | We maintain that they have not done that |
| 16 | and that they do not meet the contention pleading |
| 17 | requirements. |
| 18 | The staff is still doing its review, |
| 19 | however, and that doesn't change. Nothing about this |
| 20 | request for a hearing changes that in any way. |
| 21 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes, that's fine. |
| 22 | And, which then covers a number of my |
| 23 | questions. And, I'll ask, I actually have only one |
| 24 | question now. |
| 25 | This change to the plant, it's still not |
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| 1 | affecting the DCD igniter placement criteria, right? |
| 2 | MS. CARPENTIER: No, it is not. |
| 3 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: In the eyes of the staff? |
| 4 | MS. CARPENTIER: In the eyes of the staff, |
| 5 | yes. |
| 6 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Will that safety |
| 7 | evaluation that you're writing deal with the question |
| 8 | of whether or not this modification is generically |
| 9 | important? |
| 10 | MS. CARPENTIER: Let me check with the |
| 11 | people who are writing it. |
| 12 | According to the authors, it is not |
| 13 | currently in there. |
| 14 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. |
| 15 | In the staff's review, now, again, you're |
| 16 | going to tell me you're in the middle of this, but, I |
| 17 | was wondering how you determined the two igniters were |
| 18 | sufficient? That's the determination you're obviously |
| 19 | going to have to make, right? |
| 20 | MS. CARPENTIER: Yes, that will be. |
| 21 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I don't have any more |
| 22 | questions. |
| 23 | Thank you. |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, Mr. Zeller, |
| 25 | you reserved ten minutes. Obviously, we went well |
| 1 | |

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| 1 | beyond it for the half hour with you, but we'll allow |
| 2 | you the ten minutes for rebuttal if you have anything |
| 3 | further to add. |
| 4 | We will, however, hold you to that, so we |
| 5 | want to get out of here by 1:00. Hopefully, the staff |
| 6 | has not yet been evicted from their room. It looks |
| 7 | like Ms. Carpentier is still there, so I think we can |
| 8 | assume that. |
| 9 | Go ahead. |
| 10 | MR. ZELLER: Very good, thank you, |
| 11 | Chairman Spritzer. |
| 12 | I always learn something at proceedings |
| 13 | such as this one. But, today I heard new ones which |
| 14 | I've written down. |
| 15 | Is that there is no clear requirement that |
| 16 | a change not decrement safety, that is, cause a |
| 17 | numerical decrease in the safety. |
| 18 | I've felt that and others that I work with |
| 19 | have felt that for some time, it is quite refreshing |
| 20 | to hear it come from a member of the Atomic Safety |
| 21 | Licensing Board and we will remember that. |
| 22 | And, let me just conclude with a couple of |
| 23 | items after hearing the discussion that the Blue Ridge |
| 24 | Environmental Defense League disputes in its entirety |
| 25 | Section 4.3, pages 16 and 17 of Southern Company's |
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| 1 | request for a license amendment and exemption, that is |
| 2 | LAR-15-003. |
| 3 | But, we believe that, in conclusion, the |
| 4 | issues call for a hearing, that a genuine scientific |
| 5 | disagreement on an essential decisional issue is the |
| 6 | kind of thing which is ordinarily raised for |
| 7 | adversarial exploration and eventual resolution in the |
| 8 | adjudicatory context. |
| 9 | And, the precedent for this comes from |
| 10 | Metropolitan Edison Company and the Three Mile Island |
| 11 | Nuclear Station and the decision brought in 1983 at 17 |
| 12 | NRC 102. |
| 13 | There seems to be at least a question |
| 14 | raised that there are even hydrogen igniters necessary |
| 15 | which does seem to be a backing up from what Southern |
| 16 | Company had posited in their license amendment |
| 17 | request, is that the design review identified a |
| 18 | scenario which the plant damage meets core damage |
| 19 | frequency cutoff to be considered as part of the |
| 20 | severe accident analysis. |
| 21 | The process for modifying their licensing |
| 22 | basis is set forth in 10 CFR 52.98(f), the licensee |
| 23 | requesting amendment must perform the applicability |
| 24 | determination, safety, security interface evaluation |
| 25 | and construction impacts evaluation and the |
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aforementioned 50.59 like screening evaluation.

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2 50.59 does apply and a licensee may make 3 changes to the facility only if the change to the 4 specific specification incorporation in the license is 5 not required, this is 50.59 I'm reading from, and the change test or experiment does not meet any of the 6 7 criteria in paragraph (c)(2) of this section. And, 8 there's a long list in which the licensee is required 9 to get the license amendment, if the change would in more than a minimal 10 result increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident, more than a 11 minimal increase in the consequences of an accident or 12 creates a possibility from an accident of a different 13 14 type and, further, requirements.

Under 50.54, that is Combustible Gas 15 16 Control, as to whether it applies, in the footnote 17 50.44, number two, it says the requirement of this paragraph apply only to water-cooled reactor designs 18 19 with characteristics such that the potential for production of combustible gases is comparable to 20 light-water reactors designs licensed as of October 21 2003. 22

23 So, basically, that is all water-cooled 24 reactor designs which certainly does include Vogtle 25 Units 3 and 4.

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| 1 | So, that requires combustible gas control |
| 2 | and et cetera, et cetera, equipment survivability, |
| 3 | which we had mentioned in this discussion today and |
| 4 | structural analysis. |
| 5 | The addition of two oh, pardon me. |
| 6 | As I said, we do dispute Section 4.3 of |
| 7 | the significant hazards consideration of Southern |
| 8 | Company's request in which we acknowledge they say |
| 9 | their responses in terms of if there are any impacts, |
| 10 | they say no, no, no. And, I think we have shown that |
| 11 | there that those conclusions are certainly called |
| 12 | into question by the information that we have |
| 13 | presented and would present at an evidentiary hearing. |
| 14 | The addition of two additional igniters is |
| 15 | the question. But, the consequences of the two |
| 16 | additional igniters is done improperly in the creation |
| 17 | of one additional hydrogen explosion is what we are |
| 18 | talking about. |
| 19 | The modeling of the enclosures above the |
| 20 | integrated storage water integrated storage water |
| 21 | tank is either too complex to model or it wasn't too |
| 22 | complex but they elected not to. |
| 23 | And, they elected not to, apparently, |
| 24 | because, on average, there's a well-mixed basis for |
| 25 | the hydrogen within the containment structure. |

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| 1 | These are a series of assumptions which |
| 2 | are not supported by the license amendment request. |
| 3 | So, I guess I will just close in saying |
| 4 | that, in terms of in the questions of standing, I |
| 5 | believe we have amply demonstrated that the impact to |
| 6 | our members constituted the basis for standing because |
| 7 | of the levels of flammable gas created in an accident |
| 8 | reaching concentrations sufficient to cause a breach |
| 9 | in the containment goes to impact on the surrounding |
| 10 | community. |
| 11 | There is a clear potential for offsite |
| 12 | consequences with the breach of containment which is |
| 13 | certainly what is being discussed here if the hydrogen |
| 14 | system ignition system either does not work or |
| 15 | works improperly or, in fact, is a part of the |
| 16 | problem. |
| 17 | So, I do look forward I do appreciate |
| 18 | the opportunity to address these questions and we look |
| 19 | forward to resolution of these issues in the interest |
| 20 | of public safety. |
| 21 | Thank you. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: Thank you. |
| 23 | All right, all right, we wrote, Mr. |
| 24 | Zeller, you had earlier offered to provide some |
| 25 | additional information on Mr. Gundersen's |
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| 1 | qualifications. We'll allow you to do that. How much |
| 2 | time do you think you need for that? Hopefully, not |
| 3 | much. |
| 4 | MR. ZELLER: We could get that done, I'm |
| 5 | sure, within, what's today, it's Tuesday, by the end |
| 6 | of the week. Would that work? |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: We'll give you five |
| 8 | business days and that will take you to next week. |
| 9 | MR. ZELLER: Don't see Mr. Gundersen on my |
| 10 | screen. He could shake his head yes. Yes, okay, that |
| 11 | will be fine, five business days. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, so that |
| 13 | would take us to next Wednesday, the 10th of August. |
| 14 | So, if you can get us that by close of business next |
| 15 | Wednesday, we will consider that additional |
| 16 | information. |
| 17 | MR. ZELLER: Yes, sir. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: To the extent it may |
| 19 | be relevant. |
| 20 | Do the staff or Southern Nuclear have any |
| 21 | objection to that? |
| 22 | MS. CARPENTIER: No, Your Honor. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: I see a shake of the |
| 24 | head from Southern Nuclear counsel. |
| 25 | MS. RONNLUND: No, Your Honor. |
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| 1 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right. |
| 2 | Unless anybody has anything else oh. |
| 3 | Judge Trikouros. |
| 4 | JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I just wanted to clear |
| 5 | up one thing. I had mentioned earlier the standing |
| 6 | integrity evaluation you've done with and without |
| 7 | hydrogen igniters or at least there was a statement to |
| 8 | that, it applied only in PRA space, not in licensing |
| 9 | space, so we can ignore it. |
| 10 | MS. RONNLUND: Thank you. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN SPRITZER: All right, does anyone |
| 12 | else have anything further they'd like to raise at |
| 13 | this time? |
| 14 | Hearing no takers, we will adjourn. As |
| 15 | far as our ruling, we certainly intend to comply with |
| 16 | the 45-day requirement and hopefully, we'll actually |
| 17 | be somewhat earlier than that. But, in any event, we |
| 18 | will get it out, certainly do our very best to get it |
| 19 | out on schedule. And, if somehow our that doesn't |
| 20 | work out, you will see an appropriate Order from the |
| 21 | Board. |
| 22 | Thank you for your participation and we |
| 23 | are now adjourned. |
| 24 | (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went |
| 25 | off the record at 12:59 p.m.) |
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